LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

6  2,  3 

Class 


FORTY-SIX  YEARS 
IN  THE  ARMY 


OFTHE 

UNIVERSITY 


FROM   A   PHOTOGRAPH    BY    FALK 


FORTY-SIX  YEARS 
IN  THE  ARMY 


BY 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 
JOHN    M.    SCHOFIELD 


NEW  YORK 
THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1897 


Copyright,  1897 
By  THE  CENTURY  Co. 


THE  DEVINNE  PRESS. 


THIS  VOLUME  IS  DEDICATED  TO  THE 
YOUNG  CITIZENS  WHOSE  PATRIOT 
ISM,  VALOR  AND  MILITARY  SKILL 
MUST  BE  THE  SAFEGUARD  OF  THE 
INTERESTS,  THE  HONOR  AND  THE 
GLORY  OF  THE  AMERICAN  UNION 


207057 


PREFACE 


MOST  of  the  chapters  constituting  the  contents 
of  this  volume,  were  written,  from  time  to  time, 
as  soon  as  practicable  after  the  events  referred  to,  or 
after  the  publication  of  historical  writings  which  seemed 
to  me  to  require  comment  from  the  point  of  view  of 
my  personal  knowledge.  They  were  written  entirely 
without  reserve,  and  with  the  sole  purpose  of  telling 
exactly  what  I  thought  and  believed,  not  with  any  pur 
pose  of  publication  in  my  lifetime,  but  as  my  contribu 
tion  to  the  materials  which  may  be  useful  to  the  impartial 
historian  of  some  future  generation.  These  writings 
had  been  put  away  for  safe-keeping,  with  "  instructions 
for  the  guidance  of  my  executors,"  in  which  I  said: 

"All  the  papers  must  be  carefully  revised,  errors  cor 
rected  if  any  are  found,  unimportant  matter  eliminated, 
and  everything  omitted  which  may  seem,  to  a  cool  and 
impartial  judge,  to  be  unjust  or  unnecessarily  harsh  or 
severe  toward  the  memory  of  any  individual.  I  have 
aimed  to  be  just,  and  not  unkind.  If  I  have  failed  in  any 
case,  it  is  my  wish  that  my  mistakes  may  be  corrected, 
as  far  as  possible.  I  have  not  attempted  to  write  history, 
but  simply  to  make  a  record  of  events  personally  known 
to  me,  and  of  my  opinions  upon  such  acts  of  others,  and 
upon  such  important  subjects,  as  have  come  under  my 
special  notice.  It  is  my  contribution  to  the  materials 
from  which  the  future  historian  must  draw  for  his  data 
for  a  truthful  history  of  our  time." 

Now,  in  the  winter  of  1896-97, 1  have  endeavored  to 

vii 


PREFACE 

discharge,  as  far  as  I  am  able,  the  duty  which  I  had  im 
posed  on  my  executors,  and  have  decided  to  publish  what 
I  had  written  in  past  years,  with  corrections  and  com 
ments,  while  many  of  the  actors  in  the  great  drama  of 
the  Civil  War  are  still  living  and  can  assist  in  correcting 
any  errors  into  which  I  may  have  fallen. 

After  my  chapters  relating  to  the  campaign  of  1864  in 
Tennessee  were  in  type,  the  monograph  by  General  J.  D. 
Cox,  entitled  "  Franklin,"  was  issued  from  the  press  of 
Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  His  work  and  mine  are  the  re 
sults  of  independent  analysis  of  the  records,  made  with 
out  consultation  with  each  other. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  I.  PARENTAGE  AND  EARLY  LIFE  —  APPOINTMENT 
TO  WEST  POINT  —  VIRGINIAN  ROOM-MATES  —  ACQUAIN 
TANCE  WITH  GENERAL  WINFIELD  SCOTT  —  CHARACTER 
OF  THE  WEST  POINT  TRAINING  —  IMPORTANCE  OF  LEARN 
ING  HOW  TO  OBEY  —  A  TRIP  TO  NEW  YORK  ON  A  WA 
GER  —  THE  WEST  POINT  BIBLE-CLASS  —  DISMISSED  FROM 
THE  ACADEMY  WITHOUT  TRIAL  —  INTERCESSION  OF  STE 
PHEN  A.  DOUGLAS  —  RESTORATION  TO  CADET  DUTY  — 
JAMES  B.  MCPHERSON  —  JOHN  B.  HOOD  —  ROBERT  E. 
LEE 1 

CHAPTER  II.  ON  GRADUATING  LEAVE  —  BREVET  SECOND 
LIEUTENANT  IN  THE  2o  ARTILLERY  AT  FORT  MOULTRIE 
— AN  OFFICER'S  CREDIT  BEFORE  THE  WAR  —  SECOND 
LIEUTENANT  IN  THE  IST  ARTILLERY  —  JOURNEY  TO  FORT 
CAPRON,  FLORIDA  — A  RESERVATION  AS  TO  WHISKY  — 
A  TRIP  TO  CHARLESTON  AND  A  TROUBLESOME  MONEY 
BAG — AN  "AFFAIR  OF  HONOR" — A  FEW  LAW-BOOKS  — 
AN  EXTEMPORIZED  "MAP  AND  ITINERARY"  —  YELLOW 
FEVER  —  AT  A.  P.  HILL'S  HOME  IN  VIRGINIA  —  AS 
SIGNED  TO  DUTY  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
AT  WEST  POINT  —  INTEREST  IN  ASTRONOMY  —  MAR 
RIAGE —  A  HINT  FROM  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  —  LEAVE  OF 
ABSENCE  —  PROFESSOR  OF  PHYSICS  IN  WASHINGTON 
UNIVERSITY 16 

CHAPTER  III.  RETURN  TO  DUTY  —  GENERAL  HARNEY'S  AT 
TITUDE  —  NATHANIEL  LYON  IN  COMMAND  —  DEFENSE  OF 
THE  ST.  Louis  ARSENAL  —  SERVICE  AS  MUSTERING  OF 
FICER —  MAJOR  OF  THE  FIRST  MISSOURI  —  SURRENDER 
OF  CAMP  JACKSON  —  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  ON  LYON'S 
STAFF  —  A  MISSING  LETTER  FROM  FREMONT  TO  LYON  — 
LYON'S  REPLY  —  BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK  —  DEATH 
OF  LYON  —  A  QUESTION  OF  COMMAND  DURING  THE  RE- 

Jx 


x  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

TREAT  —  ORIGIN  OF  THE  OPPOSITION  OF  THE  BLAIRS  TO 
FREMONT  —  AFFAIR  AT  FREDERICKTOWN.         ,       .        .32 

CHAPTER  IV.  HALLECK  BELIEVES  FREMONT  OF  THE  COM 
MAND  IN  MISSOURI —  A  SPECIAL  STATE  MILITIA  —  BRIG 
ADIER-GENERAL  OF  THE  MISSOURI  MILITIA  —  A  HOS 
TILE  COMMITTEE  SENT  TO  WASHINGTON —  THE  MISSOURI 
QUARREL  OF  1862  —  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  "  ARMY  OF 
THE  FRONTIER" — ABSENT  THROUGH  ILLNESS  —  BAT 
TLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE  —  COMPELLED  TO  BE  INACTIVE 

—  TRANSFERRED    TO    TENNESSEE  — IN    COMMAND    OF 
THOMAS'S  OLD  DIVISION  OF  THE  FOURTEENTH  CORPS  — 
REAPPOINTED  MAJOR-GENERAL  —  A  HIBERNIAN  "STRI 
KER."  .  54 

CHAPTER  Y.  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE 
MISSOURI  —  TROOPS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  GRANT  —  SATIS 
FACTION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  —  CONDITIONS  ON  WHICH 
GOVERNOR  GAMBLE  WOULD  CONTINUE  IN  OFFICE  — ANTI- 
SLAVERY  VIEWS  —  LINCOLN  ON  EMANCIPATION  IN  MIS 
SOURI —  TROUBLE  FOLLOWING  THE  LAWRENCE  MASSA 
CRE —  A  VISIT  TO  KANSAS,  AND  THE  PARTY  QUARREL 
THERE  —  MUTINY  IN  THE  STATE  MILITIA  —  REPRESSIVE 
MEASURES  —  A  REVOLUTIONARY  PLOT.  .  .  .  .  68 

CHAPTER  VI.  A  MEMORANDUM  FOR  MR.  LINCOLN  —  THE 
PRESIDENT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  —  His  REPLY  TO  THE  RADI 
CAL  DELEGATION  —  THE  MATTER  OF  COLORED  ENLIST 
MENTS —  MODIFICATION  OF  THE  ORDER  RESPECTING 
ELECTIONS  REFUSED  —  A  LETTER  TO  THE  PRESIDENT  ON 
THE  CONDITION  OF  MISSOURI  —  FORMER  CONFEDERATES 
IN  UNION  MILITIA  REGIMENTS  —  SUMMONED  TO  WASH 
INGTON  BY  MR.  LINCOLN  —  OFFERED  THE  COMMAND  OF 
THE  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO  —  ANECDOTE  OF  GENERAL 
GRANT. 89 

CHAPTER  VII.    CONDITION  OF  THE  TROOPS  AT  KNOXVILLE 

—  EFFECT  OF  THE  PROMOTION  OF  GRANT  AND  SHER 
MAN —  LETTER   TO    SENATOR    HENDERSON  —  A    VISIT 
FROM  GENERAL  SHERMAN  —  UNITED  WITH  HIS  OTHER 
ARMIES  FOR  THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN  —  COMMENTS  ON 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

SHERMAN'S  "MEMOIRS"  —  FAULTY  ORGANIZATION  OF 
SHERMAN'S  ARMY  —  MCPHERSON'S  TASK  AT  RESACA — 
MCPHERSON'S  CHARACTER— EXAMPLE  OF  THE  WORKING 
OF  A  FAULTY  SYSTEM.  , 113 

CHAPTER  VIII.    SHERMAN'S  DISPLEASURE  WITH  HOOKER 

GROWING  OUT  OF  THE  AFFAIR  AT  KOLB'S  FARM  —  HOOK- 

ER'S  DESPATCH  EVIDENTLY  MISINTERPRETED  —  A  CON 
VERSATION  WITH  JAMES  B.  MCPHERSON  OVER  THE  QUES 
TION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK  —  ENCOURAGING  JOHN  B. 

HOOD  TO  BECOME  A   SOLDIER  —  VlSIT  TO    THE    CAMP  OF 

FRANK  P.  BLAIR,  JR.—  ANECDOTE  OF  SHERMAN  AND 
HOOKER  UNDER  FIRE  —  THE  ASSAULT  ON  KENESAW  — 
TENDENCY  OF  VETERAN  TROOPS  —  THE  DEATH  OF  MC 
PHERSON  BEFORE  ATLANTA  ^-SHERMAN'S  ERROR  IN  A 
QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK 132 

CHAPTER  IX.  THE  FINAL  BLOW  AT  ATLANTA  —  JOHN 
STON'S  UNTRIED  PLAN  OF  RESISTANCE  —  HOOD'S  FAULTY 
MOVE  —  HOLDING  THE  PIVOT  OF  THE  POSITION  —  ANEC 
DOTES  OF  THE  MEN  IN  THE  RANKS  —  DEFERRING  TO  GEN 
ERAL  STANLEY  IN  A  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK  —  THE 
FAILURE  AT  JONESBORO' — THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA — 
ABSENT  FROM  THE  ARMY  —  HOOD'S  OPERATIONS  IN 
SHERMAN'S  REAR  —  SENT  BACK  TO  THOMAS'S  AID — 
FAULTY  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  OPPOSE  HOOD  AT  PULASKI  — 
AT  COLUMBIA  —  REASON  OF  THE  DELAY  IN  EXCHANGING 
MESSAGES  .  .  . 152 

CHAPTER  X.  HOOD  FORCES  THE  CROSSING  OF  DUCK 
RIVER  —  IMPORTANCE  OF  GAINING  TIME  FOR  THOMAS  TO 
CONCENTRATE  REINFORCEMENTS  AT  NASHVILLE  —  THE 
AFFAIR  AT  SPRING  HILL  —  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  NIGHT 
RETREAT  —  THOMAS'S  REPLY  TO  THE  REQUEST  THAT  A 
BRIDGE  BE  LAID  OVER  THE  HARPETH  —  THE  NECESSITY 
OF  STANDING  GROUND  AT  FRANKLIN  —  HOOD'S  FORMIDA 
BLE  ATTACK  —  SERIOUS  ERROR  OF  Two  BRIGADES  OF 
THE  REAR-GUARD  —  BRILLIANT  SERVICES  OF  THE  RE 
SERVE  —  YELLOW  FEVER  AVERTED  —  HOOD'S  ASSAULTS 
REPULSED — JOHNSTON'S  CRITICISM  OF  HOOD — THE  AD 
VANTAGE  OF  CONTINUING  THE  RETREAT  TO  NASHVILLE  .  170 


xii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  XI.  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL 
THOMAS  PREVIOUS  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  — 
THE  UNTENABLE  POSITION  AT  PULASKI  —  AVAILABLE 
TROOPS  WHICH  WERE  NOT  SENT  TO  THE  FRONT  —  COR 
RESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS  —  INSTRUCTIONS 
USUALLY  RECEIVED  TOO  LATE  —  ADVANTAGE  OF  DELAY 
ING  THE  RETREAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER  —  No  SERIOUS 
DANGER  AT  SPRING  HILL— GENERAL  THOMAS  HOPING 
THAT  HOOD  MIGHT  BE  DELAYED  FOR  THREE  DAYS  AT 
FRANKLIN 189 

CHAPTER  XII.  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  —  THE 
ARRIVAL  AT  NASHVILLE  —  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  GREET 
ING —  A  REFRESHING  SLEEP  —  SERVICES  OF  THE  CAV 
ALRY  CORPS  AND  THE  FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS  —  HOOD'S 

MISTAKE  AFTER  CROSSING  DUCK  RIVER  —  AN  INCIDENT 
OF  THE  ATLANTA  CAMPAIGN  BEARING  ON  HOOD'S  CHAR 
ACTER —  AN  EMBARRASSING  METHOD  OF  TRANSMITTING 
MESSAGES  IN  CIPHER  —  THE  AGGRESSIVE  POLICY  OF  THE 
SOUTH 226 

CHAPTER  XIII.  GRANT  ORDERS  THOMAS  TO  ATTACK  HOOD 
OR  RELINQUISH  THE  COMMAND  —  THOMAS'S  CORPS  COM 
MANDERS  SUPPORT  HIM  IN  DELAY  —  GRANT'S  INTENTIONS 
IN  SENDING  LOGAN  TO  RELIEVE  THOMAS  —  CHANGE  OF 
PLAN  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE  —THE  FIGHT 
ING  OF  DECEMBER  15  —  EXPECTATION  THAT  HOOD  WOULD 
RETREAT  —  DELAY  IN  RENEWING  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE 
16TH  —  HOPELESSNESS  OF  HOOD'S  POSITION  —  LETTERS 
TO  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  —  TRANSFERRED  TO  THE  EAST 
—  FINANCIAL  BURDEN  OF  THE  WAR  —  THOMAS'S  ATTI 
TUDE  TOWARD  THE  WAR 236 

CHAPTER  XIV.  HOOD'S  MOTIVE  IN  ATTEMPTING  THE  IM 
POSSIBLE  AT  NASHVILLE  —  DIVERSITY  OF  OPINIONS  CON 
CERNING  THAT  BATTLE  —  No  ORDERS  ON  RECORD  FOR 
THE  BATTLE  OF  DECEMBER  16  —  THAT  BATTLE  DUE  TO 
THE  SPONTANEOUS  ACTION  OF  SUBORDINATE  COMMAND 
ERS—STATEMENTS  IN  THE  REPORTS  OF  THE  CORPS 
COMMANDERS  —  EXPLANATION  OF  THE  ABSENCE  OF  OR 
DERS—THE  PHRASEOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  RE 
PORT  .  258 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  XV.  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  INDORSEMENT  ON  THE 
REPORT  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  —  COURTESIES 
TO  HIM  IN  WASHINGTON  —  PECULIARITIES  OF  THE  OF 
FICIAL  RECORDS  IN  REGARD  TO  FRANKLIN  AND  NASH 
VILLE —  DOCUMENTS  WHICH  HAVE  DISAPPEARED  FROM 
THE  RECORDS  —  INCONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S 
REPORT  —  FALSE  REPRESENTATIONS  MADE  TO  HIM  — 
THEIR  FALSITY  CONFIRMED  BY  GENERAL  GRANT  .  .  276 

CHAPTER  XVI.  SHERMAN'S  "MARCH  TO  THE  SEA" — THE 
MILITARY  THEORY  ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED  —  DID  IT 
INVOLVE  WAR  OR  STATESMANSHIP  ?  —  THE  CORRESPON 
DENCE  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN,  AND  SHERMAN 
AND  THOMAS  —  THE  EFFECT  OF  JEFFERSON  DA  vis's 
SPEECH  ON  SHERMAN — RAWLINS'S  REPORTED  OPPOSI 
TION  TO  THE  MARCH,  AND  GRANT'S  FINAL  JUDGMENT 
ON  IT  .  .  .  .  .  ....  .  .299 

CHAPTER  XVII.  SHERMAN'S  PURPOSE  IN  MARCHING  TO 
THE  SEA  —  His  EXPECTATIONS  THAT  THE  CHANGE  OF 
BASE  WOULD  BE  "  STATESMANSHIP,"  IF  NOT  "  WAR  " — 
THE  THOUSAND-MILE  MARCH  OF  HOOD'S  MEN  TO  SUR 
RENDER  TO  SHERMAN  —  THE  CREDIT  GIVEN  BY  GRANT 
TO  SHERMAN  —  " MASTER  OF  THE  SITUATION"  —  THE 
FAME  OF  SHERMAN'S  GRAND  MARCHES  —  His  GREAT 
ABILITY  AS  A  STRATEGIST  .  .  .  .  .  329 

CHAPTER  XVIII.  TRANSFER  OF  THE  TWENTY-THIRD  CORPS 
TO  NORTH  CAROLINA  —  SHERMAN'S  PLAN  OF  MARCHING 
TO  THE  REAR  OF  LEE  —  THE  SURRENDER  OF  J.  E. 
JOHNSTON'S  ARMY  —  AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  APPROVED 
TERMS  OF  SURRENDER  —  POLITICAL  RECONSTRUCTION — 
SHERMAN'S  GENIUS  —  CONTRAST  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND 
SHERMAN  —  HALLECK'S  CHARACTERISTICS  —  His  AT 
TEMPT  TO  SUPPLANT  GRANT  —  PERSONAL  FEELING  IN 
BATTLE  —  THE  SCARS  OF  WAR  .  .  .  .  •  345 

CHAPTER  XIX.  THE  RESTORATION  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT 
IN  THE  SOUTHERN  STATES  —  THE  COURSE  PURSUED  IN 
NORTH  CAROLINA  —  AN  ORDER  FROM  GENERAL  GRANT 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

IN  REGARD  TO  COTTON  AND  PRODUCE  —  SUGGESTIONS 
FOR  THE  REORGANIZATION  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT  —  A 
PROVISIONAL  GOVERNOR  FOR  NORTH  CAROLINA  .  .  367 

CHAPTER  XX.  FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO  — A 
PLAN  TO  COMPEL  THE  WITHDRAWAL  OF  THE  FRENCH 
ARMY — GRANT'S  LETTER  OF  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  GEN 
ERAL  SHERIDAN  —  SECRETARY  SEWARD  ADVOCATES 
MORAL  SUASION  —  A  MISSION  TO  PARIS  WITH  THAT 
END  IN  VIEW  —  SPEECHMAKING  AT  THE  AMERICAN 
THANKSGIVING  DINNER  —  NAPOLEON'S  METHOD  OF  RE 
TREATING  WITH  DIGNITY  —  A  PRESENTATION  TO  THE 
EMPEROR  AND  EMPRESS 378 

CHAPTER  XXI.  RECONSTRUCTION  IN  VIRGINIA  —  THE 
STATE  LEGISLATURE  ADVISED  TO  ADOPT  THE  FOUR 
TEENTH  AMENDMENT  —  CONGRESSIONAL  RECONSTRUC 
TION  AS  A  RESULT  OF  THE  REFUSAL  —  THE  MANNER 
IN  WHICH  THE  ACTS  OF  CONGRESS  WERE  EXECUTED  — 
No  RESORT  TO  TRIAL  BY  MILITARY  COMMISSION  —  THE 
OBNOXIOUS  CONSTITUTION  FRAMED  BY  THE  STATE  CON 
VENTION —  How  ITS  WORSE  FEATURE  WAS  NULLIFIED 

—  APPOINTED  SECRETARY  OF  WAR         ....  394 

CHAPTER  XXII.  DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  THE  COMMAND 
ING  GENERAL  OF  THE  ARMY  AND  THE  WAR  DEPART 
MENT  —  GENERAL  GRANT'S  SPECIAL  POWERS  —  His  AP 
POINTMENT  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  AD  INTERIM: — THE 
IMPEACHMENT  OF  PRESIDENT  JOHNSON  —  MEMORANDUM 
OF  INTERVIEWS  WITH  WILLIAM  M.  EVARTS  AND  GEN 
ERAL  GRANT  IN  REGARD  TO  THE  SECRETARYSHIP  OF  WAR 

—  FAILURE  OF  THE  IMPEACHMENT  TRIAL  —  HARMONY 
IN  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  —  A  NEW  POLICY  AT  ARMY   / 
HEADQUARTERS          .  406 

CHAPTER  XXIII.  ASSIGNMENT  TO  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF 
THE  MISSOURI  —  A  CORDIAL  RECEPTION  FROM  FORMER 
OPPONENTS  IN  ST.  Louis  —  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MILITARY 
SCHOOL  AT  FORT  RILEY — FUNERAL  OF  GENERAL  GEORGE 
H.  THOMAS  —  DEATH  OF  GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE  — 
ASSIGNED  TO  THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  PACIFIC  —  A  VISIT 


TABLE  OF   CONTENTS  xv 

PAGE 

TO  HAWAII  —  MILITARY  MEN  IN  THE  EXERCISE  OP  PO 
LITICAL  POWER  —  TROUBLE  WITH  THE  MODOC  INDIANS 

—  THE  CANBY  MASSACRE          .        .        .        .        .        .  424 

CHAPTER  XXIV.  SUPERINTENDENT  AT  WEST  POINT  —  GEN- 
ERAL  SHERMAN'S  ULTERIOR  REASONS  FOR  THE  APPOINT 
MENT —  ORIGIN  OF  THE  "  DEPARTMENT  OF  WEST  POINT" 

—  CASE  OF  THE  COLORED  CADET  WHITTAKER  —  A  PRO 
POSED   REMOVAL    FOR    POLITICAL    EFFECT  —  GENERAL 
TERRY'S   FRIENDLY   ATTITUDE  —  A   MUDDLE   OF   NEW 
COMMANDS  —  WAITING  ORDERS,  AND  A  VISIT  TO  EUROPE 

—  AGAIN  IN  COMMAND  IN  THE  WEST  —  THE  ESTABLISH 
MENT  OF  FORT  SHERIDAN  AT  CHICAGO  .        .        .  439 

CHAPTER  XXV.  THE  DEATH  OF  GENERAL  HANCOCK  — 
ASSIGNED  TO  THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  —  MEAS 
URES  FOR  IMPROVING  THE  SEA-COAST  DEFENSE  —  GEN 
ERAL  FITZ-JOHN  PORTER'S  RESTORATION  TO  THE  ARMY 

—  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  BOARD  APPOINTED  TO  REVIEW 
THE    ACTION    OF    THE    COURT    MARTIAL  —  GENERAL 
GRANT'S  OPINION — SENATOR  LOGAN'S  EXPLANATION  OF 
His  HOSTILE  ATTITUDE  TOWARD  GENERAL  PORTER       456 

CHAPTER  XXVI.  THE  DEATH  OF  GENERAL  SHERIDAN  — 
His  SUCCESSOR  IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY  —  DEPLOR 
ABLE  CONDITION  OF  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  AT  THE 
TIME  —  A  BETTER  UNDERSTANDING  BETWEEN  THE  DE 
PARTMENT  AND  THE  ARMY  COMMANDER  —  GENERAL 
SHERIDAN'S  HUMILIATING  EXPERIENCE  —  THE  GRANTING 
OF  MEDALS  —  THE  SECRETARY'S  CALL-BELL  —  THE  RE 
LATIONS  OF  SECRETARY  AND  G-ENERAL  —  VIEWS  SUB 
MITTED  TO  PRESIDENT  CLEVELAND  —  THE  LAW  FIXING 
RETIREMENT  FOR  AGE  —  AN  ANECDOTE  OF  GENERAL 
GRANT 467 

CHAPTER  XXVII.  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  NEW  BOARD  OF 
ORDNANCE  AND  FORTIFICATION  —  USEFULNESS  OF  THE 
BOARD  —  TROUBLES  WITH  THE  Sioux  INDIANS  IN  1890- 
1891  —  SUCCESS  OF  THE  PLAN  TO  EMPLOY  INDIANS  AS 
SOLDIERS  —  MARRIAGE  TO  Miss  KILBOURNE  —  THE  DIF 
FICULTY  WITH  CHILI  IN  1892  .  .  484 


xvi  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER  XXVIII.  SERVICES  OF  THE  ARMY  DURING  THE 
LABOR  STRIKES  OF  1894  —  MILITARY  CONTROL  OF  THE 
PACIFIC  RAILWAYS  —  UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  IN  THE 
CITY  OF  CHICAGO  —  ORDERS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  MILES, 
AND  HIS  REPORTS  —  THE  PROCLAMATION  OF  THE  PRESI 
DENT — INSTRUCTIONS  TO  GOVERN  THE  TROOPS  IN  DEAL 
ING  WITH  A  MOB  —  THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  MILITARY  MIS 
UNDERSTOOD —  ORDERS  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  IN  REGARD 
TO  THE  PACIFIC  RAILWAYS 491 

CHAPTER  XXIX.  LESSONS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR — WEAK 
NESS  OF  THE  MILITARY  POLICY  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OF 
THE  REBELLION — A  POOR  USE  OF  THE  EDUCATED  SOL 
DIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  —  MILITARY  WISDOM  SHOWN  BY 
THE  CONFEDERATE  AUTHORITIES  —  TERRITORIAL  STRA 
TEGY —  GENERAL  MILITARY  EDUCATION  INDISPENSABLE 
TO  GOOD  CITIZENSHIP  —  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  NA 
TIONAL  GUARD — GENERAL  GRANT  WITHOUT  MILITARY 
BOOKS  —  MEASURES  NECESSARY  TO  THE  NATIONAL  DE 
FENSE  513 

CHAPTER  XXX.  THE  FINANCIAL  LESSON  OF  THE  CIVIL 
WAR — APPROACHING  BANKRUPTCY  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT 
NEAR  THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  —  THE  LEGAL-TENDER 
NOTES  AN  INJURY  TO  THE  PUBLIC  CREDIT  —  A  Vicious 
CLAUSE  IN  THE  CONSTITUTION  —  No  PREJUDICE  IN  THE 
ARMY  AGAINST  OFFICERS  NOT  EDUCATED  AT  WEST 
POINT  — THE  NEED  OF  A  LAW  REFORMING  THE  RELA 
TIONS  BETWEEN  THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  COMMANDER  OF 
THE  ARMY — DEVOTION  TO  THE  CHOSEN  LEADER  IN  TIMES 
OF  PUBLIC  PERIL 529 

CHAPTER  XXXI.  GENERAL  SHERMAN'S  FRIENDSHIP  —  His 
DEATH — GENERAL  GRANT'S  RECOGNITION  OF  SERVICES — 
His  GREAT  TRAIT,  MORAL  AND  INTELLECTUAL  HON 
ESTY — His  CONFIDENCE  IN  HIMSELF — GRANT,  LIKE  LIN 
COLN,  A  TYPICAL  AMERICAN  —  ON  THE  RETIRED  LIST  OF 
THE  ARMY  —  CONCLUSION 541 

INDEX  .  549 


FORTY-SIX  YEARS 
IN  THE  ARMY 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 
^LIFOR^ 


FORTY-SIX  YEARS 

IN  THE  ARMY 

* 

CHAPTER  I 

• 

PAKENTAGE  AND  EAELY  LIFE  —  APPOINTMENT  TO  WEST 
POINT — VIRGINIAN  EOOM-MATES  —  ACQUAINTANCE  WITH 
GENERAL  WINFIELD  SCOTT  —  CHARACTER  OF  THE  WEST 
POINT  TRAINING  —  IMPORTANCE  OF  LEARNING  HOW  TO 
OBEY  —  A  TRIP  TO  NEW  YORK  ON  A  WAGER  —  THE 
WEST  POINT  BIBLE-CLASS  —  DISMISSED  FROM  THE 
ACADEMY  WITHOUT  TRIAL  —  INTERCESSION  OF  STEPHEN 

A.  DOUGLAS  —  RESTORATION    TO    CADET    DUTY  —  JAMES 

B.  McPHERSON  —  JOHN     B.     HOOD  —  ROBERT    E.    LEE. 

I  WAS  born  in  the  town  of  Gerry,  Chautauqua  County, 
New  York,  September  29,  1831.  My  father  was  the 
Eev.  James  Schofield,  who  was  then  pastor  of  the  Bap 
tist  Church  in  Sinclairville,  and  who  was  from  1843  to 
1881  a  "home  missionary"  engaged  in  organizing  new 
churches,  and  building  "meeting-houses,"  in  Illinois, 
Iowa,  and  Missouri.  My  mother  was  Caroline  McAl 
lister,  daughter  of  John  McAllister  of  Gerry.  We  re 
moved  to  Illinois  in  June,  1843,  and,  after  a  short  stay 
in  Bristol,  my  father  made  a  new  home  for  his  family  in 
Freeport,  where  he  began  his  missionary  work  by  found 
ing  the  First  Baptist  Church  of  that  place. 

In  all  my  childhood  and  youth  I  had  what  I  regard 
as  the  best  possible  opportunities  for  education,  in  excel 
lent  public  schools  where  the  rudiments  of  English  were 


2  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

taught  with  great  thoroughness,  in  a  fair  amount  of  all 
kinds  of  manly  sports,  and  in  hard  work,  mainly  on  the 
farm  and  in  building  a  new  home,  which  left  no  time 
and  little  inclination  for  any  kind  of  mischief.  At  six 
teen  years  of  age  I  spent  three  months  in  surveying 
public  lands  in  the  wilds  of  northern  Wisconsin,  and  at 
seventeen  taught  district  school  in  the  little  town  of 
Oneco.  By  that  time  I  had  chosen  the  law  as  my  pro 
fession,  and  was  working  hard  to  complete  the  pre 
paratory  studies  at  my  own  expense. 

The  winter  school  term  in  Oneco  having  closed  early 
in  the  spring  of  1849,  I  returned  to  Freeport  and  re 
sumed  my  struggle  with  Latin.  Then  an  unforeseen 
event  turned  the  course  of  my  life.  The  young  man 
who  had  been  appointed  to  West  Point  from  our  district 
only  a  year  or  two  before  had  failed  to  continue  his 
course  in  the  Military  Academy.  Thus  a  vacancy  oc 
curred  just  at  the  close  of  Mr.  Thomas  J.  Turner's  term 
in  Congress.  There  was  no  time  for  applications  or  for 
consultation.  He  must  select  another  candidate  to  enter 
the  following  June,  or  leave  the  place  to  be  filled  by  his 
successor.  Fortunately  for  me,  Mr.  Turner,  as  one  of 
the  public-school  directors,  had  been  present  at  an  ex 
amination  where  the  subject  with  which  I  had  to  deal 
was  mathematical ;  if  he  had  caught  me  at  Latin,  the  re 
sult  must  have  been  fatal  to  all  my  prospects.  Besides, 
Mr.  Turner  had  heard  from  his  brother  James  of  the 
stamina  I  had  shown  in  the  public  land-surveying  ex 
pedition  ;  and  also  from  my  father  of  my  determination 
to  get  a  good  education  before  beginning  the  study  of 
law.  So  he  brought  me  a  cadet  appointment  when  he 
came  home,  and  said  he  believed  a  boy  with  that  record 
could  get  through  West  Point,  the  training  there  being, 
in  his  opinion,  a  good  preparation  for  the  study  of  law. 

The  little  savings  from  all  my  past  work  had  been  in 
vested  in  a  piece  of  land  which  was  sold  to  fit  me  out 


APPOINTMENT  TO  WEST  POINT  3 

for  my  journey  to  West  Point,  including  some  inexpen 
sive  visits  en  route.  I  reported  at  the  Academy  on  June 
1,  1849,  with  less  than  two  dollars  in  my  pocket,  which  I 
conscientiously  deposited  with  the  treasurer,  as  required 
by  the  regulations.  My  reception  was  of  the  most  satis 
factory  character.  William  P.  Carlin  of  the  second  class, 
and  Hezekiah  H.  G-arber  of  the  third,  both  from  Illinois, 
found  me  out  very  soon  after  I  reported,  took  me  under 
their  protection  in  a  brotherly  way,  and  gave  me  some 
timely  advice — not  to  take  too  seriously  any  little  fun  the 
"  men  "  might  make  of  my  blue  dress-coat  and  fancy  gilt 
buttons,  or  anything  like  that ;  but  I  never  experienced 
anything  even  approaching  to  hazing.  My  rather  ma 
ture  appearance  may  have  had  something  to  do  with  the 
respect  generally  paid  me.  It  was  true  I  was  only  seven 
teen  years  and  nine  months  old,  as  recorded  in  the 
register,  but  my  experience  may  have  had  some  visible 
effect. 

I  was  assigned  to  a  room  in  the  old  South  Barracks, 
which  were  demolished  the  next  year.  My  room-mates 
were  Henry  H.  Walker  and  John  E.  Chambliss,  two 
charming  fellows  from  Virginia.  We  had  hardly  learned 
each  other's  names  when  one  of  them  said  something 
about  the  "  blank  Yankees  " ;  but  instantly,  seeing  some 
thing  that  might  perhaps  have  appeared  like  Southern 
blood  in  my  face,  added,  "  You  are  not  a  Yankee  !  "  I  re 
plied,  "Yes;  I  am  from  Illinois."  "Oh,"  said  he,  "we 
don't  call  Western  men  Yankees."  In  that  remark  I 
found  my  mission  at  West  Point,  as  in  after  life,  to  be, 
as  far  as  possible,  a  peacemaker  between  the  hostile 
sections.  If  the  great  West  could  have  been  heard,  and 
its  more  dispassionate  voice  heeded,  possibly  peace  might 
have  been  preserved. 

My  experience  at  West  Point  did  not  differ  in  many 
particulars  from  the  general  average  of  cadet  life,  but  a 
few  incidents  may  be  worthy  of  special  mention.  My 


4  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

experience  in  camp  was  comparatively  limited.  The  first 
summer  I  was  on  guard  only  once.  Then  the  corporal  of 
the  grand  rounds  tried  to  charge  over  my  post  without 
giving  the  countersign,  because  I  had  not  challenged 
promptly.  We  crossed  bayonets,  but  I  proved  too  strong 
for  him,  and  he  gave  it  up,  to  the  great  indignation  of  the 
officer  of  the  day,  who  had  ordered  him  to  charge,  and 
who  threatened  to  report  me,  but  did  not.  That  night  I 
slept  on  the  ground  outside  the  guard  tents,  and  caught 
cold,  from  which  my  eyes  became  badly  inflamed,  and  I 
was  laid  up  in  the  hospital  during  the  remainder  of  the 
encampment.  On  that  account  I  had  a  hard  struggle 
with  my  studies  the  next  year.  While  sitting  on  the 
east  porch  of  the  hospital  in  the  afternoon,  I  attracted 
the  kind  attention  of  General  Winfield  Scott,  who  be 
came  from  that  time  a  real  friend,  and  did  me  a  great 
service  some  years  later. 

In  our  third-class  encampment,  when  corporal  of  the 
guard,  I  had  a  little  misunderstanding  one  night  with  the 
sentinel  on  post  along  Fort  Clinton  ditch,  which  was  then 
nearly  filled  by  a  growth  of  bushes.  The  sentinel  tore 
the  breast  of  my  shell- jacket  with  the  point  of  his  bayo 
net,  and  I  tumbled  him  over  backward  into  the  ditch 
and  ruined  his  musket.  But  I  quickly  helped  him  out, 
and  gave  him  my  musket  in  place  of  his,  with  ample 
apologies  for  my  thoughtless  act.  We  parted,  as  I  thought, 
in  the  best  of  feeling ;  but  many  years  later,  a  colonel  in 
the  army  told  me  that  story,  as  an  illustration  of  the 
erroneous  treatment  sometimes  accorded  to  sentinels  in 
his  time,  and  I  was  thus  compelled  to  tell  him  I  was  that 
same  corporal,  to  convince  him  that  he  had  been  mistaken 
as  to  the  real  character  of  the  treatment  he  had  received. 

That  third-class  year  I  lived  in  the  old  North  Barracks, 
four  of  us  in  one  room.  There,  under  the  malign  in 
fluence  of  two  men  who  were  afterward  found  deficient, 
I  contracted  the  bad  habit  of  fastening  a  blanket  against 


CHARACTER  OF  THE  WEST   POINT   TRAINING  5 

the  window  after  "  taps,"  so  that  no  one  outside  could  see 
us  "  burning  the  midnight  oil "  over  pipes  and  cards.  The 
corps  of  cadets  was  not  as  much  disciplined  in  our  day 
as  it  is  now.  If  it  had  been,  I  doubt  if  I  should  have 
graduated.  As  it  was,  I  got  196  demerits  out  of  a  possible 
200  one  year.  One  more  "  smoking  in  quarters "  would 
have  been  too  much  for  me.  I  protest  now,  after  this  long 
experience,  that  nothing  else  at  West  Point  was  either  so 
enjoyable  or  so  beneficial  to  me  as  smoking.  I  knew  little 
and  cared  less  about  the  different  corps  of  the  army,  or 
about  the  value  of  class  standing.  I  became  quite  indig 
nant  when  a  distinguished  friend  rather  reproved  me  for 
not  trying  to  graduate  higher  —  perhaps  in  part  from  a 
guilty  conscience,  for  it  occurred  just  after  we  had  grad 
uated.  I  devoted  only  a  fraction  of  the  study  hours  to 
the  academic  course  —  generally  an  hour,  or  one  and  a 
half,  to  each  lesson.  But  I  never  intentionally  neglected 
any  of  my  studies.  It  simply  seemed  to  me  that  a  great 
part  of  my  time  could  be  better  employed  in  getting  the 
education  I  desired  by  the  study  of  law,  history,  rhet 
oric,  and  general  literature.  Even  now  I  think  these 
latter  studies  have  proved  about  as  useful  to  me  as  what 
I  learned  of  the  art  and  science  of  war ;  and  they  are  es 
sential  to  a  good  general  education,  no  less  in  the  army 
than  in  civil  life.  I  have  long  thought  it  would  be  a  great 
improvement  in  the  Military  Academy  if  a  much  broader 
course  could  be  given  to  those  young  men  who  come 
there  with  the  necessary  preparation,  while  not  excluding 
those  comparatively  young  boys  who  have  only  elemen 
tary  education.  There  is  too  much  of  the  "  cast-iron  "  in 
this  government  of  law  under  which  we  live,  but  "  mild 
steel "  will  take  its  place  in  time,  no  doubt.  The  condi 
tions  and  interests  of  so  vast  a  country  and  people  are 
too  varied  to  be  wisely  subjected  to  rigid  rules. 

But  I  must  not  be  misunderstood  as  disparaging  the 
West  Point  education.    As  it  was,  and  is  now,  there  is, 


6  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

I  believe,  nothing  equal  to  it  anywhere  in  this  country. 
Its  methods  of  developing  the  reasoning  faculties  and 
habits  of  independent  thought  are  the  best  ever  devised. 
West  Point  training  of  the  mind  is  practically  perfect. 
Its  general  discipline  is  excellent  and  indispensable  in 
the  military  service.  Even  in  civil  life  something  like  it 
would  be  highly  beneficial.  In  my  case  that  discipline 
was  even  more  needed  than  anything  else.  The  hardest 
lesson  I  had  to  learn  was  to  submit  my  will  and  opinions 
to  those  of  an  accidental  superior  in  rank  who,  I  ima 
gined,  was  my  inferior  in  other  things,  and  it  took  me 
many  years  to  learn  it.  Nothing  is  more  absolutely  in 
dispensable  to  a  good  soldier  than  perfect  subordination 
and  zealous  service  to  him  whom  the  national  will  may 
have  made  the  official  superior  for  the  time  being.  I 
now  think  it  one  of  the  most  important  lessons  of  my 
own  experience  that,  while  I  had  no  difficulty  whatever 
in  securing  perfect  subordination  and  obedience  in  a 
large  public  school  when  I  was  only  seventeen  years  old, 
or  ever  afterward  in  any  body  of  troops,  from  a  squad 
of  cadets  up  to  an  army  of  men,  others  did  not  find  it  by 
any  means  so  easy  to  discipline  me.  What  I  needed  to 
learn  was  not  so  much  how  to  command  as  how  to  obey. 
My  observation  of  others  has  also  taught  much  the 
same  lesson.  Too  early  independence  and  exercise  of 
authority  seem  to  beget  some  degree  of  disrespect  for  the 
authority  of  others.  I  once  knew  a  young  major-gen 
eral  who,  in  his  zeal  to  prevent  what  he  believed  to  be 
the  improper  application  of  some  public  funds,  assumed 
to  himself  the  action  which  lawfully  belonged  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War.  The  question  thus  raised  was  considered 
paramount  to  that  of  the  proper  use  of  the  funds.  The 
young  officer  lost  his  point,  and  got  a  well-merited  re 
buke.  But  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  complete  mili 
tary  education  can  be  obtained  without  complete  military 
experience.  The  rules  of  subordination  and  obedience 


A  TRIP  TO  NEW  YORK  ON  A  WAGER  7 

in  an  army  are  so  simple  that  everybody  learns  them 
with  the  utmost  ease.  But  the  relations  between  the 
army  and  its  administrative  head,  and  with  the  civil 
power,  are  by  no  means  so  simple.  When  a  too  confi 
dent  soldier  rubs  up  against  them,  he  learns  what  "  mili 
tary"  discipline  really  means.  It  sometimes  takes  a 
civilian  to  "  teach  a  soldier  his  place  "  in  the  government 
of  a  republic.  If  a  soldier  desires  that  his  own  better 
judgment  shall  control  military  policy,  he  must  take  care 
not  to  let  it  become  known  that  the  judgment  is  his.  If 
he  can  contrive  to  let  that  wise  policy  be  invented  by 
the  more  responsible  head,  it  will  surely  be  adopted.  It 
should  never  be  suspected  by  anybody  that  there  is  any 
difference  of  opinion  between  the  soldier  and  his  civil 
chief;  and  nobody,  not  even  the  chief,  will  ever  find  it 
out  if  the  soldier  does  not  tell  it.  The  highest  quality 
attributed  to  Von  Moltke  was  his  ability  to  make  it 
clearly  understood  by  the  Emperor  and  by  all  the  world 
that  the  Emperor  himself  commanded  the  German  army. 
My  constitutional  habit  once  led  me  into  a  very  foolish 
exploit  at  West  Point.  A  discussion  arose  as  to  the  possi 
bility  of  going  to  New  York  and  back  without  danger  of 
being  caught,  and  I  explained  the  plan  I  had  worked  out 
by  which  it  could  be  done.  (I  will  not  explain  what  the 
plan  was,  lest  some  other  foolish  boy  should  try  it.)  I  was 
promptly  challenged  to  undertake  it  for  a  high  wager, 
and  that  challenge  overcame  any  scruple  I  may  have 
had.  I  cared  nothing  for  a  brief  visit  to  New  York,  and 
had  only  five  dollars  in  money  which  Jerome  N.  Bona 
parte  loaned  me  to  pay  my  way.  But  I  went  to  the  city 
and  back,  in  perfect  safety,  between  the  two  roll-calls  I 
had  to  attend  that  day.  Old  Benny  Havens  of  blessed 
memory  rowed  me  across  the  river  to  Garrison's,  and  the 
Cold  Spring  ferryman  back  to  the  Point  a  few  minutes 
before  evening  parade.  I  walked  across  the  plain  in  full 
view  of  the  crowd  of  officers  and  ladies,  and  appeared  in 


8  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ranks  at  roll-call,  as  innocent  as  anybody.  It  is  true  my 
up-train  did  not  stop  at  Garrison's  or  Cold  Spring,  but 
the  conductor,  upon  a  hint  as  to  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
kindly  slacked  the  speed  of  the  express  so  that  I  could 
jump  off  from  the  rear  platform.  In  due  time  I  repaid 
Bonaparte  the  borrowed  five  dollars,  but  the  wager  was 
never  paid.  The  only  other  bet  I  made  at  West  Point  was 
on  Buchanan's  election ;  but  that  was  in  the  interest  of  a 
Yankee  who  was  not  on  speaking  terms  with  the  South 
erner  who  offered  the  wager.  I  have  never  had  any  dis 
position  to  wager  anything  on  chance,  but  have  always 
had  an  irresistible  inclination  to  back  my  own  skill  when 
ever  it  has  been  challenged.  The  one  thing  most  to  be 
condemned  in  war  is  the  leaving  to  chance  anything 
which  by  due  diligence  might  be  foreseen.  In  the  prepa 
rations  for  defense,  especially,  there  is  no  longer  any 
need  that  anything  be  left  to  chance  or  uncertainty. 

I  attended  the  Bible-class  regularly  every  Sunday  after 
I  went  to  West  Point,  and  rejoiced  greatly  in  that  oppor 
tunity  to  hear  the  Scriptures  expounded  by  the  learned 
doctor  of  divinity  of  the  Military  Academy.  I  had  never 
doubted  for  a  moment  that  every  word  of  the  Bible  was 
divinely  inspired,  for  my  father  himself  had  told  me  it 
was.  But  I  always  had  a  curious  desire  to  know  the 
reason  of  things ;  and,  more  than  that,  some  of  my  fellows 
were  inclined  to  be  a  little  skeptical,  and  I  wanted  the 
reasons  with  which  I  could  overwhelm  their  unworthy 
doubts.  So  I  ventured  to  ask  the  professor  one  Sunday 
what  was  the  evidence  of  divine  inspiration.  He  an 
swered  only  what  my  father  had  before  told  me,  that  it 
was  "  internal  evidence  " ;  but  my  youthful  mind  had  not 
yet  perceived  that  very  clearly.  Hence  I  ventured  very 
modestly  and  timidly  to  indicate  my  need  of  some  light 
that  would  enable  me  to  see.  The  learned  doctor  did 
not  vouchsafe  a  word  in  reply,  but  the  look  of  amaze 
ment  and  scorn  he  gave  me  for  my  display  of  ignorance 


THE  WEST  POINT  BIBLE-CLASS  9 

sealed  my  lips  on  that  subject  forever.  I  have  never 
since  ventured  to  ask  anybody  any  questions  on  that 
subject,  but  have  studied  it  out  for  myself  as  well  as  I 
could.  Soon  after  that  the  doctor  preached  a  sermon  in 
which  he  denounced  skepticism  in  his  own  vigorous 
terms,  and  consigned  to  perdition  all  the  great  teachers 
of  heresy,  of  whom  he  mentioned  the  names  —  before  un 
heard,  I  am  sure,  by  the  great  majority  of  cadets,  though 
their  works  were  to  be  found  in  the  West  Point  and  all 
other  public  libraries.  I  never  looked  into  any  of  those 
books,  though  other  cadets  told  me  that  they,  at  his  sug 
gestion,  had  sought  there  for  the  information  the  good 
doctor  had  refused  to  give  us.  I  have  never,  even  to  this 
day,  been  willing  to  read  or  listen  to  what  seemed  to  me 
irreverent  words,  even  though  they  might  be  intended  to 
convey  ideas  not  very  different  from  my  own.  It  has 
seemed  to  me  that  a  man  ought  to  speak  with  reverence 
of  the  religion  taught  him  in  his  childhood  and  believed 
by  his  fellow-men,  or  else  keep  his  philosophical  thoughts, 
however  profound,  to  himself. 

Another  sermon  of  the  good  doctor  of  divinity,  which 
I  did  not  happen  to  hear,  on  the  Mosaic  history  of  crea 
tion,  contained,  as  stated  to  me,  a  denunciation  of  the 
"  God-hating  geologists."  That  offended  me,  for  I  had, 
in  common  with  all  other  cadets,  learned  greatly  to  ad 
mire  and  respect  our  professor  of  geology.  So  I  did  not 
go  to  the  Bible-class  any  more.  But  the  professor  of 
ethics  continued  to  drive  his  fine  fast  horse,  much  the 
best  one  on  the  Point,  and  I  believe  the  best  I  had  ever 
seen.  Hence  he  continued  to  enjoy  my  esteem,  though 
perhaps  he  did  not  know  it. 

Near  the  beginning  of  the  last  year  of  my  cadet  life  an 
event  occurred  which  very  nearly  proved  fatal  to  my 
prospects,  and  I  have  often  wondered  that  it  did  not 
have  some  effect  on  my  hopes.  But,  singularly  enough, 
I  never  had  a  moment's  doubt  or  anxiety  as  to  the  final 


10  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

result.  It  was  then  the  custom  for  candidates  to  report 
on  June  1,  or  within  the  next  few  days.  They  were 
organized  into  sections,  and  placed  under  the  instruc 
tion  of  cadets  selected  from  the  second  class  to  prepare 
them,  as  far  as  possible,  for  examination  about  the 
middle  of  the  month.  I  was  given  charge  of  a  section  in 
arithmetic,  and  have  never  in  all  my  life  discharged  my 
duty  with  more  conscientious  fidelity  than  I  drilled  those 
boys  in  the  subject  with  which  I  was  familiar,  and  in 
teaching  which  I  had  had  some  experience.  We  had 
gone  over  the  entire  course  upon  which  they  were  to  be 
examined,  and  all  were  well  prepared  except  two  who 
seemed  hopelessly  deficient  upon  a  few  subjects  which 
they  had  been  unable  to  comprehend.  Not  willing  to 
omit  the  last  possible  effort  in  behalf  of  those  two  boys, 
I  took  them  to  the  blackboard  and  devoted  the  last 
fifteen  or  twenty  minutes  before  the  bugle-call  to  a  final 
effort  to  prepare  them  for  the  ordeal  they  must  face  the 
next  morning.  While  I  was  thus  employed  several  of 
my  classmates  came  into  the  room,  and  began  talking  to 
the  other  candidates.  Though  their  presence  annoyed 
me,  it  did  not  interfere  with  my  work ;  so  I  kept  on  in 
tently  with  the  two  young  boys  until  the  bugle  sounded. 
I  then  went  to  my  quarters  without  paying  any  atten 
tion  to  the  interruption,  or  knowing  anything  of  the 
character  of  what  had  occurred.  But  one  of  the  candi 
dates,  perhaps  by  way  of  excuse  for  his  failure,  wrote  to 
his  parents  some  account  of  the  "  deviltry  "  in  which  my 
classmates  had  indulged  that  day.  That  report  found 
its  way  to  the  War  Department,  and  was  soon  followed 
by  an  order  to  the  commandant  of  cadets  to  investigate. 
The  facts  were  found  fully  to  exonerate  me  from  any 
participation  in  or  countenance  of  the  deviltry,  except 
that  I  did  not  stop  it ;  and  showed  that  I  had  faithfully 
done  my  duty  in  teaching  the  candidates.  After  this  in 
vestigation  was  over,  I  was  called  upon  to  answer  for 


DISMISSED  FROM   THE   ACADEMY  WITHOUT   TRIAL         \\ 

my  own  conduct ;  and,  the  names  of  my  guilty  classmates 
being  unknown  to  the  candidates,  I  was  also  held  re 
sponsible  for  their  conduct.  I  answered  by  averring  and 
showing,  as  I  believed,  my  own  innocence  of  all  that 
had  been  done,  except  my  neglect  of  duty  in  tolerating 
such  a  proceeding.  My  conscience  was  so  clear  of  any 
intentional  wrong  that  I  had  no  anxiety  about  the  result. 
But  in  due  time  came  an  order  from  the  Secretary  of 
War  dismissing  me  from  the  academy  without  trial. 
That,  I  believe,  shocked  me  a  little ;  but  the  sense  of  in 
justice  was  too  strong  in  my  mind  to  permit  of  a  doubt 
that  it  would  be  righted  when  the  truth  was  known.  I 
proposed  to  go  straight  to  Washington  and  lay  the  facts 
before  the  government.  Then  I  realized  for  the  first 
time  what  it  meant  to  have  friends.  All  my  classmates 
and  many  other  cadets  came  forward  with  letters  to 
theh\  congressmen,  and  many  of  them  to  senators  whom 
they  happened  to  know,  and  other  influential  men  in 
Washington.  So  I  carried  with  me  a  great  bundle  of 
letters  setting  forth  my  virtues  in  terms  which  might 
have  filled  the  breast  of  George  Washington  with  pride. 
There  was  no  public  man  in  Washington  whom  I  had 
ever  seen,  and  probably  no  one  who  had  ever  heard  of 
me,  except  the  few  in  the  War  Department  who  knew  of 
my  alleged  bad  conduct.  The  Secretary  of  War  would 
not  even  see  me  until  I  was  at  last  presented  to  him  by 
an  officer  of  the  army.  Then  he  offered  me  his  forefinger 
to  shake,  but  he  could  give  me  no  encouragement  what 
ever.  This  was  after  I  had  been  in  Washington  several 
weeks.  My  congressman,  Mr.  Campbell,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  Mr.  Turner,  and  several  others  received  me 
kindly,  read  my  letters,  and  promised  to  see  the  Secretary 
of  War,  which  no  doubt  they  did,  though  without  any 
apparent  effect.  The  only  result  was  the  impossible  sug 
gestion  that  if  I  would  give  the  names  of  my  guilty  class 
mates  I  might  be  let  off.  I  had  made  an  early  call  upon 


12  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  "  Little  Griant,"  Senator  Douglas,  to  whom  I  had  no 
letter,  and  whom  I  had  never  met;  had  introduced  myself 
as  a  "  citizen  of  Illinois  "  in  trouble ;  and  had  told  my  story. 
He  said  he  was  not  on  good  terms  with  that  administra 
tion,  and  preferred  not  to  go  near  the  War  Department  if 
it  could  be  avoided,  but  if  it  proved  necessary  to  let  him 
know.  Hence,  after  all  else  failed,  including  my  personal 
appeal,  which  I  had  waited  so  long  to  make,  I  told  Mr, 
Douglas  all  that  had  occurred,  and  suggested  that  there 
was  nothing  left  but  to  "  put  in  the  reserve,"  as  the  tacti 
cians  call  it.  He  replied:  "Come  up  in  the  morning,  and 
we  will  go  to  see  about  it."  On  our  way  to  the  War  De 
partment  the  next  morning,  the  senator  said,  "I  don't 
know  that  I  can  do  anything  with  this Whig  adminis 
tration  " ;  but  he  assured  me  all  should  be  made  right  in 
the  next.  That  seemed  to  me  the  kind  of  man  I  had 
looked  for  in  vain  up  to  that  time.  I  waited  in  the  ante 
room  only  a  few  minutes,  when  the  great  senator  came 
out  with  a  genial  smile  on  his  face,  shook  me  warmly  by 
the  hand,  and  bade  me  good-by,  saying :  "  It  is  all  right. 
You  can  go  back  to  West  Point.  The  Secretary  has  given 
me  his  promise."  I  need  not  go  into  the  details  of  the 
long  and  tedious  formalities  through  which  the  Secre 
tary's  promise  was  finally  fulfilled.  It  was  enough  for 
me  that  my  powerful  friend  had  secured  the  promise 
that,  upon  proof  of  the  facts  as  I  had  stated  them,  I 
should  be  fully  exonerated  and  restored  to  the  academy. 
I  returned  to  West  Point,  and  went  through  the  long 
forms  of  a  court  of  inquiry,  a  court  martial,  and  the 
waiting  for  the  final  action  of  the  War  Department,  all 
occupying  some  five  or  six  months,  diligently  attending 
to  my  military  and  academic  duties,  and  trying  hard  to 
obey  all  the  regulations  (except  as  to  smoking),  never 
for  a  moment  doubting  the  final  result.  That  lesson 
taught  me  that  innocence  and  justice  sometimes  need 
powerful  backing.  Implicit  trust  in  Providence  does  not 


JAMES  B.  McPHERSON  13 

seem  to  justify  any  neglect  to  employ  also  the  biggest 
battalions  and  the  heaviest  guns. 

During  all  that  time  I  continued  to  live  with  my  old 
room-mate,  James  B.  McPherson,  in  a  tower  room  and 
an  adjoining  bedroom,  which  La  Ehett  L.  Livingston  also 
shared.  I  had  been  corporal,  sergeant,  and  lieutenant  up 
to  the  time  of  my  dismissal ;  hence  the  duties  of  private 
were  a  little  difficult,  and  I  found  it  hard  to  avoid  de 
merits;  but  with  some  help  from  our  kind-hearted  in 
specting  officer,  Milton  Cogswell, —  bless  his  memory !- 
I  contrived  to  get  off  with  196  demerits  in  a  possible  200 
that  last  year.  In  a  mild  way,  McPherson  was  also  a 
little  under  a  cloud  at  that  time.  He  had  been  first  cap 
tain  of  the  battalion  and  squad  marcher  of  the  class  at 
engineering  drill.  In  this  latter  capacity  he  also  had 
committed  the  offense  of  not  reporting  some  of  the  class 
for  indulging  in  unauthorized  sport.  The  offense  was  not 
so  grave  as  mine,  and,  besides,  his  military  record  was 
very  much  better.  So  he  was  let  off  with  a  large  de 
merit  mark  and  a  sort  of  honorable  retirement  to  the 
office  of  quartermaster  of  the  battalion.  I  still  think,  as 
I  did  then,  that  McPherson's  punishment  was  the  more 
appropriate.  Livingston  was  one  of  those  charming, 
amiable  fellows  with  whom  nobody  could  well  find  any 
fault,  though  I  believe  he  did  get  a  good  many  demerits. 
He  also  seemed  to  need  the  aid  of  tobacco  in  his  studies. 
William  P.  Craighill,  who  succeeded  McPherson  as  first 
captain,  had  no  fault  whatever,  that  I  ever  heard  of,  ex 
cept  one  —  that  was,  standing  too  high  for  his  age.  He 
was  a  beardless  youth,  only  five  feet  high  and  sixteen 
years  old  when  he  entered  the  academy ;  yet  he  was  so 
inconsiderate  as  to  keep  ahead  of  me  all  the  time  in 
everything  but  tactics,  and  that  was  of  no  consequence 
to  him,  for  he  was  not  destined  to  command  troops  in 
the  field,  while,  as  it  turned  out,  I  was.  It  has  always 
seemed  to  me  a  little  strange  that  the  one  branch  which 


14  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

I  never  expected  to  use  afterward  was  the  only  study  in 
.which  I  graduated  at  the  head.  Perhaps  McPherson  and 
Craighill  thought,  as  I  did,  that  it  made  no  difference 
where  I  stood  in  tactics. 

Among  all  the  tactical  officers  of  our  time,  Lieutenant 
John  M.  Jones  was  esteemed  the  most  accomplished  sol 
dier  and  tactician,  and  the  most  rigid  but  just  and  im 
partial  disciplinarian.  It  had  been  my  good  fortune  to 
enjoy  his  instruction  while  I  was  private,  corporal,  ser 
geant,  and  lieutenant,  and  I  fully  shared  with  others  in 
the  above  high  estimate  of  his  character.  I  even  flattered 
myself  that  my  soldierly  conduct  in  all  that  time  had  not 
escaped  his  favorable  notice.  When  my  case  was  before 
the  court  of  inquiry  in  the  summer  of  1852,  the  profes 
sors  who  had  been  called  to  testify  gave  me  a  high  char 
acter  as  a  faithful,  diligent  student.  When  Lieutenant 
Jones  was  called  to  testify  as  to  my  character  as  a  soldier, 
he  replied  that,  in  his  opinion,  it  was  very  bad !  While  I 
was  not  a  little  surprised  and  disappointed  at  that  reve 
lation  of  the  truth  from  the  lips  of  the  superior  whom  I 
so  highly  respected,  and  did  not  doubt  for  a  moment  his 
better  judgment,  I  could  not  be  unmindful  of  the  fact 
that  the  other  tactical  officers  did  not  know  me  so  well, 
and  had  not  so  high  a  reputation  as  Lieutenant  Jones  in 
respect  to  discipline ;  and  I  felt  at  liberty  to  avail  myself, 
in  my  own  interest,  of  the  opportunity  suggested  by  this 
reflection.  Hence,  when,  after  my  complete  restoration 
to  the  academy  in  January,  I  found  my  demerits  ac 
cumulating  with  alarming  rapidity,  I  applied  for  and 
obtained  a  transfer  to  Company  C,  where  I  would  be 
under  Lieutenant  Cogswell  and  Cadet  Captain  Vincent, 
my  beloved  classmate,  who  had  cordially  invited  me  to 
share  his  room  in  barracks. 

John  B.  Hood  was  a  jolly  good  fellow,  a  little  dis 
couraged  at  first  by  unexpected  hard  work;  but  he 
fought  his  way  manfully  to  the  end.  He  was  not  quite 


ROBERT  E.  LEE  15 

so  talented  as  some  of  his  great  associates  in  the  Con 
federate  army,  but  he  was  a  tremendous  fighter  when 
occasion  offered.  During  that  last  period  of  our  cadet 
life,  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee  was  superintendent  of  the 
academy ;  he  was  the  personification  of  dignity,  justice, 
and  kindness,  and  was  respected  and  admired  as  the 
ideal  of  a  commanding  officer.  Colonel  Robert  S.  Garnett 
was  commandant  of  cadets;  he  was  a  thorough  soldier 
who  meted  out  impartial  justice  with  both  hands.  At 
our  last  parade  I  received  "honorable  mention"  twice, 
both  the  personal  judgment  of  the  commandant  himself. 
The  one  was  for  standing  at  the  head  of  the  class  in  tac 
tics;  the  other,  for  "not  carrying  musket  properly  in 
ranks."  Who  can  ever  forget  that  last  parade,  when  the 
entire  class,  officers  and  privates  together,  marched  up 
in  line  and  made  their  salute  to  the  gallant  commandant ! 
To  a  West-Pointer  no  other  emotion  equals  it,  except  that 
of  victory  in  battle. 


CHAPTER  II 

ON  GRADUATING  LEAVE  —  BREVET  SECOND  LIEUTENANT  IN 
THE  2D  ARTILLERY  AT  FORT  MOULTRIE  —  AN  OFFI 
CER'S  CREDIT  BEFORE  THE  WAR  —  SECOND  LIEUTENANT 
IN  THE  1ST  ARTILLERY  —  JOURNEY  TO  FORT  CAPRON, 
FLORIDA  —  A  RESERVATION  AS  TO  WHISKY  —  A  TRIP 
TO  CHARLESTON  AND  A  TROUBLESOME  MONEY-BAG  — 
AN  "AFFAIR  OF  HONOR"  —  A  FEW  LAW-BOOKS  —  AN 
EXTEMPORIZED  "MAP  AND  ITINERARY" — YELLOW  FEVER 
— AT  A.  P.  HILL'S  HOME  IN  VIRGINIA  —  ASSIGNED  TO 
DUTY  IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT  WEST 
POINT  —  INTEREST  IN  ASTRONOMY — MARRIAGE — A  HINT 
FROM  JEFFERSON  DAVIS  —  LEAVE  OF  ABSENCE  —  PRO 
FESSOR  OF  PHYSICS  IN  WASHINGTON  UNIVERSITY. 

A  N  old  army  colonel  many  years  ago  described  a  West 
-TJL  Point  graduate,  when  he  first  reported  for  duty 
after  graduating  leave,  as  a  very  young  officer  with  a 
full  supply  of  self-esteem,  a  four-story  leather  trunk  filled 
with  good  clothes,  and  an  empty  pocket.  To  that  must 
be  added,  in  my  case,  a  debt  equal  to  the  full  value  of 
trunk  and  clothes  and  a  hundred  dollars  borrowed  money. 
My  "equipment  fund"  and  much  more  had  been  ex 
pended  in  Washington  and  in  journeys  to  and  fro  dur 
ing  the  period  of  administrative  uncertainty  in  respect  to 
the  demands  of  discipline  at  West  Point.  Still  I  had  as 
good  a  time,  that  graduating  leave,  as  any  millionaire  in 
the  United  States.  My  good  father  was  evidently  dis 
turbed,  and  began  to  fear — for  the  first  time,  I  think — 
that  I  was  really  going  to  the  bad !  His  worst  fears  as  to 

16 


OF 


BREVET  SECOND  LIEUTENANT  ]J 

the  possible  effects  of  a  military  education  had,  after  all, 
been  realized !  When  I  showed  him  the  first  check  from 
New  York,  covering  my  pay  account  for  July,  he  said 
that  it  was  enough  to  ruin  any  boy  in  the  world.  Indeed, 
I  myself  was  conscious  of  the  fact  that  I  had  not  done  a 
stroke  of  work  all  that  month  for  those  sixty-five  and 
a  half  dollars;  and  in  order  that  my  father  might  be  con 
vinced  of  my  determination  not  to  let  such  unearned 
wealth  lead  me  into  dissipation,  I  at  once  offered  to  lend 
him  fifty  dollars  to  pay  a  debt  due  to  somebody  on  the 
Freeport  Baptist  meeting-house.  Confidence  was  thereby 
restored. 

My  first  orders  assigned  me  to  duty  at  Fort  Moultrie, 
South  Carolina,  as  brevet  second  lieutenant  in  the  2d 
Artillery.  The  steamer  landed  me  at  Charleston,  Sep 
tember  29,  1853,  the  day  I  became  twenty-two  years  of 
age.  The  next  morning  I  found  myself  without  money 
enough  to  pay  my  hotel  bill  and  take  me  over  to  Sulli 
van's  Island,  but  pay  was  due  me  for  September.  Upon 
inquiry,  I  found  that  the  paymaster  was  not  in  the  city, 
but  that  he  kept  his  public  funds  in  the  Bank  of  South 
Carolina.  Being  unacquainted  with  any  of  the  good 
people  of  Charleston,  the  well-known  rules  of  banks 
about  identification  seemed  a  serious  obstacle.  I  pre 
sented  my  pay  account  at  the  bank,  informing  the 
cashier  with  a  confident  air  that  I  was  well  aware  of  the 
fact  that  the  major's  money  was  there,  but  that  the  major 
himself  was  out  of  town.  The  accomplished  cashier, 
after  scrutinizing  me  for  a  time,  handed  me  the  money. 
My  older  brother  officers  at  the  fort  had  a  good  laugh  at 
what  they  were  pleased  to  call  my  "brass";  but  I  con 
soled  myself  with  the  reflection  that  I  had  found  out  that 
my  face  was  good  for  something.  It  is  an  instructive 
fact  that  before  the  Civil  War  an  officer  of  the  army 
needed  no  indorser  anywhere  in  this  country.  His  check 
or  his  pay  account  was  as  good  as  gold.  All  that  was 


13          FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

required  was  identification.  It  is  lamentably  true  that 
such  has  not  been  the  case  since  the  war. 

I  found  only  one  officer  on  duty  with  my  battery  at 
Fort  Moultrie,  and  he  was  awaiting  my  arrival  so  that 
he  might  go  on  leave.  He  turned  over  the  command 
with  a  manifestation  of  confidence  which  surprised  me 
at  the  time,  but  which  was  fully  explained  the  next  day. 
In  the  morning  the  first  sergeant  reported  to  me,  with 
the  quarterly  and  monthly  returns  prepared  for  my  sig 
nature,  and  made  out  more  beautifully  than  anything  in 
writing  I  had  ever  before  seen,  and  explained  to  me  in 
detail  all  the  business  affairs  of  the  battery,  as  if  he  were 
reporting  to  an  old  captain  who  had  just  returned  from 
a  long  leave  of  absence.  Next  to  General  Scott  and 
Colonel  Lee,  with  whom  I  had  had  the  honor  of  some 
acquaintance,  I  was  quite  sure  there  stood  before  me  the 
finest-looking  and  most  accomplished  soldier  in  the 
United  States  Army.  What  a  hard  time  young  officers 
of  the  army  would  sometimes  have  but  for  the  old  ser 
geants  !  I  have  pitied  from  the  bottom  of  my  heart  vol 
unteer  officers  whom  I  have  seen  starting  out,  even  in 
the  midst  of  war,  with  perfectly  raw  regiments,  and  not 
even  one  old  sergeant  to  teach  them  anything.  No 
country  ought  to  be  so  cruel  to  its  soldiers  as  that. 

In  September  we  had  the  usual  artillery  target  prac 
tice,  which  was  afterward  recalled  to  my  mind  many 
times  by  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter  in  1861  by 
the  same  guns  I  had  used  in  practice,  and  at  the  same 
range.  Then  came  the  change  of  stations  of  troops, 
which  took  the  Moultrie  garrison  to  Florida,  and  some 
of  the  1st  Artillery  to  their  place.  For  a  time  the  fort 
was  left  without  garrison  except  a  few  officers  who  were 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  their  regiment.  I  also  was  or 
dered  to  remain  until  I  "  got  off  my  brevet "  and  was 
appointed  "full  second"  in  the  1st  Artillery.  It  had 
been  a  yellow-fever  summer,  and  the  cottages  on  Sulli- 


JOURNEY  TO  FORT  CAPRON,  FLORIDA         19 

van's  Island  were  even  more  fully  occupied  than  usual, 
mostly  by  families  of  planters  from  the  rice  plantations 
of  South  Carolina.  Hospitality  was  unbounded,  and  of 
the  most  charming  character.  Nothing  I  have  experi 
enced  at  home  or  in  the  great  capitals  of  Europe  has 
surpassed  or  dimmed  the  memory  of  that  first  introduc 
tion  to  Southern  society. 

In  December,  1853,  the  order  came  announcing  my 
appointment  as  second  lieutenant,  1st  Artillery,  and  di 
recting  me  to  join  Battery  D  at  Fort  Capron,  Indian 
River,  Florida.  A  steamer  took  me  to  Palatka,  stopping 
a  short  time  at  Jacksonville,  which  was  then  little  more 
than  a  landing  on  the  St.  John's  River.  After  a  week's 
delay  at  Palatka,  another  little  mail-steamer  carried 
me  and  a  few  other  passengers  up  the  river  to  Lake 
Monroe,  whence  a  mule  served  for  transportation  across 
to  New  Smyrna,  on  Mosquito  Lagoon,  opposite  the  inlet. 
It  was  a  great  day's  sport  going  up  the  river.  The  banks 
seemed  almost  lined  with  alligators,  and  the  water  cov 
ered  with  water-fowl  of  all  kinds,  while  an  occasional 
deer  or  flock  of  turkeys  near  by  would  offer  a  chance 
shot.  At  New  Smyrna  Mrs.  Sheldon  provided  excellent 
entertainment  during  the  ten  days'  waiting  for  the  mall- 
boat  down  Mosquito  Lagoon  and  Indian  River,  while 
Mr.  Sheldon's  pack  of  hounds  furnished  sport.  At 
length  old  Captain  Davis  took  the  mail  and  my  baggage 
and  me  on  board  his  sloop,  bound  for  Fort  Capron,  op 
posite  the  mouth  of  Indian  River.  He  divided  his  time 
fairly  between  carrying  the  United  States  mail  and 
drinking  whisky,  but  he  never  attempted  to  do  both  at 
the  same  time.  I  am  not  sure  but  it  was  the  captain's 
example  which  first  suggested  to  me  the  rule  which  I 
adopted  when  commanding  an  army  in  the  field  —  to  do 
no  drinking  till  after  the  day's  fighting  was  over.  But, 
in  fact,  I  never  liked  whisky,  and  never  drank  much, 
anyhow. 


20          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

We  arrived  in  twenty-five  days  from  Charleston,  which 
was  regarded  as  a  very  satisfactory  journey.  At  the 
fort  I  found  Captain  and  Brevet-Major  Joseph  A.  Has- 
kin,  commanding;  First  Lieutenant  A.  P.  Hill,  after 
ward  lieutenant-general  in  the  Confederate  army ;  Dr.  A. 
J.  Foard,  assistant  surgeon ;  and  my  classmate  Livingston, 
brevet  second  lieutenant;  besides  sixteen  enlisted  men 
—  rather  a  close  approximation  to  the  ideal  of  that  old 
colonel  who  once  said  the  army  would  be  delightful  if  it 

were  not  for  the  soldiers.  But  that  was  changed 

after  a  while  by  the  arrival  of  recruits  —  enough  in  one 
batch  to  fill  the  battery  full.  The  battery  had  recently 
come  from  the  gulf  coast,  where  yellow  fever  had  done 
destructive  work.  I  was  told  that  there  happened  to  be 
only  one  officer  on  duty  with  the  battery  —  a  Lieutenant 
somebody  —  when  the  fever  broke  out,  and  that  he  re 
signed  and  went  home.  If  that  is  true,  I  trust  he  went 
into  the  Civil  War  and  got  killed  in  battle;  for  that  was 
the  only  atonement  he  could  possibly  make  for  leaving 
his  men  in  that  way.  But  such  cases  have  been  ex 
ceedingly  rare,  while  those  of  the  opposite  extreme  have 
not  been  uncommon,  where  officers  have  remained  with 
the  sick  and  died  there,  instead  of  going  with  the  main 
body  of  their  men  to  a  more  healthy  place.  The  proper 
place  for  a  line  officer  is  with  the  fighting  force,  to  care 
for  it  and  preserve  its  strength  by  every  means  in  his 
power,  for  war  may  come  to-morrow.  The  surgeons  and 
their  assistants  must  and  do  fully  care  for  the  sick  and 
wounded. 

Life  at  Fort  Capron  was  not  by  any  means  monoto 
nous.  It  was  varied  by  sailing,  fishing,  and  shooting,  and 
even  the  continuity  of  sport  was  broken  twice  a  month, 
generally,  by  the  arrival  of  the  mail-boat.  But  at  length 
this  diversion  failed  us.  Some  difference  occurred  be 
tween  the  United  States  Post-office  Department  and  the 
mail-contractor  on  the  St.  John's  Eiver,  and  we  got  no 


AN   "AFFAIR  OF  HONOR"  21 

mail  for  three  months.  Then  the  commanding  officer 
ordered  me  to  go  to  Charleston  by  the  sloop  that  had 
brought  us  supplies,  and  bring  back  the  mail  by  the  regu 
lar  route.  I  made  the  round  trip  in  little  more  than  a 
month.  That  same  paymaster  whom  I  had  found  away 
from  his  post  on  my  first  arrival  in  Charleston  intrusted 
to  me  a  carpet-bag  full  of  gold  and  silver,  to  pay  off  the 
garrison  for  the  past  six  months,  with  as  much  advance 
pay  as  the  officers  would  consent  to  take,  so  that  he  would 
not  have  to  make  the  trip  down  for  a  long  time  to  come. 
I  had  to  carry  the  money-bag  and  a  revolver  about 
with  me  for  twenty-five  days  or  more.  I  have  never 
consented  to  handle  Uncle  Sam's  money  since  that  time. 
It  was  during  that  short  visit  to  Charleston  that  I  be 
came  engaged,  for  the  first  and  only  time,  in  an  "  affair 
of  honor."  A  young  man  who  had  been  in  my  class  at 
West  Point,  but  had  resigned  before  the  class  had  grad 
uated,  came  to  me  at  the  hotel,  and  asked  me,  as  his 
"  friend,"  to  deliver  a  note  he  held  in  his  hand.  I  replied: 
"  Yes.  If  you  will  place  yourself  in  my  hands  and  do 
what  I  decide  is  honorable  and  right,  I  will  be  your  friend. 
Tell  me  all  about  it."  My  condition  was  accepted  without 
reserve.  My  friend,  whose  home  was  in  a  distant  city, 
had  been  in  Charleston  some  weeks,  and  had  spent  all 
the  money  he  had  and  all  he  could  borrow.  He  was  on 
the  eve  of  negotiating  a  further  loan  from  a  well-known 
banker  when  the  son  of  that  banker,  who  had  met  my 
friend  about  town,  told  his  father  the  plain  truth  about 
my  friend's  habits  and  his  probable  value  as  a  debtor. 
The  negotiation  was  ended.  My  friend  had  become  a 
stranger  in  a  strange  land,  without  the  means  to  stay 
there  any  longer  or  to  go  home.  It  was  a  desperate  case  — 
one  which  could  not  be  relieved  by  anything  less  than 
the  blood  of  the  young  "  villain  "  who  had  told  his  father 
that  "  infamous  "—truth !  I  replied :  "  Yes,  that  is  a  bad 
case;  we  will  have  to  fix  that  up.  How  are  you  off  at 


22  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

home  ?  w  He  said  the  "  old  man  "  had  plenty  of  money, 
but  had  sent  him  enough  to  come  home  once  or  twice 
before,  and  would  not  send  any  more.  Upon  further  in 
quiry,  I  found  that  my  friend's  hotel  bill  and  expenses 
home  would  amount  to  a  little  less  than  the  sum  I  had 
just  drawn  on  my  pay  account  up  to  date ;  so  I  handed 
him  the  money,  saying  that  he  could  return  it  when  conve 
nient,  and  his  "  honor  "  was  fully  satisfied.  I  never  after 
ward  heard  anything  from  him  about  that  money,  and  my 
tailor  had  to  wait  a  little  longer  for  his  pay ;  but  I  had 
done  my  duty,  as  I  understood  it,  under  the  code  of  honor. 
I  saw  that  friend  once  afterward.  He  went  into  the  army 
in  1861,  accidentally  shot  himself,  and  died  miserably  on 
the  march,  an  old  musket-barrel,  placed  there  by  my 
order,  marking  his  grave  by  the  wayside.  It  was  not 
granted  to  him,  poor  fellow!  to  fight  a  battle  for  his 
country. 

I  took  with  me  to  Florida  some  law-books  —  Black- 
stone,  Kent,  and  a  few  others:  so  few,  indeed,  that  I 
learned  them  nearly  all  by  heart ;  then,  for  want  of  any 
thing  better,  I  read  over  the  entire  code  of  the  State  of 
Florida.  Several  times  in  after  years  I  found  it  neces 
sary,  in  order  to  save  time,  to  repeat  to  great  lawyers  the 
exact  words  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States; 
but  their  habit  was  much  the  better.  It  is  seldom  wise 
to  burden  the  memory  with  those  things  which  you  have 
only  to  open  a  book  to  find  out.  I  recollect  well  the  an 
swer  once  made  by  William  M.  Evarts,  then  attorney- 
general  of  the  United  States,  to  my  inquiry  whether  he 
would  give  me,  offhand,  the  law  on  a  certain  point,  to 
save  the  time  requisite  for  a  formal  application  and  an 
swer  in  writing.  He  said  if  it  was  a  question  of  statute 
law  he  would  have  to  examine  the  books,  but  if  only  a 
question  of  common  law  he  could  make  that  as  well  as 
anybody.  But  I  had  nothing  better  to  do  for  a  time  in 
Florida,  and  when  I  got  out  I  did  not  find  my  memory 


AN  EXTEMPORIZED   "MAP  AND  ITINERARY"  23 

half  so  much  overloaded  with  law  as  my  blood  was  with 
malarial  poison.  Luckily,  I  got  rid  of  the  poison  after  a 
while,  but  held  on  to  the  law,  and  I  never  found  it  did 
me  any  harm.  In  fact,  I  would  advise  all  young  officers 
to  acquire  as  much  of  it  as  they  can. 

In  the  winter  of  1853-4  there  was  an  armed  truce  be 
tween  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  Seminole 
nation.  A  new  policy  was  soon  inaugurated,  which  had 
for  its  object  to  establish  a  complete  line  of  posts  across 
the  State  from  Jupiter  to  Lake  Okeechobee,  and  thence 
westward  to  the  gulf,  so  as  more  securely  to  confine  the 
Seminoles  within  the  Everglade  region,  although,  so  far 
as  I  know,  nobody  then  wanted  the  use  of  that  more 
northern  part  of  this  vast  territory.  The  first  step  was 
to  reopen  the  old  military  road  from  the  mouth  of  In 
dian  River  across  to  the  Kissimmee  River,  and  thence  to 
Tampa.  Being  the  second  lieutenant  of  the  single  com 
pany,  I  was  given  the  privilege  of  doing  that  work,  and 
nine  men  and  one  wagon  were  assigned  me  for  that  pur 
pose.  I  spent  the  larger  part  of  my  time,  going  and  com 
ing,  in  hunting  on  either  the  right  or  the  left  of  the 
road,  thereby  obtaining  all  the  deer  and  turkeys  the  com 
mand  could  consume,  but  paying  very  little  attention  to 
the  road  itself,  in  utter  disregard  of  the  usual  military 
rule  which  requires  that  a  sketch  be  made  and  an  itinerary 
kept  of  all  such  marches.  Hence  I  was  a  little  puzzled 
when  Acting-Inspector-Greneral  Canby,  from  Washing 
ton,  wanted  to  go  across  from  Indian  River  to  Tampa, 
and  called  on  me  for  a  copy  of  my  map  and  itinerary. 
But  I  had  stood  very  high  in  drawing  at  West  Point,  and 
could  not  allow  myself  to  be  disturbed  in  any  such  way 
as  that;  so  I  unlocked  what  little  recollection  I  had  of 
the  route  and  my  general  knowledge  of  the  country,  and 
prepared  a  very  beautiful  map  and  a  quite  elaborate  itin 
erary,  with  which  the  inspector-general  seemed  greatly 
pleased.  But  I  took  great  care,  in  addition,  to  send 


24  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

a  man  with  him  who  had  been  with  me,  and  who  was  a 
good  guide,  so  I  felt  quite  safe  respecting  any  possible 
imperfections  that  the  inspector-general  might  find  in 
my  work.  I  never  heard  anything  more  about  that  mat 
ter  until  G-eneral  Sherman  and  I  met  General  Canby  at 
Portland  in  1870.  At  that  time  we  had  a  little  laugh  at 
my  expense  respecting  the  beauty  of  that  map  of  mine, 
and  the  accuracy  with  which  I  had  delineated  the  route. 
But  as  I  was  then  a  major-general,  and  Canby  was  a 
brigadier-general  under  my  command,  I  was  not  sub 
jected  to  the  just  criticism  I  deserved  for  having  forgot 
ten  that  map  and  itinerary  at  the  time  I  made  the  march. 
The  next  step  in  the  strategical  operations  designed 
by  the  War  Department  for  Florida  was  the  occupation 
of  Fort  Jupiter,  and  the  construction  of  a  new  post  there, 
reopening  the  old  military  road  of  General  Jesup  and 
building  a  block-house  on  the  bank  of  Lake  Okeechobee, 
similar  work  to  be  undertaken  from  the  other  shore  of 
the  lake  westward.  The  work  was  commenced  about 
midwinter  of  1854-5,  and  it  was  my  privilege  to  do  it. 
When  the  hot  weather  came  on  at  Jupiter,  fever  began 
to  break  out  among  the  troops.  Jupiter  Inlet  had  been 
closed  for  several  years,  and  the  water  had  become  stag 
nant.  Within  a  very  few  weeks,  every  man,  woman, 
and  child  was  down,  or  had  been  down,  with  fever.  The 
mortality  was  such  that  there  were  hardly  enough  strong 
men  remaining  to  bury  the  dead.  As  soon  as  I  had  suf 
ficiently  recovered  to  go  in  a  boat  to  Fort  Capron,  the 
major  sent  me  back  with  all  the  convalescents  that 
were  fit  to  be  moved,  and  soon  afterward  broke  up  that 
pest-house  at  Jupiter  and  moved  the  command  back  to 
Capron.  So  far  as  I  know,  Fort  Jupiter  was  never  again 
occupied,  and  I  think  the  block-house  on  Lake  Okeecho 
bee  was  never  completed.  At  all  events,  as  good  luck 
would  have  it,  I  got  through  with  my  part  of  the  work 
and  was  ordered  out  of  Florida  before  the  Seminoles 


YELLOW  FEVER  25 

found  out  what  the  plans  of  the  War  Department  were. 
My  old  friend  and  companion  George  L.  Hartsuff,  who 
had  like  duty  to  perform  on  the  west  side  of  the  lake, 
was  attacked  by  the  Indians  and  severely  wounded,  seve 
ral  of  his  men  being  killed.  He  and  a  few  others  made 
their  escape.  Hartsuff  was  one  of  the  strongest,  bravest, 
finest  soldiers  I  ever  knew,  and  one  of  my  most  intimate 
friends ;  but,  unlike  myself,  he  was  always  in  bad  luck. 
He  got  caught  by  the  Seminoles  in  Florida;  was  ship 
wrecked  on  Lake  Michigan;  came  very  near  dying  of 
yellow  fever;  and  after  organizing  the  Twenty-third 
Army  Corps  and  commanding  it  for  a  time,  finally  died 
of  the  wounds  he  had  received  in  Florida. 

I  had  a  new  and  peculiar  experience  at  Fort  Capron 
during  my  convalescence.  I  had  there  twenty-five  or 
thirty  convalescent  soldiers,  and  no  doctor,  but  an  intel 
ligent  hospital  steward.  I  was  like  the  lawyer  who  was 
asked  to  say  grace  at  the  table  of  one  of  his  wealthy 
clients,  and  who  was  unwilling  to  admit,  under  such  cir 
cumstances,  that  there  was  any  one  thing  he  could  not 
do.  So  I  had  sick-call  regularly  every  morning,  care 
fully  questioned  every  patient  as  to  his  symptoms,  and 
told  the  steward  what  to  give  him,  taking  care  not  to 
prescribe  anything  which  some  doctor  had  not  tried  on 
me.  All  my  patients  got  well.  At  length  A.  P.  Hill 
came  up  from  Jupiter,  on  his  way  home  on  sick-leave. 
At  Capron  he  had  a  relapse,  and  was  desperately  ill.  I 
had  to  send  a  barge  to  Jupiter  for  some  medicine  which 
he  knew  was  necessary.  Mr.  Jones,  the  sutler,  and  some 
of  the  men  helped  me  to  nurse  him  night  and  day  for  a 
long  time.  At  length  he  recovered  so  far  as  to  continue 
his  journey. 

About  the  same  time  came  orders  promoting  me  to 
first  lieutenant  and  detailing  me  for  duty  at  West  Point. 
So  Hill  and  I  came  out  of  Florida  together.  On  board 
the  St.  John's  River  steamer  I  had  a  relapse,  and  was 


26  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

very  ill.  Hill  cared  for  me  tenderly,  kept  me  at  Savan 
nah  awhile,  and  then  some  days  at  Charleston,  where  I 
became  so  much  better  that  he  ventured  to  leave  me 
long  enough  to  go  over  to  Fort  Moultrie  to  see  some  of 
our  brother  officers.  While  he  was  away  I  became  so  ill 
again  that  the  doctor  had  to  put  me  under  the  influence 
of  chloroform.  When  Hill  came  back  in  the  evening  he 
cursed  himself  for  all  that  was  mean  in  the  world  for 
having  left  me  even  for  an  hour.  That  's  the  kind  of 
friends  and  comrades  soldiers  are!  As  soon  as  I  was 
well  enough  to  travel,  Hill  took  me  to  his  home  at  Cul- 
peper  Court-house  in  Virginia.  There  they  kept  me  quite 
a  long  time.  That  dear  old  gentleman,  his  father,  brought 
to  my  bedside  every  morning  a  brandy  mint- julep,  made 
with  his  own  hand,  to  drink  before  I  got  up.  Under  its 
benign  influence  my  recovery  was  very  rapid.  But  let 
none  of  my  young  friends  forget  that  the  best  gifts  of 
Providence  are  those  most  liable  to  be  abused.  The  wise 
Virginian  never  offered  me  too  many  of  them.  By  the 
first  of  December  Hill  and  I  went  together  to  West  Point, 
I  to  report  for  duty,  and  he  to  visit  his  numerous  warm 
friends  at  that  delightful  station.  There  we  parted,  in 
December,  1855,  never  to  meet  again.  With  the  glad 
tidings  from  Virginia  that  peace  was  near,  there  came 
to  me  in  North  Carolina  the  report  that  Lieutenant-Gren- 
eral  A.  P.  Hill  had  been  killed  in  the  last  battle  at  Peters 
burg.  A  keen  pang  shot  through  my  heart,  for  he  had 
not  ceased  to  be  esteemed  as  my  kind  friend  and  brother, 
though  for  four  years  numbered  among  the  public  enemy. 
His  sense  of  duty,  so  false  in  my  judgment,  I  yet  knew 
to  be  sincere,  because  I  knew  the  man.  I  wish  all  my 
fellow-citizens,  North  and  South,  East  and  West,  could 
know  each  other  as  well  as  I  knew  A.  P.  Hill. 

I  was  assigned  to  duty  in  the  department  of  philoso 
phy,  under  Professor  W.  H.  C.  Bartlett,  one  of  the  ablest, 
most  highly  esteemed,  and  most  beloved  of  the  great  men 


IN  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  PHILOSOPHY  AT  WEST  POINT    27 

who  have  placed  the  United  States  Military  Academy 
among  the  foremost  institutions  of  the  world.  At  first  it 
seemed  a  little  strange  to  be  called  back,  after  the  lapse  of 
only  two  years,  to  an  important  duty  at  the  place  where  my 
military  record  had  been  so  "  bad."  But  I  soon  found  that 
at  West  Point,  as  elsewhere,  the  standard  of  merit  depended 
somewhat  upon  the  point  of  view  of  the  judge.  A  mas 
ter  of  "  philosophy  "  could  not  afford  to  look  too  closely 
into  past  records  in  other  subjects.  Besides,  philosophers 
know,  if  others  do  not,  that  philosophers  are  sure  to  profit 
by  healthful  experience.  I  never  had  any  more  trouble 
at  West  Point,  though  I  did  have  much  difficulty  in  help 
ing  younger  men  out.  I  had  the  great  good  fortune  never 
to  be  compelled  to  report  a  cadet  for  any  delinquency, 
nor  to  find  one  deficient  in  studies,  though  I  did  some 
times  have,  figuratively  speaking,  to  beat  them  over  the 
head  with  a  cudgel  to  get  in  "  phil "  enough  to  pass  the 
academic  board. 

I  had  then  a  strong  impression,  which  has  grown  still 
stronger  with  time,  that  "  equations  A  and  B  "  need  not 
be  developed  very  far  into  the  "  mechanics  of  molecules  " 
to  qualify  a  gallant  young  fellow  for  the  command  of  a 
squadron  of  cavalry ;  but  this  is,  in  fact,  generally  and 
perfectly  well  understood  at  West  Point.  The  object 
there  is  to  develop  the  mental,  moral,  and  physical  man 
to  as  high  a  degree  as  practicable,  and  to  ascertain  his 
best  place  in  the  public  service.  It  is  only  the  hopelessly 
incorrigible  in  some  respect  who  fall  by  the  way.  Even 
they,  if  they  have  stayed  there  long  enough,  are  the  bet 
ter  for  the  training  they  have  received. 

In  this  congenial  work  and  its  natural  sequence  I 
formed  for  the  first  time  the  habit  of  earnest,  hard  mental 
work  to  the  limit  of  my  capacity  for  endurance,  and 
sometimes  a  little  beyond,  which  I  have  retained  the 
greater  part  of  my  life.  After  the  short  time  required  to 
master  the  "  Analytical  Mechanics  "  which  had  been  in- 


28  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

troduced  as  a  text-book  since  I  had  graduated,  and  a  short 
absence  on  account  of  my  Florida  debility,  which  had 
reduced  me  to  120  pounds  in  weight,  I  began  to  pursue 
physics  into  its  more  secret  depths.  I  even  indulged  the 
ambition  to  work  out  the  mathematical  interpretation  of 
all  the  phenomena  of  physical  science,  including  electri 
city  and  magnetism.  After  three  years  of  hard  labor  in 
this  direction,  I  thought  I  could  venture  to  publish  a  part 
of  my  work  in  book  form,  and  thus  submit  it  to  the  judg 
ment  of  the  able  scientists  whose  acquaintance  I  had 
made  at  the  meetings  of  the  American  Association  for 
the  Advancement  of  Science.1 

While  I  was  engaged  in  this  work  upon  physics,  a 
young  gentleman  named  Drown  came  to  West  Point,  and 
asked  me  to  give  him  some  private  lessons  in  mechanics 
and  astronomy,  to  perfect  his  qualifications  as  a  teacher. 
I  went  over  those  subjects  with  him  in  about  one  hun 
dred  lessons,  including  a  few  in  practical  astronomy.  He 
was  the  most  ardent  student  I  have  ever  known.  Like,  I 
doubt  not,  all  the  most  earnest  seekers  for  divine  truth,  in 
whatever  way  revealed  to  man,  he  would  not  be  satisfied 
with  his  own  perception  of  such  truth  unless  he  could  feel 
it  "  burn  in  his  brain."  In  that  brief  experience  I  became 
for  the  first  time  intensely  interested  in  practical  as 
tronomy,  about  which  I  had  thought  little  before,  al 
though  I  had  had  sole  charge  of  the  observatory  for  some 
time.  I  have  always  since  given  Professor  Drown  credit 
for  teaching  me  practical  astronomy  by  first  leading  me 
to  the  discovery  that  I  had  a  natural  taste  and  aptitude 
for  such  work,  theretofore  unsuspected.  That  new  "lead" 
was  followed  with  all  possible  zeal,  day  and  night,  for 
many  months,  until  all  the  instruments  in  the  observa- 


iMuch  of  my  time  in  St.  Louis  dur-  it  ready  for  the  press.    Then  it  was 

ing  the  winter  preceding  the   Civil  packed  up  in  a  box,  and  carefully 

War  was  spent  in  revising  this  work,  stored  away  in  the  St.  Louis  Arsenal, 

preparing  illustrations,  and  getting  to  abide  the  results  of  war. 


INTEREST  IN  ASTRONOMY  29 

tory,  fixed  and  movable,  including  the  old  mural  circle, 
had  gone  through  a  season's  work.  Although  my  scien 
tific  experience  has  been  very  limited,  I  do  not  believe 
anything  else  in  the  broad  domain  of  science  can  be  half 
so  fascinating  as  the  study  of  the  heavens.  I  have  re 
gretted  many  times  that  necessity  limited  my  enjoyment 
of  that  great  pleasure  to  a  very  few  years  instead  of  a 
lifetime. 

In  that  West  Point  observatory  I  had  one  of  the  many 
opportunities  of  my  life — one  which  I  always  enjoyed  — 
of  protecting  the  unfortunate  from  the  stern  decree  of 
"justice."  The  old  German  custodian  came  to  me  one 
morning  in  great  distress,  saying  that  he  had  let  the  "  as 
tronomical  chronometer"  run  down,  and  that  the  pro 
fessor  would  kill  him.  I  went  with  him  to  the  transit 
tower,  made  an  observation,  and  set  the  chronometer. 
The  professor  never  knew  the  difference  till  I  told  him, 
after  the  lapse  of  time  named  in  the  military  statute  of 
limitations.  Then  he  seemed  to  rejoice  as  much  as  I  over 
the  narrow  escape  of  his  faithful  subordinate.  The  pro 
fessor  was  not  half  as  stern  as  he  sometimes  appeared  to  be. 

I  need  hardly  say  that  in  the  midst  of  these  absorbing 
occupations  I  forgot  all  about  the  career  I  had  chosen 
in  my  boyhood.  The  law  had  no  longer  any  charms  for 
me.  Yet  I  found  in  after  life  far  more  use  for  the  law 
than  for  physics  and  astronomy,  and  little  less  than  for 
the  art  and  science  of  war. 

In  June,  1857, 1  married  Miss  Harriet  Bartlett,  the  sec 
ond  daughter  of  my  chief  in  the  department  of  philoso 
phy.  Five  children  were  born  to  us,  three  of  whom — two 
sons  and  one  daughter — grew  to  maturity  and  survive 
their  mother,  who  died  in  Washington  soon  after  I  was 
assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army,  and  was  buried  at 
West  Point  by  the  side  of  our  first-born  son,  who  had 
died  in  1868,  soon  after  I  became  Secretary  of  War. 

In  the  summer  of  1860  came  the  end  of  my  term  of 


30  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

duty  at  West  Point.  My  taste  for  service  in  the  line 
of  the  army,  if  I  ever  had  any,  was  gone ;  and  all  hope  of 
promotion,  if  I  ever  had  any,  was  still  further  away.  I 
had  been  for  more  than  four  years  about  nineteenth  first 
lieutenant  in  my  regiment,  without  rising  a  single  file.  I 
was  a  man  of  family,  and  had  already  become  quite  bald 
"  in  the  service  of  my  country."  There  was  no  captaincy 
in  sight  for  me  during  the  ordinary  lifetime  of  man,  so 
I  accepted  the  professorship  of  physics  in  Washington 
(Jniversity,  St.  Louis,  Missouri.  But  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis, 
an  intimate  friend  of  my  father-in-law,  gave  me  a  timely 
hint  that  promotion  might  be  better  in  a  year  or  two; 
and  his  bitterest  personal  enemy,  General  Scott,  gave  me 
a  highly  flattering  indorsement  which  secured  leave  of 
absence  for  a  year.  Thus  I  retained  my  commission. 

As  the  period  of  the  Civil  War  approached  a  very  large 
part  of  my  time  was  occupied  in  reading  and  studying, 
as  coolly  as  possible,  every  phase  of  the  momentous  ques 
tions  which  I  had  been  warned  must  probably  be  sub 
mitted  to  the  decision  of  war.  Hence,  when  the  crisis 
came  I  was  not  unprepared  to  decide  for  myself,  without 
prejudice  or  passion,  where  the  path  of  duty  lay,  yet  not 
without  some  feeling  of  indulgence  toward  my  brother 
officers  of  the  army  who,  as  I  believed,  were  led  by  the 
influence  of  others  so  far  astray.  I  took  an  early  oc 
casion  to  inform  General  Scott  of  my  readiness  to  relin 
quish  my  leave  of  absence  and  return  to  duty  whenever 
my  services  might  be  required,  and  I  had  the  high  honor 
of  not  being  requested  to  renew  my  oath  of  allegiance. 

My  life  in  St.  Louis  during  the  eight  months  next  pre 
ceding  the  Civil  War  was  of  great  benefit  to  me  in  the 
delicate  and  responsible  duties  which  so  soon  devolved 
upon  me.  My  connection  with  Washington  University 
brought  me  into  close  relations  with  many  of  the  most 
patriotic,  enlightened,  and,  above  all.  unselfish  citizens 
of  Missouri.  Some  of  them  were  of  the  Southern  school 


PEOFESSOE  OF  PHYSICS  IN  WASHINGTON  UNIVEESITY    31 

of  politics,  but  the  large  majority  were  earnest  Union 
men,  though  holding  the  various  shades  of  opinion  then 
common  on  the  question  of  slavery.  By  long  and  inti 
mate  intercourse,  in  the  joint  prosecution  of  work  of  the 
highest  philanthropy,  such  men  had  learned  to  respect 
the  sincerity  of  each  other's  adverse  convictions,  and  had 
become  the  exact  exemplars  of  the  many  shades  of  hon 
est,  patriotic  Unionism  so  clearly  described  in  1863  by 
President  Lincoln  in  his  letter  to  a  delegation  of  parti- 
zans  who  had  not  learned  that  principle  of  charity  which 
seems  to  have  been  born  in  the  great  martyr  of  freedom. 
Would  that  I  could  do  fitting  honor  to  the  names  of  those 
patriots,  nearly  all  of  whom  have  gone  to  their  rest,  in 
cluding  Dr.  Elliot,  President  of  Washington  University. 
James  E.  Yeatman,  President  of  the  Sanitary  Commission, 
still  lives  to  honor  his  country  and  the  great  cause  of 
humanity  of  which  he  was  the  faithful  and  efficient  ser 
vant.  I  did  not  meet  Hamilton  E.  Gamble  until  after 
he  had  become  governor.  I  shall  have  occasion  to  say 
more  of  him  later.  He  was  the  foremost  champion  of 
the  Union  cause  in  Missouri,  and  the  most  abused  by 
those  who  were  loudest  in  their  professions  of  loyalty. 
Of  the  younger  generation,  I  will  mention  only  one, 
whose  good  deeds  would  otherwise  never  be  known. 
While  himself  absent  in  the  public  service,  wherein  he. 
was  most  efficient,  he  made  me  occupy  his  delightful 
residence  near  Lafayette  Park,  and  consume  all  the  pro 
ducts  of  his  excellent  garden.  We  knew  each  other  then 
only  as  fellow- workers  in  the  Union  cause,  but  have 
been  the  most  devoted  friends  from  that  day  to  this. 
The  name  of  that  dear  friend  of  mine  is  Charles  Gibson. 
Among  the  earliest  and  most  active  leaders  in  the  Union 
cause  in  Missouri,  I  must  not  fail  to  mention  the  fore 
most  —  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.  His  patriotism  and  courage 
were  like  a  calcium  light  at  the  head  of  the  Union  column 
in  the  dark  days  and  nights  of  the  spring  of  1861. 


CHAPTER  III 

HETURN  TO  DUTY — GENEEAL  HARNEY'S  ATTITUDE — NATHAN 
IEL  LYON  IN  COMMAND  —  DEFENSE  OF  THE  ST.  LOUIS 
ARSENAL  —  SERVICE  AS  MUSTERING  OFFICER — MAJOR  OF 
THE  FIRST  MISSOURI  —  SURRENDER  OF  CAMP  JACKSON 
—  ADJUTANT-GENERAL  ON  LYON'S  STAFF  —  A  MISSING 
LETTER  FROM  FREMONT  TO  LYON  —  LYON'S  REPLY  — 
BATTLE  OF  WILSON'S  CREEK — DEATH  OF  LYON  —  A 
QUESTION  OF  COMMAND  DURING  THE  RETREAT  —  ORI 
GIN  OF  THE  OPPOSITION  OF  THE  BLAIRS  TO  FREMONT  — 
AFFAIR  AT  FREDERICKTOWN. 

WHEN  it  became  probable  that  military  force  would 
be  required  by  the  government  to  maintain  its 
authority  in  the  Southern  States,  I  informed  the  War 
Department  of  my  readiness  to  return  to  duty  whenever 
my  services  might  be  required,  and  was  instructed  to  await 
orders  in  St.  Louis.  Upon  President  Lincoln's  first  call 
for  volunteers,  I  was  detailed  to  muster  in  the  troops  re 
quired  of  the  State  of  Missouri.  With  the  order  of  detail 
was  furnished  a  copy  of  the  old  instructions  for  mustering 
into  service,  etc.,  which  required  me  to  call  upon  the  gov 
ernor  of  Missouri  for  the  regiments  to  be  mustered,  and 
to  accept  only  fully  organized  regiments.  It  was  well 
and  publicly  known  that  the  executive  of  Missouri  was 
disloyal  to  the  United  States,  and  that  compliance  with 
the  President's  demand  for  volunteers  was  not  to  be  ex 
pected  from  the  State  government ;  yet  my  instructions 
authorized  me  to  take  no  action  which  could  be  effec 
tive  under  such  circumstances,  and  the  then  department 


RETURN  TO  DUTY  33 

commander,  Brigadier-General  William  S.  Harney,  would 
not  consent  that  any  such  action  be  taken  without  orders 
from  Washington.  I  called  upon  Governor  Jackson  for 
his  regiments,  but  received  no  reply. 

In  my  visit  to  General  Harney  after  the  attack  on  Fort 
Sumter,  I  urged  the  necessity  of  prompt  measures  to  pro 
tect  the  St.  Louis  Arsenal,  with  its  large  stores  of  arms 
and  ammunition,  then  of  priceless  value,  and  called  his 
attention  to  the  rumor  of  an  intended  attack  upon  the 
arsenal  by  the  secessionists  then  encamped  near  the  city 
under  the  guise  of  State  militia.  In  reply,  the  general 
denounced  in  his  usual  vigorous  language  the  proposed 
attempt  upon  the  arsenal ;  and,  as  if  to  clinch  his  charac 
terization  of  such  a  " outrage,"  said:  "Why,  the 

State  has  not  yet  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession ;  she 
has  not  gone  out  of  the  Union."  That  did  not  indicate  to 
me  that  General  Harney's  Union  principles  were  quite  up 
to  the  standard  required  by  the  situation,  and  I  shared  with 
many  others  a  feeling  of  great  relief  when  he  was  soon 
after  relieved,  and  Captain  Nathaniel  Lyon  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  the  department.  Yet  I  have  no  doubt 
General  Harney  was,  from  his  own  point  of  view, 
thoroughly  loyal  to  the  Union,  though  much  imbued 
with  the  Southern  doctrines  which  brought  on  secession 
and  civil  war.  His  appropriate  place  after  that  move 
ment  began  was  that  of  the  honorable  retirement  in 
which  he  passed  the  remainder  of  his  days,  respected  by 
all  for  his  sterling  character  and  many  heroic  services 
to  his  country. 

Two  days  later,  Captain  Lyon,  then  commanding  the 
St.  Louis  Arsenal,  having  received  from  the  War  Depart 
ment  authority  to  enroll  and  muster  into  the  service  the 
Missouri  volunteers  as  they  might  present  themselves,  I 
reported  to  him  and  acted  under  his  orders.  Fortu 
nately,  a  large  number  of  the  loyal  citizens  of  St.  Louis 
had,  in  anticipation  of  a  call  to  take  up  arms  in  support 


34  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  the  government,  organized  themselves  into  companies, 
and  received  some  instruction  in  tactics  at  their  places  of 
secret  nightly  meeting  in  the  city.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  organized  militia  of  the  State,  mostly  disloyal,  were 
in  the  city  of  St.  Louis  near  the  arsenal,  which  contained 
many  thousand  muskets,  and  which  was  defended  by 
only  a  small  body  of  regular  troops.  There  was  great 
danger  that  the  arsenal  would  follow  the  fate  of  the 
public  arsenals  in  the  more  Southern  States.  To  avert 
this  danger  was  the  first  great  object. 

Upon  receipt  of  the  necessary  authority  by  Captain 
Lyon,  I  was  called  out  of  church  on  Sunday  morning, 
April  21,  and  the  loyal  secret  organizations  were  in 
structed  to  enter  the  arsenal  at  night,  individually,  each 
member  being  furnished  with  a  pass  for  that  purpose. 
The  mustering  officer  employed  himself  all  night  and  the 
following  day  in  distributing  arms  and  ammunition  to  the 
men  as  they  arrived,  and  in  stationing  them  along  the  ar 
senal  walls.  Thus  the  successful  defense  of  the  arsenal 
was  secured,  though  its  garrison  was  neither  mustered 
into  service  nor  organized  into  regiments,  nor  even  en 
rolled.  The  organization  of  the  volunteers  now  began, 
the  mustering  officer  superintending  the  election  of  of 
ficers,  enrolling  the  men,  and  perfecting  the  organization 
in  conformity  to  the  militia  laws  of  the  State. 

On  June  4  I  transmitted  to  the  adjutant-general  "  the 
muster-rolls  of  five  regiments  of  infantry ;  of  four  rifle 
battalions  of  two  companies  each,  attached  to  the  1st, 
2d,  3d,  and  4th  regiments ;  of  one  artillery  battalion  of 
three  companies ;  and  of  a  company  of  pioneers " ;  also 
"  the  muster-roll  of  Brigadier-General  Lyon's  staff,  mus 
tered  by  himself."  Accompanying  the  muster-rolls  was 
a  return  showing  the  strength  of  each  regiment  and  of 
the  brigade. 

Lyon  had  previously  been  elected  brigadier-general  of 
the  brigade  the  regiments  of  which  I  had  mustered  in, 


MAJOR  OF  THE  FIRST  MISSOURI  35 

but  I  had  no  authority  to  muste^in  a  brigadier-general 
and  staff. 

The  Missouri  United  States  Reserve  Corps,  organized 
in  St.  Louis  about  the  same  time,  consisting  of  five  regi 
ments,  was  mustered  into  service  by  General  Lyon,  un 
der  special  authority  from  the  War  Department.  Upon 
the  cordial  invitation  of  the  officers  of  the  1st  Regi 
ment,  I  accepted  the  place  of  major  of  that  regiment, 
mustered  myself  into  service  as  such,  and  devoted  all  the 
time  that  could  be  spared  from  my  mustering  duties  to 
instructing  the  officers  in  tactics  and  military  adminis 
tration  —  a  labor  which  was  abundantly  repaid  by  the 
splendid  record  soon  made  by  that  regiment. 

On  June  24  I  made  a  full  report  to  the  adjutant-gen 
eral  of  the  discharge  of  my  duties  as  mustering  officer, 
including  three  new  regiments  of  three  years'  volun 
teers  whose  muster  would  be  completed  in  a  few  days. 
With  this  report  my  connection  with  that  service  was 
terminated.  On  the  following  day  I  was  relieved  from 
mustering  duty,  and  at  General  Lyon's  request  was  or 
dered  to  report  to  him  at  Boonville,  remaining  with  him 
as  adjutant-general  and  chief  of  staff  until  his  death  at 
Wilson's  Creek. 

The  foregoing  account  gives  the  organization  (the 
strength  was  about  14,000)  of  the  volunteer  force  with 
which  the  war  in  Missouri  was  begun.  To  this  was 
added  Lyon's  company  of  the  2d  Infantry,  a  detach 
ment  of  regular  recruits,  about  180  strong,  commanded 
by  Lieutenant  Lothrop,  and  Totten's  battery  of  the 
2d  United  States  Artillery.  Lyon,  who,  as  described, 
had  been  elected  brigadier-general  of  the  militia,  was  on 
May  17  appointed  by  the  President  to  the  same  grade 
in  the  United  States  volunteer  forces;  and  when,  on 
May  30,  General  Harney  was  relieved  from  the  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  West,  General  Lyon  be 
came  the  commander  of  that  department. 


36  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

G-eneral  Lyon  was  a  man  of  ability  and  scholarly  at 
tainments,  an  earnest  patriot,  keenly  alive  to  the  nature 
and  magnitude  of  the  struggle  in  which  the  country  was 
about  to  engage,  and  eager  to  take  the  initiative  as  soon 
as  he  had  at  his  command  sufficient  force  to  give  promise 
of  success.  To  his  keen  foresight  the  State  militia  at 
Camp  Jackson,  near  St.  Louis,  though  a  lawful  State 
organization  engaged  in  its  usual  annual  field  exercises, 
was  an  incipient  rebel  army  which  ought  to  be  crushed 
in  the  bud.  This  feeling  was  shared  by  the  more  earnest 
Union  men  of  St.  Louis,  who  had  the  confidence  of  the 
President  and  were  in  daily  consultation  with  Lyon; 
while  the  more  prudent  or  conservative,  hoping  to  avoid 
actual  conflict  in  the  State,  or  at  least  in  the  city,  advised 
forbearance.  Subsequent  events  showed  how  illusive 
was  the  hope  of  averting  hostilities  in  any  of  the  border 
States,  and  how  fortunate  it  was  that  active  measures 
were  adopted  at  once. 

On  May  10  General  Lyon  marched  out  with  the  force 
then  organized,  surrounded  Camp  Jackson,  and  demanded 
its  surrender.  The  militia  commander,  Brigadier-General 
Daniel  M.  Frost,  after  protesting  in  vain  against  the 
"  wrong  and  insult "  to  the  State,  seeing  resistance  hope 
less,  surrendered  his  command,  about  1500  men,  with 
their  arms  and  munitions  of  war.  After  the  surrender, 
and  while  preparations  were  making  to  conduct  the 
prisoners  to  the  arsenal,  some  shots  were  fired  upon  our 
troops  from  a  crowd  that  had  assembled  round  the  camp 
ground.  The  fire  was  returned  by  some  of  the  troops, 
in  spite  of  all  efforts  of  the  officers  to  prevent  it,  and  a 
number  of  persons,  mostly  inoffensive,  were  killed  and 
wounded.  In  this  affair  I  was  designated  by  Greneral 
Lyon  to  receive  the  surrender  of  the  commander  of 
Camp  Jackson  and  his  troops,  and  to  take  charge  of  the 
prisoners,  conduct  them  to  the  arsenal,  and  the  next  day 
to  parole  them.  I  extended  to  the  commander  and  other 


ADJUTANT-GENERAL  ON    LYON'S  STAFF  37 

officers  the  courtesy  of  permitting  them  to  retain  their 
swords,  and  treated  the  prisoners  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  soothe  somewhat  their  intensely  excited  feelings.  One 
of  the  colonels,  not  anticipating  such  courteous  treat 
ment,  had  broken  his  sword  and  thrown  the  pieces  upon 
the  ground,  rather  than  surrender  it  to  the  hated  Yankees. 

The  possession  of  St.  Louis,  and  the  supremacy  of  the 
national  authority  therein,  being  now  secured,  General 
Lyon  directed  his  energies  toward  operations  in  the 
interior  of  the  State.  On  June  13  he  moved  up  the  Mis 
souri  River  with  the  1st  Missouri  Volunteers,  Totten's 
battery  of  the  2d  United  States  Artillery,  one  com 
pany  of  the  2d  United  States  Infantry,  two  companies 
of  regular  recruits,  and  nine  companies  of  the  2d  Mis 
souri  Volunteers,  and  attacked  the  enemy  under  Sterling 
Price  on  the  17th,  near  Boonville,  and  gained  an  easy 
victory.  The  loss  on  our  side  was  two  killed  and  nine 
wounded ;  that  of  the  enemy,  ten  killed  and  a  number 
of  prisoners. 

I  joined  General  Lyon  at  Boonville  on  June  26,  and 
began  duty  as  his  adjutant-general.  Preparations  were 
now  made  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  push  operations  into 
the  southwestern  part  of  Missouri.  A  force  consisting 
of  about  1500  infantry  and  one  battery  of  four  guns, 
under  Colonel  Franz  Sigel,  was  sent  from  St.  Louis, 
via  Rolla,  to  Springfield ;  while  a  force  of  regular  troops 
under  Major  Samuel  D.  Sturgis,  1st  Cavalry,  consisting 
of  one  company  of  the  2d  Dragoons,  four  companies 
of  the  1st  Cavalry,  Du  Bois's  battery  of  four  guns,  three 
companies  of  the  1st  Infantry,  two  companies  of  the 
2d  Infantry,  some  regular  recruits,  the  1st  and  2d 
Kansas  Infantry,  and  one  company  of  Kansas  Cavalry 
Volunteers,  was  ordered  from  Fort  Leaven  worth  to  join 
General  Lyon's  immediate  command,  en  route  to  Spring 
field.  General  Lyon's  march  was  begun  on  July  3,  and 
Major  Sturgis  joined  him  at  Clinton,  Mo.,  on  the  4th. 


38  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

The  command  reached  Springfield  on  July  13,  and  there 
met  Colonel  Sigel's  brigade,  which  we  learned  had  pushed 
as  far  to  the  front  as  Newtonia,  but,  meeting  a  superior 
force  of  the  enemy  at  Carthage  on  July  5,  had  fallen 
back  to  Springfield.  General  Lyon's  intention  was,  upon 
effecting  this  junction  with  Sturgis  and  Sigel,  to  push 
forward  and  attack  the  enemy,  if  possible,  while  we  were 
yet  superior  to  him  in  strength.  He  had  ordered  sup 
plies  to  be  sent  from  St.  Louis  via  Rolla,  but  they  re 
mained  at  Rolla,  the  railroad  terminus,  for  want  of  wagon 
transportation.  The  troops  had  to  live  upon  such  sup 
plies  as  could  be  obtained  from  the  country,  and  many  of 
them  were  without  shoes.  A  continuous  march  of  more 
than  two  or  three  days  was  impossible.  General  Lyon's 
force  was  rapidly  diminishing,  and  would  soon  almost 
disappear  by  the  discharge  of  the  three  months'  men, 
while  that  of  the  enemy  was  as  rapidly  increasing  and 
becoming  more  formidable  by  additions  to  its  supplies 
of  arms  and  ammunition.  General  Lyon  made  frequent 
appeals  for  reinforcements  and  for  provisions,  but  re 
ceived  little  encouragement,  and  soon  became  convinced 
that  he  must  rely  upon  the  resources  then  at  his  com 
mand.  He  was  unwilling  to  abandon  southwestern  Mis 
souri  to  the  enemy  without  a  struggle,  even  though 
almost  hopeless  of  success,  and  determined  to  bring  on  a 
decisive  battle,  if  possible,  before  his  short-term  volun 
teers  were  discharged.  Learning  that  the  enemy  was 
slowly  advancing  from  the  southwest  by  two  or  three 
different  roads,  Lyon  moved  out,  August  1,  on  the  Cass- 
ville  road,  had  a  skirmish  with  the  enemy's  advance- 
guard  at  Dug  Springs  the  next  day,  and  the  day  follow 
ing  (the  3d)  again  at  Curran  Post-office.  The  enemy 
showed  no  great  force,  and  offered  but  slight  resistance 
to  our  advance.  It  was  evident  that  a  general  engage 
ment  could  not  be  brought  on  within  the  limits  of  time 
and  distance  to  which  we  were  confined  by  the  state  of 


A  MISSING  LETTER  FROM  FREMONT  TO  LYON  39 

our  supplies.  It  was  therefore  determined  to  return  to 
Springfield. 

General  Lyon  was  greatly  depressed  by  the  situation 
in  which  he  was  placed,  the  failure  of  expected  reinforce 
ments  and  supplies  from  St.  Louis,  and  an  evidently 
strong  conviction  that  these  failures  were  due  to  a  plan 
to  sacrifice  him  to  the  ambition  of  another,  and  by  a 
morbid  sensitiveness  respecting  the  disaster  to  the  Union 
people  of  southwestern  Missouri,  (who  had  relied  upon 
him  for  protection)  which  must  result  from  the  retreat  of 
his  army.  Lyon's  personal  feeling  was  so  strongly  en 
listed  in  the  Union  cause,  its  friends  were  so  emphati 
cally  his  personal  friends  and  its  enemies  his  personal 
enemies,  that  he  could  not  take  the  cool,  soldierly  view 
of  the  situation  which  should  control  the  actions  of  the 
commander  of  a  national  army.  If  Lyon  could  have 
foreseen  how  many  times  the  poor  people  of  that  section 
were  destined  to  be  overrun  by  the  contending  forces 
before  the  contest  could  be  finally  decided,  his  extreme 
solicitude  at  that  moment  would  have  disappeared.  Or 
if  he  could  have  risen  to  an  appreciation  of  the  fact  that 
his  duty,  as  the  commander  in  the  field  of  one  of  the 
most  important  of  the  national  armies,  was  not  to  pro 
tect  a  few  loyal  people  from  the  inevitable  hardships  of 
war  (loss  of  their  cattle,  grain,  and  fences),  but  to  make  as 
sure  as  possible  the  defeat  of  the  hostile  army,  no  matter 
whether  to-day,  to-morrow,  or  next  month,  the  battle  of 
Wilson's  Creek  would  not  have  been  fought. 

On  August  9  General  Lyon  received  a  letter  from  Gen 
eral  John  C.  Fremont,  then  commanding  the  department, 
which  had  been  forwarded  to  him  from  Rolla  by  Colonel 
John  B.  Wyman.  The  letter  from  General  Fremont  to 
Colonel  Wyman  inclosing  that  to  General  Lyon  appears 
among  the  published  papers  submitted  by  Fremont  to 
the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  in  the  early 
part  of  1862,  but  the  inclosure  to  Lyon  is  wanting.  The 


40  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

original  letter,  with  the  records  to  which  it  belonged, 
must,  it  is  presumed,  have  been  deposited  at  the  head 
quarters  of  the  department  in  St.  Louis  when  the  Army 
of  the  West  was  disbanded,  in  the  latter  part  of  August, 
1861.  Neither  the  original  letter  nor  any  copy  of  it  can 
now  (July,  1897)  be  found.  It  can  only  be  conjectured 
what  motive  caused  G-eneral  Fremont  to  omit  a  copy  of 
the  letter  from  the  papers  submitted  to  the  committee, 
which  were  at  the  time  strongly  commented  upon  in  Con 
gress,  or  what  caused  to  be  removed  from  the  official  files 
the  original,  which  had  again  come  into  his  possession. 

General  Lyon's  answer  to  this  letter,  given  below,  the 
original  draft  of  which  was  prepared  by  me  and  is  yet  in 
my  possession,  shows  that  Fremont's  letter  to  Lyon  was 
dated  August  6,  and  was  received  on  the  9th.  I  am  not 
able  to  recall  even  the  substance  of  the  greater  part  of 
that  letter,  but  the  purport  of  that  part  of  it  which  was 
then  of  vital  importance  is  still  fresh  in  my  memory. 
That  purport  was  instructions  to  the  effect  that  if  Lyon 
was  not  strong  enough  to  maintain  Ms  position  as  far  in  ad 
vance  as  Springfield,  he  should  fall  back  toward  Holla  until 
reinforcements  should  meet  him. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  why  G-eneral  Fremont  did  not 
produce  a  copy  of  those  instructions  in  his  statement  to 
the  committee.  It  would  have  furnished  him  with  the 
best  defense  he  could  possibly  have  made  against  the 
charge  of  having  sacrificed  Lyon  and  his  command.  But 
the  opinion  then  seemed  so  strong  and  so  nearly  uni 
versal  that  Lyon's  fight  at  Wilson's  Creek  was  a  necessity, 
and  that  Fremont  ought  to  have  reinforced  him  before 
that  time  at  any  cost,  that  perhaps  Fremont  had  not  the 
courage  to  do  what  was  really  best  for  his  own  defense, 
namely,  to  acknowledge  and  maintain  that  he  had  or 
dered  Lyon  to  fall  back,  and  that  the  latter  should  have 
obeyed  that  order. 

At  my  suggestion,  General  Lyon  instructed  me  to  pre- 


LYON'S  KEPLY  41 

pare  an  answer  to  General  Fremont's  letter  on  the  morn 
ing  of  August  9.  He  altered  the  original  draft,  in  his 
own  hand,  as  is  shown  in  the  copy  following ;  a  fair  copy 
of  the  letter  as  amended  was  then  made,  and  he  signed  it. 


SPRINGFIELD,  Aug.  9,  1861. 

GENERAL  :  I  have  just  received  your  note  of  the  6th  inst.  by 
special  messenger. 

I  retired  to  this  place,  as  I  have  before  informed  you, 
reaching  here  on  the  5th.  The  enemy  followed  to  within  ten 
miles  of  here.  He  has  taken  a  strong  position,  and  is  recruiting 
his  supplies  of  horses,  mules,  and  provisions  by  forays  into  the 
surrounding  country  j  his  large  force  of  mounted  men  enabling 
him  to  do  this  without  annoyance  from  me. 

I  find  my  position  extremely  embarrassing,  and  am  at  present 
unable  to  determine  whether  I  shall  be  able  to  maintain  my 
ground  or  be  forced  to  retire.  I  can  resist  any  attack  from  the 
front,  but  if  the  enemy  moves  to  surround  me  I  must  retire.  I 
shall  hold  my  ground  as  long  as  possible,  [and  not]  though  I  may 
without  knowing  how  far  endanger  the  safety  of  my  entire  force 
with  its  valuable  material,  being  induced  by  the  important  con 
siderations  involved  to  take  this  step.  The  enemy  yesterday  made 
a  show  of  force  about  five  miles  distant^  and  has  doubtless  a  full 
purpose  of  making  an  attack  upon  me. 

Very  respectfully  your  obedient  servant, 

N.  LYON, 
Brigadier-General  Vols.,  Commanding. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  C.  FREMONT, 

Comdg.  Western  Department,  St.  Louis,  Mo. 

The  words  in  my  handwriting  which  were  erased  ("  and 
not "  in  brackets),  and  those  substituted  by  General  Lyon, 
given  in  italics,  clearly  express  the  difference  of  opinion 
which  then  existed  between  us  upon  the  momentous 
question  which  we  had  then  been  discussing  for  several 
days,  namely :  What  action  did  the  situation  require  of 
him  as  commander  of  that  army  ! 

I  was  then  young  and  wholly  inexperienced  in  war ; 


42  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

but  I  have  never  yet  seen  any  reason  to  doubt  the  cor 
rectness  of  the  views  I  then  urged  with  even  more  per 
sistence  than  my  subordinate  position  would  fully  justify. 
And  this,  I  doubt  not,  must  be  the  judgment  of  history. 
The  fruitless  sacrifice  at  Wilson's  Creek  was  wholly  un 
necessary,  and,  under  the  circumstances,  wholly  unjusti 
fiable.  Our  retreat  to  Eolla  was  open  and  perfectly  safe, 
even  if  begun  as  late  as  the  night  of  the  9th.  A  few 
days  or  a  few  weeks  at  the  most  would  have  made  us 
amply  strong  to  defeat  the  enemy  and  drive  him  out  of 
Missouri,  without  serious  loss  to  ourselves.  Although  it 
is  true  that  we  barely  failed  winning  a  victory  on  August 
10,  that  was,  and  could  have  been,  hoped  for  only  as  a 
mere  possibility.  Lyon  himself  despaired  of  it  before  the 
battle  was  half  over,  and  threw  away  his  own  life  in 
desperation.  In  addition  to  the  depressing  effect  of  his 
wounds,  he  must  probably  have  become  convinced  of 
the  mistake  he  had  made  in  hazarding  an  unnecessary 
battle  on  so  unequal  terms,  and  in  opposition  to  both 
the  advice  of  his  subordinates  and  the  instructions  of  his 
superior.  But  this  is  only  an  inference.  After  Lyon 
had  with  the  aid  of  Sigel  (as  explained  hereafter)  decided 
to  attack,  and  arranged  the  plan,  not  a  word  passed  be 
tween  him  and  me  on  the  question  whether  an  attack 
should  be  made,  except  my  question :  "  Is  Sigel  willing 
to  undertake  this?"  and  Lyon's  answer:  "Yes;  it  is 
his  plan." 

We  went  forward  together,  slept  under  the  same 
blanket  while  the  column  was  halted,  from  about  mid 
night  till  the  dawn  of  day,  and  remained  close  together 
nearly  all  the  time  until  his  death.  But  he  seemed  greatly 
depressed,  and  except  to  give  orders,  hardly  uttered  a 
word  save  the  few  I  have  mentioned  in  this  narrative. 

He  was  still  unwilling  to  abandon  without  a  desperate 
struggle  the  country  he  had  occupied,  thought  the  im 
portance  of  maintaining  his  position  was  not  understood 


BATTLE   OF  WILSON'S  CREEK  43 

by  his  superior  commander,  and  in  his  despondency  be 
lieved,  as  above  stated,  that  he  was  the  intended  victim 
of  a  deliberate  sacrifice  to  another's  ambition.  He  deter 
mined  to  fight  a  battle  at  whatever  risk,  and  said:  "I 
will  gladly  give  my  life  for  a  victory." 

The  enemy  had  now  concentrated  his  forces,  and  was 
encamped  on  Wilson's  Creek,  about  ten  miles  from  Spring 
field.  There  had  been  some  skirmishing  between  our  re- 
connoitering  parties  and  those  of  the  enemy  during  the 
past  few  days,  and  a  general  advance  had  been  deter 
mined  on  for  the  night  of  August  8,  but  it  was  postponed 
on  account  of  the  fatigued  condition  of  the  troops,  who 
had  been  employed  that  day  in  meeting  a  reconnaissance 
of  the  enemy.  The  attack  was  finally  made  at  daylight 
on  the  morning  of  the  eventful  August  10. 

The  plan  of  battle  was  determined  on  the  morning  of 
the  9th,  in  a  consultation  between  General  Lyon  and 
Colonel  Sigel,  no  other  officers  being  present.  General 
Lyon  said,  "  It  is  Sigel's  plan,"  yet  he  seemed  to  have  no 
hesitation  in  adopting  it,  notwithstanding  its  departure 
from  accepted  principles,  having  great  confidence  in 
SigePs  superior  military  ability  and  experience.  Sigel's 
brigade,  about  1200  strong,  was  to  attack  the  enemy's 
right,  while  Lyon,  with  the  main  body,  about  4000  strong, 
was  to  attack  the  enemy's  left.  The  two  columns  were 
to  advance  by  widely  separated  roads,  and  the  points  of 
attack  were  so  distant  that  communication  between  the 
two  columns  was  not  even  thought  of.  The  attack  was 
made,  as  intended,  by  both  columns  at  nearly  the  same  in 
stant,  and  both  drove  the  enemy  from  his  advanced  posi 
tion,  Sigel  even  occupying  the  enemy's  camp.  Here  he 
was  soon  after  assailed  by  a  superior  force,  and  driven 
from  the  field  with  the  loss  of  his  artillery  and  292  men 
killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  He  did  not  appear  upon 
the  scene  again  that  day,  and  the  result  of  his  attack  was 
unknown  to  any  one  in  the  other  column  until  after  the 


44          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

close  of  the  battle.  The  main  body,  under  Lyon's  imme 
diate  command,  made  no  general  advance  from  the  posi 
tion  first  gained,  but  maintained  that  position  against 
several  fierce  assaults.  The  enemy  manifestly  did  not 
make  good  use  of  his  superior  numbers.  He  attacked  us 
in  front  several  times,  but  with  a  force  not  greatly  supe 
rior  to  our  own,  and  was  invariably  repulsed.  Our  men 
fought  extremely  well  for  raw  troops,  maintaining  their 
ground,  without  any  cover  whatever,  against  repeated 
assaults  for  six  hours,  and  losing  in  killed  and  wounded 
fully  one  third  of  their  number.  General  Lyon  received 
two  wounds,  one  in  the  leg  and  one  in  the  head,  about 
the  middle  of  the  engagement;  he  then  became  more 
despondent  than  before,  apparently  from  the  effects  of 
his  wounds,  for  there  appeared  nothing  in  the  state  of 
the  battle  to  dishearten  a  man  of  such  unbounded  courage 
as  he  undoubtedly  possessed.  A  portion  of  our  troops 
had  given  away  in  some  disorder.  Lyon  said :  "  Major,  I 
am  afraid  the  day  is  lost."  I  looked  at  him  in  surprise, 
saw  the  blood  trickling  down  his  face,  and  divining  the 
reason  for  his  despondency,  replied:  "  No,  General;  let  us 
try  it  again."  He  seemed  reencouraged,  and  we  then 
separated,  rallied  and  led  forward  the  only  troops  then 
not  in  action — two  regiments.  Lyon  was  killed  at  the 
head  of  one  of  these  regiments  while  exposing  himself 
with  utter  recklessness  to  the  enemy's  fire. 

When  Lyon  and  I  separated,  he  to  lead  the  attack 
in  which  he  fell,  I  reformed  the  other  regiment  and 
led  it  into  action,  giving  the  command  "Charge!"  as 
soon  as  we  came  within  plain  view  of  the  enemy,  hop 
ing  to  try  conclusions  with  the  bayonet,  with  which  we 
were  much  better  supplied  than  they.  That  regiment 
advanced  in  splendid  style  until  it  received  the  enemy's 
fire,  then  the  command  "Charge!"  was  forgotten,  and 
the  regiment  halted  and  commenced  firing.  Thus  I 
found  myself  "  between  two  fires."  But  the  brave  boys 


DEATH  OF  LYON  45 

in  my  rear  could  see  me,  and  I  don't  believe  I  was  in  any 
danger  from  their  muskets,  yet  I  felt  less  "out  of  place" 
when  I  had  passed  around  the  flank  of  a  company  and 
stood  in  rear  of  the  line.  I  there  witnessed,  for  the  only 
time  in  my  experience,  one  of  those  remarkable  instances 
of  a  man  too  brave  to  think  of  running  away,  and  yet 
too  much  frightened  to  be  able  to  fight.  He  was  loading 
his  musket  and  firing  in  the  air  with  great  rapidity. 
When  I  took  hold  of  his  arm  and  shook  him,  calling 
his  attention  to  what  he  was  doing,  he  seemed  as  if 
aroused  from  a  trance,  entirely  unconscious  of  what  had 
happened. 

This  circumstance  recalls  the  familiar  story  of  two 
comrades  in  the  ranks,  the  one  apparently  unmoved,  the 
other  pale  and  trembling.  The  first  said:  "Why,  you 
seem  to  be  scared ! "  "  Yes,"  replied  the  other ;  "  if  you 
were  half  as  scared  as  I  am,  you  would  run  away ! " 

A  few  minutes  later  I  went  toward  the  right  to  rejoin 
my  chief,  and  found  his  lifeless  body  a  few  feet  in  rear  of 
the  line,  in  charge  of  his  faithful  orderly,  Lehman,  who 
was  mourning  bitterly  and  loudly  the  death  of  the  great 
soldier  whom  he  adored.  At  that  supremely  critical  mo 
ment — for  the  fight  was  then  raging  with  great  fury — my 
only  thought  was  the  apprehension  that  the  troops  might 
be  injuriously  affected  if  they  learned  of  the  death  of  the 
commander  who  had  so  soon  won  their  profound  respect 
and  confidence.  I  chided  poor  Lehman  for  his  outcry,  and 
ordered  that  the  body  be  taken  quietly  to  the  rear,  and 
that  no  one  be  told  of  the  general's  death. 

Thus  fell  one  of  our  bravest  and  truest  soldiers  and 
patriots,  a  man  who  had  no  fear  of  death,  but  who  could 
not  endure  defeat.  Upon  Lyon's  fall,  Major  Sturgis 
became  the  senior  officer  of  military  education  and  ex 
perience  present.  Several  of  the  senior  volunteer  officers 
had  been  wounded  and  carried  from  the  field.  Who  was 
the  actual  senior  in  rank  on  the  ground  was  not  easy  to 


46  FORTY- SEX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ascertain  in  the  midst  of  a  fierce  engagement.  It  was  no 
time  to  make  experiments  with  untried  military  genius. 

I  captured  a  "  secesh"  horse  found  running  loose, — for 
my  own  horse  had  been  killed  and  I  had  been  afoot  quite  a 
long  time, — mounted  him,  and  as  soon  as  the  state  of  the 
contest  would  permit,  I  rode  to  Major  Sturgis,  informed 
him  of  Lyon's  death,  and  told  him  he  must  assume  the 
command,  which  he  accordingly  did.  It  afterward  ap 
peared  that  there  was  one  lieutenant-colonel  of  volun 
teers  remaining  on  the  field,  but  neither  he  nor  any  one 
else  thought  of  questioning  the  propriety  of  Major  Stur- 
gis's  taking  the  command.  Soon  after  Lyon's  death  the 
enemy  was  repulsed,  but  then  seemed  to  gather  up  all 
his  remaining  strength  for  a  last  effort.  His  final  attack 
was  heavier  than  any  of  the  preceding,  but  it  was  more 
firmly  met  by  our  troops  and  completely  repulsed.  There 
is  probably  no  room  for  doubt  that  the  enemy  was  beaten 
if  we  had  but  known  it ;  but  the  battle-field  was  covered 
with  timber  and  underbrush,  so  that  nothing  could  be 
seen  beyond  a  few  hundred  yards.  Our  troops  were 
nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and  exhausted  by  a  night 
march  and  by  six  hours'  hard  fighting  without  breakfast. 

It  did  not  seem  possible  to  resist  another  such  attack 
as  the  last,  and  there  was  no  apparent  assurance  that 
another  would  not  be  made.  Hence  Major  Sturgis  de 
cided  to  withdraw  from  the  field  while  he  was  free  to  do 
so.  The  movement  was  effected  without  opposition,  the 
wounded  were  brought  off,  and  the  command  returned 
to  Springfield  in  the  afternoon.  This  retreat  was  un 
doubtedly  an  error,  and  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek 
must  be  classed  as  a  defeat  for  the  Union  army.  The 
error  was  a  failure  to  estimate  the  effect  that  must  have 
been  produced  upon  the  enemy  as  well  as  upon  our 
selves  by  so  much  hard  fighting.  It  was  only  necessary 
to  hold  our  ground,  trusting  to  the  pluck  and  endurance 
of  our  men,  and  the  victory  would  have  been  ours.  Had 


A  QUESTION  OF   COMMAND  DURING  THE  RETREAT       47 

Lyon,  who  was  in  front  of  the  line  of  battle  when 
wounded  as  well  as  when  killed,  appreciated  this  fact 
and  acted  upon  it,  instead  of  throwing  his  life  away,  it  is 
safe  to  say  he  would  have  won  a  brilliant  victory. 

On  the  march  from  the  battle-field  the  main  body  was 
joined  by  the  remnant  of  SigePs  brigade,  which  had  made 
a  complete  circuit  in  rear  of  the  enemy's  position.  They 
were  without  brigade  or  regimental  commanders,  and  were 
escorted  by  a  troop  of  regular  cavalry.  On  our  arrival  in 
Springfield  it  was  found  that  Colonel  Sigel  and  Colonel 
Salomon,  commanding  the  5th  Missouri  Regiment,  of 
SigePs  brigade,  had  arrived  in  town  some  hours  before. 
Major  Sturgis  then  relinquished  the  command  to  Colonel 
Sigel,  and  it  was  determined  to  retreat  toward  Rolla  next 
morning.  SigePs  brigade  was  placed  in  advance,  and 
Sturgis's  brigade  of  regulars  was  assigned  the  important 
post  of  rear-guard.  This  order  of  march  was  continued 
during  three  days,  and  the  march  was  so  conducted  that 
while  the  advance  would  reach  camp  at  a  reasonable  hour 
and  be  able  to  get  supper  and  rest,  the  rear-guard,  and 
even  the  main  body,  would  be  kept  in  the  road  until  late  in 
the  night,  and  then,  unable  to  find  their  wagons,  be  com 
pelled  to  lie  down  without  food.  The  clamor  for  relief 
from  this  hardship  became  so  general  that  Major  Sturgis 
determined  to  resume  the  command,  justifying  this  ac 
tion  upon  the  ground  that  Colonel  Sigel,  although  mus 
tered  into  the  United  States  service,  had  no  commission 
from  any  competent  authority.  Colonel  Sigel  pro 
tested  against  this  assumption  of  Major  Sturgis,  but  the 
latter  was  so  manifestly  sustained  by  the  great  majority 
of  the  officers  of  the  army  that  Colonel  Sigel  quietly 
submitted. 

One  of  SigePs  officers  proposed  that  the  question  of 
title  to  the  command  be  put  to  a  vote  of  the  assembled 
officers.  Sturgis  objected  on  the  ground  that  the  vote 
might  possibly  be  in  favor  of  Sigel.  "Then,"  said 


48  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Sturgis,  "  some  of  you  might  refuse  to  obey  my  orders, 
and  I  should  be  under  the  necessity  of  shooting  you." 

The  march  was  continued  under  Sturgis's  command, 
and  the  column  arrived  at  Eolla  on  August  19,  nine  days 
after  the  battle.  Here  the  little  Army  of  the  West,  after 
its  short  but  eventful  career,  disappeared  in  the  much 
larger  army  which  Major-General  Fremont  was  then 
organizing.- 

My  knowledge  of  the  operations  conducted  by  Gen 
eral  Fremont  in  Missouri  is  so  slight  that  I  must  con 
fine  myself  to  some  account  of  those  minor  affairs  with 
which  I  was  personally  connected. 

My  duties  as  assistant  adjutant-general  ceased  when 
Major  Sturgis  resumed  command  on  August  13.  I  then 
took  command  of  my  regiment,  the  1st  Missouri,  the  col 
onel  and  lieutenant-colonel  being  absent,  the  latter  on 
account  of  wounds  received  at  Wilson's  Creek.  Soon 
after  our  arrival  at  Eolla  the  regiment  was  ordered  to 
St.  Louis,  to  be  converted  into  an  artillery  regiment.  I 
was  employed  in  the  reorganization  and  equipment  of 
]  batteries  until  September  16,  when  General  Fremont 
ordered  me  to  visit  Cincinnati,  Pittsburg,  Washington, 
West  Point,  and  such  other  places  in  the  East  as  I 
might  find  necessary,  to  procure  guns,  harness,  etc.,  to 
complete  the  equipment  of  the  regiment. 

While  in  St.  Louis  after  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek, 
I  learned  much  in  confirmation  of  the  opinion  of  the 
character  and  ability  of  General  Fremont  which  had 
very  generally  been  held  in  the  army. 

Immediately  after  my  arrival  Colonel  Frank  P.  Blair, 
Jr.,  said  he  wanted  me  to  go  with  him  to  see  Fremont; 
so  we  went  the  next  morning.  The  headquarters  palace 
was  surrounded  by  a  numerous  guard,  and  all  ingress 
by  the  main  entrance  appeared  to  be  completely  barred. 
But  Blair  had  some  magic  word  or  sign  by  which  we 

l  My  official  report  and  others  are  published  in  the  War  Records,  Vol.  III. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  OPPOSITION  OF  THE  BLAIRS  TO  FREMONT  49 

passed  the  sentinels  at  the  basement  door.  Ascending 
two  flights  of  stairs,  we  found  the  commanding  general 
with  a  single  secretary  or  clerk  occupying  the  suite  of 
rooms  extending  from  front  to  rear  of  the  building. 
The  general  received  me  cordially,  but,  to  my  great  sur 
prise,  no  questions  were  asked,  nor  any  mention  made, 
of  the  bloody  field  from  which  I  had  just  come,  where 
Lyon  had  been  killed,  and  his  army,  after  a  desperate 
battle,  compelled  to  retreat.  I  was  led  at  once  to  a  large 
table  on  which  maps  were  spread  out,  from  which  the 
general  proceeded  to  explain  at  length  the  plans  of 
the  great  campaign  for  which  he  was  then  preparing. 
Colonel  Blair  had,  I  believe,  already  been  initiated,  but 
I  listened  attentively  for  a  long  time,  certainly  more 
than  an  hour,  to  the  elucidation  of  the  project.  In  gen 
eral  outline  the  plan  proposed  a  march  of  the  main  Army 
of  the  West  through  southwestern  Missouri  and  north 
western  Arkansas  to  the  valley  of  the  Arkansas  River, 
and  thence  down  that  river  to  the  Mississippi,  thus  turn 
ing  all  the  Confederate  defenses  of  the  Mississippi  River 
down  to  and  below  Memphis.  As  soon  as  the  explana 
tion  was  ended  Colonel  Blair  and  I  took  our  leave,  mak 
ing  our  exit  through  the  same  basement  door  by  which 
we  had  entered.  We  walked  down  the  street  for  some 
time  in  silence.  Then  Blair  turned  to  me  and  said : 
"  Well,  what  do  you  think  of  him  ?  "  I  replied,  in  words 
rather  too  strong  to  repeat  in  print,  to  the  effect  that  my 
opinion  as  to  his  wisdom  was  the  same  as  it  always  had 
been.  Blair  said:  "  I  have  been  suspecting  that  for  some 
time." 

It  was  a  severe  blow  to  the  whole  Blair  family  —  the 
breaking,  by  the  rude  shock  of  war,  of  that  idol  they 
had  so  much  helped  to  set  up  and  make  the  commander 
of  a  great  army.  From  that  day  forward  there  was 
no  concealment  of  the  opposition  of  the  Blairs  to 
Fremont. 


50  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

I  had  another  occasion  at  that  time  to  learn  something 
important  as  to  Fremont's  character.  He  had  ordered 
me  to  convert  the  1st  Eegiment  of  Missouri  Volunteer 
Infantry  into  an  artillery  regiment.  I  had  organized 
eight  batteries  and  used  all  the  field-guns  I  could  get. 
There  remained  in  the  arsenal  a  battery  of  new  rifled 
guns  which  Fremont  had  purchased  in  Europe.  I  ap 
plied  to  him  personally  for  those  guns,  telling  him  I  had 
a  well-disciplined  company  of  officers  and  men  ready  to 
man  them.  He  gave  me  the  order  without  hesitation, 
but  when  I  went  to  the  arsenal  I  found  an  order  there 
countermanding  the  order  he  had  given  me.  I  returned 
to  headquarters,  and  easily  obtained  a  renewal  of  the 
order  to  issue  the  guns  to  me.  Determining  to  get  ahead 
this  time,  I  took  the  quickest  conveyance  to  the  arsenal, 
but  only  to  find  that  the  telegraph  had  got  ahead  of  me 
—  the  order  was  again  countermanded.  The  next  day  I 
quietly  inquired  at  headquarters  about  the  secret  of  my 
repeated  disappointment,  and  learned  that  some  foreign 
adventurer  had  obtained  permission  to  raise  a  company 
of  artillery  troops  and  wanted  those  new  rifled  guns.  It 
was  true  the  company  had  not  been  raised,  but  I  thought 
that  would  probably  make  no  difference,  so  I  never  men 
tioned  the  matter  to  the  general  again.  Instead  I  planned 
a  flank  movement  which  proved  far  more  successful  than 
the  direct  attack  could  possibly  have  been.  I  explained 
to  General  Fremont  the  great  need  of  field-guns  and 
equipment  for  his  army,  and  suggested  that  if  ordered 
East  I  might  by  personal  efforts  obtain  all  he  needed. 
He  at  once  adopted  my  suggestion,  bade  me  sit  down  at 
a  desk  in  his  room  and  write  the  necessary  order,  and  he 
signed  it  without  reading.  I  readily  obtained  twenty- 
four  new  rifled  Parrott  guns,  and  soon  had  them  in  service 
in  the  Western  Department,  in  lieu  of  the  six  guns  I  had 
failed  to  get  from  the  St.  Louis  Arsenal. 

When  I  had  accomplished  this  duty  and  returned  to 


AFFAIR  AT   FREDERICKTOWN  51 

St.  Louis,  where  I  arrived  in  the  early  part  of  October,  [ 
1861,  General  Fremont  had  taken  the  field  in  the  central 
part  of  Missouri,  with  the  main  body  of  his  army,  in 
which  were  eight  batteries  of  my  regiment.  I  was  in 
structed  to  remain  in  St.  Louis  and  complete  the  organi 
zation  and  equipment  of  the  regiment  upon  the  arrival  of 
guns  and  equipments  procured  in  the  East. 

It  was  while  waiting  for  the  expected  guns  that  a  de 
mand  for  artillery  came  from  Colonel  W.  P.  Carlin,  com 
manding  a  brigade  at  Pilot  Knob  and  threatened  with 
an  attack  by  a  Confederate  force  under  Jeff.  Thompson. 
The  latter  had  already  made  a  raid  in  Carlin's  rear,  de 
stroyed  the  railroad  bridge  across  the  Big  Eiver,  and  inter 
fered  seriously  with  the  communication  to  St.  Louis.  In 
the  nervous  condition  of  the  military  as  well  as  the  pub 
lic  mind  at  that  time,  even  St.  Louis  was  regarded  as 
in  danger. 

There  was  no  organized  battery  in  St.  Louis,  but  there 
were  officers  and  men  enough  belonging  to  the  different 
batteries  of  the  1st  Missouri,  and  recruits,  to  make  a  me 
dium-sized  company.  They  had  been  instructed  in  the 
school  of  the  piece,  but  no  more.  I  hastily  put  them  upon 
the  cars,  with  four  old  smooth-bore  bronze  guns,  horses 
that  had  never  been  hitched  to  a  piece,  and  harness  that 
had  not  been  fitted  to  the  horses.  Early  next  morning 
we  arrived  at  Big  River  where  the  bridge  had  been  burned, 
unloaded  the  battery  and  horses  by  the  use  of  platforms 
extemporized  from  railroad  ties,  hitched  up,  and  forded 
the  river.  On  the  other  side  we  converted  platform-cars 
into  stock-cars,  loaded  up,  and  arrived  at  Pilot  Knob  the 
next  morning  (October  20).  The  enemy  was  understood 
to  be  at  Fredericktown,  about  twenty  miles  distant,  and 
Colonel  Carlin  determined  to  march  that  night  and  at 
tack  him  at  daylight  the  next  morning.  Carlin's  com 
mand  consisted  of  the  8th  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  21st 
Illinois  Volunteers,  parts  of  the  33d  and  38th  Illinois  Vol- 


52  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

unteers,  350  of  the  1st  Indiana  Cavalry,  one  company  of 
Missouri  Cavalry,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery  (including 
two  old  iron  guns  which  he  had  managed  to  make  avail 
able  in  addition  to  the  four  from  St.  Louis).  His  total 
force  was  about  3000  men.  The  enemy's  strength  was 
supposed  to  be  about  the  same,  but  it  turned  out  that 
he  had  only  four  old  iron  guns,  so  we  had  the  advan 
tage  of  him  in  artillery  at  least. 

The  head  of  our  column  reached  the  vicinity  of  Fred- 
ericktown  some  time  before  daylight,  and  the  troops  lay 
upon  their  arms  until  dawn.  Upon  entering  the  town 
in  the  morning,  no  enemy  was  found,  and  citizens  re 
ported  that  he  had  marched  south  the  day  before.  The 
troops  were  ordered  to  rest  in  the  village,  and  Colonel 
Carlin,  who  was  not  well,  went  to  bed  in  the  hotel.  Some 
hours  later,  I  think  near  noon,  Colonel  J.  B.  Plurnrner, 
with  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  two  pieces  of  artillery 
from  Cape  Grirardeau,  arrived  at  Fredericktown.  I  am 
not  aware  whether  this  junction  was  expected  by  the  re 
spective  commanders,  or  what  orders  they  had  received 
from  department  headquarters.  Soon  after  Colonel 
Plummer  arrived  I  was  summoned  to  the  presence  of 
the  two  commanders  and  requested  to  decide  a  question 
of  rank  between  them.  It  appeared  that  Colonel  Carlin 
had  the  older  date  as  colonel  of  volunteers,  while  Colonel 
Plummer  was  commanding,  by  special  assignment  of 
General  Fremont,  a  brigade  in  which  at  least  one  of  the 
colonels  was  senior,  not  only  to  him,  but  also  to  Colonel 
Carlin.  It  was  clear  enough  that  according  to  the  Arti 
cles  of  War  this  senior  colonel  of  the  Cape  Grirardeau 
brigade  should  command  the  combined  forces ;  but  that 
would  be  in  plain  disregard  of  General  Fremont's  order, 
the  authority  for  which  nobody  knew,  but  in  comparison 
with  which  the  Articles  of  War  or  the  Army  Regulations 
were  at  that  time  regarded  as  practically  of  trifling  con 
sequence.  The  question  was  settled,  or  rather  avoided 


AFFAIR  AT  FREDERICKTOWN  53 

(for  there  was  no  satisfactory  settlement  of  it),  by  the 
proposition  that  Colonel  Plummer,  who  proposed  to  go 
in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  should  take  with  him,  besides 
his  own  brigade,  such  portion  of  Colonel  Carlin's  as  he 
(Plummer)  thought  necessary,  Colonel  Caiiin,  who  was 
sick,  remaining  behind  with  the  remainder.  Accord 
ingly,  early  in  the  afternoon  Plummer's  column  started 
in  pursuit.  It  had  hardly  got  well  out  of  the  village 
when  the  head  of  the  column  received  a  volley  from  the 
enemy  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  How  long  the  enemy 
had  been  in  that  position  I  have  never  learned ;  but  it  is 
certain  that  his  presence  there  was  not  even  suspected 
by  our  commander,  who  supposed  him  to  be  in  full  re 
treat.  This  mistake,  however,  did  not  seem  to  cost  us 
anything,  except  perhaps  the  loss  of  a  few  men  at  the 
head  of  the  column  in  the  first  volley.  Colonel  Plummer 
quickly  formed  his  troops;  Carlin  jumped  out  of  bed 
and  galloped  to  the  front,  followed  by  those  who  had  re 
mained  in  town.  The  volunteers,  who  had  not  yet  been 
in  battle,  threw  off  their  knapsacks,  blankets,  and  over 
coats,  and  went  into  action  most  gallantly.  The  en 
gagement  was  sharp  for  a  few  moments,  and  resulted  in 
considerable  loss  on  both  sides  ;  but  the  enemy  soon  gave 
way  and  retreated  in  disorder.  The  pursuit  was  con 
tinued  several  miles,  and  until  near  night,  when  a  recall 
was  ordered,  and  our  troops  returned  to  the  town  to 
pick  up  their  trappings  and  get  their  supper. 

The  next  morning  Colonel  Plummer  continued  his  pur 
suit.  I  left  my  extemporized  battery,  under  Captain 
Manter,  with  Colonel  Carlin,  and  returned  to  St.  Louis.1 

1  For  the  official  reports,  see  the  War  Records,  Vol.  III. 


CHAPTEE  IV 

HALLECK  BELIEVES  FREMONT  OF  THE  COMMAND  IN  MIS 
SOURI — A  SPECIAL  STATE  MILITIA — BRIGADIER-GENERAL 
OF  THE  MISSOURI  MILITIA — A  HOSTILE  COMMITTEE  SENT 
TO  WASHINGTON  —  THE  MISSOURI  QUARREL  OF  1862  — 
IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  "  ARMY  OF  THE  FRONTIER" — AB 
SENT  THBOUGH  ILLNESS  —  BATTLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE 
—  COMPELLED  TO  BE  INACTIVE  —  TRANSFERRED  TO  TEN 
NESSEE —  IN  COMMAND  OF  THOMAS'S  OLD  DIVISION  OF 
THE  FOURTEENTH  CORPS — REAPPOINTED  MAJOR-GEN 
ERAL —  A  HIBERNIAN  "STRIKER." 

ON  November  19,  1861,  Major-General  H.  W.  Halleck 
relieved  Major-General  Fremont  of  the  command  of 
the  Department  of  the  Mississippi.    On  November  21  I 
was  appointed  brigadier-general  of  volunteers,  and  re 
ported  to  General  Halleck  for  duty. 

In  the  spring  of  1861  a  convention  of  the  State  of  Mis 
souri  had  assembled  at  St.  Louis  to  consider  the  question 
of  secession,  and  had  decided  to  adhere  to  the  Union. 
Nevertheless,  the  governor,  Claiborne  Fox  Jackson,  and 
the  executive  officers  had  joined  the  rebellion  and  fled 
from  the  State,  The  convention  reassembled  on  July 
20,  and  organized  a  provisional  government.  Hamilton 
R.  Gamble  was  chosen  provisional  governor,  and  in 
trusted  with  very  large  powers.  He  was  a  sterling  pa 
triot,  a  man  of  ability  and  of  the  highest  character  in 
his  public  and  private  relations,  much  too  conservative 
on  the  questions  of  States'  rights  and  slavery  to  suit  the 
"  radical "  loyalists  of  that  time,  but  possessing  probably 

54 


A  SPECIAL   STATE  MILITIA  55 

in  a  higher  degree  than  any  other  citizen  of  Missouri  the 
confidence  of  all  classes  of  Union  men  in  the  State. 

One  of  Governor  Gamble's  first  important  public  acts 
was  to  seek  and  obtain  from  President  Lincoln  authority 
to  raise  a  special  force  of  State  militia,  to  be  employed 
only  in  defense  of  the  State,  but  to  be  paid,  equipped, 
and  supplied  in  all  respects  by  the  United  States.  This 
force  was  to  be  organized  in  conformity  with  the  militia 
laws  of  the  State,  was  to  include  an  adjutant-general, 
a  quartermaster-general,  and  three  aides-de-camp  to  the 
governor,  one  major-general  and  his  staff,  and  a  briga 
dier-general  and  staff  for  each  brigade.  The  number  of 
regiments,  aggregate  strength,  and  arms  of  service  were 
not  specified. 

By  the  terms  of  this  arrangement  the  force  would 
remain  subject  to  the  governor's  command ;  but  at  the 
suggestion  of  Major-General  McClellan,  then  general-in- 
chief,  to  avoid  possible  conflict  of  command  it  was  stip 
ulated  by  the  President  that  the  commanding  general  of 
the  department  should  be  ex-officio  major-general  of  the 
militia.  And  it  is  due  to  the  memory  of  Governor  Gam 
ble  to  say  that  although  partizan  enemies  often  accused 
him  of  interfering  with  the  operations  of  the  militia  in 
the  interest  of  his  supposed  political  views,  there  never 
was,  while  I  was  in  command  of  the  militia,  the  slightest 
foundation  for  such  accusation.  He  never  attempted  to 
interfere  in  any  manner  with  the  legitimate  exercise  of 
the  authority  of  the  commanding  general,  but  was,  on  the 
contrary,  governed  by  the  commander's  views  and  opin 
ions  in  the  appointment  and  dismissal  of  officers  and  in 
other  matters  in  which  his  own  independent  authority 
was  unquestioned.  This  authority,  given  by  the  Presi 
dent,  was  subsequently  confirmed  by  act  of  Congress,  by 
which  the  force  was  limited  to  10,000  men. 

As  stated  above,  I  was  appointed  brigadier-general,  to 
date  from  November  21,  1861 ;  and  on  November  27  was 


56  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

assigned  by  General  Halleck  to  the  "  command  of  all  the 
militia  of  the  State,"  and  charged  with  the  duty  of  rais 
ing,  organizing,  etc.,  the  special  force  which  had  been 
authorized  by  the  President. 

The  organization  of  the  militia  was  not  completed  un 
til  about  the  middle  of  April,  1862,  when  the  aggregate 
force  was  13,800  men,  consisting  of  fourteen  regiments 
and  two  battalions  of  cavalry  (mounted  riflemen),  one 
regiment  of  infantry,  and  one  battery  of  artillery.  But 
the  troops  were  enrolled  mainly  in  the  districts  where 
their  services  were  required.  As  rapidly  as  companies 
were  organized  and  equipped,  they  were  put  in  the  field 
with  the  United  States  troops  then  occupying  the  State, 
and  thus  rapidly  acquired,  by  active  service  with  older 
troops,  the  discipline  and  instruction  necessary  to  effi 
ciency,  so  that  by  the  time  the  organization  was  com 
pleted  this  body  of  troops  was  an  efficient  and  valuable 
force. 

My  official  report,  made  on  December  7,  1862, l  to  the 
department  commander  and  the  general-in-chief,  gives  a 
detailed  account  of  the  purely  military  operations  of  that 
period.  But  many  matters  less  purely  military  which 
entered  largely  into  the  history  of  that  time  deserve  more 
than  a  passing  notice. 

During  the  short  administration  of  General  Fremont  in 
Missouri,  the  Union  party  had  split  into  two  factions, 
"  radical "  and  "  conservative,"  hardly  less  bitter  in  their 
hostility  to  each  other  than  to  the  party  of  secession. 
The  more  advanced  leaders  of  the  radicals  held  that 
secession  had  abolished  the  constitution  and  all  laws  re 
straining  the  powers  of  the  government  over  the  people  of 
the  Confederate  States,  and  even  over  disloyal  citizens  of 
States  adhering  to  the  Union.  They  advocated  immedi 
ate  emancipation  of  the  slaves,  and  confiscation  by  mili 
tary  authority  of  all  property  of  "  rebels  and  rebel  sym- 

1  See  War  Records,  Vol.  XIII,  p.  7. 


BRIGADIER-GENERAL  OF  THE  MISSOURI  MILITIA          57 

pathizers  " —  that  is  to  say,  of  all  persons  not  of  the  radical 
party,  for  in  their  partizan  heat  they  disdained  to  make 
any  distinction  between  "  conservatives,"  "  copperheads," 
and  "rebels."  So  powerful  and  persistent  was  the  radical 
influence  that  even  so  able  a  lawyer  as  Edwin  M.  Stan- 
ton,  then  Secretary  of  War,  was  constrained  to  send  an 
order  to  the  commander  of  the  District  of  Missouri, 
directing  him  to  execute  the  act  of  Congress  of  July  17, 
1862,  relative  to  confiscation  of  property  of  persons  en 
gaged  in  the  rebellion,  although  the  law  provided  for  its 
execution  in  the  usual  way  by  the  judicial  department  of 
the  government,  and  gave  no  shadow  of  authority  for 
military  action. 

It  is  only  necessary  here  to  remark  that  the  order  was 
not,  as  it  could  not  be  lawfully,  obeyed.  Action  under 
it  was  limited  to  the  securing  of  property  subject  to  con 
fiscation,  and  liable  to  be  removed  or  otherwise  disposed 
of,  and  the  collection  of  evidence  for  the  use  of  the  judi 
cial  officers.  The  following  is  Secretary  Stanton's  order 
sent  by  telegraph,  September  5,  1862 : 

It  is  represented  that  many  disloyal  persons  residing  at  St. 
Louis  and  elsewhere  in  your  command  are  subject  to  the  provi 
sions  of  the  Confiscation  Act,  and  that  it  would  be  expedient  to 
enforce  against  them  the  provisions  of  that  act.  You  are  in 
structed  to  enforce  that  act  within  your  command,  and  will 
please  send  directions  for  that  purpose  to  your  provost-marshal. 

In  compliance  with  the  Secretary's  instructions,  I  issued 
an  order,  on  September  11,  providing  for  the  action  above 
stated,  and  no  further. 

These  instructions  from  the  Secretary  of  War  were  sub 
sequently  repudiated  by  President  Lincoln ;  but  in  the 
meantime  they  produced  serious  evil  under  my  suc 
cessor,  who  fully  enforced  them  by  apparently  committing 
the  national  administration  to  the  extreme  radical  doc 
trine,  and  making  the  military  commander  in  Missouri 


58  FOKTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

appear  to  be  acting  not  in  harmony  with  the  President's 
views.  So  far  as  I  know,  this  subject  does  not  appear 
to  have  been  submitted  to  the  President  until  some 
time  in  1863,  after  Major-General  Curtis,  as  department 
commander,  had  for  some  months  carried  out  the  radical 
theory  of  military  confiscation,  and  I,  as  his  successor, 
had  put  a  stop  to  it.  Then  an  appeal  was  made  to  the 
President,  and  he,  in  his  celebrated  letter  of  instructions 
of  October  1,  1863,  directed  the  military  to  have  nothing 
to  do  with  the  matter. 

The  State  administration  of  Missouri,  under  its  con 
servative  governor,  was  of  course  sternly  opposed  to  this 
radical  policy,  including  the  forced  liberation  of  slaves, 
for  which  there  was  at  that  time  no  warrant  of  law  or 
executive  authority.  A  simple  sense  of  duty  compelled 
the  military  commander  to  act  in  these  matters  more  in 
harmony  with  the  State  government  than  with  the  radi 
cal  party,  and  in  radical  eyes  he  thus  became  identified 
with  their  enemies,  the  conservatives. 

This  gave  rise  on  August  4,  1862,  to  a  meeting  of 
prominent  citizens  of  St.  Louis,  who  adopted  resolutions, 
of  the  most  important  of  which  the  following  was  re 
ported  to  be  a  true  copy: 

Resolved,  That  a  committee  of  gentlemen  be  requested  to  go 
to  Washington  City  to  urge  upon  the  President  the  appointment 
of  a  commander  of  the  military  forces  of  this  State  who  will, 
under  instructions,  act  with  vigor  in  suppressing  the  guerrillas 
of  this  State,  and  with  authority  to  enlist  the  militia  of  the 
State  into  the  service  of  the  United  States. 

The  chair  appointed,  as  the  committee  to  go  to  Wash 
ington,  Henry  T.  Blow,  John  C.  Vogle,  I.  H.  Sturgeon,  and 
Thomas  O'Keilley,  and  authorized  Mr.  Blow  to  add  to  this 
committee  any  other  "  true  Union  man n  who  would  go. 
Who,  if  any,  besides  Messrs.  Blow,  Yogle,  and  O'Reilley 
actually  composed  the  committee,  I  was  never  informed. 


A  HOSTILE  COMMITTEE  SENT  TO  WASHINGTON  59 

On  August  10,  Halleck,  then  general-in-chief,  telegraphed 
me  from  Washington :  "  There  is  a  deputation  here  from 
Colonel  Blair  and  others  asking  for  your  removal  on  ac 
count  of  inefficiency." 

Colonel  Blair  happened  into  my  office  a  few  minutes 
after  the  receipt  of  this  despatch  on  the  llth,  and  I 
handed  it  to  him.  He  at  once  said  in  substance,  and 
with  feeling:  "That  is  not  true.  No  one  is  authorized 
to  ask  in  my  name  for  your  removal";  and  he  sent  a 
despatch  to  that  effect  to  G-eneral  Halleck. 

The  next  day  (August  12)  despatches  were  exchanged 
between  General  Halleck  and  Colonel  Blair,  of  which  the 
latter  furnished  me  a  copy,  inclosed  with  the  following 
note  from  himself: 

ST.  Louis,  Mo.,  August  13th,  '62. 
BRIG.-GEN'L  SCHOFIELD. 

DEAR  SCHOFIELD  :  I  inclose  you  a  copy  of  a  despatch  (marked 
"  A ")  received  yesterday  from  Major-General  Halleck,  and  my 
answer  thereto,  marked  "  B." 

Yours, 

FRANK  P.  BLAIR,  JR. 


COPY  "A." 
To  HON.  F.  P.  BLAIR, 

August  12th,  1862. 

(By  telegraph  from  War  Dep't.) 

WASHINGTON,  12:50  P.  M. 

The  committee  from  St.  Louis  —  Henry  T.  Blow,  John  C. 
Vogle,  and  Thomas  O'Reilley — told  me,  in  presence  of  the  Presi 
dent,  that  they  were  authorized  by  you  to  ask  for  Gen.  Scho- 
field's  removal  for  inefficiency.  The  Postmaster- General  has 

to-day  sent  to  me  a  letter  from  Mr. ,  asking  that  you 

be  put  in  Gen.  Schofield's  place.     There  has  been  no  action  in 
this  or  on  the  papers  presented  by  the  above-named  committee. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

General-in-chief. 


60  FORTY- SIX  YEARS. IN  THE  ARMY 

COPY  "B." 

ST.  Louis,  Mo.,  August  12th,  1862. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  HALLECK, 

General-in-chief,  Washington  City,  D.  C. : 
I  despatched  you  yesterday,  and  wrote  the  Postmaster-Gen 
eral  last  week.  Let  the  letter  be  submitted  to  you.  Nobody  is 
authorized  to  ask  in  my  name  for  Gen'l  Schofield's  removal.  I 
think  the  State  military  organization  should  be  abandoned  as 
soon  as  practicable,  and  a  military  commander,  in  this  State, 
authorized  to  act  without  respect  to  Gov.  Gamble.  I  do  not 
want  the  place,  but  want  the  commander  in  the  State  to  be 
instructed  to  act  without  any  regard  to  the  State  authorities. 

FRANK  P.  BLAIR,  JR. 

The  foregoing  gives,  so  far  as  I  know  it,  the  essence 
of  the  Missouri  quarrel  of  1862.  I  have  never  had  the 
curiosity  to  attempt  to  ascertain  how  far  the  meeting  of 
August  4  was  hostile  to  me  personally. 

During  the  time,  subsequent  to  General  Halleck's  de 
parture  for  Washington,  July  23,  1862,  that  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Mississippi  was  left  without  any  immediate 
commander,  there  appears  to  have  been  a  contest  in  Wash 
ington  between  the  military  and  the  political  influence, 
relative  to  the  disposition  to  be  made  of  that  important 
command.  The  following  from  General  Halleck  to  me, 
dated  September  9,  1862,  indicates  the  situation  at  that 
time : 

(Unofficial.) 
MY  DEAR  GEN'L  : 

There  has  been  a  strong  political  pressure  of  outsiders  to  get 
certain  parties  put  in  command  of  new  Dep'ts  to  be  made  out 
of  the  old  Dep't  of  the  Miss.  The  presence  of  the  enemy  and 
the  danger  of  the  capital  have  for  the  moment  suspended  these 
political  intrigues,  or  rather  prevented  the  accomplishment  of 
their  objects.  If  any  one  of  our  Western  Gen'ls  would  do 
something  creditable  and  brilliant  in  the  present  crisis,  it  would 
open  the  way  to  a  new  organization  such  as  it  should  be. 

From  the  position  of  St.  Louis  as  the  source  of  supplies,  Mis- 


IN  COMMAND  OF  THE   "ARMY  OF  THE  FRONTIER"       (ft 

souri  ought  not  to  be  separated  from  Arkansas  and  western 
Tennessee.     What  will  be  done  in  the  matter  I  do  not  know. 

Yours  truly, 

H.  W.  HALLECK. 


None  of  "  our  Western  generals  "  had  then  done  any 
thing  very  "  creditable  and  brilliant."  Even  Grant  was 
the  object  of  grave  charges  and  bitter  attacks.  Powerful 
influences  were  at  work  to  supersede  him  in  command  of 
the  army  in  west  Tennessee.  Had  there  been  any  avail 
able  general  at  that  time  capable  of  commanding  public 
confidence,  the  military  idea  would  doubtless  have  pre 
vailed,  but  in  the  absence  of  such  a  leader  the  politicians 
triumphed  in  part. 

The  old  department,  called  Department  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  was  divided,  and  Major-General  Samuel  R.  Curtis 
was  assigned  to  command  the  new  Department  of  the 
Missouri,  composed  of  the  territory  west  of  the  Missis 
sippi  River.  For  some  months  the  radicals  had  it  all 
their  own  way,  and  military  confiscation  was  carried  on 
without  hindrance. 

When  this  change  occurred  I  was  in  the  field  in  im 
mediate  command  of  the  forces  which  I  had  assembled 
there  for  aggressive  operations,  and  which  General  Curtis 
named  the  "  Army  of  the  Frontier."  My  official  report  of 
December  7,  1862,  gave  a  full  account  of  the  operations 
of  that  army  up  to  November  20,  when  sickness  compelled 
me  to  relinquish  the  command. 

As  will  be  seen  from  that  report  and  from  my  corre 
spondence  with  General  Curtis  at  the  time,  it  was  then 
well  known  that  the  enemy  was  concentrating  in  the 
Arkansas  valley  all  the  troops  he  could  raise,  and  mak 
ing  preparations  to  return  across  the  Boston  Mountains 
and  "  dispute  with  us  the  possession  of  northwestern 
Arkansas  and  southwestern  Missouri  " ;  and  I  had  placed 
my  troops  where  they  could  live  to  a  great  extent  on 


62  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  country,  and  quickly  concentrate  to  meet  the  enemy 
when  he  should  advance.  But  G-eneral  Curtis  ordered 
me  to  move  north  and  east  with  two  divisions,  leaving 
Blunt  with  one  division  to  occupy  that  country.  It  was 
on  this  return  march  that  I  was  overtaken  by  a  severe 
attack  of  bilious  fever. 

As  my  official  report  of  December  7,  1862,  is  published 
in  Volume  XIII  of  the  War  Eecords,  I  make  no  refer 
ence  here  to  the  operations  covered  by  it.  That  able  and 
impartial  historian,  the  Comte  de  Paris,  published  a  very 
accurate  history  of  the  operations  in  Missouri  in  the 
summer  of  1862,  in  which  he  paid  me  the  compliment, 
which  a  soldier  values  so  highly,  of  saying  that  I  was 
free  from  partizan  passion. 

It  was  during  my  absence  through  illness  that  Hind- 
man  made  his  expected  advance.  Blunt's  division  was 
encamped  at  Cane  Hill,  and  Hindman  crossed  the  moun 
tains  at  Lee's  Creek,  aiming  to  reach  Blunt's  rear,  cut  off 
his  retreat,  and  overwhelm  him. 

Fortunately,  Blunt  had  received  information  in  ad 
vance  of  the  intended  movement,  and  had  called  the  two 
divisions  from  Missouri  to  his  support.  These  two  divi 
sions,  under  General  Herron,  were  encamped  at  Wilson's 
Creek,  a  distance  of  about  116  miles.  On  the  morning 
of  December  3  they  began  their  march  to  join  Gen 
eral  Blunt.  They  had  reached  a  point  about  six  miles 
south  of  Fayetteville  when,  unexpectedly  to  both,  Her- 
ron's  and  Hindman's  heads  of  column  met  at  Prairie 
Grove  about  seven  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  December 
7,  and  the  engagement  commenced  immediately.  Blunt, 
hearing  the  sound  of  battle,  moved  rapidly  toward  Prairie 
Grove  and  attacked  the  enemy's  left.  The  battle  lasted 
all  day,  with  heavy  losses  on  both  sides,  and  without  any 
decided  advantage  to  either  side.  At  dark  the  enemy  still 
held  his  position,  but  in  the  morning  was  found  to  be 
in  full  retreat  across  the  mountains.  A  portion  of  our 


BATTLE  OF  PRAIRIE  GROVE  53 

troops  occupied  the  battle-field  of  Prairie  Grove  when  I 
resumed  command  on  December  29,  and  the  remainder 
were  making  a  raid  to  the  Arkansas  Eiver,  where  they 
destroyed  some  property,  and  found  that  Hindman  had 
retreated  toward  Little  Eock.  It  was  evident  that  the 
campaign  in  that  part  of  the  country  for  that  season  was 
ended.  The  question  was  "  What  next  1 "  I  took  it  for 
granted  that  the  large  force  under  my  command — nearly 
16,000  men — was  not  to  remain  idle  while  Grant  or  some 
other  commander  was  trying  to  open  the  Mississippi 
Eiver ;  and  I  was  confirmed  in  this  assumption  by  Gen 
eral  Curtis's  previous  order  to  march  eastward  with  two 
divisions,  which  order,  though  premature  when  given, 
might  now  be  renewed  without  danger.  At  once,  there 
fore,  I  set  to  work  to  organize  a  suitable  force,  including 
the  Indian  regiments,  to  hold  the  country  we  had  gained, 
and  three  good  divisions  to  prosecute  such  operations 
as  might  be  determined  on,  and  at  once  commenced  the 
march  north  and  east  toward  the  theater  of  future  active 
operations. 

Although  I  had  at  first  esteemed  General  Blunt  much 
more  highly  than  he  deserved,  and  had  given  him  most 
liberal  commendation  in  my  official  report  for  all  he  had 
done,  I  became  satisfied  that  he  was  unfit  in  any  respect 
for  the  command  of  a  division  of  troops  against  a  dis 
ciplined  enemy.  As  was  my  plain  duty,  I  suggested 
confidentially  to  General  Curtis  that  the  command  of  a 
division  in  the  field  was  not  General  Blunt's  true  place, 
and  that  he  be  assigned  to  the  District  of  Kansas,  where 
I  permitted  him  to  go,  at  his  own  request,  to  look  after 
his  personal  interests.  General  Curtis  rebuked  me  for 
making  such  a  suggestion,  and  betrayed  my  confidence 
by  giving  my  despatch  to  James  H.  Lane,  senator  from 
Kansas,  and  others  of  Blunt's  political  friends,  thus  put 
ting  me  before  the  President  and  the  United  States  Sen 
ate  in  the  light  of  unjust  hostility  to  gallant  officers  who 


64  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

had  just  won  a  great  victory  over  the  enemy  at  Prairie 
Grove.  The  result  of  this,  and  of  radical  influence  in 
general,  was  that  my  nomination  as  major-general  of  vol 
unteers,  then  pending  in  the  Senate,  was  not  confirmed, 
while  both  Blunt  and  Herron  were  nominated  and  con 
firmed  as  major-generals ! 

Such  as  Lane  and  Blunt  were  the  men  who  so  long 
seemed  to  control  the  conduct  of  military  affairs  in  the 
West,  and  whom  I  found  much  more  formidable  enemies 
than  the  hostile  army  in  my  front.  Herron  I  esteemed 
a  very  different  man  from  Blunt,  and  thought  he  would, 
with  experience,  make  a  good  division  commander.  But 
circumstances  occurred  soon  after  which  shook  my  con 
fidence  in  his  character  as  well  as  in  that  of  General 
Curtis.  Herron  and  some  of  his  staff -officers  were  sub 
poenaed,  through  department  headquarters,  as  material 
witnesses  for  the  defense  in  the  case  of  an  officer  on  trial 
before  a  military  commission.  They  failed  to  appear. 
Soon  after,  when  Herron  was  assigned  to  command  the 
Army  of  the  Frontier,  he  "dissolved"  the  commission 
"for  the  present,"  adding:  "The  court  will  be  reassembled 
by  order  from  these  headquarters  in  the  field  when  wit 
nesses  not  at  present  to  be  had  can  be  brought  forward." 
Upon  learning  this,  after  I  assumed  command  of  the  de 
partment  I  ordered  Herron  to  report  for  duty  to  Gen 
eral  Grant  before  Yicksburg.  In  the  meantime  Herron 
wrote  to  the  War  Department  protesting  against  serving 
under  me  as  department  commander,  and  got  a  sharp 
rebuke  from  the  President  through  the  Secretary  of 
War.  This  brief  explanation  is  all  that  seems  necessary 
to  show  the  connection  between  the  several  events  as 
they  appear  in  the  official  records. 

After  the  battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  being  then  in  St. 
Louis,  I  asked  General  Curtis  to  let  me  go  down  the 
Mississippi  and  join  the  expedition  against  Vicksburg, 
saying  that  as  Blunt  and  Herron  had  won  a  battle  in  my 


COMPELLED  TO  BE  INACTIVE  (55 

absence,  I  did  not  wish  to  resume  command  over  them. 
But  Curtis  would  not  consent  to  this ;  he  said  he  wanted 
me  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Frontier.  He  thus  in 
vited  the  confidence  which  he  afterward  betrayed,  and 
for  which  he  rebuked  me.  I  felt  outraged  by  this  treat 
ment,  and  thereafter  did  not  feel  or  show  toward  General 
Curtis  the  respect  or  subordination  which  ought  to  char 
acterize  the  relations  of  an  officer  toward  his  commander. 
This  feeling  was  intensified  by  his  conduct  in  the  Herron 
affair,  and  by  the  determination  gradually  manifested 
not  to  permit  me  or  my  command  to  do  anything.  He 
for  a  long  time  kept  up  a  pretense  of  wanting  me  to 
move  east  or  west,  or  south,  or  somewhere,  but  nega 
tived  all  my  efforts  actually  to  move.  The  situation 
seemed  to  me  really  unendurable :  I  was  compelled  to 
lie  at  Springfield  all  the  latter  part  of  winter,  with  a 
well-appointed  army  corps  eager  for  active  service,  hun 
dreds  of  miles  from  any  hostile  force,  and  where  we  were 
compelled  to  haul  our  own  supplies,  in  wagons,  over  the 
worst  of  roads,  120  miles  from  the  railroad  terminus  at 
Rolla.  I  could  not  get  permission  even  to  move  nearer 
the  railroad,  much  less  toward  the  line  on  which  the 
next  advance  must  be  made;  and  this  while  the  whole 
country  was  looking  with  intense  anxiety  for  the  move 
ment  that  was  to  open  the  Mississippi  to  the  Gulf,  and 
the  government  was  straining  every  nerve  to  make 
that  movement  successful.  Hence  I  wrote  to  General 
Halleck  the  letters  of  January  31,  1863,  and  February 
3.  These  appear  to  have  called  forth  some  correspon 
dence  between  Generals  Halleck  and  Curtis,  of  which 
General  Halleck's  letter  of  February  18  was  the  only 
part  that  came  into  my  possession.1  This  account  was 
written  several  years  before  the  War  Records  were  pub 
lished. 

1  The  whole  correspondence  may  be  found  in  the  War  Records,  Vol. 
XXII,  part  ii. 


66  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

In  my  letter  of  January  31, 1  said : 

Pardon  me  for  suggesting  that  the  forces  under  command  of 
Davidson,  Warren,  and  myself  might  be  made  available  in  the 
opening  of  the  Mississippi,  should  that  result  not  be  accom 
plished  quickly.  .  .  . 

The  immediate  result  of  this  correspondence  was  that 
some  troops  were  sent  down  the  river,  but  none  of  my 
command,  while  two  divisions  of  the  latter  were  ordered 
toward  the  east.  This  march  was  in  progress  when 
Congress  adjourned.  The  Senate  not  having  confirmed 
my  appointment  as  major-general,  the  time  of  my  tem 
porary  humiliation  arrived.  But  I  had  not  relied  wholly 
in  vain  upon  G-eneral  Halleck's  personal  knowledge  of 
my  character.  He  had  not  been  able  fully  to  sustain  me 
against  selfish  intrigue  in  Kansas,  Missouri,  and  Wash 
ington;  but  he  could  and  did  promptly  respond  to  my 
request,  and  ordered  me  to  Tennessee,  where  I  could  be 
associated  with  soldiers  who  were  capable  of  appreciating 
soldierly  qualities.  One  of  the  happiest  days  of  my  life 
was  when  I  reported  to  Rosecrans  and  Thomas  at  Mur- 
freesboro',  received  their  cordial  welcome,  and  was  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  Thomas's  own  old  division  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps.  One  of  the  most  agreeable  parts  of 
my  whole  military  service  was  the  thirty  days  in  com 
mand  of  that  division  at  Triune,  and  some  of  my 
strongest  and  most  valued  army  attachments  were  formed 
there. 

But  that  happy  period  of  soldier  life  was  brief.  Early 
in  May  President  Lincoln  reappointed  me  major-general, 
with  original  date,  November  29,  1862,  and  ordered  me 
back  to  the  old  scene  of  un soldierly  strife  and  turmoil 
in  Missouri  and  Kansas. 

In  1861  and  1862  I  had  a  Hibernian  "  striker "  who 
had  been  a  soldier  in  the  old  mounted  rifles,  and  had 
been  discharged  on  account  of  a  wound  received  in  an 


A  HIBERNIAN   "  STRIKER"  (57 

Indian  fight,  but  was  yet  well  able  to  perform  the  duties 
of  an  officer's  servant  in  the  field.  His  care  of  his  mas 
ter's  property,  and  sometimes  of  the  master  himself,  was 
very  remarkable.  In  the  midst  of  the  battle  at  Wilson's 
Creek  the  horse  I  was  riding  was  killed,  and  I  called  in 
vain  for  my  spare  horse.  From  the  best  information 
obtained  I  concluded  that  both  the  horse  and  my  faith 
ful  orderly  had  been  killed,  and  I  sincerely  mourned 
my  loss.  But  after  the  fight  was  over  I  found  my 
man  quietly  riding  the  spare  horse  along  with  the  troops, 
as  if  nothing  unusual  had  happened.  When  I  upbraided 
him  for  his  conduct  and  demanded  to  know  where  he 
had  been  all  that  time,  he  replied :  aAh,  Major,  when  I 
saw  the  one  horse  killed  I  thought  I  'd  better  take  the 
other  to  a  place  of  safety!" 

Where  my  efficient  assistant  obtained  his  supplies  I 
never  knew,  but  he  would  fill  without  delay  any  requisi 
tion  I  might  make,  from  a  shoe-string  to  a  buffalo-robe. 
One  day  in  1862  I  found  in  my  camp  trunk  several  pairs 
of  shoulder-straps  belonging  to  the  grades  of  captain, 
major,  and  lieutenant-colonel.  As  I  was  then  a  briga 
dier-general,  I  inquired  of  my  man  why  he  kept  those 
badges  of  inferior  grades.  He  replied :  "  Ah,  General, 
nobody  can  tell  what  may  happen  to  you."  When,  only 
a  few  months  later,  after  having  been  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  major-general  I  was  again  reduced  to  that  of 
brigadier-general,  I  remembered  the  forethought  of  my 
Irish  orderly. 


CHAPTER  V 

IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI  — 
TROOPS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  GRANT  —  SATISFACTION  OF 
THE  PRESIDENT  —  CONDITIONS  ON  WHICH  GOVERNOR 
GAMBLE  WOULD  CONTINUE  IN  OFFICE  —  ANTI-SLAVERY 
VIEWS  —  LINCOLN  ON  EMANCIPATION  IN  MISSOURI  — 
TROUBLE  FOLLOWING  THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE  —  A 
VISIT  TO  KANSAS,  AND  THE  PARTY  QUARREL  THERE 
— MUTINY  IN  THE  STATE  MILITIA  —  REPRESSIVE  MEA 
SURES —  A  REVOLUTIONARY  PLOT. 

ON  May  24,  1863,  I  relieved  General  Curtis  in  com 
mand  of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri.  In  his 
instructions  of  May  22,  General  Halleck  said : 

"You  owe  your  present  appointment  entirely  to  the 
choice  of  the  President  himself.  I  have  not,  directly  or 
indirectly,  interfered  in  the  matter.  But  I  fully  concur 
in  the  choice,  and  will  give  you  all  possible  support  and 
assistance  in  the  performance  of  the  arduous  duties  im 
posed  upon  you." 

A  few  days  later  I  received  the  following  significant 
letter  from  the  President: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  May  27,  1863. 
GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD: 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  Having  relieved  General  Curtis  and  as 
signed  yon  to  the  command  of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri, 
I  think  it  may  be  of  some  advantage  for  me  to  state  to  you  why 
I  did  it. 

I  did  not  relieve  General  Curtis  because  of  any  full  convic 
tion  that  he  had  done  wrong  by  commission  or  omission.  I  did 

68 


IN  COMMAND  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI     gg 

it  because  of  a  conviction  in  my  mind  that  the  Union  men  of 
Missouri,  constituting,  when  united,  a  vast  majority  of  the  whole 
people,  have  entered  into  a  pestilent  factional  quarrel  among 
themselves  —  General  Curtis,  perhaps  not  of  choice,  being  the 
head  of  one  faction,  and  Governor  Gamble  that  of  the  other. 
After  months  of  labor  to  reconcile  the  difficulty,  it  seemed  to 
grow  worse  and  worse,  until  I  felt  it  my  duty  to  break  it  up 
somehow ;  and  as  I  could  not  remove  Governor  Gamble,  I  had 
to  remove  General  Curtis. 

Now  that  you  are  in  the  position,  I  wish  you  to  undo  noth 
ing  merely  because  General  Curtis  or  Governor  Gamble  did  it, 
but  to  exercise  your  own  judgment  and  do  right  for  the  public 
interest. 

Let  your  military  measures  be  strong  enough  to  repel  the  in 
vader  and  keep  the  peace,  and  not  so  strong  as  to  unnecessarily 
harass  and  persecute  the  people.  It  is  a  difficult  role,  and  so 
much  greater  will  be  the  honor  if  you  perform  it  well.  If  both 
factions,  or  neither,  shall  abuse  you,  you  will  probably  be  about 
right.  Beware  of  being  assailed  by  one  and  praised  by  the 
other.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

In  acknowledging  the  President's  letter  on  June  1,  I 
concluded  by  saying : 

I  have  strong  hopes  that  the  Missouri  State  Convention,  at 
its  approaching  session,  will  adopt  such  measures  for  the  speedy 
emancipation  of  slaves  as  will  secure  the  acquiescence  of  the 
large  majority  of  Union  men,  though  perhaps  not  quite  satis 
factory  to  either  extreme.  If  this  hope  be  realized,  one  of  my 
most  embarrassing  difficulties  will  be  removed,  or  at  least 
greatly  diminished. 

The  military  problem  in  that  department,  as  under 
stood  by  me  and  by  my  superiors  in  Washington,  was  at 
that  time  a  comparatively  simple  one,  though  my  prede 
cessor  in  command  of  the  department  entertained  differ 
ent  views.  With  my  views  of  the  military  situation, 
whether  confined  to  my  own  department  or  extended  to 
embrace  the  entire  country,  there  was  but  one  course  to 


70  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

pursue,  namely,  to  send  all  available  force  to  assist  in 
the  capture  of  Vicksburg  and  the  opening  of  the  Missis 
sippi  to  the  gulf.  After  that  I  could  easily  operate  from 
points  on  the  Mississippi  as  a  base,  capture  Little  Eock 
and  the  line  of  the  Arkansas,  and  then  make  that  river 
the  base  of  future  operations. 

Hence,  in  response  to  a  request  from  General  Halleck, 
I  at  once  sent  to  General  Grant  and  other  commanders  at 
the  front  all  the  troops  I  could  possibly  spare,  saying 
at  the  same  time  that  this  would  leave  me  very  weak, 
but  that  I  was  "  willing  to  risk  it  in  view  of  the  vast  im 
portance  of  Grant's  success." 

Thus  I  began  my  military  operations  by  stripping  the 
department  of  troops  to  the  lowest  possible  defensive 
limit.  But  this  was  what  I  had  so  earnestly  urged  be 
fore,  when  in  a  subordinate  position ;  and  I  was  glad  to 
do  it  when  the  responsibility  rested  upon  me.  My  loan 
of  troops  to  Grant  was  returned  with  interest  as  soon  as 
practicable  after  Vicksburg  had  fallen,  and  I  was  then 
able  to  advance  a  large  force,  under  General  Steele,  for 
the  capture  of  Little  Rock,  resulting  in  holding  the  entire 
line  of  the  Arkansas  River  from  that  time  forward. 

At  that  time  I  had  met  General  Grant  but  once,  and 
then  for  only  a  moment,  and  I  have  always  assumed 
that  the  timely  aid  sent  him  at  Vicksburg  was  the  foun 
dation  for  the  kind  and  generous  friendship  and  confi 
dence  which  he  ever  afterward  manifested  toward  me, 
and  which,  with  the  like  manifestations  of  approval  from 
President  Lincoln,  are  to  me  the  most  cherished  recollec 
tions  of  my  official  career. 

The  appreciation  of  my  action  in  Washington  was  ex 
pressed  by  General  Halleck  in  a  letter  dated  July  7, 1863, 
in  which  he  said :  "  The  promptness  with  which  you  sent 
troops  to  General  Grant  gave  great  satisfaction  here"; 
and  by  the  President  himself,  in  a  letter  to  the  "Hon. 
Charles  D.  Drake  and  others,  committee,"  dated  October 


TROOPS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  GRANT  7^ 

5,  1863,  in  which  he  wrote :  "  Few  things  have  been  so 
grateful  to  my  anxious  feelings  as  when,  in  June  last, 
the  local  force  in  Missouri  aided  General  Schofield  to  so 
promptly  send  a  large  general  force  to  the  relief  of  Gen 
eral  Grant,  then  investing  Vicksburg  and  menaced  from 
without  by  General  Johnston." 

It  would  have  been  impossible  for  me  to  send  away 
more  than  a  small  part  of  those  troops  if  I  had  not  been 
able  to  replace  them  by  Missouri  militia.  This  General 
Curtis  had  probably  been  unable  to  do  because  of  the 
unfortunate  antagonism  between  him  and  the  State  gov 
ernment;  and  perhaps  this  much  ought  to  be  said  in 
explanation  of  his  apparently  selfish  policy  of  retaining 
so  many  idle  troops  in  Missouri.  For  my  part,  I  could 
see  neither  necessity  nor  excuse  for  quarreling  with  the 
governor  of  Missouri,  and  thus  depriving  myself  and  the 
nation  of  his  legitimate  aid.  Governor  Gamble  was  per 
haps  "  behind  the  times "  in  his  views  on  the  slavery 
question,  although  decidedly  in  favor  of  gradual  emanci 
pation  ;  and  he  was  utterly  intolerant  of  those  radical 
schemes  for  accomplishing  ends  by  lawless  means,  then 
so  loudly  advocated.  I  thought  at  the  time  a  more  radi 
cal  policy  might  possibly  tend  to  harmonize  the  Union 
factions  and  allay  the  excitement,  and  frequently  told 
Governor  Gamble  that  it  would  be  necessary  to  adopt  a 
policy  on  the  negro  question  more  in  harmony  with  the 
views  of  the  administration  and  of  the  Northern  people. 
To  this  the  governor  assented,  and  seemed  desirous  of 
going  as  far  in  that  direction  as  he  could  carry  the  Union 
people  of  Missouri  with  him.  From  his  seat  in  the  State 
Convention  at  Jefferson  City  he  made  a  speech  advocat 
ing  emancipation  in  a  much  shorter  period  than  the  con 
vention  could  finally  be  prevailed  upon  to  adopt,  while  I 
was  using  my  personal  influence  with  members  to  the 
same  end. 

But  it  soon  became  evident  that  nothing  would  satisfy 


72  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  radical  leaders  short  of  the  overthrow  of  the  existing 
State  government;  that  a  reconciliation  of  the  quarrel 
between  the  "pestilent  factions"1  in  Missouri,  so  much 
desired  by  Mr.  Lincoln,  was  exactly  what  the  radicals 
did  not  want  and  would  not  have.  Satisfied  of  this  and 
disgusted  with  the  abuse  heaped  upon  him  by  men  who 
owed  him  warm  and  honest  support,  Governor  Gamble 
tendered  his  resignation  to  the  convention,  then  in  ses 
sion.  His  resignation  was  not  accepted,  and  by  a  "major 
ity  of  the  convention  and  multitudes  of  private  citizens  " 
he  was  requested  to  withdraw  it.  In  this  request  I 
united,  for  I  could  see  no  possibility  of  improvement 
under  any  governor  that  the  convention — a  very  conser 
vative  body  —  might  elect,  while  the  result  might  be 
confusion  worse  confounded. 

The  governor  submitted  to  me  the  following  letter  in 
cluding  conditions  upon  which  he  would  consent  to  con 
tinue  in  office : 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD. 

GENERAL  :  For  the  purpose  of  restoring  order  and  law  and 
maintaining  the  authority  of  the  Federal  and  State  governments 
in  the  State  of  Missouri,  it  is  necessary  that  we  have  an  under 
standing  as  to  the  most  important  measures  to  be  adopted. 

I  have  tendered  my  resignation  as  governor,  and  have  been 
requested  to  withdraw  it  on  the  ground  that  it  is  necessary  to 
the  peace  and  quiet  of  the  State  that  I  remain  in  office.  In  this 
request  you  have  united  with  a  majority  of  the  convention  and 
multitudes  of  private  citizens.  I  am  willing  to  accede  to  the 
request,  and,  if  an  ordinance  of  emancipation  is  passed,  to  re 
main  in  office,  if  on  the  part  of  the  government  I  can  be  sure  of 
its  cooperation  in  my  efforts  to  preserve  the  peace  and  remove  all 
causes  of  dissension  and  dissatisfaction  from  among  the  people. 

I  think  it  necessary  that  the  following  measures  be  adopted 
by  you  as  the  commanding  general  of  the  department : 

1  The  division  of  the  Union  party     nated  during  the  administration  of 
into  radicals  and  conservatives,  or     General  Fremont. 
"  charcoals  "  and  "  claybanks,"  origi- 


CONDITIONS  OF  GOVERNOR  GAMBLE'S  CONTINUING        73 

First.  That  it  be  distinctly  made  known  that  the  provisional 
government  of  the  State  is  the  government  recognized  by  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  and  that  any  attempt,  in  any 
way,  to  interfere  by  violence,  or  by  tumultuous  assemblages,  or 
in  any  other  unlawful  manner,  will  be  suppressed  by  the  power 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States. 

Second.  That  the  functions  of  the  civil  government  of  the 
State  will  be  supported  and  upheld,  and  that  the  process  of  the 
State  in  civil  and  criminal  matters  may  be  executed  in  all  posts 
and  encampments  of  troops  of  the  United  States,  and  that  re 
sistance  thereto  by  military  persons  shall  be  punished. 

Third.  That  no  recruiting  of  negroes  within  this  State  shall 
be  recognized,  unless  the  persons  recruiting  them  shall  be  able 
to  produce  the  written  permission  of  the  governor  of  the  State; 
and  that  any  person  attempting  to  recruit  without  such  permis 
sion,  if  he  be  in  the  military  service  shall  be  immediately  pro 
hibited  from  all  such  conduct,  and  if  in  civil  life  shall  be  pro 
ceeded  against  by  the  State  authorities,  without  any  interference 
by  the  military. 

Fourth.  That  no  countenance  or  encouragement  shall  be  given 
to  provost-marshals,  or  others  in  military  authority,  in  any  pro 
ceeding  against  the  property  of  citizens,  slaves  included,  upon 
the  ground  of  its  being  liable  to  confiscation ;  but  the  confisca 
tion  shall  be  executed  by  the  civil  officers  of  the  United  States, 
as  is  directed  by  the  authorities  at  Washington. 

When  we  arrive  at  a  perfect  understanding  between  our 
selves,  I  am  willing  to  put  myself  in  the  same  boat  with  you, 
and  we  will  sink  or  swim  together.  If  you  should  be  censured 
or  removed  from  this  command  because  of  what  is  done  to 
carry  these  propositions  into  effect,  I  will  abandon  office  im 
mediately.  .  .  . 


To  this  I  replied  verbally  that  I  could  not  enter  into 
any  agreement  as  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by  me  as 
commander  of  the  department ;  that  I  must  hold  myself 
free  to  pursue  such  course  as  circumstances  should  from 
time  to  time  indicate,  or  such  as  might  be  ordered  by  the 
President ;  my  policy  would  be  indicated  from  time  to 
time  by  my  general  orders ;  in  some  respects  it  would 


74  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

doubtless  conflict  with  that  submitted  by  his  Excel 
lency.  Nevertheless  the  governor  finally  consented  to 
withdraw  his  resignation. 

The  convention  at  length  passed  an  ordinance  pro 
viding  for  the  gradual  extinction  of  slavery  in  the  State, 
and  adjourned.  The  feeling  of  bitterness  between  the 
opposing  factions  rather  increased  than  diminished  dur 
ing  its  session. 

The  following  letter  to  my  friend  Mr.  Williams,  which 
was  published  in  the  New  York  and  St.  Louis  papers  with 
my  consent,  made  sufficiently  clear  the  views  I  then  en 
tertained  upon  the  slavery  question,  and  left  no  reason 
able  ground  for  any  emancipationist  to  quarrel  with  me 
on  that  subject,  however  much  he  may  have  been  dis 
satisfied  with  the  action  of  the  convention, —  just  as  my 
letter  of  June  1  to  the  President  left  him  no  room  for 
doubt — if,  indeed,  he  had  entertained  any  before — upon 
the  question  then  deemed  so  important: 


HEADQUARTERS,  DEP'T  OF  THE  MISSOURI, 

ST.  Louis,  June  1,  1863. 
J.  E.  WILLIAMS,  ESQ., 

Pres't  Metropolitan  Bank,  New  York. 

MY  DEAR  SIR  :  Professor  Bartlett  has  informed  me  of  the  in 
terest  you  have  manifested  in  my  promotion  and  connection 
with  this  department,  and,  above  all,  that  you  have  done  me  the 
kindness  to  assert  my  soundness  on  the  important  question  of 
the  day. 

You  are  right  in  saving  that  I  was  an  anti-slavery  man, 
though  not  an  abolitionist,  before  the  war.  These  terms  have 
greatly  changed  their  relative  meaning  since  the  rebellion  broke 
out.  I  regard  universal  emancipation  as  one  of  the  necessary 
consequences  of  the  rebellion,  or  rather  as  one  of  the  means 
absolutely  necessary  to  a  complete  restoration  of  the  Union  — 
and  this  because  slavery  was  the  great  cause  of  the  rebellion, 
and  the  only  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  perfect  union.  The  per 
ception  of  these  important  truths  is  spreading  with  almost  as- 


ANTI-SLAVERY  VIEWS  75 

tounding  rapidity  in  this  State.  I  have  great  hope  that  the 
State  Convention,  which  meets  on  the  15th  instant,  will  adopt 
some  measure  for  the  speedy  emancipation  of  slaves.  If  so,  our 
difficulties  will  be  substantially  at  an  end. 

When  the  popular  mind  seizes  a  great  principle  and  resolves 
to  carry  it  into  execution,  it  becomes  impatient  of  the  restraints 
imposed  by  existing  laws,  and  in  its  haste  to  break  down  the 
barriers  which  stand  in  the  way  of  its  darling  object,  becomes 
regardless  of  all  law,  and  anarchy  is  the  result.  This  is  our 
difficulty  here.  The  people  will  have  freedom  for  the  slave. 
No  law  of  the  United  States  nor  of  Missouri,  nor  yet  any  order 
of  the  President,  meets  the  case. 

The  loyal  slave-owner  demands  that  his  rights  under  the  law 
be  protected.  Let  us  have  an  ordinance  of  the  State  Conven 
tion  which  will  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  popular  mind,  and 
no  loyal  man  will  murmur. 

You  can  imagine  with  what  deep  interest  I  Took  forward  to 
the  legal  settlement  of  this  question,  so  deeply  involving  the 
success  of  the  great  cause  for  the  time  being  intrusted  to  my 
care. 

In  Arkansas  and  other  States  to  which  the  President's  procla 
mation  applies,  so  far  as  I  have  observed,  no  such  difficulty  ex 
ists.  The  loyal  people  accept  the  decree  without  complaint, 
perfectly  willing  to  give  up  all  they  have  for  the  Union.  So 
much  the  greater  honor  is  due  them  for  this  cheerful  sacrifice 
because  they  do  not  and  cannot  be  expected  to  appreciate  and 
understand  the  principle  of  freedom  as  it  is  impressed  upon  the 
loyal  heart  of  the  North. 

Please  accept  my  thanks  for  your  kindness,  and  believe  me, 

Yours  very  truly, 
(Signed)  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

On  June  20,  I  telegraphed  to  Mr.  Lincoln : 

The  action  of  the  Missouri  State  Convention  upon  the  ques 
tion  of  emancipation  will  depend  very  much  upon  whether  they 
can  be  assured  that  their  action  will  be  sustained  by  the  General 
Government  and  the  people  protected  in  their  slave  property 
during  the  short  time  that  slavery  is  permitted  to  exist.  Am  I 
authorized  in  any  manner,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  pledge  such 
support  and  protection  1 


76  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

This  question  is  of  such  vital  importance  to  the  peace  of  Mis 
souri  that  I  deem  it  my  duty  to  lay  it  before  your  Excellency. 

The  following  reply  from  the  President  fairly  illus 
trates  the  wisdom  and  justice  of  his  views,  and  shows 
how  perfectly  I  was  in  accord  with  him  in  my  desire  to 
do  what  was  wisest  and  best  for  the  peace  of  Missouri : 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  June  22,  1863. 
GENL.  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

MY  DEAR  SIR:  Your  despatch,  asking  in  substance  whether, 
in  case  Missouri  shall  adopt  gradual  emancipation,  the  General 
Government  will  protect  slave-owners  in  that  species  of  prop 
erty  during  the  short  time  it  shall  be  permitted  by  the  State  to 
exist  within  it,  has  been  received. 

Desirous  as  I  am  that  emancipation  shall  be  adopted  by  Mis 
souri,  and  believing  as  I  do  that  gradual  can  be  made  better 
than  immediate,  for  both  black  and  white,  except  when  military 
necessity  changes  the  case,  my  impulse  is  to  say  that  such  pro 
tection  would  be  given.  I  cannot  know  exactly  what  shape  an 
act  of  emancipation  may  take.  If  the  period  from  the  initiation 
to  the  final  end  should  be  comparatively  short,  and  the  act 
should  prevent  persons  being  sold  during  that  period  into  more 
lasting  slavery,  the  whole  would  be  easier.  I  do  not  wish  to 
pledge  the  General  Government  to  the  affirmative  support  of 
even  temporary  slavery,  beyond  what  can  be  fairly  claimed 
under  the  Constitution.  I  suppose,  however,  this  is  not  desired; 
but  that  it  is  desired  for  the  military  force  of  the  United  States, 
while  in  Missouri,  to  not  be  used  in  subverting  the  tempo 
rarily  reserved  legal  rights  in  slaves  during  the  progress  of 
emancipation.  This  I  would  desire  also.  I  have  very  earnestly 
urged  the  slave  States  to  adopt  emancipation ;  and  it  ought  to 
be,  and  is,  an  object  with  me  not  to  overthrow  or  thwart  what 
any  of  them  may  in  good  faith  do  to  that  end.  You  are  there 
fore  authorized  to  act  in  the  spirit  of  this  letter,  in  conjunc 
tion  with  what  may  appear  to  be  the  military  necessities  of 
your  department. 

Although  this  letter  will  become  public  at  some  time,  it  is 
not  intended  to  be  made  so  now.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 


LINCOLN  ON  EMANCIPATION  IN  MISSOURI  77 

My  impression  is  that  the  nature  of  this  quarrel  in 
Missouri  was  not  fully  understood  at  the  time  in  Wash 
ington,  as  Greneral  Halleck  wrote  me  that  neither  of  the 
factions  was  regarded  as  really  friendly  to  the  President. 
But  my  belief  is  that  they  were  then,  as  they  subse 
quently  proved  to  be,  divided  on  the  Presidential  ques 
tion  as  well  as  in  State  politics ;  that  the  conservatives 
were  sincere  in  their  friendship  and  support  of  Mr.  Lin 
coln,  and  desired  his  renomination,  while  the  radicals 
were  intriguing  for  Mr.  Chase  or  some  other  more  radi 
cal  man. 

This  struggle  between  extreme  radicalism  and  conser 
vatism  among  the  Union  people  of  Missouri  was  long 
and  bitter,  but  I  have  nothing  to  do  with  its  history  be 
yond  the  period  of  my  command  in  that  department.  It 
resulted,  as  is  now  well  known,  in  the  triumph  of  radi 
calism  in  the  Republican  party,  and  the  consequent  final 
loss  of  power  by  that  party  in  the  State.  Such  extremes 
could  not  fail  to  produce  a  popular  revulsion,  and  it 
required  no  great  foresight  to  predict  the  final  result. 

The  factions  in  Missouri  gave  the  military  commander 
trouble  enough  in  1863 ;  but  to  that  was  added  the  similar 
and  hardly  less  troublesome  party  quarrel  in  Kansas.  I 
cannot  give  a  more  accurate  account  of  the  complicated 
situation  there  than  by  quoting  from  my  correspondence 
and  journal  of  that  period.  On  August  28  I  wrote  to 
President  Lincoln  as  follows : 

In  reply  to  your  telegram  of  the  27th,  transmitting  copy  of 
one  received  from  two  influential  citizens  of  Kansas,  I  beg  leave 
to  state  some  of  the  facts  connected  with  the  horrible  massacre 
at  Lawrence,  and  also  relative  to  the  assaults  made  upon  me  by 
a  certain  class  of  influential  politicians. 

Since  the  capture  of  Vicksburg,  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
rebel  army  in  the  Mississippi  valley  has  disbanded,  and  large 
numbers  of  men  have  come  back  to  Missouri,  many  of  them 
doubtless  in  the  hope  of  being  permitted  to  remain  at  their 


78  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

former  homes  in  peace,  while  some  have  come  under  instructions 
to  carry  on  a  guerrilla  warfare,  and  others,  men  of  the  worst 
character,  become  marauders  on  their  own  account,  caring  no 
thing  for  the  Union,  nor  for  the  rebellion,  except  as  the  latter 
affords  them  a  cloak  for  their  brigandage. 

Under  instructions  from  the  rebel  authorities,  as  I  am  in 
formed  and  believe,  considerable  bands,  called  "  Border  Guards/' 
were  organized  in  the  counties  of  Missouri  bordering  on  Kansas, 
for  the  ostensible  purpose  of  protecting  those  counties  from  in 
roads  from  Kansas,  and  preventing  the  slaves  of  rebels  from 
escaping  from  Missouri  into  Kansas.  These  bands  were  unques 
tionably  encouraged,  fed,  and  harbored  by  a  very  considerable 
portion  of  the  people  of  those  border  counties.  Many  of  those 
people  were  in  fact  the  families  of  these  "  bushwhackers,77  who 
are  brigands  of  the  worst  type. 

Upon  the  representation  of  General  Ewing  and  others  familiar 
with  the  facts,  I  became  satisfied  there  could  be  no  cure  for  this 
evil  short  of  the  removal  from  those  counties  of  all  slaves  en 
titled  to  their  freedom,  and  of  the  families  of  all  men  known  to 
belong  to  these  bands,  and  others  who  were  known  to  sympa 
thize  with  them.  Accordingly  I  directed  General  Ewing  to 
adopt  and  carry  out  the  policy  he  had  indicated,  warning  him, 
however,  of  the  retaliation  which  might  be  attempted,  and  that 
he  must  be  fully  prepared  to  prevent  it  before  commencing  such 
severe  measures. 

Almost  immediately  after  it  became  known  that  such  policy 
had  been  adopted,  Quantrill  secretly  assembled  from  several  of 
the  border  counties  of  Missouri  about  300  of  his  men.  They 
met  at  a  preconcerted  place  of  rendezvous  near  the  Kansas  line, 
at  about  sunset,  and  immediately  marched  for  Lawrence,  which 
place  they  reached  at  daylight  the  next  morning.  They  sacked 
and  burned  the  town  and  murdered  the  citizens  in  the  most 
barbarous  manner. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  any  unguarded  town  in  a  country 
where  such  a  number  of  outlaws  can  be  assembled  is  liable  to  a 
similar  fate,  if  the  villains  are  willing  to  risk  the  retribution 
which  must  follow.  In  this  case  100  of  them  have  already 
been  slain,  and  the  remainder  are  hotly  pursued  in  all  directions. 
If  there  was  any  fault  on  the  part  of  General  Ewing,  it  appears 
to  have  been  in  not  guarding  Lawrence.  But  of  this  it  was  not 
my  purpose  to  speak.  General  Ewing  and  the  governor  of 


TROUBLE  FOLLOWING   THE  LAWRENCE  MASSACRE        79 

Kansas  have  asked  for  a  court  of  inquiry,  and  I  have  sent  to 
the  War  Department  a  request  that  one  may  be  appointed,  and 
I  do  not  wish  to  anticipate  the  result  of  a  full  investigation.  .  .  . 

I  am  officially  informed  that  a  large  meeting  has  been  held  at 
Leavenworth,  in  which  a  resolution  was  adopted  to  the  effect 
that  the  people  would  assemble  at  a  certain  place  on  the  border, 
on  September  8,  for  the  purpose  of  entering  Missouri  to  search 
for  their  stolen  property.  Efforts  have  been  made  by  the  mayor 
of  Leavenworth  to  get  possession  of  the  ferry  at  that  place,  for 
the  purpose  of  crossing  armed  parties  of  citizens  into  north 
Missouri. 

I  have  strong  reasons  for  believing  that  the  authors  of  the 
telegram  to  you  are  among  those  who  introduced  and  obtained 
the  adoption  of  the  Leavenworth  resolution,  and  who  are  en 
deavoring  to  organize  a  force  for  the  purpose  of  general  retalia 
tion  upon  Missouri.  Those  who  so  deplore  my  "  imbecility  "  and 
"  incapacity "  are  the  very  men  who  are  endeavoring  to  bring 
about  a  collision  between  the  people  of  Kansas  and  the  troops 
under  General  Ewing's  command. 

I  have  not  the  "  capacity  n  to  see  the  wisdom  or  justice  of  per 
mitting  an  irresponsible  mob  to  enter  Missouri  for  the  purpose 
of  retaliation,  even  for  so  grievous  a  wrong  as  that  which 
Lawrence  has  suffered. 

I  have  increased  the  force  upon  the  border  as  far  as  possible, 
and  no  effort  has  been,  or  will  be,  spared  to  punish  the  invaders 
of  Kansas,  and  to  prevent  such  acts  in  the  future.  The  force 
there  has  been  all  the  time  far  larger  than  in  any  other  portion 
of  my  department,  except  on  the  advanced  line  in  Arkansas  and 
the  Indian  Territory.  .  .  . 

P.  S.  Since  writing  the  above  I  have  received  the  "  Daily 
Times"  newspaper,  published  at  Leavenworth,  containing  an 
account  of  the  meeting  referred  to,  and  Senator  Lane's  speech, 
which  I  have  the  honor  to  inclose  herewith  for  your  information. 

In  a  letter  of  that  same  date  (August  28),  Governor 
Carney  informed  me,  among  other  things,  that  "after 
the  fearful  disaster  at  Lawrence  and  on  the  return  of  our 
troops  who  had  pursued  Quantrill  and  his  murderous 
band,  General  Ewing  and  General  James  H.  Lane  met  at 
Morristown  and  spent  the  night  together.  The  latter  re- 


80  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

turned  to  Lawrence  and  called  a  mass  meeting,  at  which 
he  defended  General  Ewing  and  made  an  intensely  bitter 
speech  against  you.  Yesterday  he  arrived  in  this  city, 
and  soon  after  caused  to  be  issued  a  placard  stating  he 
would  address  the  citizens  on  war  matters.  There  are 
two  parties  here — one  for  and  the  other  against  Ewing. 
That  against  him  is  headed  by  Mr.  Wilder,  member  of 
Congress,  and  by  Mr.  Anthony,  mayor  of  this  city.  This 
division  put  General  Lane  in  this  dilemma  here,  that  he 
could  not  defend  Ewing  as  he  had  done  in  Lawrence,  and 
hence  he  devoted  his  whole  attention  to  you.  The  more 
violent  of  the  men  opposing  you  are  for  independent  raids 
into  Missouri.  How  far  General  Lane  encouraged  this 
class  you  must  judge  from  the  facts  I  have  stated  and 
from  the  inclosed  speech.  To  give  tone  and  distinction 
to  the  meeting,  General  Lane  offered  a  resolution  calling 
upon  the  President  to  relieve  you,  affirming  that  there 
could  be  no  safety  in  Kansas,  no  help  for  Kansas,  unless 
this  was  done.  .  .  .  You  will  judge  from  the  facts  stated, 
from  the  course  pursued  by  General  Lane  at  Lawrence, 
and  from  his  speech  here,  how  far  General  Ewing  is  your 
friend  or  fit  to  command  this  district." 

On  August  31,  I  started  for  the  scene  of  the  agitation. 
The  following  extracts  from  my  journal  reveal  the 
situation : 


Sept.  2. —  Reached  Leavenworth  at  five  o'clock  A.  M.  Stop 
ped  at  the  Planters'  Hotel ;  was  called  upon  by  Governor  Car 
ney  and  several  of  Ms  political  friends.  Discussed  at  much 
length  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  District  of  the  Border. 
Carney  is  an  aspirant  for  the  United  States  Senate.  Intends  to 
run  against  Lane.  Desires  to  kill  off  Ewing,  considering  him 
a  formidable  rival,  or  at  least  a  supporter  of  Lane.  Ewing  has 
determined  not  to  be  a  candidate  at  the  next  election,  and  will 
not  commit  himself  in  support  of  either  Carney  or  Lane.  De 
sires  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  Lane  because  he  thinks  Lane 
will  probably  be  reflected.  Carney  understands  Ewing  as  sup- 


VISIT  TO  KANSAS,  AND  THE  PARTY  QUARREL  THERE  gl 


porting  Lane,  or  at  least  as  having  withdrawn  in  Lane's  favor. 
In  fact,  Ewing  refuses  an  alliance  with  Carney.  Carney  there 
fore  desires  to  kill  Ewing.  Lane  finds  it  to  his  interest  to  sus 
tain  Ewing  so  long  as  Schofield  commands  the  department. 
Ewing  is  a  better  man  for  Lane  than  any  other  Schofield  would 
be  likely  to  give  him.  Lane's  desire  is  to  remove  Schofield  and 
get  in  his  place  a  general  who  would  place  Kansas  under  com 
mand  of  one  of  Lane's  tools,  or  a  man  who  could  be  made  one 
by  Lane;  therefore  Lane  defends  Ewing  and  concentrates  his 
attack  upon  Schofield.  .  .  . 

Asked  and  obtained  a  long  private  interview  with  Lane.  Went 
over  the  whole  ground  of  his  hostility  to  Genl.  S.  during  the 
past  year.  Showed  him  the  injustice  he  had  done  Genl.  S., 
and  how  foolish  and  unprofitable  to  himself  his  hostility  had 
been.  He  stated  with  apparent  candor  that  he  had  bent  the 
whole  energies  of  his  soul  to  the  destruction  of  Genl.  S.;  had 
never  labored  harder  to  accomplish  any  object  in  his  life.  Said 
he  had  been  evidently  mistaken  in  the  character  and  principles 
of  Genl.  S.,  and  that  no  man  was  more  ready  than  he  to  atone 
for  a  fault.  We  then  approached  the  subject  of  the  invasion  of 
Missouri  by  people  of  Kansas.  Genl.  Lane  still  adheres  to  his 
design  of  collecting  the  people  at  Paola  and  leading  them  on  an 
expedition  "  for  the  purpose  of  searching  for  their  stolen  prop 
erty."  He  professes  his  ability  to  control  the  people;  that  he 
would  be  answerable,  and  offered  to  pledge  himself,  to  Genl.  S. 
and  the  government  that  they  should  do  nothing  beyond  that 
which  he  declares  as  the  object  of  the  expedition.  .  .  . 

Lane  was  informed  that  Genl.  S.  would  go  to  Kansas  City 
the  next  day,  and  Lane  replied  that  he  intended  to  go  also.  It 
was  agreed  that  both  should  go  the  next  morning  and  converse 
with  Genl.  Ewing  on  the  subject.  The  same  evening  Genl. 
Lane  made  a  public  speech  in  Leavenworth,  in  which  he  urged 
the  people  to  meet  at  Paola,  and  assured  them  that  the  depart 
ment  and  district  commanders  would  not  interfere  with  the  pro 
posed  expedition;  on  the  contrary,  that  both  would  countenance 
and  cooperate  with  it.  He  also  proclaimed  the  object  to  be  to 
lay  waste  the  border  counties  of  Missouri  and  exterminate  the 
disloyal  people.  This  statement,  following  an  interview  on  that 
subject,  was  calculated  to  mislead  a  large  number  of  well-dis 
posed  people  who  would  not  for  a  moment  think  of  acting  in 
opposition  to  military  rules,  and  to  greatly  increase  the  number 


82          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  people  who  would  assemble  at  Paola,  and  seriously  complicate 
the  difficulty. 

In  the  evening  had  another  interview  with  Gov.  Carney  and 
some  of  his  friends.  My  main  object  was  to  secure  the  full  co 
operation  of  the  State  government  in  preventing  the  invasion  of 
Missouri.  For  this  purpose  I  had  to  consult  to  a  considerable  de 
gree  the  political  views  and  aims  of  the  governor  and  his  friends. 
Their  object  was,  of  course,  to  make  out  of  Lane's  project  as 
much  capital  as  possible  against  him.  It  was  held  by  many  of 
them  that  Lane  had  no  serious  design  of  entering  Missouri;  that 
he  expected,  of  course,  that  the  military  authorities  would  forbid 
it ;  and  that  he  would  yield  as  a  military  necessity,  and  thus  gain 
with  his  people  additional  ground  for  condemnation  of  the  de 
partment  commander,  while  he  had  the  credit  of  having  done 
all  he  possibly  could  to  enable  them  to  "recover  their  stolen 
property."  .  .  .  Viewing  matters  in  this  light,  the  governor  and 
his  advisers  were  strongly  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  the  surest 
way  of  making  capital  for  themselves  out  of  Lane's  move  was 
to  let  him  go  on  with  it,  without  any  interference  on  their 
part,  confident  that  it  would  turn  out  a  grand  humbug.  .  .  . 
After  reaching  Kansas  City  and  talking  with  Genl.  Ewing,  I  re 
plied  to  the  governor,  accepting  the  services  of  as  many  of  his 
troops  as  he  and  G-enl.  Ewing  should  deem  necessary  for  the  pro 
tection  of  all  the  towns  in  Kansas  near  the  border,  stating  that 
with  Kansas  so  protected,  Genl.  Ewing  would  not  only  carry  out 
his  order  for  the  expulsion  of  disloyal  persons,  but  also  in  a  short 
time  drive  out  the  guerrillas  from  his  district  and  restore  peace. 
In  addition  to  this,  I  wrote  the  governor  a  private  letter  urging 
him  to  issue  his  proclamation  discouraging  the  Paola  meeting 
and  warning  his  people  against  any  attempt  to  go  into  Missouri, 
and  informing  him  I  would  issue  an  order  forbidding  armed 
men  not  in  the  regular  military  service  from  crossing  the  line. 

Sept.  4. — I  received  the  governor's  reply  that  he  would  issue 
his  proclamation  as  requested,  and  also  asking  permission  to 
publish  a  letter  which  I  had  written  him  on  August  29,  in  reply 
to  one  from  him  regarding  these  matters.  This  permission  was 
granted. 

My  order  was  also  published  declaring  that  the  militia  of  Kan 
sas  and  Missouri  would  be  used  only  for  the  defense  of  their  re 
spective  States ;  that  they  should  not  pass  from  one  State  into 
the  other  without  express  orders  from  the  district  commander ; 


VISIT  TO  KANSAS,  AND  THE  PARTY  QUARREL  THERE  §3 

that  armed  bodies  of  men  not  belonging  to  the  United  States 
troops,  or  to  the  militia  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  de 
partment  commander  by  the  governors  of  their  respective  States, 
should  not,  under  any  pretext  whatever,  pass  from  one  State 
into  the  other. 

In  the  evening  of  the  3d  I  sent  a  despatch  to  the  general-in- 
chief  [Halleck],  informing  him  that  the  Paola  movement  was 
under  the  control  and  guidance  of  Lane,  and  that  I  should  not 
permit  them  to  enter  Missouri ;  that  Lane  said  he  would  appeal 
to  the  President ;  that  I  did  not  apprehend  a  hostile  collision ; 
but  that  a  despatch  from  the  President  or  the  Secretary  of  War 
(to  Lane)  would  aid  me  much  in  preventing  difficulty. 

If  such  despatch  should  be  sent,  I  requested  to  be  informed  of 
its  purport.  No  reply  received  from  the  general-in-chief  up  to 
this  time  (1  P.  M.,  Sept.  5).  ... 

Sept.  6. — Lane  failed  to  meet  me  at  Kansas  City,  according  to 
agreement.  My  correspondence  with  Governor  Carney  relative 
to  the  Lawrence  massacre  and  the  Paola  movement  appeared  in 
the  Leavenworth  papers  of  yesterday;  also  my  order  forbid 
ding  armed  citizens  from  crossing  into  Missouri. 

The  governor's  proclamation  did  not  appear  according  to 
promise ;  probably  he  may  have  decided  to  defer  it  until  after 
the  Paola  meeting,  as  a  means  of  making  capital  against  Lane. 

A  private  letter  from  one  of  Governor  Carney's  advisers  was 
received  yesterday  (5th),  dated  the  3d,  but  evidently  written  in 
the  evening  of  the  4th  or  morning  of  the  5th,  which  indicated 
that  Carney  does  not  intend  to  publish  a  proclamation,  for  the 
reason  that  Lane  desires  to  force  him  to  do  it.  ... 

Went  to  Westport  yesterday.  Met  several  of  the  leading 
loyal  citizens  ;  all  agree  that  Genl.  Swing's  order  No.  11  is  wise 
and  just — in  fact  a  necessity.  I  have  yet  to  find  the  first  loyal 
man  in  the  border  counties  who  condemns  it.  They  are  also 
warm  in  their  support  of  Genl.  Ewing,  and  deprecate  his  re 
moval.  I  am  satisfied  he  is  acting  wisely  and  efficiently.  .  .  . 

The  radicals  in  Missouri  condemn  him  (Ewing)  as  one  of  my 
friends;  the  conservatives,  because  he  is  a  Kansas  man,  and 
more  especially  because  of  his  order  No.  11,  and  similar  reasons 
and  radical  measures.  For  a  time  this  will  weaken  me  very 
much,  and  possibly  may  cause  my  overthrow.  This  risk  I  must 
take,  because  I  am  satisfied  I  am  doing  the  best  for  the  public 
good,  and  acting  according  to  my  instructions  from  the  Presi- 


g4          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

dent.  I  seem  in  a  fair  way  to  reach  one  of  the  positions  referred 
to  in  the  President's  letter  of  instructions,  viz. :  that  in  which 
both  factions  will  abuse  me.  According  to  the  President's 
standard,  this  is  the  only  evidence  that  I  will  ever  have  that  I 
am  right.  It  is  hardly  possible  that  I  will  ever  reach  a  point 
where  both  will  commend  me.  .  .  . 

Sept.  8. — Went  to  Independence  yesterday,  in  company  with 
Genl.  Ewing ;  .  .  .  made  a  few  remarks  to  quite  a  large  assem 
blage  of  people,  which  were  well  received  j  was  followed  by  Genl. 
Ewiug  in  an  appropriate  speech,  which  produced  a  good  effect. 

Have  determined  to  modify  General  Swing's  order,  or  rather 
he  will  modify  it  at  my  suggestion,  so  that  no  property  shall  be 
destroyed.  I  deem  the  destruction  of  property  unnecessary  and 
useless.  The  chief  evil  has  resulted  from  the  aid  given  to  guer 
rillas  in  the  way  of  information  conveyed  by  disloyal  people, 
and  by  preparing  their  food  for  them.  This  evil  is  now  re 
moved.  Forage  and  grain  cannot  be  destroyed  or  carried  away 
to  such  extent  as  materially  to  cripple  them.  I  will  as  far  as 
possible  preserve  the  property  of  all  loyal  people,  with  the  view 
of  permitting  them  to  return  as  soon  as  the  guerrillas  shall  be 
driven  out.  Property  of  known  rebels  will  be  appropriated  as 
far  as  possible  to  the  use  of  the  army  and  loyal  people  who  are 
made  destitute.  None  will  be  destroyed. 

Had  a  long  interview  this  morning  with  Mayor  Anthony  of 
Leaveuworth  and  a  number  of  influential  citizens  of  that  place. 
Anthony  was  arrested  and  sent  to  this  place  yesterday  by  a  de 
tective  in  the  employ  of  Genl.  Ewing.  The  arrest  was  with 
out  authority,  and  Genl.  Ewing  promptly  discharged  the 
mayor.  The  object  of  the  citizens  was  to  obtain  a  revocation  of 
martial  law  in  Leavenworth,  and  come  to  a  correct  understand 
ing  as  to  the  relation  between  the  military  and  civil  authorities 
in  that  town,  so  as  to  prevent  difficulty  in  future.  The  whole 
matter  was  satisfactorily  arranged.  .  .  . 

So  far  as  can  be  learned,  no  people  have  gone  from  Leaven- 
worth  to  the  Paola  meeting,  and  it  is  probable  the  whole  af 
fair  will  amount  to  nothing.  Believing  that  the  trouble  here  is 
substantially  over,  I  propose  to  start  for  St.  Louis  to-morrow 
morning. 

A  regiment  of  enrolled  militia  ordered  to  New  Madrid 
to  relieve  the  25th  Missouri,  in  order  that  the  latter 


MUTINY  IN  THE  STATE  MILITIA  85 

might  go  to  reinforce  General  Steele  in  Arkansas,  muti 
nied  after  they  had  gone  on  board  the  steamer,  brought 
the  boat  ashore,  and  went  to  their  homes.  The  provost 
guard  of  St.  Louis  was  sent  to  arrest  them.  News  having 
come  of  the  capture  of  Little  Eock,  the  two  enrolled 
militia  regiments  in  St.  Louis  were  dismissed,  except  the 
mutineers,  who  were  kept  at  hard  labor  for  some  time, 
and  the  leaders  tried  for  mutiny. 

This  mutiny  was  caused  by  the  efforts  of  the  radical 
papers  and  politicians,  who  had  for  some  time  openly 
opposed  the  organization  of  the  provisional  regiments, 
and  encouraged  the  men  to  mutiny. 

I  published  an  order  enforcing  martial  law  against  all 
who  should  incite  mutiny  among  the  troops,  and  through 
General  Halleck  obtained  the  President's  approval  of 
this  order,  but  did  not  find  it  necessary  to  make  that 
approval  public  until  it  was  made  known  by  the  Presi 
dent  himself. 

In  writing  to  General  Halleck  on  September  20, 1  said: 

I  inclose  herewith  a  copy  of  an  order  which  I  have  found  it 
necessary  to  publish  and  enforce.  The  revolutionary  faction 
which  has  so  long  been  striving  to  gain  the  ascendancy  in  Mis 
souri,  particularly  in  St.  Louis,  to  overthrow  the  present  State 
government  and  change  the  policy  of  the  national  administra 
tion,  has  at  length  succeeded  so  far  as  to  produce  open  mutiny 
of  one  of  the  militia  regiments  and  serious  difficulties  in  others. 

I  inclose  a  number  of  slips  from  papers  published  in  Mis 
souri,  to  show  the  extent  to  which  this  factious  opposition  to 
the  government  has  been  carried.  The  effect  already  produced 
is  but  natural,  and  the  ultimate  effect  will  be  disastrous  in  the 
extreme,  unless  a  strong  remedy  be  applied  speedily. 

Out  of  consideration  for  popular  opinion  and  the  well-known 
wishes  of  the  President  relative  to  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the 
press,  I  have  forborne  until,  in  my  belief,  further  forbearance 
would  lead  to  disastrous  results.  I  am  thoroughly  convinced  of 
the  necessity  for  prompt  and  decided  measures  to  put  down  this 
revolutionary  scheme,  and  my  sense  of  duty  will  not  permit  me 


86          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

to  delay  it  longer.  It  is  barely  possible  that  I  may  not  have  to 
enforce  the  order  against  the  public  press.  They  may  yield 
without  the  application  of  force ;  but  I  do  not  expect  it.  The 
tone  of  some  of  their  articles  since  the  publication  of  the  order 
indicates  a  determination  to  wage  the  war  which  they  have 
begun  to  the  bitter  end.  This  determination  is  based  upon  the 
belief  that  the  President  will  not  sustain  me  in  any  such  mea 
sures  as  those  contemplated  in  the  order.  A  distinct  approval 
by  the  President  of  my  proposed  action,  and  a  knowledge  of  the 
fact  here,  would  end  the  whole  matter  at  once.  I  desire,  if  pos 
sible,  to  have  such  approval  before  taking  action  in  any  indi 
vidual  case.  Indeed,  I  believe  such  approval  would  prevent  the 
necessity  for  the  use  of  force.  It  is  difficult,  I  am  aware,  for 
any  one  at  a  distance  to  believe  that  such  measures  can  be 
necessary  against  men  and  papers  who  claim  to  be  "  radically 
loyal."  The  fact  is,  they  are  "  loyal "  only  to  their  "  radical " 
theories,  and  are  so  "radical"  that  they  cannot  possibly  be 
"  loyal "  to  the  government.  .  .  . 

These  men  were  styled  "revolutionists,"  not  without 
sufficient  cause.  It  was  currently  reported  that  they  had 
in  1861  conceived  the  elevation  of  Fremont  to  a  dicta 
torship.  In  1862,  and  again  in  1863,  they  invented  a 
scheme  for  the  violent  overthrow  of  the  provisional  State 
government  and  the  existing  national  administration  in 
Missouri.  The  first  act  of  the  program  was  to  seize  and 
imprison  Governor  Gamble  and  me.  In  1862  some  of 
them  committed  the  indiscretion  of  confiding  their  plans 
to  General  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.,  who  at  once  warned  me 
of  it,  but  refused  to  give  me  the  names  of  Ms  informers 
or  of  the  leaders.  He  said  he  could  not  do  so  without 
breach  of  confidence,  but  that  he  had  informed  them  that 
he  should  give  me  warning  and  expose  the  individuals 
if  any  further  steps  were  taken.  Here  the  matter  ended. 

In  1863  I  received  warning  through  the  guard  stationed 
at  my  residence  in  the  suburbs  of  the  city,  with  which 
the  revolutionists  had  the  folly  to  tamper  in  their  efforts 
to  spread  disaffection  among  my  troops.  This  discovery, 


A  REVOLUTIONARY   PLOT  87 

and  the  premature  mutiny  of  the  regiment  ordered  to 
New  Madrid,  nipped  the  plot  in  the  bud.  I  refer  to  the 
circumstances  now  only  to  show  that  I  was  not  unjust 
in  my  denunciation  of  the  "revolutionary  faction"  in 
Missouri. 

In  General  Halleck's  letter  of  September  26,  inclosing 
the  President's  written  approval  of  my  general  order,  he 
said: 

.  .  .  Neither  faction  in  Missouri  is  really  friendly  to  the 
President  and  administration;  but  each  is  striving  to  destroy 
the  other,  regardless  of  all  other  considerations.  In  their  mutual 
hatred  they  seem  to  have  lost  all  sense  of  the  perils  of  the  coun 
try  and  all  sentiment  of  national  patriotism.  Every  possible 
effort  should  be  made  to  allay  this  bitter  party  strife  in  that 
State. 

In  reply,  September  30,  I  expressed  the  following 
opinion : 

...  I  feel  compelled  to  say  that  I  believe  you  are  not  alto 
gether  right  in  your  information  about  the  factions  in  Missouri. 
If  the  so-called  "claybank"  faction  are  not  altogether  friendly 
to  the  President  and  administration,  I  have  not  been  able  to  dis 
cover  it.  The  men  who  nojv  sustain  me  are  the  same  who  rallied 
round  Lyon  and  sustained  the  government  in  the  dark  days  of 
1861,  while  the  leaders  of  the  present  "charcoal"  faction  stood 
back  until  the  danger  was  past.  I  believe  I  have  carried  out 
my  instructions  as  literally  as  possible,  yet  I  have  received  a  rea 
sonable  support  from  one  faction  and  the  most  violent  opposi 
tion  from  the  other.  I  am  willing  to  pledge  my  official  position 
that  those  who  support  me  now  will  support  me  in  the  execution 
of  any  policy  the  President  may  order.  They  are  the  real  friends 
of  the  government.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  be  blind  to  this 
fact,  notwithstanding  the  existence,  to  some  extent,  of  the  fac 
tional  feeling  to  which  you  allude. 

The  improvement  produced  by  the  order  was  so  de 
cided  that  publication  of  the  President's  approval  was 
thought  unnecessary.  It  only  became  public  through 


88  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

his  letter  of  October  1,  1863,  of  which  he  gave  a  copy 
to  the  radical  delegation. 

In  September  the  governor  of  Missouri  placed  all  the 
militia  of  the  State,  including  those  not  in  active  service, 
under  my  command.  I  published  orders  intended  to 
control  their  action  and  prevent  interference  with  polit 
ical  meetings;  also  to  secure  freedom  of  voting  at  the 
coming  election  in  November.  Several  militia  officers 
guilty  of  such  interference  were  dismissed,  which  pro 
duced  a  wholesome  effect. 


CHAPTER  VI 

A    MEMORANDUM    FOE    MR.   LINCOLN  —  THE    PRESIDENT'S    IN 
STRUCTIONS —  HIS  REPLY  TO  THE  RADICAL  DELEGATION 

—  THE  MATTER  OF  COLORED  ENLISTMENTS  —  MODIFICA 
TION    OF    THE    ORDER    RESPECTING    ELECTIONS    REFUSED 

—  A  LETTER   TO   THE  PRESIDENT  ON  THE  CONDITION  OF 
MISSOURI  —  FORMER    CONFEDERATES    IN    UNION    MILITIA 
REGIMENTS  —  SUMMONED    TO   WASHINGTON   BY   MR.  LIN 
COLN —  OFFERED   THE   COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY   OF   THE 
OHIO  —  ANECDOTE   OF   GENERAL   GRANT. 

ON  October  1,  1863,  I  furnished  the  following  memo 
randum  to  the  Hon.  James  S.  Rollins,  M.  C.,  for  the 
information  of  the  President.     It  was  doubtless  seen  by 
the  President  before  the  date  of  his  letter  to  the  radical 
delegation,  quoted  further  on. 

The  radicals  urge  as  evidence  of  Genl.  Schofi eld's  misrule 
that  Missouri  is  in  a  worse  condition  than  at  any  time  since  the 
rebellion;  that  he  has  failed  to  use  the  troops  at  his  disposal 
to  put  down  the  rebellion.  This  charge  is  false,  unless  it  be  ad 
mitted  that  the  radicals  are  rebels.  It  is  true  that  the  State  is 
in  a  bad  condition,  and  it  is  equally  true  that  this  condition  is 
directly  brought  about  by  professed  Union  men  —  radicals. 

There  has  been  no  time  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  when 
there  were  so  few  armed  rebels  or  guerrillas  in  Missouri  as  at 
the  present  time.  The  only  trouble  at  all  worth  mentioning  in 
comparison  with  what  the  State  has  suffered  heretofore  is  the 
lawless  acts  of  radicals  in  their  efforts  to  exterminate  or  drive 
out  all  who  differ  from  them  in  political  sentiment.  This  law 
lessness  is  instigated,  encouraged,  and  applauded  by  the  radical 
press  and  leaders.  Every  effort  to  put  down  this  lawlessness  is 


90  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

denounced  by  the  radicals  as  persecution  of  loyal  men.  When 
Genl.  Curtis  relinquished  command  he  had  in  Missouri  and 
Kansas  43,000  men  5  Genl.  Schofield  retained  in  these  States 
only  23,000.  Of  the  remaining  20,000,  he  sent  some  reinforce 
ments  to  Genl.  Rosecrans  and  a  large  force  to  Genl.  Grant, 
to  assist  in  the  capture  of  Vicksburg;  and  with  the  remainder 
and  a  force  equivalent  to  the  one  sent  to  Genl.  Grant,  returned 
by  him  after  the  fall  of  Vicksburg,  he  has  reclaimed  all  Arkan 
sas  and  the  Indian  Territory. 

The  radicals  denounce  Genl.  Schofield  because  of  his  rela 
tions  to  the  State  government.  It  is  true  that  those  relations 
have  been  most  cordial,  but  it  is  not  true  that  his  policy 
has  been  controlled  or  materially  influenced  by  Gov.  Gamble. 
Gov.  Gamble  has  not  sought  to  exercise  any  such  control.  He, 
without  hesitation,  placed  all  the  militia  in  active  service  under 
Genl.  S.'s  command,  and  yielded  to  him  the  control  of  all  mili 
tary  operations.  As  an  example  to  illustrate  the  truth  of  this 
statement:  Genl.  S.  required  the  militia  to  obey  the  102d  Ar 
ticle  of  War;  although  they  were  not  in  the  service  of  the 
United  States,  and  although  they  constituted  the  only  force 
in  the  State  capable  of  arresting  fugitive  slaves  with  any  cer 
tainty,  no  complaint  was  made  by  the  State  government.  No 
military  force  is  used  in  this  department  for  the  return  of  fugi 
tives.  All  assertions  to  the  contrary  are  false.  On  the  con 
trary,  it  has  been  invariably  held  by  Genl.  Schofield  and  Col. 
Broadhead  that  free  papers  given  under  Genl.  Curtis  were  to 
be  held  valid,  even  though  wrongfully  given,  the  negroes  hav 
ing  been  the  slaves  of  loyal  men.  So  also  when  the  slaves  of 
loyal  men  have,  by  mistake  or  otherwise,  been  enlisted  in  col 
ored  regiments,  Genl.  Schofield  has  invariably  held  that  they 
have  been  made  free  by  their  enlistment,  and  cannot  be  re 
turned  to  their  masters  or  discharged  from  the  service. 

It  cannot  be  denied  that  Genl.  Schofield's  whole  influence 
has  been  in  favor  of  emancipation.  He  did  all  in  his  power  to 
secure  the  passage  of  an  ordinance  of  emancipation  by  the  late 
State  Convention.  The  leaders  of  the  present  " charcoal "  faction, 
who  now  war  on  Genl.  Schofield,  are  not  the  men  who  sus 
tained  the  government  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The  men 
who  now  support  Genl.  S.  are  the  identical  ones  who  stood 
around  Lyon  and  sustained  the  government  in  the  dark  days 
of  1861.  They  are  the  true  friends  of  the  government;  men 


A  MEMORANDUM  FOR  MR.  LINCOLN  9^ 

who  stand  between  the  rebels  on  one  side  and  the  radical  revo 
lutionists  on  the  other ;  the  men  who  maintain  the  Constitution, 
uphold  the  laws,  and  advocate  justice  to  all  men.  If  sustained 
by  the  President,  they  will  rally  to  their  standard  all  the  best 
men  of  the  State,  of  all  parties. 

Secession  is  dead  in  Missouri.  As  a  party  the  secessionists 
are  utterly  without  influence.  The  degree  of  support  which 
they  will  hereafter  give  to  the  government  will  depend  upon 
its  policy.  If  the  radicals  triumph,  the  enemies  of  the  govern 
ment  will  be  increased  both  in  numbers  and  bitterness.  If  a 
wise  and  just  policy  be  pursued,  every  respectable  man  in  the 
State  will  soon  be  an  active  supporter  of  the  government,  and 
Missouri  will  be  the  most  loyal  State  in  the  Union. 

This,  in  fact,  is  the  cause  of  the  present  fierce  action  of  the 
radicals.  They  know  they  must  get  the  power  at  once,  or  there 
will  soon  be  an  overwhelming  loyal  party  opposed  to  them. 
The  "  claybank "  leaders  control  all  the  conservative  elements 
in  the  State,  and  give  to  Genl.  S.,  as  the  representative  of  the 
President,  an  honest  support.  They  will  continue  to  support 
him  in  the  execution  of  any  policy  the  President  may  order  to 
be  carried  out.  They  sustain  him,  and  will  sustain  him  in 
future,  although  they  may  not  approve  all  his  acts,  because  it  is 
their  duty  to  the  government. 

About  the  last  of  September  a  radical  delegation  of 
about  one  hundred  members  from  Missouri  and  Kansas 
went  to  Washington  to  urge  my  removal  from  command 
in  Missouri.  The  President  sent  me  the  following  in 
structions,  and  made  a  reply  to  the  delegation,  also 
given  below : 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  Oct.  1, 1863. 
GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

SIR  :  There  is  no  organized  military  force  in  avowed  oppo 
sition  to  the  General  Government  now  in  Missouri ;  and  if  any 
such  shall  reappear,  your  duty  in  regard  to  it  will  be  too  plain 
to  require  any  special  instructions.  Still,  the  condition  of  things 
both  there  and  elsewhere  is  such  as  to  render  it  indispensable 
to  maintain  for  a  time  the  United  States  military  establishment 


92  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

in  that  State,  as  well  as  to  rely  upon  it  for  a  fair  contribution 
of  support  to  the  establishment  generally.  Your  immediate 
duty  in  regard  to  Missouri  now  is  to  advance  the  efficiency  of 
that  establishment,  and  to  use  it,  as  far  as  practicable,  to  compel 
the  excited  people  there  to  leave  one  another  alone. 

Under  your  recent  order,  which  I  have  approved,  you  will 
only  arrest  individuals,  and  suppress  assemblies  or  newspapers, 
when  they  may  be  working  palpable  injury  to  the  military  in 
your  charge ;  and  in  no  other  case  will  you  interfere  with  the 
expression  of  opinion  in  any  form,  or  allow  it  to  be  interfered 
with  violently  by  others.  In  this  you  have  a  discretion  to  exer 
cise  with  great  caution,  calmness,  and  forbearance. 

With  the  matters  of  removing  the  inhabitants  of  certain 
counties  en  masse,  and  of  removing  certain  individuals  from  time 
to  time,  who  are  supposed  to  be  mischievous,  I  am  not  now  in 
terfering,  but  am  leaving  to  your  own  discretion. 

Nor  am  I  interfering  with  what  may  still  seem  to  you  to  be 
necessary  restrictions  upon  trade  and  intercourse. 

I  think  proper,  however,  to  enjoin  upon  you  the  following: 
Allow  no  part  of  the  military  under  your  command  to  be  en 
gaged  in  either  returning  fugitive  slaves,  or  in  forcing  or  entic 
ing  slaves  from  their  homes ;  and,  so  far  as  practicable,  enforce 
the  same  forbearance  upon  the  people. 

Report  to  me  your  opinion  upon  the  availability  for  good  of 
the  enrolled  militia  of  the  State. 

Allow  no  one  to  enlist  colored  troops,  except  upon  orders 
from  you,  or  from  here  through  you. 

Allow  no  one  to  assume  the  functions  of  confiscating  prop 
erty,  under  the  law  of  Congress  or  otherwise,  except  upon 
orders  from  here. 

At  elections  see  that  those,  and  only  those,  are  allowed  to  vote 
who  are  entitled  to  do  so  by  the  laws  of  Missouri,  including,  as 
of  those  laws,  the  restriction  laid  by  the  Missouri  Convention 
upon  those  who  may  have  participated  in  the  rebellion. 
.  So  far  as  practicable,  you  will,  by  means  of  your  military 
force,  expel  guerrillas,  marauders,  and  murderers,  and  all  who 
are  known  to  harbor,  aid,  or  abet  them.  But,  in  like  manner, 
you  will  repress  assumptions  of  unauthorized  individuals  to  per 
form  the  same  service,  because,  under  pretense  of  doing  this, 
they  become  marauders  and  murderers  themselves. 

To  now  restore  peace,  let  the  military  obey  orders,  and  those 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  INSTRUCTIONS  93 

not  of  the  military  leave  each  other  alone,  thus  not  breaking  the 
peace  themselves. 

In  giving  the  above  directions,  it  is  not  intended  to  restrain 
you  in  other  expedient  and  necessary  matters  not  falling  within 
their  range.  Your  obt.  servt.,  A  LlNCOLN 

I  wrote  in  my  journal,  under  date  of  October  2 : 

Colonel  Du  Bois,  Captain  Benham,  and  Captain  Howard, 
who  were  sent  to  inspect  in  Genl.  Ewing's  and  Genl.  Blunt's 
districts,  have  returned.  They  report  affairs  in  Blunt's  district 
in  a  disgraceful  condition.  I  have  determined  to  relieve  Blunt, 
and  propose  to  send  McNeil  to  Fort  Smith.  I  telegraphed  my 
intentions  to  Genl.  Halleck  this  morning,  and  asked  for  a 
general  officer  to  command  one  of  the  two  districts.  Soon  after 
I  received  a  despatch  from  the  President  saying  Genl.  Halleck 
had  shown  him  my  despatch,  and  adding:  "If  possible,  you  better 
allow  me  to  get  through  with  a  certain  matter  here  before  add 
ing  to  the  difficulties  of  it.  Meantime  supply  me  with  the  par 
ticulars  of  Ma j. -Genl.  Blunt's  case." 

I  replied :  "  I  will  forward  the  papers  in  Genl.  Blunt's  case, 
and  defer  action  until  I  know  your  pleasure  regarding  it.  I  de 
sire,  if  possible,  to  diminish  and  not  increase  your  difficulties. 
This  is  one  reason  why  I  informed  Genl.  Halleck  what  I  thought 
it  necessary  to  do.77  Have  since  received  a  despatch  from  Genl. 
Halleck  saying  that  he  had  ordered  Brig.-Genl.  J.  B.  Sanborn 
from  Vicksburg  to  report  to  me  for  duty. 

Have  received  a  letter  from  Atty.-Genl.  Bates,  dated  Sept. 
29,  saying  I  need  have  no  fear  of  the  result  of  the  efforts  of  the 
radical  delegation. 

On  Sept.  30  I  received  a  despatch  from  the  President  trans 
mitting  the  false  report  from  Leavenworth  that  Col.  Moss,  of 
the  militia,  was  driving  out  Union  families  from  Platt  and  Union 
counties.  After  full  inquiry  from  Col.  Guitar,  Genl.  Ewing,  and 
Col.  Williams  at  St.  Joseph,  have  replied  to  the  President,  in 
forming  him  the  report  is  false,  and  a  base  attempt  of  my  ene 
mies  to  influence  his  action. 

Under  date  of  October  4,  I  wrote  in  my  journal : 

The  address  presented  to  the  President  by  the  radical  delega 
tion  from  Missouri  was  published  in  the  "  Democrat "  last  even- 


94  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

ing.  I  telegraphed  the  President  last  night  that  "so  much  of 
it  as  relates  to  me  is  not  only  untrue  in  spirit,  but  most  of  it  is 
literally  false.  If  an  answer  or  explanation  is  on  any  account 
desirable,  I  shall  be  glad  to  make  it."  To-day  I  received  from 
the  President  a  despatch  saying:  "  Think  you  will  not  have  just 
cause  to  complain  of  my  action.  .  .  ." 

The  next  day  the  President  made  this  reply  to  the 
radical  delegation: 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  October  5,  1863. 
HON.  CHARLES  D.  DRAKE  AND  OTHERS,  Committee. 

GENTLEMEN:  Your  original  address,  presented  on  the  30th 
ultimo,  and  the  four  supplementary  ones,  presented  on  the  3d 
inst.,  have  been  carefully  considered.  I  hope  you  will  regard 
the  other  duties  claiming  my  attention,  together  with  the  great 
length  and  importance  of  the  documents,  as  constituting  a  suffi 
cient  apology  for  my  not  having  responded  sooner. 

These  papers,  framed  for  a  common  object,  consist  of  the  things 
demanded,  and  the  reasons  for  demanding  them. 

The  things  demanded  are : 

First.  That  General  Schofield  shall  be  relieved  and  General 
Butler  be  appointed  as  commander  of  the  Military  Department 
of  Missouri. 

Second.  That  the  system  of  enrolled  militia  in  Missouri  may 
be  broken  up,  and  national  forces  be  substituted  for  it ;  and, 

Third.  That  at  elections  persons  may  not  be  allowed  to  vote 
who  are  not  entitled  by  law  to  do  so. 

Among  the  reasons  given,  enough  of  suffering  and  wrong  to 
Union  men  is  certainly,  and  I  suppose  truly,  stated.  Yet  the 
whole  case  as  presented  fails  to  convince  me  that  General  Scho 
field,  or  the  enrolled  militia,  is  responsible  for  that  suffering  and 
wrong.  The  whole  can  be  explained  on  a  more  charitable  and, 
as  I  think,  a  more  rational  hypothesis. 

We  are  in  civil  war.  In  such  cases  there  always  is  a  main 
question ;  but  in  this  case  that  question  is  a  perplexing  compound 
—  Union  and  slavery.  It  thus  becomes  a  question  not  of  two 
sides  merely,  but  of  at  least  four  sides,  even  among  those  who  are 
for  the  Union,  saying  nothing  of  those  who  are  against  it.  Thus, 
those  who  are  for  the  Union  with,  but  not  without,  slavery;  those 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  REPLY  TO  THE  RADICAL  DELEGATION  95 

for  it  without,  but  not  with  ;  those  for  it  with  or  without,  but  pre 
fer  it  with;  and  those  for  it  with  or  without,  but  prefer  it  ivithout. 
Among  these  again  is  a  subdivision  of  those  who  are  for  gradual, 
but  not  for  immediate,  and  those  who  are  for  immediate,  but  not 
for  gradual,  extinction  of  slavery. 

It  is  easy  to  conceive  that  all  these  shades  of  opinion,  and 
even  more,  may  be  sincerely  entertained  by  honest  and  truthful 
men ;  yet  all  being  for  the  Union,  by  reason  of  these  differences 
each  will  prefer  a  different  way  of  sustaining  the  Union.  At 
once  sincerity  is  questioned  and  motives  are  assailed ;  actual  war 
coming,  blood  grows  hot  and  blood  is  spilled.  Thought  is 
forced  from  old  channels  into  confusion ;  deception  breeds  and 
thrives ;  confidence  dies,  and  universal  suspicion  reigns.  Each 
man  feels  an  impulse  to  kill  his  neighbor,  lest  he  be  first  killed 
by  him.  Revenge  and  retaliation  follow,  and  all  this,  as  before 
said,  may  be  among  honest  men  only.  But  this  is  not  all. 
Every  foul  bird  comes  abroad,  and  every  dirty  reptile  rises  up. 
These  add  crime  to  confusion.  Strong  measures  deemed  indis 
pensable,  but  harsh  at  best,  such  men  make  worse  by  malad 
ministration.  Murders  for  old  grudges  and  murders  for  pelf 
proceed  under  any  cloak  that  will  best  cover  for  the  occasion. 

These  causes  amply  account  for  what  has  occurred  in  Mis 
souri,  without  ascribing  it  to  the  weakness  or  wickedness  of  any 
general.  The  newspaper  files  —  those  chronicles  of  current 
events  —  will  show  that  the  evils  now  complained  of  were  quite 
as  prevalent  under  Fremont,  Hunter,  Halleck,  and  Curtis  as 
under  Schofield. 

If  the  former  had  greater  force  opposed  to  them,  they  had 
also  greater  forces  with  which  to  meet  it.  When  the  organized 
rebel  army  left  the  State,  the  main  Federal  force  had  to  go 
also,  leaving  the  department  commander  at  home  relatively  no 
stronger  than  before. 

Without  disparaging  any,  I  affirm  with  confidence  that  no 
commander  of  that  department  has,  in  proportion  to  his  means, 
done  better  than  General  Schofield. 

The  first  specific  charge  against  General  Schofield  is  that  the 
enrolled  militia  was  placed  under  his  command,  when  it  had  not 
been  placed  under  the  command  of  General  Curtis. 

That,  I  believe,  is  true ;  but  you  do  not  point  out,  nor  can  I 
conceive,  how  that  did  or  could  injure  loyal  men  or  the  Union 
cause. 


96  FOBTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AKMY 

You  charge  that  upon  General  Curtis  being  superseded  by 
General  Schofield,  Franklin  A.  Dick  was  superseded  by  James  O. 
Broadhead  as  provost-marshal-general.  No  very  specific  show 
ing  is  made  as  to  how  this  did  or  could  injure  the  Union  cause. 
It  recalls,  however,  the  condition  of  things,  as  presented  to  me, 
which  led  to  a  change  of  commanders  for  the  department. 

To  restrain  contraband  intelligence  and  trade,  a  system  of 
searches,  seizures,  permits,  and  passes  had  been  introduced  by 
General  Fremont.  When  General  Halleck  came,  he  found  and 
continued  the  system,  and  added  an  order,  applicable  to  some 
parts  of  the  State,  to  levy  and  collect  contributions  from  noted 
rebels  to  compensate  losses  and  relieve  destitution  caused  by 
the  rebellion.  The  action  of  General  Fremont  and  General 
Halleck,  as  stated,  constituted  a  sort  of  system  which  General 
Curtis  found  in  full  operation  when  he  took  command  of  the 
department.  That  there  was  a  necessity  for  something  of  the 
sort  was  clear;  but  that  it  could  only  be  justified  by  stern  ne 
cessity,  and  that  it  was  liable  to  great  abuse  in  administration, 
was  equally  clear.  Agents  to  execute  it,  contrary  to  the 
great  prayer,  were  led  into  temptation.  Some  might,  while 
others  would  not,  resist  that  temptation.  It  was  not  possible  to 
hold  any  to  a  very  strict  accountability ;  and  those  yielding  to 
the  temptation  would  sell  permits  and  passes  to  those  who  would 
pay  most,  and  most  readily,  for  them,  and  would  seize  property 
and  collect  levies  in  the  aptest  way  to  fill  their  own  pockets ; 
money  being  the  object,  the  man  having  money,  whether  loyal 
or  disloyal,  would  be  a  victim.  This  practice  doubtless  existed 
to  some  extent,  and  it  was  a  real  additional  evil  that  it  could 
be,  and  was,  plausibly  charged  to  exist  in  greater  extent  than 
it  did. 

When  General  Curtis  took  command  of  the  department,  Mr. 
Dick,  against  whom  I  never  knew  anything  to  allege,  had  gen 
eral  charge  of  this  system.  A  controversy  in  regard  to  it 
rapidly  grew  into  almost  unmanageable  proportions.  One  side 
ignored  the  necessity  and  magnified  the  evils  of  the  system, 
while  the  other  ignored  the  evils  and  magnified  the  necessity, 
and  each  bitterly  assailed  the  motives  of  the  other.  I  could  not 
fail  to  see  that  the  controversy  enlarged  in  the  same  proportion 
as  the  professed  Union  men  there  distinctly  took  sides  in  two 
opposing  political  parties.  I  exhausted  my  wits,  and  very  nearly 
my  patience  also,  in  efforts  to  convince  both  that  the  evils  they 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  REPLY   TO  THE  RADICAL  DELEGATION    97 

charged  on  each  other  were  inherent  in  the  case,  and  could  not 
be  cured  by  giving  either  party  a  victory  over  the  other. 

Plainly  the  irritating  system  was  not  to  be  perpetual,  and  it 
was  plausibly  urged  that  it  could  be  modified  at  once  with  ad 
vantage.  The  case  could  scarcely  be  worse;  and  whether  it 
could  be  made  better,  could  only  be  determined  by  a  trial.  In 
this  view,  and  not  to  ban  or  brand  General  Curtis,  or  to  give  a 
victory  to  any  party,  I  made  the  change  of  commander  for  the 
department.  I  now  learn  that  soon  after  this  change  Mr.  Dick 
was  removed,  and  that  Mr.  Broadhead,  a  gentleman  of  no  less 
good  character,  was  put  in  the  place.  The  mere  fact  of  this 
change  is  more  distinctly  complained  of  than  is  any  conduct  of 
the  new  officer,  or  other  consequences  of  the  change. 

I  gave  the  new  commander  no  instructions  as  to  the  adminis 
tration  of  the  system  mentioned,  beyond  what  is  contained  in 
the  private  letter,  afterward  surreptitiously  published,1  in  which 
I  directed  him  to  act  solely  for  the  public  good,  and  indepen 
dently  of  both  parties.  Neither  anything  you  have  presented 
me,  nor  anything  I  have  otherwise  learned,  has  convinced  me 
that  he  has  been  unfaithful  to  this  charge. 

Imbecility  is  urged  as  one  cause  for  removing  General  Scho- 
field;  and  the  late  massacre  at  Lawrence,  Kansas,  is  pressed 
as  evidence  of  that  imbecility.  To  my  mind  that  fact  scarcely 
tends  to  prove  the  proposition.  That  massacre  is  only  an  ex 
ample  of  what  Grierson,  John  Morgan,  and  many  others  might 
have  repeatedly  done  on  their  respective  raids,  had  they  chosen 
to  incur  the  personal  hazard  and  possessed  the  fiendish  hearts 
to  do  it. 

The  charge  is  made  that  General  Schofield,  on  purpose  to 
protect  the  Lawrence  murderers,  would  not  allow  them  to  be 
pursued  into  Missouri.  While  no  punishment  could  be  too  sud 
den  or  too  severe  for  those  murderers,  I  am  well  satisfied  that 
the  preventing  of  the  remedial  raid  into  Missouri  was  the  only 
safe  way  to  avoid  an  indiscriminate  massacre  there,  including 
probably  more  innocent  than  guilty.  Instead  of  condemning,  I 
therefore  approve  what  I  understand  General  Schofield  did  in 
that  respect. 

The  charges  that  General  Schofield  has  purposely  withheld 
protection  from  loyal  people,  and  purposely  facilitated  the 
objects  of  the  disloyal,  are  altogether  beyond  my  power  of  be- 

1  By  a  radical  newspaper. 
7 


98          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

lief.  I  do  not  arraign  the  veracity  of  gentlemen  as  to  the  facts 
complained  of,  but  I  do  more  than  question  the  judgment  which 
.would  infer  that  those  facts  occurred  in  accordance  with  the 
purposes  of  General  Schofield. 

With  my  present  views,  I  must  decline  to  remove  General 
Schofield.  In  this  I  decide  nothing  against  General  Butler. 
I  sincerely  wish  it  were  convenient  to  assign  him  a  suitable 
command. 

In  order  to  meet  some  existing  evils,  I  have  addressed  a  letter 
of  instructions  to  General  Schofield,  a  copy  of  which  I  inclose 
to  you. 

As  to  the  "  enrolled  militia,"  I  shall  endeavor  to  ascertain 
better  than  I  now  know  what  is  its  exact  value.  Let  me  say 
now,  however,  that  your  proposal  to  substitute  national  forces 
for  the  enrolled  militia  implies  that  in  your  judgment  the  latter 
is  doing  something  which  needs  to  be  done,  and  if  so,  the  propo 
sition  to  throw  that  force  away,  and  supply  its  place  by  bring 
ing  other  forces  from  the  field,  where  they  are  urgently  needed, 
seems  to  me  very  extraordinary.  Whence  shall  they  come  ? 
Shall  they  be  withdrawn  from  Banks,  or  Grant,  or  Steele,  or 
Rosecrans  ? 

Few  things  have  been  so  grateful  to  my  anxious  feelings  as 
when,  in  June  last,  the  local  force  in  Missouri  aided  General 
Schofield  to  so  promptly  send  a  large  general  force  to  the  relief 
of  General  Grant,  then  investing  Vicksburg  and  menaced  from 
without  by  General  Johnston.  Was  this  all  wrong?  Should 
the  enrolled  militia  then  have  been  broken  up,  and  General 
Herron  kept  from  Grant  to  police  Missouri  f  So  far  from  find 
ing  cause  to  object,  I  confess  to  a  sympathy  for  whatever  re 
lieves  our  general  force  in  Missouri,  and  allows  it  to  serve  else 
where.  I,  therefore,  as  at  present  advised,  cannot  attempt  the 
destruction  of  the  enrolled  militia  of  Missouri.  I  may  add  that, 
the  force  being  under  the  national  military  control,  it  is  also 
within  the  proclamation  in  regard  to  the  habeas  corpus. 

I  concur  in  the  propriety  of  your  request  in  regard  to  elections, 
and  have,  as  you  see,  directed  General  Schofield  accordingly.  I 
do  not  feel  justified  to  enter  upon  the  broad  field  you  present 
in  regard  to  the  political  differences  between  radicals  and  con 
servatives.  From  time  to  time  I  have  done  and  said  what  ap 
peared  to  me  proper  to  do  and  say.  The  public  knows  it  all.  It 
obliges  nobody  to  follow  me,  and  I  trust  it  obliges  me  to  follow 


THE   MATTER   OF  COLORED  ENLISTMENTS  99 

nobody.  The  radicals  and  conservatives  each  agree  with  me  in 
some  things  and  disagree  in  others.  I  could  wish  both  to  agree 
with  me  in  all  things ;  for  then  they  would  agree  with  each  other, 
and  would  be  too  strong  for  any  foe  from  any  quarter.  They, 
however,  choose  to  do  otherwise,  and  I  do  not  question  their 
right ;  I,  too,  shall  do  what  seems  to  be  my  duty.  I  hold  who 
ever  commands  in  Missouri,  or  elsewhere,  responsible  to  me,  and 
not  to  either  radicals  or  conservatives.  It  is  my  duty  to  hear 
all;  but  at  last,  I  must,  within  my  sphere,  judge  what  to  do  and 
what  to  forbear.  Your  obt.  servt., 

A.  LINCOLN. 

On  October  13,  I  wrote  in  my  journal : 

The  radical  delegation  has  returned  from  Washington  very 
much  crestfallen.  It  is  generally  conceded  that  they  have 
accomplished  nothing.  Nothing  official  is  yet  known  on  the 
subject.  .  .  . 

Lane  spoke  at  Turner's  Hall  last  evening;  no  disturbance; 
was  silent  on  the  subject  of  the  department  commander.  He 
informed  me  yesterday,  through  Major  Vaughan,  that  he  had 
stopped  the  war  upon  me,  and  intended  hereafter  not  to  oppose 
me  unless  circumstances  rendered  it  necessary.  Said  the  Presi 
dent  told  him  that  whoever  made  war  on  General  Schofield,  under 
the  present  state  of  affairs,  made  war  on  him — the  President. 
Said  he  never  had  made  war  on  General  S.,  "  except  incidentally." 

Oct.  14. — Received  yesterday  an  order  from  Genl.  [Lorenzo] 
Thomas  appointing  officers  for  the  1st  Regt.  Mo.  Volunteers,  of 
African  descent,  and  directing  that  they  be  detailed  to  raise  the 
regiment. 

Have  telegraphed  to  the  War  Department  for  instructions  as 
to  the  mode  of  raising  these  troops,  referring  to  a  letter  I  wrote 
to  Col.  Townsend  on  the  subject  on  the  29th  of  September.  In 
that  letter  I  explained  the  difficulty  of  raising  such  troops  in 
Missouri,  unless  it  be  done  without  regard  to  the  claims  of  loyal 
slave-owners.  I  also  recommended  that  all  able-bodied  negroes 
be  enlisted,  receipts  given  as  a  basis  for  payment  to  loyal  own 
ers,  and  suggested  that  those  of  unquestioned  loyalty  might  be 
paid  at  once  from  the  substitute  fund.  No  answer  has  been  re 
ceived  to  that  letter. 

Some  months  ago  I  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  asking 
instructions  about  the  negro  question.  No  answer.  The  Hon. 


100         FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Secretary  seems  determined  to  make  me  deal  with  that  question 
on  my  own  responsibility.  It  is  very  natural,  but  hardly  just 
to  me. 

I  had  issued  an  order  respecting  elections,  in  accor 
dance  with  the  President's  instructions.  A  personal  re 
quest  was  made  to  me  for  a  modification  of  the  order. 
The  following  letter  was  written  in  reply  to  that  re 
quest  : 

HEADQRS.,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI, 

ST.  Louis,  Oct.  24th,  1863. 
HON.  C.  DRAKE,  St.  Louis. 

SIR:  After  full  consideration  of  the  subject  of  our  conver 
sation  this  morning,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  no  further  orders 
upon  the  subject  of  the  election  are  necessary.  The  law  which 
provides  the  manner  in  which  soldiers  shall  vote,  and  directs 
how  the  judges  of  election  shall  be  appointed,  is  as  binding 
upon  all  persons  to  whom  it  relates  as  any  order  would  be. 

Genl.  Order  No.  120  also  alludes  to  the  subject  of  soldiers 
voting,  I  think,  in  sufficiently  strong  terms,  although  it  is  taken 
for  granted  in  that  order  that  officers  will  do  their  duty  under 
the  law  in  appointing  judges  of  election  and  in  giving  their  men 
an  opportunity  to  vote.  Moreover,  any  failure  on  their  part  to 
do  their  whole  duty  in  this  regard  would  be  a  clear  violation  of 
Genl.  Order  101.  I  believe  there  is  no  ground  for  apprehension 
that  officers  will  neglect  their  duty  regarding  the  election.  If 
anything  is  needed,  it  is  that  the  troops  be  given  full  informa 
tion  through  the  daily  papers,  which  they  all  read,  of  their  du 
ties  and  privileges  under  the  laws. 

From  the  short  examination  I  have  been  able  to  give,  I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  the  Act  of  the  General  Assembly  changing 
the  mode  of  voting  does  not  apply  to  soldiers  voting  at  the 
company  polls;  that  the  ordinance  of  the  convention  remains 
unrepealed. 

This,  however,  is  a  question  which  I  will  not  presume  to  de 
cide  or  to  refer  to  even  in  an  order. 

I  return  herewith  the  copy  of  Laws  of  Missouri  which  you 
were  so  kind  as  to  lend  me. 

Very  respectfully  your  obt.  servt., 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-Genl. 


A  LETTER  ON  THE  CONDITION  OF  MISSOURI 

On  October  25  I  wrote  to  Mr.  Lincoln  in  regard  to  a 
reorganization  of  the  militia  of  northwestern  Missouri 
which  had  been  made  for  the  purpose  of  suppressing  the 
lawlessness  that  had  prevailed  there  under  the  name  of 
"  loyalty,"  saying : 

I  take  the  liberty  of  sending  you  a  letter  which  I  have  this 
day  received  from  Hon.  Willard  P.  Hall,  Lieut.-Governor  of 
Missouri. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  you,  as  showing  the  good  effect  of 
the  stringent  measures  which  I  felt  compelled  to  adopt  in 
some  portions  of  Missouri,  and  of  the  firm  support  you  have 
given  me. 

The  immediate  effect,  as  might  have  been  expected,  was  a  ter 
rible  storm,  but  it  has  passed  away,  I  hope  never  to  return. 

The  State  is  now  in  far  better  condition  than  it  has  been  at 
any  time  during  the  war. 

I  have  issued  an  election  order  in  compliance  with  your  in 
structions,  with  which  all  parties  express  themselves  well  satis 
fied.  It  seems  I  have  at  last  succeeded  in  doing  one  thing  which 
nobody  can  find  fault  with. 

Shelby's  raid  has  terminated  with  a  loss  of  about  one  half  of 
the  men  with  which  he  entered  the  State,  and  he  received  no  re 
cruits  except  the  robbers  under  Quantrill  and  Jackman.  These 
left  the  State  with  him.  This  fact  is  gratifying  as  showing  that 
the  rebel  power  in  Missouri  is  completely  broken. 

Whatever  may  be  the  secret  feelings  of  the  former  secession 
ists  of  Missouri,  their  influence  now,  so  far  as  it  is  exerted  at  all, 
is  for  peace  and  submission  to  the  national  authority.  All  that 
is  now  necessary  to  secure  peace  to  Missouri,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  occasional  raids  from  Arkansas,  is  union  among  the 
loyal  people.  I  shall  spare  no  effort  to  reconcile  their  differences 
as  far  as  possible,  or  at  least  to  restrain  their  quarrel  within 
peaceable  limits.  The  additional  strength  your  support  has 
given  me  will  enable  me  to  do  this  far  better  than  before.  My 
radical  friends  now  exhibit  some  disposition  to  stop  their  war 
upon  me,  and  I  shall  certainly  not  give  them  any  good  reason  for 
continuing  it.  The  honest  enthusiasts  on  the  subject  of  liberty, 
who  compose  the  respectable  portion  of  this  party,  are  already 
well  disgusted  with  their  lawless  brethren  who  have  brought 


102  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

such  odium  upon  them,  and  now  begin  to  realize  the  necessity 
of  sustaining  me  in  enforcing  the  laws. 

Whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  pending  election,  I  believe 
the  most  serious  danger  is  already  past. 

I  shall  not  fail  to  exercise  great  forbearance  in  enforcing  re 
strictions  upon  speech  and  the  press.  I  have  enforced  my  order 
in  only  one  case,  and  that  so  clear  that  the  offender  fully  con 
fessed  and  asked  pardon  on  any  terms.  It  will  not  probably 
be  necessary  for  me  to  exercise  any  control  over  the  press  here 
after. 

Your  accurate  appreciation  of  the  real  difficulty  here,  and  the 
strong  and  generous  manner  in  which  you  have  sustained  me, 
will  do  more  good  in  Missouri  than  to  have  doubled  the  troops 
under  my  command.  This  I  hope  soon  to  show  you  by  sending 
additional  forces  to  the  front. 

With  the  above  letter  to  the  President  I  inclosed  the 

following : 

ST.  JOSEPH,  Mo.,  Oct.  21st,  1863. 

GENERAL:  It  is  with  very  great  pleasure  that  I  can  inform 
you  of  the  satisfactory  condition  of  things  in  this  section  of 
Missouri.  There  is  more  security  for  men  and  property  in 
northwestern  Missouri  than  there  has  been  since  the  rebellion 
began.  There  is  not  a  spark  of  rebellious  feeling  left  here, 
and  all  citizens  seem  to  be,  and  I  believe  are,  ready  to  discharge 
all  the  duties  of  loyal  men. 

The  people  are  truly  grateful  to  you  for  your  efforts  to  pro 
tect  them,  and  you  may  rest  assured  will  never  fail  you  in  any 
emergency.  Yours  truly, 

WILLARD  P.  HALL. 

MAJOR-GENL.  SCHOFIELD,  etc. 

The  following  was  written  by  me,  November  1, 1863,  to 
Mr.  James  L.  Thomas  of  St.  Louis,  in  answer  to  what 
was  understood  to  be  an  attempt  to  obtain  some  ex 
pression  of  partizan  preference  as  between  the  "  pestilent 
factions  " : 

In  reply  to  your  letter  of  Oct.  30th,  I  will  state  that  in  some 
important  particulars  you  entirely  misapprehended  my  remarks 


A  LETTER  ON  THE  CONDITION  OF  MISSOURI  1Q3 

made  during  our  conversation  on  the  29th.  I  spoke  of  the  law 
less  acts  committed  in  some  portions  of  Missouri  by  men  claim 
ing  to  be  radicals  and  acting  in  the  name  of  radicalism;  and 
asserted  that  leading  men  and  papers  of  the  party  had  failed  to 
do  their  duty  by  disavowing  and  frowning  down  this  lawless 
ness;  that  in  this  course  they  had  been  guilty  of  great  folly* 
and  had  brought  odium  upon  their  party  in  Missouri  and 
throughout  the  country ;  that  they  had  injured  rather  than 
advanced  the  cause  of  emancipation.  I  made  no  remarks  rela 
tive  to  the  radical  party,  nor  to  radicals  as  a  party  or  class  of 
citizens.  I  spoke  of  those  men  and  papers  who  by  tolerating 
and  encouraging  lawlessness  in  the  name  of  radicalism  had 
done  so  much  towards  producing  trouble  in  the  State. 

It  is  perhaps  natural  that  any  honest  man  should  feel,  as  you 
propose,  to  disown  a  party  in  which  such  abuses  are  tolerated, 
but  I  cannot  see  the  propriety  of  so  doing.  Would  it  not  be 
much  wiser  and  more  patriotic  to  endeavor  to  purify  the  party, 
to  bring  it  back  to  the  high  principles  upon  which  it  was 
founded,  and  to  rid  it  of  the  elements  whch  have  disgraced 
those  principles? 

Our  conversation  on  the  29th  was  regarded  by  me  as  con 
fidential,  and  I  still  desire  it  to  be  so  regarded  by  you,  and  also 
this  letter.  No  possible  good  can  result  from  a  public  discus 
sion  by  me  of  such  matters. 

You  are  aware  that  as  department  commander  I  have  no 
thing  to  do  with  politics,  nor  with  offenders  as  members  of  any 
party.  I  shall  unquestionably,  upon  proper  proof,  punish  all 
who  have  been,  or  may  hereafter  be,  guilty  of  the  crimes  you 
mention,  without  regard  to  the  party  they  may  belong  to ;  but 
I  do  not  propose  to  condemn  any  party  or  class  of  men  because 
of  the  guilt  of  one  or  any  number  of  its  members.  When  I  find 
men  acting  wrongfully  or  unwisely  to  the  prejudice  of  the 
Union  cause,  I  endeavor,  within  my  proper  sphere,  to  correct 
or  restrain  them  by  appropriate  means  according  to  circum 
stances.  Whether  my  influence  thus  exerted  inures  to  the 
benefit  of  one  party  or  another  is  a  question  which  I  cannot 
take  into  consideration. 

My  dealing  is  with  individuals,  not  with  parties.  Officially  I 
know  nothing  of  radicals  or  conservatives.  The  question  with 
me  is  simply  what  individuals  obey  the  laws  and  what  violate 
them ;  who  are  for  the  government  and  who  against  it.  The 


104  FORTY- SIX  YEAKS  IN  THE  AEMY 

measures  of  the  President  are  my  measures ;  his  orders,  my 
rule  of  action.  Whether  a  particular  party  gains  strength  or 
loses  it  by  my  action  must  depend  upon  the  party,  and  not 
upon  me. 


At  this  time  occurred  the  following  exchange  of  letters 
with  the  President : 

(Private  and  confidential.) 
EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  Oct.  28th,  1863. 

GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD  :  There  have  recently  reached 
the  War  Department,  and  thence  been  laid  before  me,  from 
Missouri,  three  communications,  all  similar  in  import  and  iden 
tical  in  object.  One  of  them,  addressed  to  nobody,  and  without 
place  or  date,  but  having  the  signature  of  (apparently)  the 
writer,  is  a  letter  of  eight  closely  written  foolscap  pages.  The 
other  two  are  written  by  a  different  person  at  St.  Joseph,  Mo., 
and  of  the  date,  respectively,  October  12th  and  13th,  and  each 
inclosing  a  large  number  of  affidavits. 

The  general  statements  of  the  whole  are  that  the  Federal  and 
State  authorities  are  arming  the  disloyal  and  disarming  the 
loyal,  and  that  the  latter  will  all  be  killed  or  driven  out  of  the 
State  unless  there  shall  be  a  change. 

In  particular,  no  loyal  man  who  has  been  disarmed  is  named 
but  the  affidavits  show,  by  name,  forty-two  persons  as  disloyal 
who  have  been  armed.  They  are  as  follows :  [Names  omitted.  ] 

A  majority  of  these  are  shown  to  have  been  in  the  rebel  ser 
vice.  I  believe  it  could  be  shown  that  the  government  here 
has  deliberately  armed  more  than  ten  times  as  many  captured 
at  Gettysburg,  to  say  nothing  of  similar  operations  in  East  Ten 
nessee.  These  papers  contain  altogether  thirty-one  manuscript 
pages,  and  one  newspaper  in  extenso ;  and  yet  I  do  not  find  it 
anywhere  charged  in  them  that  any  loyal  man  has  been  harmed 
by  reason  of  being  disarmed,  or  that  any  disloyal  one  has 
harmed  anybody  by  reason  of  being  armed  by  the  Federal  or 
State  government. 

Of  course  I  have  not  had  time  to  carefully  examine  all;  but 
I  have  had  most  of  them  examined  and  briefed  by  others,  and 
the  result  is  as  stated.  The  remarkable  fact  that  the  actual  evil 
is  yet  only  anticipated — inferred — induces  me  to  suppose  I  un- 


FORMER  CONFEDERATES  IN  UNION  MILITIA   REGIMENTS    1Q5 

derstand  the  case.  But  I  do  not  state  my  impression,  because 
I  might  be  mistaken,  and  because  your  duty  and  mine  is  plain 
in  any  event. 

The  locality  of  nearly  all  this  seems  to  be  St.  Joseph  and 
Buchanan  County.  I  wish  you  to  give  special  attention  to  this 
region,  particularly  on  Election  day.  Prevent  violence,  from 
whatever  quarter,  and  see  that  the  soldiers  themselves  do  no 
wrong.  Yours  truly, 

A.  LINCOLN. 

HDQRS.,  DEPT.  OF  THE  MISSOURI, 

ST.  Louis,  Nov.  9th,  1863. 

MR.  PRESIDENT  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt 
of  your  confidential  letter  dated  Oct.  28th,  and  containing  the 
names  of  men  enlisted  in  the  militia  of  northwest  Missouri  who 
are  said  to  have  been  disloyal. 

On  my  visit  to  Kansas  and  northwest  Missouri  during  the 
troubles  there  in  September  last,  I  examined  personally  into  the 
difficulties  in  Platte,  Buchanan,  and  other  western  counties,  and 
learned  fully  their  nature  and  origin.  I  at  once  ordered  the  re 
organization  of  the  militia,  which  created  so  much  commotion 
for  a  time,  but  which  has  restored  that  portion  of  the  State  to  a 
condition  of  profound  peace. 

I  have  watched  the  progress  of  affairs  there  closely,  and  have 
kept  myself  fully  advised  of  all  the  facts.  It  is  true  that  about 
twice  as  many  former  rebels  as  were  named  by  your  informants 
are  in  the  militia  organization,  amounting  to  from  five  to  ten 
per  cent,  of  the  whole.  It  is  also  true  that  a  very  much  larger 
number  of  returned  Missouri  rebels  have  enlisted  in  the  Kansas 
Volunteers,  and,  so  far  as  I  know,  are  faithful,  good  soldiers. 

The  rule  I  established  for  the  militia  organization  in  north 
west  Missouri  was  that  the  officers  should  be  of  undoubted 
loyalty,  original  Union  men,  and  that  both  officers  and  privates, 
as  far  as  possible,  should  be  men  of  wealth  and  respectability, 
whose  all  depended  upon  the  preservation  of  peace. 

The  former  sufferings  of  these  men  from  the  lawlessness 
which  has  so  long  existed  on  the  border  made  them  willing  to 
do  military  duty  to  save  from  destruction  or  loss  what  property 
they  had  left.  I  have  yet  to  hear  the  first  report  of  a  murder, 
robbery,  or  arson  in  that  whole  region  since  this  new  organiza 
tion  was  made.  The  late  election  was  conducted  in  perfect 


106  FOKTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AKMY 

peace  and  good  order.  There  is  not  the  slightest  pretense  from 
any  source  of  any  interference  or  other  misconduct  on  the  part 
of  any  of  the  troops.  I  have  not  deemed  it  necessary  to  be 
very  particular  about  the  antecedents  of  troops  that  are  pro 
ducing  such  good  results.  If  I  can  make  a  repentant  rebel  of 
more  service  to  the  government  than  a  man  who  never  had 
any  political  sins  to  repent  of,  I  see  no  reason  for  not  doing  so. 
Indeed,  I  take  no  little  satisfaction  in  making  these  men  guard 
the  property  of  their  more  loyal  neighbors,  and  in  holding  their 
own  property  responsible  for  their  fidelity. 

I  have  the  satisfaction  of  reporting  to  you  that  the  late  elec 
tion  in  all  parts  of  the  State  passed  off  in  perfect  quiet  and 
good  order.  I  have  heard  of  no  disturbance  of  any  kind  any 
where.  The  aggregate  vote,  I  think,  shows  that  the  purity  of 
the  ballot-box  was  preserved  in  a  remarkable  degree.  If  the 
loyal  people  all  voted,  few  or  no  rebels  did. 

The  prospects  of  future  peace  in  this  State  are  highly  en 
couraging. 

I  am  very  respectfully  your  obt.  servt., 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Maj.-Genl. 
To  the  President. 


I  had  abundant  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  result 
of  this  controversy,  so  far  as  it  concerned  me,  and  with 
the  condition  of  the  department  when  it  terminated,  near 
midwinter.  Yet  I  was  satisfied  some  change  was  im 
pending,  and  cared  not  how  soon  it  might  come,  now 
that  my  administration  had  been  fully  vindicated.  In 
fact,  such  a  command  was  not  at  all  to  my  taste,  and  I 
had  always  longed  for  purely  military  service  in  the 
field,  free  from  political  complications.  It  was  therefore 
with  sincere  pleasure  that  I  received,  in  December,  a 
summons  from  the  President  to  come  to  Washington. 

But  before  relating  the  circumstances  of  my  visit  to 
the  President,  I  must  refer  to  an  incident  which  occurred 
a  short  time  before  I  left  St.  Louis,  and  which  I  was 
afterward  led  to  suspect  was  the  immediate  cause  of  the 
President's  desire  to  see  me. 


SUMMONED  TO  WASHINGTON  BY  MR.   LINCOLN 

The  Missouri  legislature  was  in  session  and  balloting 
for  a  United  States  senator.  The  legislature  was  divided 
into  three  parties  —  radicals,  conservative  Republicans, 
and  Democrats,  or  "  copperheads,"  neither  strong  enough 
to  elect  without  a  fusion  with  one  of  the  others.  A  union 
of  the  radicals  and  the  conservatives  was,  of  course, 
most  desired  by  the  administration  ;  but  their  bitterness 
had  become  so  great  that  either  would  prefer  a  bargain 
with  the  Democrats  rather  than  with  the  other.  The 
Hon.  E.  B.  Washburne,  representative  in  Congress  from 
Illinois,  made  an  opportune  visit  to  St.  Louis  about  this 
time,  procured  an  interview  with  me  at  the  house  of  a 
common  friend,  and  led  me  into  a  frank  conversation 
relative  to  this  political  question.  I  told  him  candidly 
that  in  my  opinion  the  desired  union  of  radicals  and 
conservatives  was  impossible,  for  they  were  more  bitterly 
opposed  to  each  other  than  either  was  to  the  Democrats. 
Mr.  Washburne  went  to  Washington,  and  reported  to 
the  President  that  I  was  opposed  to  the  much-desired 
radical  and  conservative  union  in  Missouri,  and  was 
using  my  influence  to  prevent  it.  So  opposite  was  this 
to  the  truth  that  I  had  even  written  a  letter  to  my  friend 
Colonel  J.  0.  Broadhead,  the  conservative  candidate, 
asking  him  to  withdraw  in  favor  of  the  radical  candi 
date,  as  a  means  of  bringing  about  the  harmony  so  much 
desired  by  the  President.  This  letter  was  not  sent,  be 
cause  the  telegraphic  reports  from  Jefferson  City  showed 
that  it  was  too  late  to  do  any  good;  but  it  was  handed  to 
Colonel  Broadhead  on  his  return  to  show  him  my  wishes 
in  the  matter. 

Upon  my  first  visit  to  the  President,  he  repeated  to  me 
this  Washburne  story,  without,  however,  intimating  that 
he  attached  much  weight  to  it.  I  at  once  replied  by 
giving  him  the  simple  facts  about  my  conversation  with 
Washburne,  and  what  my  true  position  was  on  that 
question.  Mr.  Lincoln  promptly  dismissed  the  subject 


108  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

with  the  words  :  "  I  believe  you,  Schofield ;  those  fellows 
have  been  lying  to  me  again." 

Mr.  Lincoln  undoubtedly  referred  here  to  a  previous 
incident  which  was  related  to  me  by  the  Hon.  James  S. 
Bollins,  member  of  Congress  from  Missouri,  one  of  the 
truest  and  most  truthful  men  in  the  world,  as  having  oc 
curred  in  his  presence.  Some  men  from  Missouri  had 
prevailed  upon  Mr.  Eollins  to  introduce  them  to  the  Pres 
ident,  to  whom  they  wished  to  represent  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  Missouri  as  viewed  from  their  standpoint. 
After  listening  to  their  story,  the  President  opened  the 
little  right-hand  drawer  of  his  desk,  took  out  a  letter 
from  me,  and  read  it  to  them.  He  then  said :  "  That  is 
the  truth  about  the  matter ;  you  fellows  are  lying  to  me." 

Determined  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt  in  the  Presi 
dent's  mind,  I  telegraphed  to  St.  Louis  and  got  the 
Broadhead  letter ;  but  by  the  time  it  arrived  I  had  be 
come  so  satisfied  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  confidence  that  I  did 
not  think  it  worth  while  to  show  it  to  him. 

I  remained  at  the  capital  several  weeks,  and  had  full 
conversations  with  the  President  on  public  affairs.  The 
political  situation  was  a  perplexing  one.  The  state  of 
parties  in  the  West  seemed  that  of  inextricable  confusion, 
which  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  friends  were  anxious  to  un 
ravel,  if  possible,  before  the  next  Presidential  nomination. 
In  Missouri  the  faction  which  had  been  friendly  to  me 
was  also  a  supporter  of  Mr.  Lincoln,  while  the  radicals 
were  opposed  to  him.  In  Kansas,  on  the  contrary,  the 
so-called  Lane  and  Carney  factions,  while  vying  with 
each  other  in  professions  of  radicalism,  were  divided  in 
the  opposite  manner.  The  former  supported  the  Presi 
dent,  but  was  bitterly  hostile  to  me,  while  the  latter  was 
friendly  to  me  and  opposed  to  Mr.  Lincoln.  I  frankly 
told  the  President  that  it  was  impossible  for  me  to  rec 
oncile  those  differences  —  indeed,  that  I  did  not  believe 
any  general  in  the  army  could,  as  department  com- 


OFFERED   THE   COMMAND   OF   THE   ARMY   OF   THE   OHIO    1Q9 

mander,  satisfy  the  Union  people  of  both  Kansas  and 
Missouri;  neither  the  rnan  nor  the  policy  that  would 
suit  the  one  would  be  at  all  satisfactory  to  the  other. 
Mr.  Lincoln  had  evidently  already  arrived  at  much  the 
same  conclusion,  and  soon  determined  to  divide  the  old 
Department  of  the  Missouri  into  three  departments,  and 
try  to  assign  to  each  a  commander  suited  to  its  peculiar 
ities.  But  Mr.  Lincoln  declared  decidedly  to  me,  and  to 
my  friends  in  the  Senate,  that  he  would  make  no  change 
until  the  Senate  united  with  him  in  vindicating  me  by 
confirming  my  nomination  as  major-general,  then  in  the 
hands  of  the  Military  Committee  of  the  Senate,  and  that 
he  would  then  give  me  a  more  important  command. 

A  large  majority — indeed,  all  but  some  half-dozen — of 
the  Senate  were  known  to  be  favorable  to  the  confirma 
tion  ;  but  this  small  minority  had  control  of  the  Military 
Committee,  and  were  consequently  able  to  delay  any  re 
port  of  the  case  to  the  Senate,  and  thus  to  thwart  the 
President's  wishes. 

The  matter  stood  thus  for  nearly  a  month,  and  seemed 
no  nearer  solution  than  at  first,  when  a  despatch  was  re 
ceived  in  Washington  from  General  Grant,  then  com 
manding  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  saying 
it  was  necessary  to  relieve  General  Foster,  on  account 
of  ill-health,  from  the  command  of  the  Department  and 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  to  appoint  a  successor.  Upon 
being  asked  whom  he  wanted  for  that  command,  Grant 
replied:  "Either  McPherson  or  Schofield." 

Among  the  changes  then  known  in  Washington  to  be 
in  the  near  future  was  Grant's  elevation  to  the  command 
of  "all  the  armies,"  to  be  naturally  followed  by  Sher 
man's  succession  to  that  of  the  Division  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  McPherson's  to  that  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.  But  Grant  alone,  perhaps,  had  no  right  to 
anticipate  those  changes,  hence  he  gave  his  just  prefer 
ence  to  my  senior,  McPherson. 


HO  FOBTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AKMY 

Halleck  handed  me  Grant's  despatch,  and  asked  me 
how  I  would  like  that.  I  replied :  "  That  is  exactly  what 
I  want ;  nothing  in  the  world  could  be  better."  He  then 
told  me  to  take  the  despatch  to  the  President,  which  I 
immediately  did,  and  in  handing  it  to  him  said :  "  If  you 
want  to  give  me  that,  I  will  gladly  take  all  chances  for 
the  future,  whether  in  the  Senate  or  elsewhere."  Mr.  Lin 
coln  replied  in  his  characteristic  way :  "  Why,  Schofield, 
that  cuts  the  knot,  don't  it  ?  Tell  Halleck  to  come  over 
here,  and  we  will  fix  it  right  away."  I  bade  the  President 
adieu,  and  started  at  once  for  St.  Louis,  to  turn  over  my 
command  and  proceed  to  my  new  field  of  duty. 

I  saw  Mr.  Lincoln  only  once  after  that  time.  That  was 
when,  just  a  year  later,  I  was  passing  through  Washing 
ton  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  and  called  merely  to 
pay  my  respects.  The  President  greeted  me  with  the 
words :  "  Well,  Schofield,  I  have  n't  heard  anything 
against  you  for  a  year."  Apparently,  the  great  trouble 
to  him  with  which  I  had  been  so  closely  connected,  if 
not  the  cause,  was  uppermost  in  his  mind. 

With  Mr.  Lincoln  I  had  no  personal  acquaintance,  hav 
ing  met  him  but  once,  previous  to  the  visit  above  de 
scribed.  But  in  assigning  me  to  the  command  in  Mis 
souri  he  had,  contrary  to  the  usual  custom,  written  for 
me  his  own  instructions,  thus  inviting  my  fullest  con 
fidence.  I  had  availed  myself  of  this  to  tell  him  every 
thing  without  reserve,  and  he  appeared  never  to  doubt 
the  exact  truth  of  my  statements. 

My  personal  acquaintance  with  General  Grant  was 
equally  limited — we  having  met  but  once,  and  for  only 
a  moment.  He  knew  me  only  by  reputation.  I  never 
had  any  conversation  or  correspondence  with  him  on 
the  subject,  but  presume  he  knew  something  about  the 
trouble  I  was  in,  had  not  forgotten  the  aid  I  sent  him 
at  Yicksburg,  and  believed  I  would  do  what  was  right 
to  the  best  of  my  ability.  I  have  had  abundant  reasons 


ANECDOTE  OF  GENERAL  GRANT 

for -believing  that  he  never  felt  disappointed  in  his  trust 
and  confidence. 

General  Halleck  knew  me  much  better,  having  been 
my  immediate  commander  in  Missouri  in  1861  and  1862. 
Although  on  one  or  two  occasions  he  seemed  a  little 
harsh  in  respect  to  unimportant  matters,  he  was  uni 
formly  kind,  considerate,  and  unwavering  in  his  per 
sonal  and  official  support. 

The  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Stanton,  expressed  his 
confidence  and  approval;  said  he  was  opposed  to  any 
change;  that  it  was  the  President's  affair,  with  which 
he  had  nothing  to  do.  I  got  the  impression  that  he  re 
garded  the  whole  scheme  as  a  political  one,  in  which  he 
took  no  interest,  and  with  which  he  felt  no  sympathy. 

In  St.  Louis  I  met  General  Grant,  who  was  then  so 
soon  to  be  assigned  to  the  command  of  "all  the  armies 
of  the  United  States,"  and  for  the  first  time  really  be 
came  acquainted  with  him.  We  were  together  much  of 
the  time  for  several  days  and  nights.  The  citizens  of  St. 
Louis  entertained  the  general  in  a  most  magnificent 
manner.  At  a  grand  banquet  given  in  his  honor,  at  which 
I  sat  on  his  right,  he  did  not  even  touch  one  of  the  many 
glasses  of  wine  placed  by  the  side  of  his  plate.  At 
length  I  ventured  to  remark  that  he  had  not  tasted  his 
wine.  He  replied:  "I  dare  not  touch  it.  Sometimes 
I  can  drink  freely  without  any  unpleasant  effect;  at 
others  I  cannot  take  even  a  single  glass  of  light  wine." 
A  strong  man,  indeed,  who  could  thus  know  and  govern 
his  own  weakness !  In  reply  to  the  toast  in  his  honor,  he 
merely  arose  and  bowed  without  saying  a  word.  Then 
turning  to  me,  he  said  it  was  simply  impossible  for  him 
to  utter  a  word  when  on  his  feet.  As  is  well  known,  the 
great  general  finally  overcame  his  reserve. 

It  was  very  difficult  for  me  to  comprehend  the  politi 
cal  necessity  which  compelled  Mr.  Lincoln  to  give  his 
official  countenance  to  such  men  as  Lane  and  Blunt  in 


FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Kansas,  but  such  necessity  was  thought  to  exist.  I  -sup 
pose  a  great  statesman  should  use  in  the  best  way  he  can 
the  worst  materials  as  well  as  the  best  that  are  within 
his  reach,  and,  if  possible,  make  them  all  subserve  the 
great  purposes  he  has  to  accomplish. 

The  old  department  was  cut  up,  the  Lane  faction  in 
Kansas  was  given  the  man  of  its  choice  —  General  Curtis ; 
Missouri  was  placed  alone  under  General  Rosecrans  — 
not  Butler,  as  the  radicals  had  asked ;  Arkansas,  having 
no  voice  in  the  matter,  was  left  under  the  soldier,  General 
Steele,  then  in  command  there ;  and  I  left  them  all  with 
out  regret  and  with  buoyant  hopes  of  more  satisfactory 
service  in  a  purely  military  field. 


CHAPTER  VII 

CONDITION  OF  THE  TEOOPS  AT  KNOXVILLE  —  EFFECT  OF 
THE  PROMOTION  OF  GEANT  AND  SHEKMAN — LETTER  TO 
SENATOR  HENDERSON  —  A  VISIT  FROM  GENERAL  SHER 
MAN —  UNITED  WITH  HIS  OTHER  ARMIES  FOR  THE  AT 
LANTA  CAMPAIGN  —  COMMENTS  ON  SHERMAN'S  "ME 
MOIRS" —  FAULTY  ORGANIZATION  OF  SHERMAN'S  ARMY 
— MCPHERSON'S  TASK  AT  RESACA — MCPHERSON'S  CHAR 
ACTER —  EXAMPLE  OF  THE  WORKING  OF  A  FAULTY 
SYSTEM. 

I  ARRIVED  at  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  on  February  8, 
1864,  and  the  next  day  relieved  G-eneral  John  Gr. 
Foster.  The  troops  then  about  Knoxville  were  the  Ninth 
Corps,  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty-third,  and  about  one 
thousand  cavalry  and  two  divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps; 
the  latter  belonged  to  the  Department  of  the  Cumber 
land,  but  had  been  left  with  General  Burnside  after  the 
siege  of  Knoxville  was  raised  by  G-eneral  Sherman. 

The  Ninth  and  Twenty-third  Corps  were  reduced  in 
effective  strength  to  mere  skeletons,  the  former  report 
ing  present  for  duty  equipped  only  2800  men,  and  the 
latter  3000  men ;  and  these  had  for  a  long  time  been  liv 
ing  on  half  rations  or  less,  and  were  generally  far  less 
than  half  clad,  many  of  them  being  entirely  without 
shoes.  The  remainder  of  these  troops  were  disabled  by 
wounds,  sickness,  lack  of  food  or  clothing,  or  were  em 
ployed  in  the  care  of  the  sick  or  on  extra  duty. 

Many  thousands  of  dead  horses  and  mules  were  scat 
tered  round  the  town,  while  the  few  remaining  alive  were 

8  113 


H4  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

reduced  to  skeletons.  Of  about  30,000  animals  with 
which  General  Burnside  had  gone  into  East  Tennessee, 
scarcely  1000  remained  fit  for  service ;  while  his  army  of 
over  25,000  men  had  been  reduced  to  not  more  than  7000 
fit  for  duty  and  effective  for  service  in  the  field.  Such 
was  the  result  of  the  siege  of  Knoxville,  and  such  the 
Army  of  the  Ohio  when  I  became  its  commander. 

But  the  splendid  victory  gained  a  short  time  before  at 
Chattanooga  had  raised  the  blockade  upon  our  line  of 
supply,  and  the  railroad  to  Chattanooga  and  Nashville 
was  soon  opened,  so  that  our  starving  and  naked  troops 
could  begin  to  get  supplies  of  food  and  clothing.  The 
movement  of  the  first  train  of  cars  was  reported  by  tele 
graph  from  every  station,  and  was  eagerly  awaited  by  the 
entire  army.  When  the  locomotive  whistle  announced 
its  approach,  everybody  turned  out  to  welcome  it  with 
shouts  of  joy.  It  proved  to  consist  of  ten  car-loads  of 
horse  and  mule  shoes  for  the  dead  animals  which  strewed 
the  plains!  Fortunately  the  disgust  produced  by  this 
disappointment  was  not  of  long  duration.  The  next 
train,  which  followed  very  soon,  contained  coffee,  sugar, 
and  other  articles  to  gladden  the  hearts  of  hungry  soldiers. 

The  Confederate  army  under  Longstreet  still  remained 
in  East  Tennessee.  A  movement  had  recently  been  made 
by  our  troops,  under  the  immediate  command  of  General 
John  G.  Parke  (General  Foster  being  too  lame  to  take 
the  field  in  person),  to  drive  Longstreet  out.  But  the 
movement  had  failed,  the  troops  returning  to  Knoxville 
with  the  loss  of  considerable  material.  In  consequence 
of  this,  much  anxiety  was  felt  in  Washington  regarding 
the  situation  in  East  Tennessee.  It  was  even  appre 
hended  that  Knoxville  might  be  in  danger;  and  an  ad 
vance  of  Longstreet's  force  to  Strawberry  Plains,  where 
he  laid  a  bridge  over  the  Holston  and  crossed  a  part  of 
his  troops,  seemed  to  give  some  ground  for  such  appre 
hensions. 


CONDITION  OF  THE  TROOPS  AT  KNOXVILLE  H5 

The  miserable  condition  of  our  troops,  the  season  of 
the  year,  the  almost  total  lack  of  means  of  transportation 
for  supplies  and  of  a  pontoon  bridge  to  cross  the  river, 
rendered  any  considerable  movement  on  our  part  impos 
sible.  But  to  relieve  the  existing  apprehension,  I  deter 
mined  to  assume  the  offensive  at  once,  and  to  maintain  it 
as  far  as  possible. 

Early  in  February  General  Grant  had  proposed  to  give 
me  10,000  additional  troops  from  General  Thomas's  army 
at  Chattanooga,  and  to  let  me  begin  the  campaign  against 
Longstreet  at  once.  But  on  February  16  he  informed  me 
that  the  movement  would  have  to  be  delayed  because  of 
some  operations  in  which  General  Thomas  was  to  engage. 
Nevertheless,  I  advanced  on  the  24th  with  what  force  I 
had,  at  the  same  time  sending  a  reconnaissance  south  of 
the  French  Broad  River  to  ascertain  the  nature  of  a  hos 
tile  movement  reported  in  that  direction. 

Upon  our  advance,  Longstreet's  troops  withdrew  across 
the  Holston  and  French  Broad  and  retreated  toward 
Morristown.  His  advance  had  evidently  been  intended 
only  to  cover  an  attempted  cavalry  raid  upon  our  rear, 
which  the  high  water  in  the  Little  Tennessee  rendered 
impracticable. 

We  now  occupied  Strawberry  Plains,  rebuilt  the  rail 
road  bridge,  pushed  forward  the  construction  of  a  bateau 
bridge  which  had  been  commenced,  in  the  meantime 
using  the  bateaux  already  constructed  to  ferry  the  troops 
across  the  river.  In  this  manner  we  were  able  to  ad 
vance  as  far  as  Morristown  by  February  29  with  suffi 
cient  force  to  reconnoiter  Longstreet's  position.  This 
reconnaissance  demonstrated  that  the  enemy  held  Bull's 
Gap,  and  that  his  entire  force  was  grouped  about  that 
strong  position.  The  object  of  this  movement  having 
been  accomplished  without  loss,  our  troops  retired  to 
New  Market  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  troops  to  be  sent 
by  General  Thomas,  the  completion  of  the  railroad 


116  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

bridge,  and  other  necessary  preparations  for  the  expected 
campaign. 

On  March  12  another  reconnaissance  was  made  as  far 
as  Bull's  Gap,  which  was  found  to  be  still  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  although  reliable  information  indicated  that 
Longstreet  was  preparing  for,  and  had  perhaps  already 
begun,  his  movement  toward  Virginia.  Although  his 
force,  if  concentrated,  was  much  superior  to  mine,  I  de 
termined  to  endeavor  to  take  advantage  of  his  move 
ment  to  attack  his  rear.  My  advance  held  Morristown; 
all  the  troops  were  ordered  forward  to  that  place,  and 
preparations  made  for  an  attack,  when,  on  the  15th,  or 
ders  came  from  General  Grant  to  send  the  Ninth  Corps 
to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Such  a  reduction  of  my  command,  instead  of  the  ex 
pected  reinforcement,  left  me  wholly  unable  to  do  more 
than  observe  Longstreet  as  he  leisurely  withdrew  from 
Tennessee  and  joined  Lee  in  Virginia,  and  prepare  for 
the  campaign  of  the  coming  summer,  the  nature  of  which 
I  could  then  only  conjecture. 

This  entire  change  of  program  doubtless  resulted  from 
the  promotion  of  General  Grant  to  lieutenant-general 
and  commander-in-chief,  and  General  Sherman  to  his 
place  in  command  of  the  Military  Division  of  the  Mis 
sissippi,  which  occurred  at  that  time.  The  change  of 
plans  was  undoubtedly  wise.  The  Confederate  govern 
ment  could  not  afford  to  leave  Longstreet's  force  in  East 
Tennessee  during  the  summer.  He  must  join  Lee  or 
Johnston  before  the  opening  of  the  summer  campaign. 
It  was  not  worth  while  for  us  to  expend  time  and  strength 
in  driving  him  out,  which  ought  to  be  devoted  to  prepa 
rations  for  vastly  more  important  work.  I  felt  disap 
pointed  at  the  time  in  not  having  an  opportunity  of 
doing  something  that  would  silence  my  enemies  in  "Wash 
ington,  who  were  not  slow  to  avail  themselves  of  any 
pretext  for  hostile  action  against  me.  It  was  not  difficult 


EFFECT  OF  THE  PROMOTION  OF  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  H7 

to  manufacture  one  out  of  the  public  reports  of  what  had 
been  done,  or  not  done,  in  East  Tennessee,  and  the  Mili 
tary  Committee  of  the  Senate  reported  against  the  con 
firmation  of  my  appointment  as  major-general.  Of  this 
I  was  informed  by  my  friend  Senator  J.  B.  Henderson, 
in  a  letter  urging  me  to  "  whip  somebody  anyhow."  This 
information  and  advice  elicited  a  long  reply,  from  which 
the  following  are  extracts,  which  expressed  pretty  fully 
my  views  and  feelings  on  that  subject,  and  which,  with 
events  that  soon  followed,  ended  all  trouble  I  ever  had 
with  that  august  body,  the  United  States  Senate. 

I  recollect  in  this  connection  a  very  pertinent  remark 
made  by  G-eneral  Grant  soon  after  he  became  President. 
My  nomination  as  major-general  in  the  regular  army, 
with  those  of  Sherman  and  Sheridan  as  general  and  lieu 
tenant-general,  had  been  sent  to  the  Senate  and  returned 
approved  so  promptly  as  to  occasion  comment.  I  re 
marked  that  it  had  on  one  occasion  taken  me  a  year  and 
a  half  to  get  through  the  Senate.  President  Grant,  as  he 
handed  me  my  commission,  replied :  "  Yes ;  and  if  your 
conduct  then  had  been  such  as  to  avoid  that  difficulty 
with  the  Senate,  you  would  probably  never  have  received 
this  commission  at  all."  I  have  no  doubt  he  was  right. 
To  have  pleased  the  radical  politicians  of  that  day  would 
have  been  enough  to  ruin  any  soldier. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

KNOXVILLE,  TENN.,  April  15,  1864. 

DEAR  SENATOR  :  I  have  just  received  your  letter  of  the  7th 
informing  me  that  the  Military  Committee  has  reported  against 
my  nomination,  and  urging  me  to  "  whip  somebody  anyhow."  I 
am  fully  aware  of  the  importance  to  me  personally  of  gaming  a 
victory.  No  doubt  I  might  easily  get  up  a  little  "  claptrap  "  on 
which  to  manufacture  newspaper  notoriety,  and  convince  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  that  I  had  won  a  great  victory,  and 
secure  my  confirmation  by  acclamation.  Such  things  have  been 
done,  alas !  too  frequently  during  this  war.  But  such  is  not  my 


;Q8  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

theory  of  a  soldier's  duties.  I  have  an  idea  that  my  military  su 
periors  are  the  proper  judges  of  my  character  and  conduct,  and 
that  their  testimony  ought  to  be  considered  satisfactory  as  to  my 
military  qualities. 

I  have  the  approval  and  support  of  the  President,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  General  Halleck,  General  Grant,  and  General 
Sherman.  I  am  willing  to  abide  the  decision  of  any  one  or  all 
of  them,  and  I  would  not  give  a  copper  for  the  weight  of  any 
body's  or  everybody's  opinion  in  addition  to,  or  in  opposition 
to,  theirs. 

If  the  Senate  is  not  satisfied  with  such  testimony,  I  can't  help 
it.  I  never  have  and  never  will  resort  to  "  buncombe  "  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  my  own  advancement.  If  I  cannot  gain 
promotion  by  legitimate  means,  I  do  not  want  it  at  all.  ...  In 
all  this  time  I  have  yet  to  hear  the  first  word  of  disapproval, 
from  my  superior  officer,  of  any  one  of  my  military  operations 
(unless  I  except  Curtis,  who  disapproved  of  my  pursuing  Hind- 
man  so  far  into  Arkansas),  and  in  general  have  received  high 
commendation  from  my  superiors,  both  for  my  military  opera 
tions  and  administration.  I  would  rather  have  this  record  with 
out  a  major-general's  commission,  than  to  gain  the  commission 
by  adding  to  my  reputation  one  grain  of  falsehood.  .  .  . 

Grant  was  here  in  the  winter,  and  Sherman  only  a  few  days 
ago.  They  are  fully  acquainted  with  the  condition  of  affairs.  I 
have  been  acting  all  the  time  under  their  instructions,  and  I  be 
lieve  with  their  entire  approval.  They  are  generally  understood 
to  be  men  whose  opinions  on  military  matters  are  entitled  to  re 
spect.  I  cannot  do  more  or  better  than  refer  the  Senate  to  them. 

One  thing  is  certain:  I  shall  not  be  influenced  one  grain  in 
the  discharge  of  my  duty  by  any  question  as  to  what  action  the 
Senate  may  take  on  my  nomination.  ...  If  the  Senate  is  not 
satisfied  as  to  my  past  services,  why  not  wait  until  they  can 
know  more?  I  am  tired  enough  of  this  suspense,  but  still  am 
perfectly  willing  to  wait.  In  fact,  I  have  become,  in  spite  of 
myself,  very  indifferent  on  the  subject.  I  am  pretty  thoroughly 
convinced  that  a  major-general's  commission  is  not  worth  half 
the  trouble  I  and  my  friends  have  had  about  mine,  and  I  feel 
very  little  inclination  to  trouble  them,  or  even  myself,  any  more 
about  it. 

The  Senate  has  its  duty  to  perform  in  this  matter,  as  well  as 
myself  and  my  superior  officers.  If  senators  are  not  willing  to 


LETTER  TO  SENATOR  HENDERSON         ;Q9 

act  upon  the  concurrent  testimony  of  all  my  superior  officers  as 
to  what  services  I  have  rendered,  I  shall  not  condescend  to  hum 
bug  them  into  the  belief  that  I  have  done  something  which  I 
really  have  not. 

You  ask  me  what  are  the  prospects  of  putting  down  the  rebel 
lion.  I  answer  unhesitatingly  that  when  the  management  of 
military  matters  is  left  to  military  men,  the  rebellion  will  be  put 
down  very  quickly,  and  not  before.  I  regard  it  as  having  been 
fully  demonstrated  that  neither  the  Senate,  nor  the  House  of 
Representatives,  nor  the  newspapers,  nor  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  nor  even  all  of  them  together,  can  command  an 
army.  I  rather  think  if  you  let  Grant  alone,  and  let  him  have 
his  own  way,  he  will  end  the  war  this  year.  At  all  events,  the 
next  ninety  days  will  show  whether  he  will  or  not. 

I  find  this  letter  is  both  too  long  and  too  ill-natured.     I  feel 
too  much  as  if  I  would  like  to  "  whip  somebody  anyhow,"  so  I 
will  stop  where  I  am.    Let  me  hear  from  you  again  soon. 
Yours  very  truly, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

HON.  J.  B.  HENDERSON, 

U.  S.  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Of  course  I  knew  the  advice  of  my  friend  Senator 
Henderson  was  not  intended  to  be  taken  seriously,  but 
only  as  expressing  his  view,  much  the  same  as  my  own, 
of  the  then  existing  situation  in  the  Senate.  But  it  gave 
me,  all  the  same,  the  opportunity  I  wanted  to  give  his 
brother  senators,  through  him,  "  a  piece  of  my  mind." 

General  Sherman,  on  a  visit  to  Knoxville  about  the  end 
of  March,  a  few  days  before  the  date  of  the  foregoing 
letter,  disclosed  to  me  his  general  plans  for  the  coming 
campaign,  and  the  part  I  was  expected  to  take  in  it. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  give  an  adequate  conception  of 
the  feeling  of  eager  expectation  and  enthusiasm  with 
which,  having  given  my  final  salutation  to  my  "  friends  " 
in  the  Senate,  I  entered  upon  the  preparations  for  this 
campaign.  Of  its  possible  results  to  the  country  there 
was  room  in  my  mind  only  for  confidence.  But  for  myself, 


120  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ABMY 

it  was  to  decide  my  fate,  and  that  speedily.  My  reputa 
tion  and  rank  as  a  soldier,  so  long  held  in  the  political 
balance,  were  at  length  to  be  settled.  The  long-hoped- 
for  opportunity  had  come,  and  that  under  a  general 
whose  character  and  ability  were  already  established, 
and  of  the  justice  of  whose  judgment  and  action  regard 
ing  his  subordinates  there  could  be  no  reason  for  doubt 
in  my  mind.  My  command  was  to  be  mostly  of  vet 
eran  troops,  and  not  too  large  for  my  experience.  Its 
comparative  smallness  was  a  source  of  satisfaction  to 
me  at  that  time,  rather  than  anything  like  jealousy  of 
my  senior  brother  commanders  of  the  Cumberland  and 
Tennessee. 

My  first  care  was  to  provide  my  men  with  all  neces 
sary  equipment  for  the  campaign,  and  to  fill  up  the  ranks 
by  calling  in  all  absentees.  It  was  a  refreshing  sight  to 
see  the  changed  aspect  and  feeling  of  the  gallant  little 
army  as  it  marched  with  full  ranks  and  complete  equip 
ment,  newly  clad,  from  Knoxville  toward  Dalton. 

My  next  thought  was  to  win  the  respect  and  confi 
dence  of  my  men.  An  opportunity  to  do  this  was  speed 
ily  afforded  in  the  delicate  operations  in  front  of  Dalton. 
The  result  may  perhaps  be  fairly  expressed  in  the  words 
of  an  old  soldier  who  was  overheard  to  say  as  I  passed 
his  regiment  that  day  under  fire :  "  It  is  all  right,  boys ; 
I  like  the  way  the  old  man  chaws  his  tobacco."  From 
that  day  forward  I  felt  that  the  Twenty-third  Corps  con 
fided  in  me  as  I  did  in  them.  I  never  had  any  doubt 
they  would  do  just  what  I  expected  them  to  do,  and 
would  take  it  for  granted  that  it  was  "all  right." 

It  is  with  the  greatest  pleasure  that  I  record  here  the 
just  tribute  paid  to  that  splendid  body  of  men  by  Gen 
eral  Sherman  about  the  close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign : 
"  The  Twenty -third  Corps  never  failed  to  do  all  that  was 
expected  of  it." 

And  it  is  with  equal  pleasure  that  I  record  the  just 


COMMENTS  ON  SHERMAN'S   " MEMOIRS" 

and  generous  treatment  shown  by  G-eneral  Sherman  to 
ward  me  from  the  beginning  of  that  campaign.  Although 
much  my  senior  in  years,  experience,  and  reputation,  he 
never  showed  that  he  was  aware  of  it,  but  always  treated 
me  as  his  peer.  In  his  official  reports  and  his  memoirs 
he  has  never  been  unkind  or  unjust,  though  it  has  never 
been  his  habit  to  bestow  much  praise  on  individuals,  or 
to  think  much  of  the  rewards  due  his  subordinates,  gen 
erally  giving  credit  as  justly  due  to  troops  rather  than 
to  commanders.  It  would  be  impossible  for  me  not  to 
cherish  feelings  of  strong  affection  for  my  old  com 
mander,  as  well  as  tho  profound  respect  due  his  char 
acter  as  a  man  and  soldier,  and  his  brilliant  genius. 

If  anything  I  may  say  in  criticism  of  General  Sher 
man's  acts  or  words  shall  seem  unkind  or  be  considered 
unjust,  I  can  only  disclaim  any  such  feeling,  and  freely 
admit  that  it  would  be  wholly  unworthy  of  the  relations 
that  always  existed  between  us.  I  write  not  for  the 
present,  but  for  the  future,  and  my  only  wish  is  to  repre 
sent  the  truth  as  it  appears  to  me.  If  I  fail  to  see  it 
clearly,  I  do  but  condemn  myself.  History  will  do  im 
partial  justice.  Having  been  in  a  subordinate  position 
in  the  campaigns  of  1864  in  Georgia  and  Tennessee,  I 
shall  not  attempt  to  write  a  full  account  of  those  cam 
paigns,  but  shall  limit  myself  to  such  comments  as  seem 
to  me  to  be  called  for  upon  the  already  published  histo 
ries  of  those  campaigns. 

In  estimating  the  merits  of  Sherman's  "  Memoirs," x  it 
should  be  remembered  that  he  does  not,  and  does  not 
claim  to,  occupy  the  position  of  a  disinterested,  impartial 
historian.  He  writes,  not  for  the  purpose  of  doing  equal 
and  exact  justice  to  all  actors  in  a  great  historical  drama, 
but  for  the  purpose  of  elucidating  his  own  acts  and  mo 
tives,  and  vindicating  himself  against  the  harsh  criticism 

i  The  following  was  written  in  1875,  soon  after  the  appearance  of  the  first 
edition. 


122  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

and  censure  which  have  followed  some  of  his  most  impor 
tant  transactions.  However  unconscious  General  Sher 
man  himself  may  have  been  of  the  influence  of  such 
motives,  their  existence  was  natural,  even  inevitable,  and 
they  have  manifestly  given  their  coloring  to  all  of  the 
memoirs.  This  should  not  occasion  surprise,  nor  even 
regret,  much  less  be  held  to  justify  unkind  criticism. 
It  is  desirable  for  the  future  historian  to  have  the  view 
of  the  chief  actor  in  any  portion  of  history  taken  from 
his  own  standpoint.  It  is  only  by  a  critical,  laborious 
and  honest  comparison  of  this  view  with  those  of  other 
actors  and  eye-witnesses  that  impartial  history  may  ulti 
mately  be  written. 

My  present  purpose  is  simply  to  direct  attention  to 
some  points  in  the  history  of  those  campaigns  of  General 
Sherman  in  which  I  was  one  of  his  principal  subordi 
nates,  upon  which  the  views  of  others  were  at  the 
time,  or  have  since  been,  different  from  his  own.  In 
what  I  have  to  say  the  motive  of  self-vindication  can 
have  little  or  no  influence;  for,  with  some  unimportant 
exceptions,  General  Sherman  does  relatively  full  justice 
to  me  and  to  the  little  army  which  I  had  the  honor  to 
command.  I  shall  speak  mainly  of  the  acts  of  others,  es 
pecially  the  noble  dead. 

I  must  preface  my  remarks  by  observing  that  the  or 
ganization  of  Sherman's  army  during  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign  was  extremely  faulty,  in  that  the  three  grand 
divisions  were  very  unequal  in  strength,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  having  nearly  five  times  the  infantry  strength 
of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  and  more  than  twice  that  of  the 
Army  of  the  Tennessee,  even  after  the  junction  of  Blair's 
corps.  The  cavalry,  of  which  two  divisions  belonged  to 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  always  acted  either  under  the  di 
rect  orders  of  General  Sherman  or  of  the  nearest  army 
commander,  according  to  the  flank  on  which  it  was  oper 
ating.  This  inequality  resulted  from  the  fact  that  Sher- 


FAULTY  ORGANIZATION  OF  SHERMAN'S  ARMY          123 

man's  army  was  composed  of  three  separate  armies,  or 
such  portions  of  them  as  could  be  spared  from  their  sev 
eral  departments,  united  for  that  campaign.  General 
Thomas  was,  naturally  enough,  disinclined  to  part  with 
any  of  his  troops,  and  the  troops  did  not  wish  to  be  sep 
arated  from  the  old  army  in  which  they  had  won  so  much 
honor,  nor  from  the  commander  whom  they  revered. 
Besides,  General  Thomas  had  had  much  greater  experi 
ence  in  the  command  of  troops  in  the  field  than  I,  and 
General  Sherman,  if  he  thought  of  it  at  all,  may  well 
have  doubted  the  wisdom  of  diminishing  the  command 
of  the  one  to  increase  that  of  the  other.  I  do  not  know 
whether  this  matter  was  discussed  at  all  before  the  open 
ing  of  the  campaign,  certainly  not  by  me,  who  would 
have  been  restrained  by  motives  of  delicacy,  if  by  no 
other,  from  mentioning  it.  But  in  fact  my  ambition  was 
then  limited  to  fighting  well  and  successfully  with  the 
single  corps  under  my  command.  It  was  only  after  ex 
perience  had  drawn  attention  more  pointedly  to  the  evils 
resulting  from  faulty  organization,  and  success  had  in 
spired  legitimate  confidence,  that  this  subject  became 
matter  of  much  thought  and  some  discussion. 

But  this  faulty  organization  continued  to  the  end  of 
the  Atlanta  campaign,  and  was,  as  I  think  will  clearly 
appear,  one  of  the  causes  of  many  of  the  partial  failures 
or  imperfect  successes  that  characterized  our  operations. 
General  Thomas's  command  often  proved  unwieldy  and 
slow  from  being  larger  than  one  man  could  handle  in  a 
rough  and  in  many  places  densely  wooded  country, 
while  the  others  were  frequently  too  small  for  the  work 
to  be  done.  It  was  often  attempted  to  remedy  this  de 
fect  by  ordering  a  division  or  corps  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  to  "cooperate  with"  or  "support"  one  of 
the  others  in  making  an  attack ;  but  military  experience 
has  shown  that  "cooperate"  and  "support"  mean,  in 
general,  to  do  nothing  effective.  The  corps  command- 


124  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ers,  generally,  not  being  in  the  habit  of  acting  indepen 
dently,  and  not  being  in  direct  communication  with  the 
general-in-chief,  and  hence  not  familiar  with  his  plans 
and  views,  would  not  act  with  the  necessary  promptness 
or  vigor;  and  not  regarding  themselves  as  absolutely 
under  the  orders  of  the  general  they  were  directed  to 
support,  they  would  not  obey  his  orders  or  requests  un 
less  they  were  in  accord  with  their  own  views ;  while  one 
of  these  corps  commanders,  General  Sherman  says,  mani 
fested  an  ambition  to  get  one  of  the  separate  armies  un 
der  his  command  and  win  a  victory  on  his  "  own  hook." 
But  General  Sherman  fails  to  state  that  he  encouraged 
all  this  by  his  own  now  well-known  erroneous  opinion 
upon  the  question  of  the  relative  rank  of  army  and  corps 
commanders ;  that  this  vital  question  was  evaded  until 
its  decision  in  a  special  case — that  of  Stanley  and  Scho- 
field — became  absolutely  necessary,  and  was  then  decided 
erroneously,  the  error  resulting  in  failure  and  great  dis 
appointment  to  Sherman.  Had  this  question  been  de 
cided  at  an  early  day  according  to  the  plain  import  of 
the  law,  as  was  afterward  done  by  the  War  Department, 
and  orders  given  to  corps  commanders  to  obey  instead 
of  "cooperate"  or  "support,"  much  trouble  would  have 
been  avoided. 

First  among  the  most  important  events  of  the  At 
lanta  campaign  were  the  operations  about  Dalton  and 
Eesaca.  Here  I  have  always  thought  General  Sherman 
committed  the  mistake,  so  common  in  war  (and,  as  I  be 
lieve,  not  infrequently  afterward  committed  by  himself 
and  others  in  the  Union  armies),  of  assigning  to  too 
small  a  force  the  main  attack  upon  the  vital  point  of  an 
enemy's  position.  McPherson  had  only  about  22,000  in 
fantry,  while  Sherman  estimated  Johnston's  force  at  about 
60,000.  Thomas's  position  in  front  of  Rocky-face  Ridge 
was  virtually  as  unassailable  as  that  of  Johnston  be 
hind  it.  The  only  weak  point  of  our  position  was  that 


MCPHERSON'S  TASK  AT  RESACA  125 

of  two  divisions  of  the  Twenty- third  Corps  on  our  left, 
north  of  Dalton.  Had  these  divisions  been  attacked,  as 
Sherman  apprehended,  they  might  have  suffered  severely, 
but  would  have  drawn  off  force  enough  from  the  enemy 
to  increase  largely  the  probabilities  of  success  in  the 
attack  in  Johnston's  rear.  One  half  of  Sherman's  in 
fantry  was  ample  for  the  demonstration  in  front  of  Dal 
ton.  At  least  one  half  should  have  been  sent  through 
Snake  Creek  G-ap  to  strike  the  enemy's  rear.  There  was 
no  necessity  to  attack  Resaca  at  all,  and  experience  has 
shown  what  terrible  losses  a  small  force  in  a  strongly 
fortified  position  may  inflict  upon  a  very  large  attacking 
force.  Two  or  three  brigades  could  have  invested  Re 
saca,  with  the  garrison  it  then  held,  while  a  force  large 
enough  to  hold  its  ground  against  Johnston's  whole  army 
could  have  been  put  upon  the  railroad  between  Resaca 
and  Dalton.  The  result  would  then,  in  all  probability, 
have  been  what  Sherman  expected.  Indeed,  the  fate  of 
Johnston's  army  might  perhaps  have  been  decided  then 
and  there. 

Sherman  certainly  cannot  be  suspected  of  wishing  to 
do  injustice  to  the  memory  of  McPherson,  for  he  loved 
and  respected  him  most  highly,  and  mourned  his  death 
with  evident  sincerity.  But  I  think  he  is  in  error  in 
saying  that  "  at  the  critical  moment  McPherson  seems  to 
have  been  a  little  timid."  I  believe  the  error  was  Sher 
man's,  not  McPherson's;  that  McPherson  was  correct  in 
his  judgment,  which  certainly  was  mine  (after  passing 
over  the  same  ground  and  fighting  the  battle  of  Resaca), 
that  his  force  was  entirely  too  small  for  the  work  assigned 
it.  I  had  not  the  same  opportunity  General  Sherman 
had  of  judging  of  McPherson's  qualities  as  a  commander; 
but  I  knew  him  well  and  intimately,  having  sat  upon  the 
same  bench  with  him  at  West  Point  for  four  years,  and 
been  his  room-mate  for  a  year  and  a  half.  His  was  the 
most  completely  balanced  mind  and  character  with  which 


126  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

I  have  ever  been  intimately  acquainted,  although  he  did 
not  possess  in  a  very  high  degree  the  power  of  invention 
or  originality  of  thought.  His  personal  courage  seemed 
to  amount  to  unconsciousness  of  danger,  while  his  care 
of  his  troops  cannot,  I  believe,  be  justly  characterized 
otherwise  than  as  wise  prudence.  I  consider  this  to  be 
only  a  just  tribute  to  the  memory  of  the  nearest  and 
dearest  friend  of  my  youth. 

If  McPherson  had  commanded  one  third  of  the  army, 
he  might,  with  a  corps  of  Thomas's  army  in  close  sup 
port,  have  felt  strong  enough  to  occupy  and  hold  a  posi 
tion  between  Dalton  and  Eesaca.  As  it  was,  Thomas 
should  have  followed  close  upon  his  rear  through  Snake 
Creek  Gap,  with  two  corps.  The  distance  between  the 
two  wings  of  the  army  would  have  been  so  short  and 
the  ground  between  them  so  impassable  to  the  enemy 
as  to  give  us  practically  a  continuous  line  of  battle, 
and  Thomas's  two  corps  in  the  valley  of  the  Connasauga 
near  Tilton  would  have  been  in  far  better  position  to 
strike  the  retreating  enemy  when  he  was  compelled  to 
let  go  of  Dalton,  than  they  were  in  front  of  Rocky-face 
Ridge.  Impartial  history  must,  I  believe,  hold  Sherman 
himself  mainly  responsible  for  the  failure  to  realize  his 
expectations  in  the  first  movement  against  Johnston. 

It  seems  at  least  probable  that  at  the  beginning  of 
the  movement  against  Dalton,  Sherman  did  not  fully  un 
derstand  the  character  of  the  enemy's  position ;  for  his 
plan  clearly  appears  to  have  been  to  make  the  main 
attack  in  front  at  the  moment  Johnston  should  be 
compelled  to  let  go  from  his  stronghold  by  reason  of 
McPherson's  operations  in  his  rear;  while  McPherson, 
after  breaking  the  railroad  and  then  falling  back  for  se 
curity  to  the  Gap,  should  strike  Johnston  in  flank  during 
the  confusion  of  retreat. 

The  nature  of  the  position  rendered  this  plan  imprac 
ticable  for  producing  any  important  result.  Had  McPher- 


MCPHERSON'S  TASK  AT  RESACA          127 

son  broken  the  road  ever  so  "good"  and  then  fallen  back 
to  the  Gap  as  ordered,  Johnston  could  have  moved  his 
main  army  to  Resaca  that  night,  and  at  daylight  the 
next  morning  Sherman  would  have  found  in  the  enemy's 
trenches  at  Dalton  only  a  skirmish-line  which  would 
have  leisurely  retreated  before  him  to  the  new  position 
at  Eesaca.  The  result  would  have  been  essentially  the 
same  as  that  which  was  actually  accomplished. 

Indeed,  as  it  now  seems  clearly  to  appear  to  General 
Sherman,  the  only  possible  mode  of  striking  an  effective 
blow  at  Dalton  was  to  capture  Resaca  or  seize  and  hold 
a  point  on  the  road  in  rear  of  Dalton,  and  not  to  break 
the  road  and  fall  back  as  McPherson  was  ordered  to  do. 
If  Sherman  had  seen  this  clearly  at  the  time,  it  is  incon 
ceivable  that  he  would  have  sent  less  than  one  fourth  of 
his  army  to  execute  the  all-important  part  of  the  plan. 
And  he  now  judges  McPherson  as  manifesting  timidity1 
because  he  did  not  at  the  critical  moment  attempt  to  ac 
complish,  with  his  comparatively  small  force,  what  Sher 
man  should  have  ordered  to  be  done  by  a  much  larger 
force. 

A  very  bold,  independent  commander  might  have  at 
tempted,  whether  successful  or  not,  what  Sherman  thinks 
McPherson  ought  to  have  done  at  Resaca ;  and,  as  Sher 
man  says,  such  an  opportunity  does  not  occur  twice  in 
the  life  of  any  man.  But  McPherson  was  a  subordinate 
in  spirit  as  well  as  in  fact,  and  cannot  fairly  be  charged 
with  timidity  for  not  attempting  what  he  was  not  or 
dered  to  do,  and  what,  in  fact,  was  no  part  of  the  plans 
of  his  superior  so  far  as  they  were  indicated  in  his  orders. 

If  McPherson  had  assaulted  Resaca,  it  is  possible,  but 
only  possible,  that  he  might  have  succeeded.  There  were 
some  cases  during  the  Civil  War  where  intrenchments 
hastily  constructed  and  imperfectly  defended  were  car- 

!In  the  revised  edition,  Vol.  II,  p.  34,  General  Sherman  substitutes 
" cautious"  for  "timid." 


128  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ried  by  assault;  many  more  where  the  assault  failed;  and, 
I  believe,  not  one  case  where  intrenchments  carefully 
prepared  in  advance,  with  obstructions  in  front,  and  de 
fended  by  a  force  commensurate  with  the  extent  of  the 
line,  like  those  at  Resaca,  were  successfully  assaulted. 

It  is  true  that  McPherson's  force  was  vastly  superior 
to  the  single  brigade  that  held  Resaca  that  day,  but  that 
practically  amounts  to  nothing.  A  single  division  would 
have  been  as  good  for  such  an  assault  as  two  corps.  Be 
yond  a  reasonable  proportion,  say  of  three  or  four  to 
one,  numbers  amount  to  nothing  in  making  such  an  as 
sault.  It  would  be  physically  possible  for  numbers  to 
succeed  in  such  a  case  if  their  immediate  commander 
was  willing  to  sacrifice  them  and  they  were  willing  to  be 
sacrificed.  But  considering  the  general  unwillingness 
among  commanders  and  men  to  sacrifice  or  to  be  sacri 
ficed  beyond  what  seems  to  them  a  reasonable  expenditure 
of  life  for  the  object  to  be  gained,  success  is  morally  im 
possible,  or  very  nearly  so,  in  an  assault  such  as  would 
have  been  required  to  capture  Resaca  on  May  9,  1864. 
Clearly,  such  an  assault  should  not  be  attempted  except 
as  the  only  chance  of  victory ;  and  then  the  subordinate 
officers  and  men  should  be  clearly  informed  precisely  what 
they  are  expected  to  do,  and  made  to  understand  the  ne 
cessity  for  so  great  and  unusual  a  sacrifice.  In  that  case 
brave  and  true  men  will  make  the  sacrifice  required,  pro 
vided  their  pluck  holds  out  long  enough;  and  that  no 
man  is  wise  enough  to  predict,  even  of  himself,  much 
less  of  a  large  number  of  men. 

The  only  chance  of  success  was  to  invest  Resaca  on 
the  west  and  north,  and  put  between  the  investing  line 
and  Dalton  troops  enough  to  hold  their  ground  against 
the  main  body  of  Johnston's  army ;  and  this  must  have 
been  done  in  a  single  day,  starting  from  the  debouche  of 
Snake  Creek  Grap,  the  troops  moving  by  a  single,  com 
mon  country  road.  Johnston's  whole  army,  except  a 


MCPHEESON'S  TASK  AT  RESACA          129 

small  rear-guard,  would  by  the  use  of  three  roads  have 
been  in  position  to  attack  McPherson  at  dawn  of  day  the 
next  morning,  while  the  main  body  of  Sherman's  army 
was  far  away  on  the  other  side  of  Rocky-face.  Or  if 
McPherson  had  not  held  the  entire  natural  position  as 
far  east  as  the  Connasauga  River,  Johnston  could  have 
passed  round  him  in  the  night.  It  seems  to  me  certain 
that  McPherson's  force  was  too  small  to  have  taken  and 
held  that  position.  Indeed  it  does  not  seem  at  all  cer 
tain  that,  however  large  his  force  might  have  been,  he 
could  have  put  troops  enough  in  position  before  night  to 
accomplish  the  object  of  cutting  off  Johnston's  retreat. 
The  case  was  analogous  to  that  of  Hood's  crossing  Duck 
River  in  November  of  that  year,  and  trying  to  cut  off 
our  retreat  at  Spring  Hill.  There  was  simply  not  time 
enough  to  do  it  in  that  one  day,  and  if  not  done  in  one 
day  it  could  not  be  done  at  all. 

So  that  it  does  not  seem  at  all  certain  that  this,  which 
was  "  Thomas's  plan  "  to  throw  the  entire  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  on  the  road  in  Johnston's  rear  and  thus  cut 
off  his  retreat,  would  have  succeeded  any  better  than 
Sherman's,  yet  it  gave  greater  promise  of  success,  and 
therefore  ought  to  have  been  tried.  It  is  at  least  prob 
able  that  Johnston's  view  of  the  case  (see  his  "Narra 
tive,"  pages  15,  16,  17)  is  the  correct  one :  that,  with  his 
thorough  knowledge  of  the  ground,  ample  roads,  and 
means  of  early  information,  together  with  our  ignorance 
of  the  ground  and  our  extremely  deficient  roads,  he  could 
have  defeated  any  possible  attempt  to  cut  him  off  from 
Resaca. 

To  illustrate  the  faulty  system  of  organization  and 
command  which  characterized  the  Atlanta  campaign,  I 
will  now  refer  to  an  incident  of  the  operations  about 
Dallas,  it  being  next  in  order  of  date  of  those  I  wish  to 
consider.  General  Sherman  does  not  allude  to  it  at  all 
in  his  "  Memoirs." 


130  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN   THE  ARMY 

Near  the  close  of  the  operations  about  Dallas,  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  was  moved  to  our  left,  under  in 
structions  from  General  Sherman  to  endeavor  to  strike 
the  enemy's  right  flank.  A  division  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  ordered  to  "  support "  the  Twenty-third 
Corps.  There  were  no  roads  available,  and  the  country 
was  in  the  main  densely  wooded.  The  head  of  the  col 
umn  was  directed  by  the  compass  toward  a  point  where 
our  maps,  the  general  topography  of  the  country,  and  the 
enemy's  known  position  indicated  that  his  right  must 
probably  rest.  After  a  laborious  march  through  dense 
undergrowth,  during  which  our  skirmish-line  was  lost  in 
the  woods  and  another  deployed  to  replace  it,  we  struck 
an  intrenched  line  strongly  held,  and  a  sharp  action 
ensued.  The  Twenty-third  Corps  was  deployed  as  far  to 
the  left  as  possible,  and  the  skirmishers  reported  that 
they  had  reached  the  extremity  of  the  enemy's  intrenched 
line,  but  could  not  overlap  it.  At  this  moment  the  divi 
sion  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  came  up  in  splendid 
style,  and  massed  immediately  in  rear  of  our  left,  in  "close 
supporting  distance,"  and  under  a  pretty  heavy  fire.  I 
first  sent  a  staff  officer  and  then  went  myself  to  the 
division  commander,  explained  the  situation,  and  asked 
him  to  put  in  a  brigade  on  my  left  and  turn  the  enemy's 
flank  so  as  to  give  us  a  footing  beyond  his  parapet.  He 
replied  that  he  was  ordered  by  General  Thomas  only  to 
" support"  me,  and  that  he  would  do  no  more.  The  day 
was  already  far  advanced,  and  before  I  could  bring  troops 
from  another  part  of  my  line  darkness  came  on,  and  the 
action  ended  for  the  day.  By  the  next  morning  I  had 
brought  another  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to 
the  flank,  and  General  Sherman  arrived  on  the  ground. 
By  his  personal  orders  this  division  was  pushed  straight 
through  the  woods  to  a  point  in  the  enemy's  rear,  on 
the  road  leading  from  Dallas  to  Acworth,  which  point  it 
reached  without  any  opposition,  and  there  intrenched. 


EXAMPLE  OF  THE  WORKING  OF  A  FAULTY  SYSTEM 

That  night  Johnston  abandoned  his  lines.  An  inspection 
of  the  enemy's  intrenchments  demonstrated  that  our 
skirmishers  were  right,  and  that  a  single  brigade  on  our 
left  would  have  been  ample  to  turn  the  enemy's  flank 
and  open  the  way  to  victory.  The  above  facts  were 
immediately  reported  to  Sherman  and  Thomas.  I  do 
not  know  what  action,  if  any,  was  taken  upon  them. 

I  refer  to  this  incident,  not  as  especially  affecting  the 
military  reputation  of  any  officer  one  way  or  the  other, 
but  to  illustrate  the  working  of  a  faulty  system.  Under 
proper  organization  and  discipline,  any  division  com 
mander  could  hardly  have  failed  with  that  fine  division 
to  do  all  that  was  desired  of  him  that  day.  I  believe 
that  division  commander's  commission  as  major-general 
of  volunteers  was  anterior  in  date  to  mine,  and  he,  no 
doubt,  with  General  Sherman  and  some  others,  thought 
he  was  not  subject  to  my  orders. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

SHERMAN'S  DISPLEASURE  WITH  HOOKER  GROWING  OUT  OF 
THE  AFFAIR  AT  KOLB'S  FARM  —  HOOKER'S  DESPATCH 
EVIDENTLY  MISINTERPRETED  —  A  CONVERSATION  WITH 
JAMES  B.  MCPHERSON  OVER  THE  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE 
RANK  —  ENCOURAGING  JOHN  B.  HOOD  TO  BECOME  A 
SOLDIER — VISIT  TO  THE  CAMP  OF  FRANK  P.  BLAIR,  JR. 

—  ANECDOTE  OF  SHERMAN  AND  HOOKER  UNDER  FIRE  — 
THE  ASSAULT  ON  KENESAW  —  TENDENCY  OF  VETERAN 
TROOPS  —  THE  DEATH  OF  McPHERSON  BEFORE  ATLANTA 

—  SHERMAN'S  ERROR  IN  A  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK. 

IN  the  affair  at  Kolb's  Farm,  on  June  22,  Hascall's  divi 
sion  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  was  abreast  of  and  con 
necting  with  Hooker's  right,  while  his  advance-guard  was 
many  yards  in  advance  of  the  line,  when  the  enemy's 
attack  at  the  Kolb  House  began.  The  first  attack  fell 
upon  this  advance-guard,  the  14th  Kentucky  Volunteers, 
which  gallantly  held  its  ground  until  twice  ordered  to  re 
tire  and  join  the  main  line.  In  the  meantime  Hascall's 
line  had  been  formed  in  prolongation  of  Hooker's  and 
covered  with  the  usual  hastily  constructed  parapets,  and 
three  brigades  of  Cox's  division  had  been  ordered  for 
ward  to  protect  Hascall's  right.  The  attack  was  repulsed 
with  ease,  and  there  was  no  ground  for  apprehension 
about  the  safety  of  my  immediate  flank,  much  less  of 
Hooker's,  after  the  arrival  of  Cox's  division,  which  oc 
curred  before  the  hour  of  Hooker's  signal-despatch  to 
Sherman  expressing  anxiety  about  our  extreme  right. 
On  the  following  morning  we  reoccupied  the  ground 

132 


SHERMAN'S  DISPLEASURE  WITH  HOOKER  133 

held  by  the  14th  Kentucky  at  the  opening  of  the  engage 
ment,  and  not  only  did  I  offer  to  show  General  Sherman 
that  the  dead  of  my  "  advance  division  were  lying  far 
ther  out  than  any  of  Hooker's,"  but  he  actually  rode 
with  me  over  the  ground,  and  saw  the  dead  of  the  14th 
Kentucky  lying  in  advance  of  Hooker's  picket-line. 

My  impression  is  that  Hooker,  in  his  signal-despatch 
of  5:30  P.  M.,  saying,  "We  have  repulsed  two  heavy  at 
tacks,  and  feel  confident,  our  only  apprehension  being 
for  our  extreme  right  flank.  Three  entire  corps  are  in 
front  of  us,"1  meant  by  "our  extreme  right  flank"  not 
his  own  right,  but  mine — that  is,  the  extreme  right  of  the 
entire  line ;  for  at  the  time  of  that  despatch  nearly  my 
whole  corps  was  'strongly  posted  on  Hooker's  right,  and 
was  well  "  refused,"  forming  a  strong  right  flank.  This 
G-eneral  Hooker  well  knew.  But  the  Sandtown  Road 
leading  to  our  rear,  on  which  Cox's  division  had  been 
posted  until  Johnston's  attack  made  it  necessary  to  close 
him  up  on  Hascall,  was  now  less  strongly  guarded.  I 
believe  that  General  Hooker  had  conceived  the  idea,  as 
indicated  by  his  despatch  to  Sherman,  that  Johnston  had 
drawn  his  main  force  from  around  Kenesaw,  and  was 
about  to  strike  our  extreme  right.  I  recollect  that  I  was 
all  the  time  on  the  watch  for  such  a  blow,  but  relied 
upon  my  cavalry  to  give  me  some  warning  of  it,  and 
made  it  a  rule  to  be  always  as  well  prepared  for  it  as  I 
could.  Being  habitually  on  the  flank,  I  had  got  used  to 
that  sort  of  thing,  while  Hooker,  having  been  habitually 
in  the  center  with  his  flanks  well  protected,  was  more 
nervous  about  having  them  exposed.  At  all  events,  I  did 
not  regard  the  situation  at  the  Kolb  House  as  anything 
unusual,  and  did  not  think  of  mentioning  it  in  such  a 
light  to  General  Sherman ;  while  General  Hooker,  with 
a  sort  of  paternal  feeling  of  seniority,  may  have  thought 
it  his  duty  to  take  care  of  the  whole  right  wing  of  the 

i  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXVIII,  part  iv,  p.  558. 


134  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

army,  and  to  advise  the  general-in-chief  of  the  supposed 
danger  to  our  "  extreme  right  flank." 

There  occurred  on  that  occasion  one  of  those  little  and 
seemingly  trifling  incidents  which  never  escape  the  mem 
ory,  and  are  always  a  source  of  pride,  especially  to  those 
who  are  comparatively  young.  When  Sherman  read 
Hooker's  despatch,  which  he  interpreted  as  meaning  that 
my  corps  was  not  in  position  to  protect  Hooker's  flank, 
he  said  in  substance,  if  not  literally,  and  with  great  em 
phasis  :  "  That  is  not  true.  I  sent  Schofield  an  order  to 
be  there.  I  know  he  received  the  order,  for  his  initials, 
in  his  own  hand,  are  on  the  envelop  which  the  orderly 
brought  back,  and  I  know  he  is  there.  Hooker's  state 
ment  is  false."  What  a  delight  it  was  to  execute  the 
orders  of  a  chief  who  manifested  such  confidence ! 

I  do  not  remember  that  I  was  "very  angry"  about 
Hooker's  despatch,  as  General  Sherman  says  (Vol.  II,  page 
59),  though  I  think  Sherman  was.  Indeed,  he  had  more 
reason  to  be  angry  than  I ;  for  the  fact,  and  evidence  of 
it,  were  so  plain  that  the  Twenty- third  Corps  had  done  its 
duty  as  ordered,  that  if  Hooker's  despatch  was  meant  to 
imply  the  contrary,  which  I  doubt,  that  was  a  cause  of 
anger  to  the  general-in-chief,  whom  he  had  unnecessa 
rily  alarmed,  rather  than  to  me,  who  had  no  apprehen 
sion  of  being  suspected  by  the  general-in-chief  of  having 
failed  in  my  duty. 

In  fact,  I  do  not  recollect  having  seen  Hooker's  despatch 
at  all  until  I  saw  it  quoted  in  Sherman's  "  Memoirs."  My 
recollection  is  that  Sherman  told  me,  on  his  visiting  us 
the  next  day,  that  he  had  received  during  the  battle  a 
despatch  from  Hooker  to  the  effect  that  his  flank  was  un 
protected.  In  reply  to  this  I  explained  to  General  Sher 
man  where  my  troops  had  been  during  the  engagement, 
and  showed  him  the  dead  of  the  14th  Kentucky  lying  on 
the  advanced  ground  they  had  held  while  Hascall's  divi 
sion  was  forming.  I  believe  that  if  I  had  seen  Hooker's 


HOOKER'S  DESPATCH  EVIDENTLY  MISINTERPRETED    135 

despatch  at  the  time,  I  should  have  interpreted  it  then,  as 
I  do  now,  as  referring,  not  to  his  immediate  right,  but  to 
the  extreme  right  of  the  line.  I  do  not  recollect  any 
words,  "pretty  sharp "  or  otherwise,  between  General 
Hooker  and  myself  on  that  subject,  and  do  not  believe  it 
was  ever  mentioned  between  us.  In  short,  I  do  not  think 
I  was  present  at  the  interview  in  the  "  little  church  "  de 
scribed  by  General  Sherman  (Sherman's  "  Memoirs,"  Vol. 
II,  page  59).  I  have  an  impression  that  General  Hascall 
was  there,  and  that  it  is  to  him  General  Sherman  refers. 
I  believe  the  Kolb  House  difficulty  was  almost  entirely  a 
misapprehension  between  General  Sherman  and  General 
Hooker.  Why  this  mistake  was  not  explained  at  the  time 
or  afterward  I  do  not  know,  unless  it  was  that  the  feelings 
of  those  two  gentlemen  toward  each  other  were  unfavor 
able  to  any  such  explanation. 

I  will  add  that  General  Hooker  and  I  were  together 
both  before  and  after  the  opening  of  the  Kolb  House  en 
gagement.  He  knew  perfectly  well  where  my  troops  were, 
and  what  they  were  doing,  and  it  seems  to  me  utterly 
impossible  that  he  can  have  meant  by  his  despatch  what 
General  Sherman  understood  it  to  mean. 

My  despatches  of  that  date  to  Sherman  show  that  I  had 
no  special  apprehension  even  in  respect  to  our  extreme 
right  flank,  and  that  I  doubted  the  report  that  one  whole 
corps  was  in  our  front. 

My  orders  on  that  day1  show  that  Hascall  was  up  with 
Hooker  at  the  intersection  of  the  Marietta  and  Powder 
Spring  roads,  near  the  Kolb  House,  as  early  as  3  p.  M., 
and  that  Cox  was  ordered  up  with  three  brigades  at  4:15 
p.  M.,  before  the  assault  began.  Cox  arrived  with  the  head 
of  his  column  during  the  enemy's  attack,  and  was  directed 
by  me  in  person  where  and  how  to  put  his  troops  in  po 
sition.  Hence  I  think  I  must  be  right  in  the  inference 
that  in  Hooker's  despatch  to  Sherman  of  5 : 30  P.  M.,  the 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXVII,  part  iv,  pp.  566  and  568. 


136  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

words  "  our  extreme  right  flank "  must  have  been  in 
tended  to  refer  to  my  extreme  right,  and  not  Ms.  He 
was  simply  unduly  apprehensive  for  the  safety  of  the  ex 
treme  right  flank  of  the  army,  not  of  his  own  corps  in 
particular.  My  report  to  General  Sherman  at  9  p.  M. 
simply  shows  that  I  did  not  share  that  apprehension ; 
that,  instead  of  believing  there  were  "  three  entire  corps 
in  front  of  us,"  I  doubted  whether  there  was  even  all  of 
Hood's  corps. 

Greneral  Hooker's  habit  of  swinging  off  from  the  rest  of 
G-eneral  Thomas's  army,  and  getting  possession  of  roads 
designated  for  McPherson  or  for  me,  was  a  common  sub 
ject  of  remark  between  Sherman,  Thomas,  McPherson, 
and  myself;  and  his  motive  was  understood  to  be,  as  G-en 
eral  Sherman  states,  to  get  command  of  one  of  the  armies, 
in  the  event  of  battle,  by  virtue  of  his  senior  commission. 
But  the  subject  was  never  mentioned  between  Greneral 
Hooker  and  me,  and  he  never  even  approximated  to  giv 
ing  me  an  order.  No  doubt  he  entertained  the  opinion 
that  he  would  have  a  right  to  give  orders  to  either  Gen 
eral  McPherson  or  myself  under  certain  circumstances 
likely  to  arise,  for  General  Sherman  entertained  the  same 
opinion.  What  General  Thomas  thought  on  the  question 
I  never  knew.  My  own  opinion  and  McPherson's  were 
decidedly  the  contrary. 

In  the  final  movement  which  resulted  in  the  with 
drawal  of  Johnston's  army  from  Kenesaw,  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  passed  by  the  right  flank  of  my  infantry 
line  along  the  famous  Sandtown  Road.  While  this  was 
going  on,  McPherson  and  I  sat  on  our  horses  together 
a  long  time,  observing  the  movement  and  renewing  the 
familiar  intercourse  of  our  youth.  We  had  a  long  and 
free  conversation  on  a  great  variety  of  subjects  —  a  rare 
opportunity  for  commanders,  even  in  the  same  army, 
where  their  troops  were  generally  from  ten  to  twenty 
miles  apart  in  line  of  battle.  One  of  the  first  subjects 


CONVERSATION  OVER  THE  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK   137 

that  came  up  was  that  question  of  relative  rank;  for 
our  troops  had  "  met w  and  were  then  "  doing  duty  to 
gether,"  in  the  language  of  the  old  article  of  war.  But 
the  subject  was  quickly  dismissed  with  the  remark,  made 
almost  simultaneously  by  both,  that  such  a  question 
could  not  possibly  cause  any  difficulty  between  us.  Mc- 
Pherson  had  the  senior  commission  of  major-general,  and 
I  the  senior  assignment  as  army  commander.  Perhaps  it 
would  have  puzzled  even  Halleck  to  frame  a  satisfactory 
decision  in  that  peculiar  case.  I  had  long  before  deter 
mined  what  my  decision  would  be  if  that  question  ever 
became  a  practical  one  between  McPherson  and  myself 
on  the  field  of  battle.  I  would  have  said,  in  substance 
at  least :  "  Mac,  just  tell  me  what  you  want  me  to  do." 

As  we  sat  together  that  day,  McPherson  confided  to 
me  the  secret  of  his  marriage  engagement,  for  the  pur 
pose,  as  he  stated,  of  inquiring  whether,  in  my  opinion, 
he  could  before  long  find  a  chance  to  go  home  and  get 
married.  I  told  him  I  thought  that  after  the  capture  of 
Altanta  operations  would  be  suspended  long  enough  for 
that.  But  my  dear  and  noble  friend  was  killed  in  the 
next  great  battle.  After  Atlanta  had  fallen  I  went  home, 
as  McPherson  would  doubtless  have  done  if  he  had  lived ; 
but  our  common  friend  and  classmate  Hood  cut  the  visit 
so  short  that  there  would  have  been  little  time  for  mar 
riage  festivities. 

McPherson,  among  other  high  qualities,  was  one  of  the 
most  generous  men  I  ever  knew.  He  was  remarkably 
skilful  in  topographical  drawing,  etching,  lettering,  and 
all  other  uses  of  the  pen.  Although  at  the  head  of  the 
class  and  a  most  conscientious  student  whose  time  was 
very  valuable  to  himself,  he  would  spend  a  very  large 
part  of  that  precious  time  in  "  lettering w  problems  for 
classmates  who  needed  such  help.  For  this  reason  and 
others  he  was,  by  common  consent  of  all  the  classes,  the 
most  popular  man  in  the  corps.  I  could  not  compete 


138  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

with  "  Mac "  at  all  in  the  lettering  business,  but  I  tried 
to  follow  his  good  example,  in  my  own  way,  by  helping 
the  boys  over  knotty  points  in  "math  "  and  "  phil."  I  had 
taught  district  school  one  winter  before  going  to  West 
Point,  and  hence  had  acquired  the  knack  of  explaining 
things. 

Hood  was  not  well  up  in  mathematics.  The  first  part 
of  the  course  especially  he  found  very  hard — so  much  so 
that  he  became  discouraged.  After  the  unauthorized  fes 
tivities  of  Christmas,  particularly,  he  seemed  much  de 
pressed.  On  the  26th  he  asked  me  which  I  would  prefer 
to  be,  "an  officer  of  the  army  or  a  farmer  in  Kentucky?" 
I  replied  in  a  way  which  aroused  his  ambition  to  accom 
plish  what  he  had  set  out  to  do  in  coming  to  West  Point, 
without  regard  to  preference  between  farming  and  soldier 
ing.  He  went  to  work  in  good  earnest,  and  passed  the 
January  examination,  though  by  a  very  narrow  margin. 
From  that  time  on  he  did  not  seem  to  have  so  much  diffi 
culty.  When  we  were  fighting  each  other  so  desperately, 
fifteen  years  later,  I  wondered  whether  Hood  remembered 
the  encouragement  I  had  given  him  to  become  a  soldier, 
and  came  very  near  thinking  once  or  twice  that  perhaps  I 
had  made  a  mistake.  But  I  do  not  believe  that  public 
enmity  ever  diminished  my  personal  regard  for  my  old 
friend  and  classmate. 

In  thinking  of  McPherson,  I  recall  an  interesting  inci 
dent  connected  with  Frank  P.  Blair,  Jr.'s  arrival  with  his 
corps  about  June  9,  referred  to  by  General  Sherman  (Vol. 
II,  page  24).  For  some  reason  we  had  an  afternoon's 
rest  the  day  after  Blair  arrived;  so  I  rode  over  to  his 
camp  —  seven  or  eight  miles,  perhaps  —  to  greet  my  old 
friend.  McPherson,  to  whose  army  Blair's  corps  be 
longed,  and  other  officers  were  there.  To  our  immense 
surprise,  Blair  had  brought  along  great  hogsheads  of  ice 
and  numerous  baskets  of  champagne,  as  if  to  increase  the 
warmth  of  our  welcome.  Of  course  we  did  not  disdain 


VISIT   TO  THE  CAMP  OF  FRANK  P.   BLAIR,  JR.          ^39 

such  an  unusual  treat  in  the  enemy's  country.  About 
sunset  McPherson  invited  me  to  visit  his  camp,  and  we 
started  off  at  full  gallop,  which  we  kept  up  all  the  way, 
yet  it  was  some  time  after  dark  when  we  reached  the 
headquarters  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  A  good 
camp  supper  was  awaiting  us,  with  jolly  young  officers  to 
make  it  merry.  It  was  not  until  supper  was  ended  that 
I  began  to  realize  the  necessity  of  a  night's  march  to  get 
back  to  my  own  camp.  As  our  infantry  line  was  twenty 
miles  long,  and  the  cavalry  stretched  it  out  on  either 
flank  as  many  more,  my  single  orderly  was  quite  suffi 
cient  protection  from  any  attack  from  the  enemy;  but  the 
Georgia  bushes,  brambles,  and  mud,  combined  with  the 
absence  of  any  known  road,  constituted  an  enemy  hard  to 
overcome.  However,  by  the  aid  of  the  compass  which  I 
have  always  carried  in  my  head  since  I  used  to  hunt  in  the 
wilds  of  the  West,  I  got  back  to  camp,  and  went  to  bed, 
taking  care  not  to  observe  the  time  of  night  by  my  watch. 
As  I  have  said,  I  was  often  much  annoyed  by  General 
Hooker's  corps  getting  possession  of  roads  which  had 
been  designated  for  mine  to  advance  upon,  thus  greatly 
delaying  my  movements.  But  it  is  but  just  to  say  that 
this  is  susceptible  of  an  explanation  much  more  creditable 
to  General  Hooker  than  that  given  by  General  Sherman. 
General  Thomas's  army  was  so  large  that  he  could  never 
get  his  three  corps  into  position  as  soon  as  expected  by 
the  use  of  the  roads  designated  for  him.  Hence,  when 
Hooker  was  not  in  advance  he  would  "  switch  off  "  and 
hunt  for  another  road  to  the  right  or  left,  and  thus  some 
times  strike  in  ahead  of  McPherson  or  me,  and  leave  us 
no  road  at  all  to  move  on.  In  fact,  the  army  was  so 
large  and  the  roads  were  so  few  that  our  movements  were 
often  painfully  slow  and  tedious,  and  General  Hooker's 
motive  may  have  been  only  to  get  ahead  and  bring  his 
corps  into  action  or  to  the  position  assigned  to  it  in 
whatever  way  he  could. 


140  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

The  first  time  I  ever  saw  General  Sherman  and  Gen 
eral  Hooker  together,  or  got  even  a  suspicion  that  their 
personal  relations  were  other  than  the  most  satisfactory, 
was  at  Resaca.  Cox's  division  had  gained  possession  of 
some  portions  of  the  enemy's  outer  works,  so  that  from  a 
bald  hill  just  in  rear  of  our  line  some  parts  of  the  main 
line  of  defense  could  be  distinctly  seen.  Upon  my  in 
forming  General  Sherman  of  this,  he  soon  appeared  on 
the  ground,  accompanied  or  closely  followed  by  a  large 
number  of  general  and  staff  officers.  Besides  Sherman, 
Thomas,  Hooker,  and  Newton,  a  score  of  others  were 
there,  all  eager  to  see  what  they  could  of  the  now  famous 
stronghold  which  McPherson  had  refrained  from  assault 
ing.  I  led  them  to  the  hill,  on  which  a  few  dead  trees 
were  still  standing,  and  from  which  the  much-desired 
view  could  be  obtained.  Of  course  all  were  on  foot,  yet 
they  were  too  numerous  not  to  attract  the  attention  of 
the  enemy.  Very  soon  the  sound  of  musketry  in  front, 
then  not  very  heavy,  was  varied  by  the  sharp  explosion 
of  a  shell  overhead,  and  fragments  of  branches  of  dead 
trees  came  falling  all  around.  A  general  "  scatteration  " 
occurred  in  all  directions  save  one.  Newton  and  I,  who 
were  conversing  at  the  time,  quietly  stepped  aside  a  few 
paces  out  of  the  line  of  fire,  where  we  were  much  safer 
than  we  would  have  been  in  full  retreat,  and  then  turned 
round  to  see  what  had  become  of  our  companions.  All 
save  two  had  disappeared,  even  Thomas  having  aban 
doned  the  field,  probably  for  the  first  and  only  time  in 
his  life.  But  still  there,  on  the  bald  hill,  in  full  view 
of  the  hostile  artillery,  were  the  two  already  highly  dis 
tinguished  generals,  Sherman  and  Hooker,  both  alike 
famous  for  supreme  courage,  striding  round  the  ground, 
appearing  to  look  at  nothing  in  particular  and  not  con 
versing  with  each  other,  but  seeming  at  least  a  foot  taller 
than  usual,  each  waiting  for  the  other  to  lead  off  in  re 
treat.  After  quite  a  long  continuance  of  this  little  drama, 


ANECDOTE  OF  SHERMAN  AND  HOOKER  UNDER  FIRE 

which  greatly  entertained  Newton  and  me,  the  two  great 
soldiers,  as  if  by  some  mysterious  impulse, — for  they  did 
not  speak  a  word, — simultaneously  and  slowly  strode  to 
the  rear,  where  their  horses  were  held.  I  cheerfully  give 
the  "  Johnny  Rebs  "  credit  for  the  courtesy  of  not  firing 
another  shot  after  they  saw  the  effect  of  the  first,  which  I 
doubt  not  was  intended  only  as  a  gentle  hint  that  such 
impudence  in  Yankees  was  not  to  be  tolerated.  Yet  a 
single  shell  from  the  same  direction, — probably  from  the 
same  battery, — when  we  were  moving  into  action  that 
morning,  exploded  near  my  head,  and  killed  the  aide  who 
was  riding  behind  me.1  My  too  numerous  staff  and  es 
cort  had  attracted  attention.  I  had  at  Dalton  a  few  days 
before  forbade  the  staff  and  escort  to  follow  me  into  ac 
tion,  unless  specially  ordered  to  do  so ;  but  they  had  not  so 
soon  learned  the  lesson  which  the  sad  casualty  at  Resaca 
taught  them.  It  was  then  early  in  the  campaign.  Later, 
both  generals  and  orderlies  had  learned  to  restrain  some 
what  their  curiosity  and  their  too  thoughtless  bravery. 
The  perfect  old  soldier  has  learned  to  economize  the  life 
and  strength  of  men,  including  his  own,  with  somewhat 
the  same  care  that  he  does  those  of  artillery  horses  and 
transportation  mules.  It  is  only  the  young  soldier  who 
does  not  know  the  difference  between  husbanding  the 
national  resources  and  showing  cowardice  in  face  of  the 
enemy. 

At  Wilson's  Creek,  where  the  brave  Lyon  was  killed 
in  August,  1861,  and  where  the  gallant  volunteers  on  both 
sides  had  fought  with  almost  unexampled  courage,  stand 
ing  up  to  their  work  all  the  time,  until  one  third  of  their 
numbers  were  killed  or  wounded,  and  their  forty  rounds 

1  Captain  A.  H.  Engle,   who  was  leaving  camp,  Captain  Engle  made 

killed  at  Resaca,  was  a  most  charm-  out    all    his    accounts    and    handed 

ing  and  talented  youth,  only  twenty  them,  with  the  money  for  which  he 

years  of  age.     That  was  his  first  bat-  was    responsible,    to    another    staff 

tie.   He  was  caterer  of  the  headquar-  officer,  saying  he  was  going  to  be 

ters   mess.      That    morning,   before  killed  that  day. 


142  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN   THE  ARMY 

of  ammunition  gone,  the  little  companies  of  old,  regular 
Indian-fighters  had  been  deployed  as  skirmishers  in  close 
order,  behind  trees  and  bushes  and  hillocks,  and  had  suf 
fered  comparatively  small  losses.  The  following  colloquy 
occurred  between  one  of  them  and  a  volunteer  whose 
cartridge-box,  as  he  was  proud  to  show,  was  empty. 
Volunteer:  "How  many  shots  did  you  fire?"  Old  sol 
dier  (looking  into  his  cartridge-box) :  "I  fired  just  nine 
teen."  Volunteer:  "And  how  many  rebs  do  you  think 
you  killed ? "  Old  soldier :  "I  guess  I  killed  about  nine 
teen." 

One  beautiful,  quiet  Sunday  afternoon,  in  front  of  At 
lanta,  when  even  the  pickets  were  respecting  the  Sab 
bath  day,  my  headquarters  band,  which  had  been  playing 
selections  of  sacred  music,  easily  heard  on  the  other  side 
of  the  lines,  struck  up  a  favorite  Southern  air  of  quite 
a  different  character.  Quickly  came  a  shell  crashing 
through  the  trees  far  over  our  heads.  The  band  as 
quickly  took  the  hint  and  changed  the  tune.  Such  little 
"  courtesies  "  from  our  "  friends  the  enemy  "  were  not  at 
all  uncommon  in  the  short  intervals  of  rest  from  deadly 
work. 

General  Sherman  says  in  Vol.  II,  page  60,  of  his  "  Mem 
oirs  " : 

During  the  24th  and  25th  of  June,  General  Schofield  extended 
his  right  as  far  as  prudent,  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to  thin 
out  his  lines  correspondingly,  with  the  intention  to  make  two 
strong  assaults  at  points  where  success  would  give  us  the  great 
est  advantage.  I  had  consulted  Generals  Thomas,  McPherson, 
and  Schofield,  and  we  all  agreed  that  we  could  not  with  pru 
dence  stretch  out  any  more,  and  therefore  there  was  no  alterna 
tive  but  to  attack  "  fortified  lines  " —  a  thing  carefully  avoided  up 
to  that  time. 

The  first  sentence  literally  means  that  I  extended  my 
right  "with  the  intention,"  on  my  part,  "to  make  two 


THE  ASSAULT  ON  KENESAW  143 

strong  assaults,"  etc.  But  that  is  a  mere  verbal  error. 
General  Sherman,  of  course,  meant  to  say  that  the  inten 
tion  was  his. 

The  second  sentence  is,  perhaps,  ambiguous.  At  least 
it  has  been  construed  to  mean  more  than  the  truth.  It 
is  undoubtedly  true  that  "  we  all  agreed  that  we  could 
not  with  prudence  stretch  out  any  more,"  but  we  did  not 
agree  in  the  conclusion  "  and  therefore  there  was  no  al 
ternative,"  etc. 

Indeed,  such  conclusion  was  extremely  illogical,  as  was 
demonstrated  a  few  days  later,  when  one  of  the  other 
"  alternatives  "  was  adopted  with  success.  This  success 
ful  movement  was  essentially  the  same  as  that  which  had 
been  previously  made  to  dislodge  the  enemy  from  Dai- 
ton,  and  that  by  which  Sherman's  army  had  been  trans 
ferred  from  New  Hope  Church  to  the  railroad  in  front  of 
Allatoona,  as  well  as  that  by  which  Atlanta  was  afterward 
captured.  Hence  the  existence  of  this  "alternative" 
could  not  have  been  unthought  of  by  any  of  us  at  the 
time  of  the  assault  on  Kenesaw. 

But  there  was  another  alternative  in  this  and  similar 
cases,  which  was  much  discussed  at  various  times  during 
the  campaign.  Its  practicability  can  be  judged  of  only 
upon  general  principles,  for  it  was  never  tried.  It  was  to 
detach  two  or  three  corps,  nearly  half  our  army  (which 
was  about  double  the  strength  of  the  enemy),  make  a  de 
tour  wide  enough  to  avoid  his  fortifications,  and  strike 
directly  at  his  flank  and  rear.  Such  a  movement,  it  was 
urged,  at  Dalton,  Kenesaw,  or  Atlanta  would  have  com 
pelled  Johnston  to  fight  a  battle  on  equal  terms  with  one 
half  of  Sherman's  army,  while  he  had  to  hold  his  parapets 
against  the  other  half.  Whatever  else  may  be  said  of 
this  proposed  movement,  it  would  undoubtedly  have  been 
more  hazardous  and  much  more  decisive,  one  way  or  the 
other,  than  any  of  the  plans  actually  adopted.  It  cer 
tainly  promised  success  proportionate  to  the  cost,  instead 


144          FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  a  costly  failure,  which  the  assault  of  fortified  lines  had 
almost  invariably  proved  to  be. 

I  did  not  see  Thomas  or  McPherson  for  some  days  be 
fore  the  assault,  but  I  believe  their  judgment,  like  mine, 
was  opposed  to  it.  Undoubtedly  it  was  generally  op 
posed,  though  deferentially  as  became  subordinates  to 
ward  the  commanding  general.  The  responsibility  was 
entirely  Sherman's,  as  he  afterward  frankly  stated ;  and  I 
presume  he  did  not  mean  to  imply  otherwise  by  the  lan 
guage  used  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  above  quoted  (Vol.  II,  page 
60).  G-eneral  Sherman's  orders,  issued  on  June  24  (Special 
Field  Orders,  No.  28),  directed  each  of  the  three  armies  to 
make  an  attack  (under  the  word  "assault"  for  Thomas  and 
"  attack  "  for  McPherson  and  me).  I  had  made  all  prep 
arations  to  carry  out  the  order  on  my  part.  Being  vis 
ited  by  G-eneral  Sherman  a  day  or  two  before  the  date 
named  for  the  execution  of  the  order  (June  27),  I  ex 
plained  to  him  what  I  had  done,  and  how  little  hope 
there  was  of  success,  on  account  of  the  smallness  of  my 
reserve  to  push  the  advantage  even  if  we  should  break  the 
line,  when  he  at  once  replied  that  it  was  not  intended  that 
I  should  make  an  attack  in  front,  but  to  make  a  strong 
demonstration  in  my  front,  and  gain  what  advantage  I 
could  on  the  enemy's  flank.  During  the  day  Cox's  divi 
sion  forced  the  passage  of  Olley's  Creek  and  secured  a  po 
sition  on  the  head  of  Nickajack,  which  was  spoken  of  by 
Sherman  as  the  only  success  of  the  day. 

There  were  doubtless  many  occasions  in  the  Atlanta 
campaign  when  the  enemy's  intrenchments  could  have 
been  assaulted  with  success.  These  were  when  the  posi 
tion  had  been  but  recently  occupied  and  the  fortifica 
tions  were  very  slight.  After  several  days'  occupation, 
as  at  the  points  attacked  by  Thomas  and  McPherson,  the 
lines  became  impregnable.  Frequent  efforts  were  made, 
and  by  none  more  earnestly  than  by  General  Sherman,  to 
press  the  troops  to  a  vigorous  assault  of  the  enemy's  po- 


TENDENCY  OF  VETERAN  TROOPS          145 

sition  under  the  favorable  circumstances  above  referred 
to.  But  the  general  feeling  of  the  army,  including  not 
only  privates,  but  officers  of  nearly  all  grades,  was  un 
doubtedly  opposed  to  such  attacks.  The  notion  was  very 
prevalent  that  there  was  no  necessity  of  fighting  the  en 
emy  on  unequal  terms.  When  attacked,  either  with  or 
without  cover,  the  troops  would  fight  with  the  most  de 
termined  valor,  and  almost  invariably  with  success.  So 
when  attacking  the*enemy  in  open  ground  there  was  no 
lack  of  energy  or  pluck.  But  we  lose  one  of  the  most 
important  lessons  of  the  war  if  we  fail  to  remember  and 
appreciate  the  fact  that  our  veteran  troops  are  very  loath 
to  make  an  attack  where  they  believe  they  have  not  a 
fair  chance  of  success.  This  feeling  must  be  attributed, 
not  to  a  lack  of  high  soldierly  qualities,  but  to  intelli 
gence  and  good  sense.  The  veteran  American  soldier 
fights  very  much  as  he  has  been  accustomed  to  work  his 
farm  or  run  his  sawmill:  he  wants  to  see  a  fair  pros 
pect  that  it  is  "going  to  pay."  His  loyalty,  discipline, 
and  pluck  will  not  allow  him  under  any  circumstances  to 
retreat  without  orders,  much  less  to  run  away ;  but  if  he 
encounters  a  resistance  which  he  thinks  he  cannot  over 
come,  or  which  he  thinks  it  would  "  cost  too  much "  to 
overcome,  he  will  lie  down,  cover  himself  with  a  little 
parapet,  and  hold  his  ground  against  any  force  that  may 
attempt  to  drive  him  back.  This  feeling  of  the  soldier  is 
an  element  in  the  problem  of  war  which  cannot  be  ig 
nored.  The  general  who,  with  such  an  army,  would  win 
the  full  measure  of  success  due  to  greatly  superior  num 
bers,  must  manceuver  so  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to  fight 
him  on  approximately  equal  terms,  instead  of  assaulting 
fortifications  where,  against  modern  weapons,  numbers 
are  of  little  or  no  avail.  In  the  days  of  the  bayonet  suc 
cessful  tactics  consisted  in  massing  a  superior  force  upon 
some  vital  point,  and  breaking  the  enemy's  line.  Now  it 
is  the  fire  of  the  musket,  not  the  bayonet,  that  decides 


10 


146  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  battle.  To  mass  troops  against  the  fire  of  a  covered 
line  is  simply  to  devote  them  to  destruction.  The  greater 
the  mass,  the  greater  the  loss — that  is  all.  A  large  mass 
has  no  more  chance  of  success  than  a  small  one.  That 
this  is  absolutely  true  since  the  introduction  of  breech 
loaders  is  probably  not  doubted  by  any  one ;  and  it  was 
very  nearly  true  with  the  muzzle-loading  rifles  used  dur 
ing  our  late  war,  as  was  abundantly  demonstrated  on 
many  occasions. 

I  have  always  believed  that  the  true  tactics  of  our  late 
war,  whenever  our  force  was  double  that  of  the  enemy 
(as  it  sometimes  was  and  always  should  have  been  at  all 
points  where  decisive  movements  were  to  be  made),  were 
to  throw  one  half  the  force  upon  the  enemy's  rear,  so  as 
to  compel  him  to  attack  that  force  or  else  retreat  by  side 
roads  with  loss  of  trains  and  artillery.  This  would  doubt 
less  have  been  a  bold  departure  from  the  ancient  tactics, 
which  had  not  yet  been  proved  obsolete.  Yet  I  always 
thought  it  strange  that  our  leading  generals  were  un 
willing  to  attempt  it.  Had  Sherman  divided  his  army  in 
such  a  way,  and  struck  at  Hood's  rear,  he  might  have 
found  a  chance  to  destroy  that  army  as  well  as  the  rail 
roads  in  Georgia. 

The  death  of  McPherson,  on  July  22,  was  felt  by  all 
to  be  an  irreparable  loss,  and  by  none  more  so  than  by 
General  Sherman,  who  manifested  deep  feeling  when  the 
body  was  brought  to  the  Howard  House,  east  of  Atlanta. 
I  recollect  well  his  remark  to  the  effect  that  the  whole  of 
the  Confederacy  could  not  atone  for  the  sacrifice  of  one 
such  life. 

My  recollection  of  some  of  the  incidents  of  that  day 
differs  in  some  respects  from  that  of  General  Sherman. 
As  soon  as  it  was  known  that  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee 
was  heavily  engaged  I  drew  out  of  line  the  larger  part 
of  my  troops,  leaving  the  picket-line  in  position,  with 
strong  reserves  behind  the  parapets,  and  massed  them 


THE  DEATH  OF  McPHERSON  BEFORE  ATLANTA 

near  my  left,  ready  to  send  reinforcements  to  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  if  necessary,  or  to  form  a  temporary 
left  flank  if  the  line  on  my  left  should  be  broken,  as  it 
was  late  in  the  day,  as  described  by  General  Sherman.1 

When  that  break  was  made  in  the  line  immediately  to 
the  left  of  mine,  I  had  a  rare  opportunity  of  witnessing 
Sherman's  splendid  conduct  as  a  simple  soldier,  the  oc 
casion  for  which  occurs  so  rarely  to  the  general-in-chief 
of  a  great  army.  Sherman  at  once  sent  to  me  for  all  my 
artillery,  which  responded  to  his  call  at  a  full  gallop. 
He  led  the  batteries  in  person  to  some  high,  open  ground 
in  front  of  our  line  near  the  Howard  House,  placed  them 
in  position,  and  directed  their  fire,  which  from  that  ad 
vanced  position  enfiladed  the  parapets  from  which  our 
troops  had  been  driven,  and  which  the  enemy  then  occu 
pied.  With  the  aid  of  that  terrible  raking  fire,  the 
division  of  Union  troops  very  quickly  regained  the  in- 
trenchments  they  had  lost.  General  Sherman,  on  page 
81,  Vol.  II,  gives  me  the  credit  due  to  himself  for  that 
soldierly  conduct  as  an  artillery  commander.  I  was 
occupied  in  forming  my  infantry  reserve  to  meet  the 
enemy  if  Logan's  troops  did  not  drive  them  back.  Only 
my  artillery  was  used  in  restoring  this  broken  line,  be 
cause  Logan's  infantry  proved  sufficient  without  further 
aid.  This  action  of  mine  was  taken  with  General  Sher 
man's  knowledge  and  approval,  and  was  the  correct 
thing  to  do,  for  the  reason  that  the  ground  in  my  front 
was  such  as  to  make  both  my  position  and  that  of  the 
enemy  practically  unassailable.  I  had  no  apprehension 
of  an  attack  in  my  front,  and  there  was  no  question  of 
my  attempting  to  "  make  a  lodgment  in  Atlanta "  that 
day,  as  stated  by  Sherman  in  Vol.  II,  page  80. 

It  was  proposed  by  me  that  my  reserve  and  Thomas's 
should  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennes 
see,  either  directly  or,  better  still,  by  making  a  counter- 

i  Vol.  II,  pp.  80,  81. 


148  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

attack  in  front  of  the  right  of  that  army,  which,  if  suc 
cessful,  would  cut  off  the  hostile  force  then  attacking  its 
left.  Sherman  replied,  as  I  recollect,  that  he  had  asked 
Thomas  to  send  some  troops  to  the  left,  and  the  latter 
had  replied  that  he  had  none  to  spare.  Without  these  the 
proposition  to  make  a  counter-attack  could  not  be  enter 
tained.  But  my  memory  is  only  that  of  conversations 
with  General  Sherman  during  the  day,  and  he  ought  to 
be  much  better  informed  than  I  concerning  what  passed 
between  General  Thomas  and  himself.  I  recollect  that 
General  Sherman  during  the  day  expressed  something 
like  a  wish  to  "  let  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  fight  its 
own  battle,"  but  in  his  statement  of  motive  for  so  doing 
I  think  he  does  that  army  injustice.  My  impression 
was,  and  is,  that  they  would  have  been  very  glad  of  as 
sistance,  and  that  timely  help  would  have  increased  the 
fraternal  feeling  between  the  armies,  instead  of  creating 
unworthy  jealousy. 

I  cannot  but  believe,  as  I  then  thought,  that  we  were 
losing  a  great  opportunity  that  day.  A  large  force  of 
the  enemy  had  made  a  wide  circuit  from  his  defenses 
about  Atlanta  and  attacked  our  left  several  miles  dis 
tant.  We  there  had  a  chance  to  fight  him  on  equal 
terms.  I  thought,  and  still  think,  we  ought  to  have  con 
centrated  a  large  part  of  Thomas's  force  and  mine  near 
the  Howard  House,  and  made  a  strong  counter-attack 
upon  this  attacking  column  of  the  enemy,  with  the  hope 
of  cutting  it  off  from  Atlanta.  Instead  of  this,  Thomas 
spent  the  day  in  efforts  to  "make  a  lodgment  in  At 
lanta  "  over  well-prepared  fortifications  which  the  Geor 
gia  militia  could  hold  against  him  about  as  well  as  the 
veteran  Confederate  troops. 

The  movement  of  August  4  and  5  was  designed  to  be 
substantially  what  had  been  frequently  suggested,  but 
which  I  have  heretofore  referred  to  as  having  never 
been  tried,  with  the  exception  that  the  attacking  force 


SHERMAN'S  ERROR  IN  A  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK 

was  not  to  sever  its  connection  with  the  main  body,  and 
hence  might  not  reach  far  enough  to  strike  an  exposed 
flank  of  the  enemy.  But  even  with  this  modification  I 
thought  the  movement  ought  to  have  a  fair  chance  of 
success.  That  movement  was  not  suggested  by  me  in 
any  way,  and,  so  far  as  I  know,  not  by  General  Thomas. 
I  believe  it  originated  entirely  with  General  Sherman. 
I  never  heard  of  it  until  I  received  his  orders.  There 
was  no  "argument"  by  me  of  the  question  of  relative 
rank,  as  suggested  by  General  Sherman  (Vol.  II,  page  99). 

The  positions  of  the  troops  when  the  order  for  the 
movement  was  made  rendered  it  convenient  that  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  be  put  in  first, —  that  is,  next  to 
the  right  of  General  Thomas's  troops  then  in  position, — 
while  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  commanded  by  General  John 
M.  Palmer,  was  relied  upon  to  develop  rapidly  to  our  right 
and  endeavor  to  strike  the  enemy's  flank  before  he  could 
extend  his  intrenched  line  far  enough  to  meet  and  resist 
our  attack.  It  was  not  until  some  time  after  my  orders 
for  this  movement  had  been  issued  and  should  have 
been  in  process  of  vigorous  execution  that  I  received  the 
first  intimation  that  the  question  of  rank  had  been 
raised,  as  stated  by  General  Sherman,  and  that  my  or 
ders  had  simply  been  transmitted  to  the  division  com 
manders' of  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 

It  cannot  for  a  moment  be  admitted  that  any  share 
of  the  blame  for  that  failure  attaches  to  the  Fourteenth 
Corps,  as  such.  Nor  do  I  believe  with  General  Sherman 
that  its  slowness  on  that  occasion  was  due  to  anything 
"  imbibed"  from  General  Thomas. 

My  own  view  of  military  duty  was  different  from  that 
entertained  by  the  commander  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
as  was  shown  in  my  subsequent  action,  hereinafter  re 
ferred  to,  when  I  was  ordered  to  report  to  and  act  under 
the  orders  of  General  Stanley.  But  if  the  distinguished 
statesman  who  then  commanded  the  Fourteenth  Corps 


150  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

fell  into  error  at  that  time,  he  has  doubtless  since  re 
gretted  it  far  more  than  any  other  man  could  possibly 
do ;  and  he  has  many  times  atoned  for  that  error  by  the 
great  services  to  the  country  which  he  has  continued  to 
render  up  to  the  present  time. 

The  primary  and  principal  cause  of  this  and  all  similar 
difficulties  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  was  the  grave 
error  of  opinion  which  disregarded  the  special  rank  of 
army  and  department  commanders  given  them  by  the 
President's  assignment  under  the  law,  and  the  still  graver 
error  of  judgment  in  leaving  such  an  important  question 
open  until  the  eve  of  battle,  in  the  "hope  that  there 
would  be  no  necessity  for  making  this  decision."  This 
error  seems  incomprehensible  when  it  is  considered  that 
it  in  effect  nullified  the  President's  selection  of  army  and 
department  commanders  at  the  most  important  of  all 
moments,  the  crisis  of  battle,  by  making  these  com 
manders  subject  to  the  orders  of  any  general  of  older 
commission  whose  troops  happened  to  be  adjacent  to 
theirs. 

In  the  midst  of  battle,  when  the  orders  of  a  com 
mon  superior  cannot  be  obtained  in  time  to  meet  an 
emergency,  the  highest  commander  present  must  give 
the  necessary  orders  and  must  be  obeyed.  This  is  prob 
ably  the  gravest  responsibility  of  war.  Yet  Sherman's 
opinion  and  decision  would  have  placed  this  responsi 
bility,  not  upon  the  army  commander  who  had  been 
selected  by  the  President,  upon  the  advice  of  the  general- 
in-chief,  under  an  act  of  Congress  passed  especially  for 
the  purpose,  but  upon  some  one  who  through  political 
influence  or  otherwise  had  got  an  earlier  commission  of 
major-general.  So  many  of  the  latter  had  proved  to  be 
unqualified  for  responsible  command  that  Congress  had 
enacted  a  special  law  authorizing  the  President  to  super 
sede  such  prior  commissions  and  assign  commanders  of 
armies  or  army  corps  in  the  field  and  in  any  department 


SHERMAN'S  ERROR  IN  A  QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK 

whom  he  deemed  competent.1  Palpable  as  this  fallacy 
seems,  yet  it  was  adhered  to  until  overruled  by  the  War 
Department. 

It  is  proper  for  me  to  add  that  I  had  at  that  time  but 
a  very  slight  personal  acquaintance  with  General  Palmer. 
However,  I  knew  him  well  by  reputation,  and  esteemed 
him  highly.  General  Thomas,  especially,  had  given  me  a 
high  estimate  of  his  character  and  abilities.  If  there  was 
any  cause  of  jealousy  or  ill-feeling  between  us,  I  never 
suspected  it. 

1  Reference  is  made  here  to  the  to  modify  it  in  respect  to  command 
122d  Article  of  War,  and  the  resolu-  in  any  "  field  or  department,"  ap- 
tion  of  Congress  especially  intended  proved  April  4,  1862. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  FINAL  BLOW  AT  ATLANTA  —  JOHNSTON'S  UNTRIED  PLAN 
OF  KESISTANCE  —  HOOD'S  FAULTY  MOVE  —  HOLDING  THE 
PIVOT  OF  THE  POSITION  —  ANECDOTES  OF  THE  MEN  IN 
THE  BANKS  —  DEFERRING  TO  GENEEAL  STANLEY  IN  A 
QUESTION  OF  RELATIVE  RANK — THE  FAILURE  AT  JONES- 
BORO' — THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA — ABSENT  FROM  THE 
ARMY  —  HOOD'S  OPERATIONS  IN  SHERMAN'S  REAR  —  SENT 
BACK  TO  THOMAS'S  AID — FAULTY  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  OP 
POSE  HOOD  AT  PULASKI  —  AT  COLUMBIA  —  REASON  OF 
THE  DELAY  IN  EXCHANGING  MESSAGES. 

WHEN  all  our  efforts  to  accomplish  decisive  results 
by  partial  operations  upon  the  flanks  had  failed, 
this  question  was  much  discussed :  What  more  decisive 
movement  shall  next  be  made  for  the  capture  of  Atlanta  ? 
There  were  practically  but  two  propositions  to  be  consid 
ered  :  that  of  General  Sherman,  which  was  adopted  with 
success ;  and  that  heretofore  referred  to  as  having  never 
been  tried,  to  detach  two  or  more  corps  to  make  a  lodg 
ment  on  the  railroad  at  or  below  East  Point,  and  thus 
compel  the  enemy  to  come  out  of  Atlanta  and  endeavor 
to  regain  control  of  his  only  line  of  supply,  or  abandon 
that  city  altogether.  General  Sherman  thought  it  too 
hazardous  to  detach  two  corps,  though  he  was  willing  for 
me  to  undertake  it  with  one.  In  fact,  this  feeling  marked 
General  Sherman's  action  throughout  the  campaign.  He 
had  no  hesitation  in  detaching  a  small  force,  the  loss  of 
which  would  still  leave  him  greatly  superior  in  numbers 
to  the  enemy,  or  a  very  large  force  under  his  own  com- 

152 


JOHNSTON'S  UNTRIED  PLAN  OF  RESISTANCE  153 

mand,  leaving  the  enemy  to  the  care  of  the  smaller  part, 
as  in  his  march  to  Savannah.  General  Thomas,  on  the 
contrary,  thought  the  movement  proposed  by  G-eneral 
Sherman  "extra  hazardous,"  as  Sherman  says  in  his 
"Memoirs"  (Vol.  II,  page  106).  I  did  not  regard  either 
of  them  as  very  hazardous,  and  upon  consideration  rather 
preferred  General  Sherman's,  because  I  thought  it  could 
not  fail  to  be  decisive  of  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  while  the 
other  might  fail  if  not  executed  with  promptness  and 
vigor,  and  this,  experience  had  warned  us,  we  could  not 
be  quite  sure  of. 

Some  time  after  the  war,  that  very  able  commander 
General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  told  me  that  in  his  judg 
ment  Sherman's  operations  in  Hood's  rear  ought  not  to 
have  caused  the  evacuation  of  Atlanta;  that  he  (John 
ston),  when  in  command,  had  anticipated  such  a  move 
ment,  and  had  prepared,  or  intended  to  prepare,  to  oppose 
it  by  constructing  artillery 'redoubts  at  all  suitable  points 
in  the  rear  of  Atlanta,  as  well  as  in  front,  which  redoubts 
could  be  very  speedily  connected  by  infantry  intrench- 
ments  whenever  necessary;  that  he  aimed  to  keep  on 
hand  in  Atlanta  at  all  times  supplies  enough  to  last  him 
longer  than  Sherman's  army  could  subsist  on  the  con 
tents  of  their  wagons  and  haversacks ;  and  that  Sherman 
could  not  possibly  hold  all  the  railroads  leading  into  At 
lanta  at  the  same  time,  nor  destroy  any  one  of  them  so 
thoroughly  that  it  could  not  be  repaired  in  time  to  re 
plenish  Johnston's  supplies  in  Atlanta. 

Here  is  presented  a  question  well  worthy  of  the  careful 
study  of  military  critics.  Whatever  may  be  the  final 
judgment  upon  that  question,  it  seems  perfectly  clear  that 
Johnston's  plan  of  defense  ought  at  least  to  have  been 
tried  by  his  successor.  If  Hood  had  kept  all  his  troops  in 
compact  order  about  Atlanta,  he  would  have  been  in  the 
best  possible  condition  to  resist  Sherman  if  the  latter 
turned  back  from  Jonesboro'  and  attacked  Atlanta  from 


154  FORTY- SIX   YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  rear,  or  to  strike  Sherman's  rear  or  flank  in  full  force 
if  he  made  any  other  movement.  The  division  of  Hood's 
forces  at  that  time,  one  part  holding  on  to  Atlanta  while 
the  other  went  to  head  off  Sherman,  was  the  worst  dispo 
sition  that  could  have  been  made. 

As  related  to  me  personally  by  General  Sheridan, — for 
I  have  not  yet  studied  the  Virginia  campaigns  so  thor 
oughly  as  to  justify  me  in  speaking  from  the  records, — it 
was  a  similar  mistake  on  the  part  of  the  Confederate  cav 
alry  commander  Greneral  J.  E.  B.  Stuart,  in  trying  to  get 
between  Sheridan  and  Richmond,  which  gave  Sheridan 
the  advantage  and  led  to  Stuart's  defeat.  Stuart  had 
ridden  hard  all  night,  and  got  between  Sheridan  and 
Richmond,  his  men  and  horses  exhausted,  while  Sheridan 
had  been  resting  and  feeding  his  men  and  animals.  In 
the  morning  Sheridan  "rode  over"  his  exhausted  an 
tagonist.  These  are  among  the  many  cases  where  ex 
aggerated  ideas  of  the  importance  of  places  have  led  to 
the  defeat  of  armies.  I  knew  Stuart  well  at  West  Point, 
he  having  been  in  the  class  next  to  mine.  He  then  gave 
promise  of  his  future  brilliant  career  as  a  cavalry  leader. 

The  only  specially  hazardous  part  of  Sherman's  move 
ment  was  that  which  would  fall  to  my  lot  —  namely,  to 
hold  the  "  pivot "  against  a  possible  attack  of  Hood's 
whole  army  while  Thomas  and  Howard  should  swing 
round  it,  and  then  draw  out  and  join  them  after  the 
swing  was  made.  Upon  my  reporting  that  I  was  per 
fectly  willing  to  undertake  this  task,  and  had  no  doubt 
of  the  ability  of  my  corps  to  accomplish  it,  all  question 
about  making  the  movement  appeared  to  be  settled,  and 
it  was  at  once  ordered.  Hood  did  not  avail  himself  of 
his  opportunity  to  attack  me  when  alone,  either  in  posi 
tion  or  in  motion,  hence  my  part  of  the  movement  proved 
easiest  of  all. 

I  had  placed  my  corps  in  a  completely  inclosed  field- 
work,  large  enough  to  contain  all  my  trains,  and  strong 


ANECDOTES   OF   THE   MEN   IN   THE   RANKS  155 

enough  to  resist  any  attack  from  a  greatly  superior  force 
until  Sherman's  movement  could  be  accomplished. 

I  recollect  even  to  this  day  a  little  incident  of  that  time 
which  was,  at  least  to  me,  both  amusing  and  instructive. 
After  receiving  Sherman's  orders,  which  meant  "  suspend 
aggressive  work  and  go  to  fortifying,"  I  was  directing  the 
laying  out  of  the  new  work  at  the  most  important  part  of 
the  line,  and  the  men  had  been  ordered  to  commence  dig 
ging,  when  I  heard  an  old  volunteer,  as  he  laid  aside  his 
gun  and  put  off  his  accoutrements  with  manifest  reluc 
tance,  say,  sotto  voce :  "  Well,  if  digging  is  the  way  to  put 
down  the  rebellion,  I  guess  we  will  have  to  do  it."  Our 
old  soldiers  had  a  "mind  of  their  own,"  and  were  not 
afraid  to  let  their  commanders  know  it ;  yet  they  were 
essentially  as  thoroughly  subordinate  and  reliable  as  any 
troops  any  general  ever  had  the  honor  to  command. 

I  now  recall  another  incident  which  occurred  a  few 
days  earlier,  in  which  a  young  Indiana  volunteer  was 
somewhat  less  respectful,  though  he  had  no  idea  whom  he 
was  addressing,  nor,  probably,  any  thought  whatever  about 
"  relative  rank."  I  had  come  out  from  my  tent,  before 
sunrise  in  the  morning,  and  was  performing  my  morning 
ablutions  in  the  ordinary  camp  basin,  preparatory  to  put 
ting  on  my  outer  clothing.  None  of  my  "  people  "  were 
yet  up,  and  the  night  sentinel  of  my  camp  was  a  little  way 
off.  There  came  up  a  weary,  belated  soldier  who  had, 
perhaps,  been  trudging  along  much  of  the  night,  trying 
to  overtake  his  regiment.  I  heard  him  ask  in  a  loud  voice : 
"  Where  is  the  128th  Indiana  1 "  Not  supposing  the  ques 
tion  was  addressed  to  me,  I  did  not  look  up.  Then  came 
in  still  louder  tones  and  in  an  amended  form  which  left 
no  room  for  doubt  as  to  whom  it  was  addressed :  "  I  mean 
you  old  fellow  there  with  the  red  shirt !  Where  is  the 
128th  Indiana  I" 

If  from  lapse  of  time  my  memory  may  not  be  exact  as 
to  the  number  of  the  regiment,  I  am  sure  no  apology  is 


156         FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

necessary  to  the  gallant  128th.  It  was,  anyhow,  one  of 
those  very  high-numbered  new  Indiana  regiments  which 
had  recently  joined  the  army.  The  young  soldier  was 
sent  to  the  headquarters  escort,  given  his  breakfast,  and 
carried  along  until  his  regiment  was  overtaken. 

The  Twenty-third  Corps  reached  the  railroad  about  the 
close  of  day  on  August  31,  having  time  to  do  no  more 
than  intrench  our  positions.  The  orders  that  day  and 
night  were  urgent  to  make  the  destruction  of  the  railroad 
thorough  and  extensive.  This  was  evidently  General 
Sherman's  primary  object,  showing  a  doubt  in  his  mind 
whether  the  effect  of  his  movement  would  be  the  speedy 
abandonment  of  Atlanta,  or  whether  he  would  have  to 
trust  to  his  destruction  of  the  railroad  to  accomplish  that 
object. 

Late  in  the  night  of  the  31st,  after  G-eneral  Stanley 
and  I,  who  were  encamped  near  together,  had  gone  to 
sleep,  we  received  despatches  from  General  Sherman 
stating  in  effect  that  as  we  were  too  far  from  the  main 
body  of  the  army  to  receive  orders  from  him  or  General 
Thomas,  our  two  corps  must  act  on  the  morrow  under 
the  orders  of  the  highest  commander  present,  and  that 
General  Stanley,  having  the  older  commission,  was  that 
highest  commander.  I  was  therefore  directed  to  report 
to  General  Stanley  and  act  under  his  orders.  I  replied 
to  General  Sherman  that  while  I  differed  from  him  in 
opinion  upon  the  question  of  relative  rank,  I  would  for 
the  present  cheerfully  abide  his  decision  and  execute  his 
orders.  Early  the  next  morning,  before  I  had  time  to  re 
port  to  General  Stanley,  he  appeared  at  my  camp,  evi 
dently  much  disturbed  by  the  orders  he  had  received. 
He  said  General  Sherman  was  wrong ;  that  he  was  not 
entitled  to  the  command  and  did  not  want  it ;  and  urged 
me  to  accept  the  chief  command,  and  let  him  act  under 
my  orders.  I  replied  that  General  Sherman's  order  was 
imperative,  and  I  could  not  relieve  him  (General  Stanley) 


THE  FAILURE  AT  JONESBORCX  157 

from  the  responsibility  of  executing  it.  It  was  all  wrong, 
but  there  was  no  present  remedy,  and  he  must  do  the 
best  he  could.  The  position  of  his  corps  on  the  right 
made  it  necessary  that  it  should  have  the  advance  in  the 
day's  movement,  while  I  would  follow  close  after  and 
support  him  under  all  circumstances. 

So  we  started  early  in  the  morning  to  execute  Sher 
man's  orders  —  thoroughly  to  destroy  the  railroad,  and 
close  down  on  Thomas  toward  Jonesboro'.  That  morn 
ing,  as  Sherman  says  (Vol.  II,  page  107),  "  Howard  found 
an  intrenched  foe  (Hardee's  corps)  covering  Jonesboro'," 
and  "  orders  were  sent  to  Generals  Thomas  and  Schofield 
to  turn  straight  for  Jonesboro',  tearing  up  the  railroad 
track  as  they  advanced."  But  of  course,  as  General 
Sherman  had  anticipated  the  night  before,  such  orders 
could  not  reach  me  in  time  to  do  any  good.  They  were 
not  received  until  after  the  affair  at  Jonesboro'  was 
ended.  But  hearing  the  sound  of  battle  in  our  front,  I 
rode  rapidly  forward  to  the  head  of  Stanley's  column, 
which  was  then  not  advancing,  made  inquiries  for  that 
officer,  and  was  informed  that  he  was  trying  to  find  Gen 
eral  Thomas  to  get  orders.  I  immediately  brought  my 
infantry  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  out  of  the  road  oc 
cupied  by  Stanley's  corps,  moved  it  to  the  front  through 
woods  and  fields,  and  endeavored  to  find  a  way  by  which 
I  could  reach  the  enemy's  flank  or  rear,  riding  so  far 
ahead  with  a  few  staff  officers  and  orderlies  that  I  es 
caped  very  narrowly  being  captured  by  the  enemy. 
Finally,  near  dark,  General  Stanley's  troops  began  to  de 
ploy  and  attack  the  enemy ;  and  as  there  were  more  troops 
on  the  ground  than  could  possibly  be  used  that  day,  I 
could  do  no  more  than  stand  and  watch  their  movements, 
as  I  did  with  intense  interest  until  my  medical  director, 
Dr.  Hewit,  one  of  the  bravest  and  coolest  men  I  ever  knew, 
called  my  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  place  was  much 
too  hot  for  a  general  and  his  staff  who  had  nothing  to  do 


158  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

there.  I  believe  if  General  Sherman  had  been  in  our 
place  he  would  have  thought  it  "more  than  a  skirmish- 
line  "  (Vol.  II,  page  108)  in  Stanley's  front  that  gave  us 
that  fire  both  of  musketry  and  artillery  which  my  staff 
officers  have  frequently  spoken  of  as  one  of  the  ugliest 
they  ever  experienced.  G-eneral  Stanley's  fault  was,  not 
that  he  deployed  his  troops,  but  that  he  did  not  put  them 
in  at  once  when  he  arrived  on  the  ground,  instead  of  wait 
ing  for  orders.  But  G-eneral  Stanley,  whose  gallantry  was 
never  questioned,  was  a  subordinate  in  experience.  He 
had  but  recently  risen  to  the  command  of  a  corps,  and 
had  been  little  accustomed  to  act  on  his  own  responsi 
bility.  Feeling  overburdened  with  the  responsibility 
wrongfully  thrust  upon  him  that  day,  he  naturally 
sought  relief  from  it  by  reporting  for  orders  to  General 
Thomas  as  soon  as  his  corps  was  reunited  to  the  main 
army. 

The  failure  at  Jonesboro',  as  at  so  many  other  places, 
was  due  to  that  erroneous  interpretation  of  the  law  that 
threw  the  supreme  responsibility  at  the  crisis  of  battle 
upon  untried  and  (in  this  case)  unwilling  shoulders,  or 
else  left  the  lawful  commander  without  recognized  au 
thority,  to  beg  in  vain  of  others  to  "  cooperate  "  with  him. 

During  the  night  of  August  31  others  besides  General 
Sherman  were  too  restless  and  impatient  to  sleep  (Vol. 
II,  page  108).  The  sounds  of  explosion  in  Atlanta  were 
distinctly  heard,  and  the  flashes  of  light  distinctly  seen. 
With  the  compass  for  direction  and  the  watch  for  in 
tervals  of  time  between  flash  and  sound,  there  was  no 
difficulty  in  locating  their  origin  at  Atlanta.  An  untu 
tored  farmer  may  well  have  thought  "  these  sounds  were 
just  like  those  of  a  battle,"  but  a  practised  ear  could  not 
have  failed  to  note  the  difference.  First  there  would 
come  an  explosion  louder  than  and  unlike  the  report  of 
one  or  several  guns,  and  this  would  be  followed  by  nu 
merous  smaller,  sharper,  and  perfectly  distinct  reports, 


THE  CAPTURE  OF  ATLANTA  159 

quite  unlike  that  of  musketry,  which  could  not  be  mis 
taken  for  anything  but  the  explosion  of  shells.  There 
could  be  no  room  for  doubt  that  these  lights  and  sounds 
meant  the  destruction  in  Atlanta  of  magazines  or  car 
loads  of  fixed  ammunition,  and  hence  that  Hood  was 
abandoning  that  place.  I  reported  my  observations  and 
conclusion  to  General  Sherman,  but  he  "still  remained 
in  doubt."  The  doubt  was  to  me  incomprehensible ;  but 
perhaps  that  was  because  I  had  no  doubt  from  the  start, 
whether  I  was  right  or  wrong,  what  the  result  would  be. 
My  period  of  elation  was  when  we  got  firm  hold  of  the 
railroad  at  Rough  and  Ready.  Hood  having  failed  to 
attack  our  exposed  flank  during  the  movement,  the  fall 
of  Atlanta  was  already  an  accomplished  fact  with  me 
when  Sherman  was  still  in  doubt,  as  well  as  when 
Thomas  thought  the  news  "too  good  to  be  true."  But 
the  above  is  worthy  of  noting  only  as  a  necessary  in 
troduction  to  something  far  more  important. 

Hood's  army  was  now  divided  and  scattered  over  a  dis 
tance  of  thirty  miles,  one  corps  below  Jonesboro'  being 
just  driven  from  its  ground  with  considerable  loss  and 
in  retreat  to  Lovejoy's,  the  main  body  leaving  Atlanta 
and  stretched  along  the  road  toward  McDonough  ;  while 
Sherman's  whole  army,  except  Slocum's  corps,  was  in 
compact  order  about  Jonesboro',  nearly  in  a  straight  line 
between  Atlanta  and  Love  joy's.  This  seemed  exactly 
the  opportunity  to  destroy  Hood's  army,  if  that  was  the 
objective  of  the  campaign.  So  anxious  was  I  that  this  be 
attempted  that  I  offered  to  go  with  two  corps,  or  even  with 
one,  and  intercept  Hood's  retreat  on  the  McDonough  road, 
and  hold  him  until  Sherman  could  dispose  of  Hardee  or 
interpose  his  army  between  him  and  Hood.  But  more 
prudent  counsels  prevailed,  and  we  remained  quietly  in 
our  camps  for  five  days,  while  Hood  leisurely  marched 
round  us  with  all  his  baggage  and  Georgia  militia,  and 
collected  his  scattered  fragments  at  Love  joy's. 


160  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Atlanta  had  become,  like  Richmond,  in  popular  esti 
mation  the  real  objective  of  military  operations.  The 
public  lost  sight  of  the  fact  that  it  was  armies  in  the 
field,  and  not  fortified  places,  which  gave  strength  to 
the  rebellion;  and  apparently  even  prominent  generals,  if 
they  did  not  share  the  popular  delusion,  at  least  recog 
nized  its  value.  The  capture  of  Atlanta  was  enough  to 
meet  the  "  political  necessity,"  make  "  the  election  of  Mr. 
Lincoln  certain,"  and  win  rejoicings  and  congratulations 
from  all  parts  of  the  North !  It  was  not  worth  while  to 
run  any  risk  of  trying  to  do  more  at  that  time !  It  had 
to  be  left  for  two  of  Sherman's  corps,  after  the  other 
four  had  gone  on  "  the  march  to  the  sea,"  to  fight  Hood 
at  Columbia  and  Spring  Hill,  hurl  him  back  from  Frank 
lin,  and  then,  with  reinforcements  not  equal  to  half  what 
Sherman  had  taken  away,  to  overwhelm  him  at  Nash 
ville.  Why  was  not  this  done  with  a  much  larger  force 
under  Sherman  at  Atlanta?  This  is  one  of  the  questions 
for  the  future  historian  to  discuss. 

During  our  rest  near  Love  joy's,  G-eneral  Sherman  re 
quested  me  to  give  him  a  statement  in  writing  of  my 
dissent  from  his  decision  upon  the  question  of  relative 
rank,  which  I  did.  This  he  submitted  to  the  War  De 
partment  for  decision,  as  a  "question  of  rank  that  had 
arisen  between  G-enerals  Schofield  and  Stanley."  At  this 
General  Stanley  was  very  indignant,  as  well  as  at  Gen 
eral  Sherman's  censure  of  his  conduct  on  September  1 ; 
for  the  reason  that  no  question  of  rank  had  been  raised 
by  us,  and  the  command  was  thrust  upon  him  in  opposi 
tion  to  his  wish  and  in  violation  of  the  law  as  he  under 
stood  it.  In  due  time  came  the  decision  of  the  Wai- 
Department,  written  by  General  Halleck,  sustaining  the 
view  of  the  law  Stanley  and  I  had  taken,  and  reversing 
that  of  General  Sherman ;  also  kindly  commending  my 
action  in  waiving  the  question  during  active  operations. 

It  was  by  virtue  of  the  above  decision  of  the  War  De- 


ABSENT  FROM  THE  AKMY 

partment  that  I,  instead  of  General  Stanley,  had  com 
mand  of  the  force  that  in  the  following  November,  1864, 
opposed  Hood's  advance  from  the  Tennessee  River  and 
repulsed  his  fierce  assault  at  Franklin. 

As  I  was  absent  from  the  army  on  business  connected 
with  my  department  during  most  of  Hood's  raid  upon 
the  railroad  in  the  rear  of  Atlanta  (Sherman  having  an 
nounced  his  purpose  to  let  his  army  rest  during  that 
time),  I  have  little  to  say  in  respect  to  the  operations 
resulting  therefrom.  But  some  things  in  Sherman's  ac 
count  seem  to  require  a  little  elucidation. 

Being  informed  by  General  Sherman  of  Hood's  move 
ment,  I  hurried  to  the  front  and  tried  to  reach  the  army  by 
a  special  train  with  a  small  guard  from  Cleveland,  Tenn., 
but  met,  October  13,  the  head  of  Hood's  column  at  Dai- 
ton,  where  several  trains  of  cars  with  supplies  and  men 
without  arms  returning  from  furlough  on  their  way  to 
Sherman  had  been  stopped  by  the  reported  approach  of 
Hood.  I  ordered  all  back  to  Cleveland,  and  we  barely  had 
time  to  escape  capture  by  Hood's  cavalry.  On  arriving 
at  Cleveland,  I  reported  by  telegraph  to  General  Thomas, 
then  at  Nashville;  and  he  desired  me  to  go  to  Chatta 
nooga,  take  command  of  the  troops  there,  and  prepare 
to  defend  that  place,  which  it  was  thought  Hood  might 
attempt  to  take  by  a  coup  de  main,  or  to  cooperate  with 
Sherman.  As  General  Sherman  says  (Vol.  II,  page  156), 
"Hood  had  broken  up  the  telegraph,  and  thus  had  pre 
vented  quick  communication";  but  through  my  own 
scouts  and  spies  I  was  able  to  keep  track  of  Hood's 
movements.  As  soon  as  he  turned  westward  I  deter 
mined  to  move  with  the  troops,  when  no  longer  neces 
sary  to  the  defense  of  Chattanooga,  rapidly  to  Trenton 
and  Valley  Head,  seize  the  passes  through  the  Lookout 
range,  and  prevent  Hood's  escape  in  that  direction,  pre 
suming  that  Sherman  would  intercept  his  retreat  down 
the  Chattanooga  valley.  I  sent  a  courier  to  General  Sher- 


162  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

man  informing  him  of  my  purpose,  and  informed  Gen 
eral  Thomas  by  telegraph.  But  the  latter  disapproved 
my  plan,  and  directed  me  to  move  to  defend  Caperton's 
Ferry.  This  is  what  General  Sherman  refers  to  in  his 
despatch  of  October  16:  "Your  first  move  on  Trenton 
and  Valley  Head  was  right ;  the  move  to  defend  Caper- 
ton's  Ferry  is  wrong.  Notify  General  Thomas  of  these, 
my  views."  But  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong 
proved  immaterial,  since  Hood  was  left  free  to  escape 
down  the  Chattanooga  valley.  Why  this  was  done,  or 
why  Sherman  did  not  want  to  force  the  enemy  east,  by 
Spring  Place,  into  the  barren  mountains,  where  John 
ston  would  have  been  compelled  to  go  if  McPherson's 
move  on  Eesaca  in  May  had  been  successful,  seems  a 
mystery.  The  explanation  is  probably  to  be  found  in 
Sherman's  wish  that  Hood  would  go  where  he  would 
not  be  compelled  to  follow,  and  thus  would  leave  him 
(Sherman)  a  clear  road  for  his  march  to  the  sea.  In 
deed  the  conviction  seems  irresistible  that  Sherman  and 
Hood  could  hardly  have  acted  in  more  perfect  concert 
if  they  had  been  under  the  same  commander.  The  one 
did  exactly  what  the  other  wanted,  and  the  other  took 
care  not  to  interfere  with  his  movement. 

At  the  close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  I  promised  Gen 
eral  Sherman  that  I  would,  as  soon  as  I  should  be  able  to 
do  so,  write  a  full  critical  history  of  that  campaign  as  a 
text-book  for  military  students.  I  have  not  yet  found 
time  to  fulfil  that  promise.  The  foregoing  pages  were  in 
tended,  when  written,  as  only  a  very  partial  fulfilment  of 
that  task,  and  that  almost  entirely  of  one  side  of  it — far 
the  most  difficult  side.  The  other  side  is  so  easy,  com 
paratively,  and  is  already  so  familiar  to  military  students, 
that  further  elucidation  now  seems  hardly  necessary. 
Yet  I  hope,  as  a  labor  of  love,  if  for  no  other  reason,  to 
present  my  impressions  of  those  grand  tactical  evolutions 
of  a  compact  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  as  I 


HOOD'S  OPERATIONS  IN  SHERMAN'S  REAR  103 

witnessed  them  with  the  intense  interest  of  a  young  com 
mander  and  student  of  the  great  art  which  has  so  often 
in  the  history  of  the  world  determined  the  destinies  of 
nations. 

After  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  in  September,  1864,  Gen 
eral  Sherman  proposed  to  give  his  army  rest  for  a 
month  while  he  perfected  his  plans  arid  preparations 
for  a  change  of  base  to  some  point  on  the  Atlantic  or 
the  gulf,  in  pursuance  of  the  general  plan  outlined  by 
General  Grant  before  the  Atlanta  campaign  was  opened 
in  May.  But  the  Confederate  commander  took  the  initia 
tive,  about  September  20,  by  moving  his  army  around 
Sherman's  right,  striking  his  railroad  about  Allatoona 
and  toward  Chattanooga,  doing  some  damage,  and  then 
marching  off  westward  with  the  design  of  transferring  the 
theater  of  war  from  Georgia  to  Alabama,  Mississippi,  or 
Tennessee. 

Sherman  very  promptly  decided  not  to  accept  that 
challenge  to  meet  Hood  upon  a  field  chosen  by  the  latter, 
but  to  continue  substantially  the  original  plan  for  his 
own  operations,  having  in  view  also  new  ulterior  plans 
opened  to  him  by  this  erratic  movement  of  his  adversary. 
An  essential  modification  of  the  original  plan,  to  meet 
the  unexpected  movement  of  Hood,  was  to  send  back 
into  Tennessee  force  enough,  in  addition  to  the  troops 
then  there  and  others  to  be  assembled  from  the  rear,  to 
cope  with  Hood  in  the  event  of  his  attempting  the  in 
vasion  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  or  to  pursue  and 
occupy  his  attention  if  he  should  attempt  to  follow  Sher 
man.  General  George  H.  Thomas,  commanding  the  De 
partment  of  the  Cumberland,  whose  headquarters  were 
at  Nashville,  was  already  at  that  place,  and  was  directed 
by  General  Sherman  to  assume  command  of  all  the 
troops  in  the  three  departments  under  Sherman's  com 
mand,  except  those  with  the  latter  in  Georgia,  and  to 
direct  the  operations  against  Hood. 


164  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Thomas  had  in  his  department  at  that  time  only  the 
garrisons  and  railroad  guards  which  had  been  deemed 
essential  during  the  preceding  operations  in  Georgia ;  and 
many  of  those  were  soon  to  be  discharged  by  expiration 
of  their  terms  of  enlistment,  their  places  to  be  supplied 
by  new  regiments  coming  from  the  rear.  General  A. 
J.  Smith's  corps,  then  in  Missouri,  about  ten  thousand 
strong,  was  ordered  to  Tennessee,  and  Sherman  also 
ordered  Stanley,  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  about  twelve 
thousand  men,  to  return  from  Georgia  to  Tennessee  and 
report  to  Thomas.  Stanley'  had  started  by  rail  to  Tulla- 
homa,  and  was  to  march,  as  he  did,  from  the  latter  point 
to  Pulaski,  Tennessee,  which  had  been  selected  as  the 
point  of  concentration  for  Thomas's  forces.  This  was 
the  situation  when  I  returned  to  the  army  and  reported 
in  person  to  General  Sherman. 

Under  Sherman's  promise  of  a  month's  rest  for  his 
army,  I  had  gone  back  to  attend  to  the  business  of  my 
department,  as  General  Thomas  had  also  done,  and  hence 
was  in  the  rear  when  Hood  made  his  raid  upon  Sher 
man's  railroad.  Upon  reporting  to  General  Sherman 
near  the  end  of  October,  I  learned  for  the  first  time  his 
purpose  to  march  to  Savannah,  and  what  troops  he  had 
provided  for  Thomas  in  Tennessee.  I  told  Sherman,  with 
that  perfect  candor  which  he  always  invited,  that  in  my 
opinion  Thomas's  force  was  much  too  small ;  that  Hood 
evidently  intended  to  invade  Tennessee;  and  that  he 
would  not  be  diverted  from  his  purpose  by  Sherman's 
march  in  the  opposite  direction,  but  would,  on  the  con 
trary,  be  encouraged  thereby  to  pursue  his  own  plan. 
Hence  I  requested  Sherman  to  send  me  back  with  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  to  join  Thomas.  Sherman  at  first 
appeared  to  understand  my  suggestion  as  a  desire  to  be 
left  in  Tennessee  instead  of  Thomas,  the  latter  to  go 
with  Sherman.  But  I  explained  to  him  emphatically 
that  such  was  not  my  thought.  I  took  it  for  granted 


SENT  BACK  TO  THOMAS'S  AID  155 

that  Thomas  was  to  command  the  army  in  Tennessee, 
and  I  wanted  only  to  go  back  and  help  him  because 
he  would,  in  my  opinion,  have  to  do  the  fighting  while 
Sherman's  march  would  be  unopposed.  Sherman  then 
replied  that  he  must  have  three  grand  divisions,  under 
Slocurn,  Howard,  and  myself,  to  make  his  army  com 
plete,  arid  that  he  could  not  spare  me;  and  he  gave  no 
indication  of  concurrence  in  my  opinion  that  he  ought 
to  send  back  more  troops. 

After  leaving  General  Sherman  that  afternoon  and 
returning  to  my  own  camp,  I  wrote  him  a  letter  giving 
a  special  reason  why  my  corps,  rather  than  aoy  other, 
should  be  sent  back  to  Tennessee  in  order  that  it  might 
be  filled  up  by  new  regiments  which  had  been  ordered 
from  the  North.  No  answer  came  to  these  suggestions 
until  I  had  made  three  days'  march  toward  Atlanta,  en 
route  for  Savannah.  Then  I  received  an  order,  October 
30,  to  march  to  the  nearest  point  on  the  railroad,  and 
report  by  telegraph  to  General  Thomas  for  orders. 

At  first  General  Thomas  ordered  me  to  move  by  rail 
to  Tullahoma,  and  then  march  across  to  Pulaski,  as  Stan 
ley  was  doing.  But  just  then  Forrest  with  his  cavalry 
appeared  at  Johnsonville,  on  the  Tennessee  River  west  of 
Nashville,  and  destroyed  a  great  quantity  of  property, 
General  Thomas  not  having  sufficient  force  available  to 
oppose  him ;  hence  on  November  3  Thomas  ordered  me 
to  come  at  once  by  rail  to  Nashville  with  my  corps, 
where  I  reported  to  him  with  the  advance  of  my  troops 
on  November  5.  He  then  ordered  me  to  go  at  once  with 
some  of  my  troops  to  Johnsonville  and  dispose  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry  there,  and  then  to  return  to  Nashville 
and  proceed  to  Pulaski,  to  take  command  of  all  the 
troops  in  the  field,  which  would  then  include  the  Fourth 
Corps,  my  own  Twenty-third,  except  the  detachment  left 
at  Johnsonville,  and  the  cavalry  watching  Hood  toward 
Florence.  My  duty  at  Johnsonville,  where  I  left  two 


166  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

brigades,  was  soon  disposed  of;  and  I  then  returned  to 
Nashville,  and  went  at  once  by  rail  to  Pulaski,  arriving 
at  that  place  in  the  evening  of  November  13. 

Some  so-called  histories  of  the  Tennessee  campaign 
have  been  based  upon  the  theory  that  I  was  marching 
from  Georgia  to  Tennessee,  to  unite  my  corps  with  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  army  at  Nashville,  when  I  encountered 
Hood  at  Franklin,  and  after  a  sharp  contest  managed 
to  elude  him  and  continue  my  march  and  unite  with  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  Nashville.  Hence  I  wish  to 
point  out  clearly  that  I  had  been  with  the  entire  Twenty- 
third  Corps  to  Nashville,  with  a  part  of  it  to  Johnson- 
ville  and  back  to  Nashville,  and  thence  to  Columbia  and 
near  Pulaski,  all  by  rail;  that  all  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  then  in  Tennessee  was  the  Fourth  Corps 
and  the  cavalry  at  and  near  Pulaski;  that  General 
Thomas  placed  those  troops  under  my  command,  and 
that  they  remained  so  until  after  the  battle  of  Franklin, 
November  30,  and  the  retreat  to  Nashville  that  night; 
and  that  General  Thomas  did  not  have  an  army  at 
Nashville  until  December  1.  I  had  united  with  Thomas's 
troops  two  weeks  before  the  battle  of  Franklin,  and  was 
commanding  his  army  in  the  field  as  well  as  my  own 
during  that  time.  If  the  historians  had  read  the  records 1 
they  could  not  possibly  have  fallen  into  such  a  mistake. 

Before  reaching  Pulaski  I  was  furnished  with  an  order 
from  General  Thomas's  headquarters  assigning  me  to  the 
command  in  the  field,  by  virtue  of  my  rank  as  a  depart 
ment  commander,  and  a  copy  of  instructions  which  had 
already  been  telegraphed  to  General  Stanley  at  Pulaski. 
I  assumed  command  in  the  morning  of  November  14. 
The  moment  I  met  Stanley  at  Pulaski,  in  the  evening  of 
November  13,  he  called  my  attention  to  the  faulty  posi 
tion  of  the  troops  and  to  an  error  in  General  Thomas's 
instructions,  about  which  I  then  knew  nothing  because  I 

i  War  Reeords,  Vol.  XLV. 


FAULTY  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  OPPOSE  HOOD  AT  PULASKI 

was  unacquainted  with  the  geography  of  the  surround 
ing  country.  Upon  Stanley's  statement,  I  halted  Cox's 
division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  a  few  miles  north  of 
Pulaski  so  that  the  troops  might  be  the  more  readily 
placed  as  the  situation  required  when  I  had  time  to  con 
sider  it.  No  part  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  actually 
went  to  Pulaski,  although  that  was  the  place  to  which 
General  Thomas  had  ordered  it. 

On  the  19th  General  Thomas  repeated  to  me  the  same 
orders  he  had  sent  to  General  Stanley,  in  these  words : 
"  If  the  enemy  advances  in  force,  as  General  Hatch  be 
lieves,  have  everything  in  readiness  either  to  fight  him 
at  Pulaski  if  he  advances  on  that  place,  or  cover  the 
railroad  and  concentrate  at  Columbia,  should  he  attempt 
to  turn  your  right  flank.  .  .  ,wl  I  then  telegraphed 
General  Thomas,  November  20,  pointing  out  the  faulty 
nature  of  the  position  selected  by  him  for  the  troops  at 
Pulaski,  and  the  danger  that  must  be  incurred  in  at 
tempting  to  carry  out  his  instructions  to  fight  Hood  at 
Pulaski  if  he  should  advance  upon  that  place ;  also  sug 
gesting  what  seemed  to  be  the  best  way  to  avoid  that 
diniculty.  General  Thomas  very  promptly  approved 
these  suggestions,  and  thus  ended  the  embarrassment 
occasioned  by  the  faulty  instructions.  But  his  official 
report  on  that  point  has  made  it  necessary  for  me  to 
comment  upon  it  more  fully  later. 

The  season  of  Hood's  invasion  of  Tennessee  was  ex 
tremely  unfavorable  for  aggressive  operations,  and  hence 
correspondingly  favorable  for  the  defense.  The  ordinary 
country  roads  were  almost  impassable,  while  the  turn 
pikes  were  in  good  condition.  As  we  held  the  crossing 
of  the  Tennessee  Eiver  at  Decatur,  Hood  was  compelled 
to  cross  at  the  Shoals  below,  and  to  advance  over  those 
very  bad  roads ;  hence  we  had  ample  time  in  which  to 
make  the  necessary  dispositions  to  oppose  him. 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  944. 


168  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

Our  cavalry  gave  us  accurate  information  that  the 
enemy  was  advancing  on  the  21st,  when  Cox,  with  Wag 
ner  in  support,  was  ordered  to  interpose  between  the 
enemy's  cavalry  and  Columbia ;  while  Stanley,  with  two 
divisions  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  marched  from  Pulaski  to 
that  place,  and  our  cavalry  moved  on  the  enemy's  right 
to  cover  the  turnpike  and  railroad.  The  whole  army  was 
in  position  at  Columbia,  November  24,  and  began  to  in 
trench.  Hood's  infantry  did  not  appear  in  sight  until  the 
26th.  Cox  had  a  brush  with  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which 
had  driven  in  one  of  our  cavalry  brigades.  That  action 
was  magnified  at  the  time,  and  afterward,  into  evidence 
of  a  race  between  our  troops  and  the  enemy  for  the  pos 
session  of  Columbia.  In  fact,  Euger's  troops  at  Columbia 
were  quite  capable  of  holding  that  place  against  Forrest^ 
and  Hood's  infantry  was  not  within  a  day's  march  of 
either  Cox  or  Stanley  until  after  both  had  reached 
Columbia. 

We  held  our  intrenched  position  in  front  of  Columbia 
until  the  evening  of  November  27,  inviting  an  attack,  and 
hoping  that  Thomas  would  arrive  with,  or  send,  reinforce 
ments  in  time  to  assume  the  offensive  from  Columbia ; 
but  reinforcements  did  not  come,  and  the  enemy  did  not  at 
tack.  It  became  evident  that  Hood's  intention  was  not  to 
attack  that  position,  but  to  turn  it  by  crossing  Duck  River 
above ;  hence  the  army  was  moved  to  the  north  bank  of 
the  river  in  the  night  of  the  27th.  It  was  still  hoped  that 
the  line  of  Duck  River  might  be  held  until  reinforcements 
could  arrive.  General  Thomas  was  very  urgent  that  this 
should  be  done,  if  possible,  as  the  arrival  of  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  corps  from  Missouri  had  been  expected  daily  for 
some  time,  when  General  Thomas  intended,  as  it  was  un 
derstood,  to  come  to  the  front  in  person  with  that  corps 
and  all  the  other  troops  he  could  assemble  in  his  depart 
ment,  take  command,  and  move  against  the  enemy. 

About  that  time  was  disclosed  one  of  those  contriv- 


REASON  OF  THE  DELAY  IN  EXCHANGING  MESSAGES 

ances  by  which  the  non-military  agencies  of  government 
interfere  with  the  operations  of  armies.  The  War  De 
partment  telegraph  corps  alone  was  intrusted  with  the 
cipher  in  which  General  Thomas  and  I  could  communi 
cate  with  each  other  by  telegraph.  Neither  he,  nor  I,  nor 
any  of  our  staff  officers  were  permitted  to  know  the  tele 
graph  code.  The  work  was  so  badly  done  that  from 
eight  to  forty-eight  hours  were  occupied  in  sending  and 
delivering  a  despatch.  Finally  the  cipher-operator  at 
tached  to  my  headquarters  in  the  field  deserted  his  post 
and  went  to  Franklin,  so  that  the  time  required  for  a 
messenger  to  ride  from  Franklin  to  my  position  in  the 
field  was  added  to  the  delay  caused  by  deciphering  de 
spatches.  From  all  this  it  resulted  that  my  superior  at 
Nashville  was  able  to  give  me  little  assistance  during  the 
critical  days  of  that  campaign.  It  has  been  generally  sup 
posed  that  I  was  all  that  time  acting  under  orders  or  in 
structions  from  General  Thomas,  and  his  numerous  de 
spatches  have  been  quoted  in  "  histories  "  as  evidence  in 
support  of  that  supposition.  The  fact  is  that  I  was 
not  only  without  any  appropriate  orders  or  instructions 
nearly  all  the  time,  but  also  without  any  timely  informa 
tion  from  General  Thomas  to  guide  my  action. 

This  fact  appears  to  have  been  fully  recognized  by 
General  Thomas  in  his  official  report,  wherein  he  made 
no  mention  of  any  orders  or  instructions  given  by  him 
during  the  progress  of  those  operations,  but  referred  only 
to  "instructions  already  given"  before  I  went  to  Pulaski, 
and  said :  "  My  plans  and  wishes  were  fully  explained  to 
General  Schofield,  and,  as  subsequent  events  will  show, 
properly  appreciated  and  executed  by  him." l 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  i,  p.  590. 


CHAPTER  X 

HOOD     FOKCES     THE     CEOSSING    OF     DUCK    EIVEE —  IMPOE- 
TANCE     OF    GAINING    TIME    FOE    THOMAS     TO     CONCEN- 

TEATE  EEINFOECEMENTS  AT  NASHVILLE  —  THE  AFFAIE 
AT  SPEING  HILL  —  INCIDENTS  OF  THE  NIGHT  EETEEAT 

—  THOMAS'S  EEPLY  TO  THE  EEQUEST  THAT  A  BEIDGE 
BE    LAID    OVEE    THE    HAEPETH  —  THE    NECESSITY    OF 
STANDING  GEOUND  AT  FEANKLIN  —  HOOD'S  FOEMIDABLE 
ATTACK  —  SEEIOUS  EEEOE  OF  TWO  BEIGADES  OF  THE 
EEAE-GUAED  —  BEILLIANT  SEEVICES  OF  THE  EESEEVE — 
YELLOW  FEVEE  AVEETED  —  HOOD'S  ASSAULTS  EEPULSED 

—  JOHNSTON'S  CEITICISM  OF  HOOD  —  THE  ADVANTAGE 
OF  CONTINUING  THE  EETEEAT  TO  NASHVILLE. 

IN  the  afternoon  of  November  28 1  received  information 
that  the  enemy's  cavalry  had  forced  the  crossing  of 
Duck  Eiver  above  Columbia,  and  driven  our  cavalry  back; 
and,  about  two  o'clock  that  night,  that  prisoners  reported 
the  enemy  laying  pontoon  bridges,  and  that  Hood's  in 
fantry  would  begin  to  cross  that  morning.  The  army  was 
ready  to  march  at  a  moment's  notice.  It  could  have  re 
tired  to  Spring  Hill  or  to  Franklin  without  molestation  or 
delay,  but  that  would  have  given  the  enemy  the  crossing 
of  Duck  Eiver  at  Columbia  and  the  turnpike  road  for  his 
advance  with  his  artillery  and  trains.  There  was  no 
assurance  that  Thomas  had  assembled  any  of  his  expected 
reinforcements  at  Nashville  or  elsewhere.  It  was  known 
that  orders  had  been  given  some  days  before  looking  to 
concentration  of  some  of  the  troops  in  his  department 
somewhere,  but  what  had  been  accomplished  I  was  not 

170 


IMPORTANCE  OF  GAINING  TIME  FOR  THOMAS          171 

informed.  About  A.  J.  Smith  I  was  in  a  like  state  of 
uncertainty.  Only  one  thing  was  clear,  and  that  was  that 
I  must  hold  Hood  back,  if  possible,  until  informed  that 
Thomas  had  concentrated  his  troops ;  for  if  I  failed  in 
that,  Hood  would  not  only  force  me  back  upon  Nashville 
before  Thomas  was  ready  to  meet  him  there,  but  would 
get  possession  of  the  Chattanooga  Railroad,  and  thus  cut 
off  the  troops  coming  to  Nashville  from  that  direction. 
After  considering  the  matter  some  time  in  the  night,  I 
decided  to  hold  on  at  least  until  morning.  Early  in  the 
morning  a  brigade  of  infantry  was  sent  up  the  river  to 
reconnoiter  and  watch  the  enemy's  movements ;  at  the 
same  time  Stanley  was  ordered,  with  two  divisions  of  his 
corps,  back  to  Spring  Hill,  to  occupy  and  intrench  a  po 
sition  there  covering  the  roads  and  the  trains,  which  were 
ordered  to  be  parked  at  that  place,  and  General  Thomas 
H.  Ruger  was  ordered  to  join  him. 

About  8  A.  M.  on  the  29th  came  a  despatch  from  Thomas, 
dated  8  P.  M.  of  the  day  before,  conveying  the  information 
that  Smith  had  not  arrived,  and  saying  nothing  about  any 
other  reinforcements,  but  expressing  the  wish  that  the 
Duck  River  position  be  held  until  Smith  arrived;  and 
another  despatch  designating  Franklin,  behind  the  Har- 
peth  River,  as  the  place  to  which  I  would  have  to  retire  if 
it  became  necessary  to  fall  back  from  Duck  River.  I  then 
decided  to  hold  on  to  the  crossing  of  Duck  River  until  the 
night  of  the  29th,  thus  gaining  twenty-four  hours  more 
for  Thomas  to  concentrate  his  troops.  I  did  not  appre 
hend  any  serious  danger  at  Spring  Hill;  for  Hood's  in 
fantry  could  not  reach  that  place  over  a  wretched  country 
road  much  before  night,  and  Stanley,  with  one  division 
and  our  cavalry,  could  easily  beat  off  Forrest.  Hence  I 
retained  Ruger's  division  and  one  of  Stanley's,  and  dis 
posed  all  the  troops  to  resist  any  attempt  Hood  might 
make,  by  marching  directly  from  his  bridges  upon  my 
position  on  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River,  to  dislodge  me 


172  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

from  that  position.  That  was  his  best  chance  of  success, 
but  he  did  not  try  it. 

Stanley  arrived  at  Spring  Hill  in  time  to  beat  off  For 
rest  and  protect  our  trains.  Then  he  intrenched  a  good 
position  in  which  to  meet  Hood's  column  when  it  should 
arrive,  which  it  did  late  in  the  afternoon.  They  had  a 
hard  fight  which  lasted  until  about  dark.  Much  bitter 
controversy  arose  between  Hood  and  some  of  his  subor 
dinates  because  of  their  failure  to  dislodge  Stanley's  divi 
sion  and  get  possession  of  the  turnpike  at  Spring  Hill. 
While  I  have  no  wish  to  take  any  part  in  that  discussion, 
I  must  say  that  I  think  the  mistake  was  Hood's.  I  think 
he  attempted  a  little  longer  march,  over  a  very  bad  road, 
than  could  be  made  in  so  short  a  time.  The  29th  of  No 
vember  is  a  very  short  day,  and  the  march  of  troops  across 
pontoon  bridges  and  through  deep  mud  is  very  slow. 
If  Hood  had  turned  down  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River, 
across  the  fields,  which  were  no  worse  than  his  road,  he 
could  have  got  into  a  fight  about  noon ;  but  he  thought, 
according  to  his  own  account  in  "  Advance  and  Retreat," 
that  he  was  deceiving  me  by  his  thundering  demonstra 
tions  at  Columbia,  and  that  I  did  not  know  he  was  march 
ing  to  Spring  Hill.  He  thought  he  was  going  to  "  catch 
me  napping,"  after  the  tactics  of  Stonewall  Jackson,  while 
in  fact  I  was  watching  him  all  day.  Besides,  Hood  went 
to  bed  that  night,  while  I  was  in  the  saddle  all  night, 
directing  in  person  all  the  important  movements  of  my 
troops.  Perhaps  that  is  enough  to  account  for  the  dif 
ference  between  success  and  failure,  without  censuring 
subordinate  commanders.  Mine  did  all  I  could  have 
asked  anybody  to  do  that  night. 

As  soon  as  I  was  satisfied  that  Hood  was  gone  to 
Spring  Hill  and  would  not  attack  me  on  the  bank  of 
Duck  River,  I  took  the  head  of  my  troops — Ruger's  divi 
sion  —  and  marched  rapidly  to  Spring  Hill,  leaving  staff 
officers  to  give  orders  to  the  other  division  commanders 


THE  AFFAIE  AT  SPEING  HILL  173 

to  follow  immediately  in  proper  order  as  then  formed  in 
line.  These  orders  were  somehow  misunderstood.  The 
order  of  march  was  reversed,  and  the  troops,  except 
Ruger's,  and  Whitaker's  brigade  of  Kimball's  division, 
did  not  move  at  once.  But  the  delay  did  no  harm,  and  I 
did  not  know  of  the  mistake  until  several  days  afterward. 
If  Hood  had  only  known  of  that  mistake,  he  might  have 
troubled  me  no  little,  perhaps,  by  pushing  a  column 
across  from  his  camp,  south  of  Whitaker's  right  flank 
at  Spring  Hill,  until  it  reached  the  Columbia  turnpike. 
But  I  had  prepared  even  for  that,  as  well  as  I  could,  by 
sending  a  company  of  infantry  to  occupy  the  only  cross 
road  I  could  see  near  Spring  Hill  as  we  approached  that 
place.  I  ordered  the  captain  of  that  company  to  hold 
that  road  at  all  hazards  until  he  was  relieved  by  my  orders ! 
Some  of  Hood's  troops  "relieved"  him  next  morning! 
We  have  to  do  cruel  things  sometimes  in  war.  On  ar 
riving  at  Spring  Hill,  Whitaker's  brigade  was  put  in  line 
on  the  right  of  the  troops  then  in  position,  so  as  to  cover 
the  turnpike  on  which  we  were  marching.  This  was  about 
dark.  In  a  few  minutes  the  Confederate  camp-fires  were 
lighted  a  few  hundred  yards  in  front  of  that  brigade.  It 
was  a  very  interesting  sight,  but  I  don't  think  any  of 
Whitaker's  men  cared  to  give  the  Confederates  a  similar 
view  of  them. 

After  stopping  to  see  Stanley  a  few  minutes,  and  learn 
ing  that  some  of  Forrest's  troopers  had  been  seen  at 
Thompson's  Station,  three  miles  farther  north,  about 
dusk,  I  went  with  Ruger's  division  to  drive  them  off  and 
clear  the  way  to  Franklin.  To  my  great  surprise,  I  found 
only  smoldering  fires — no  cavalry.  This  was  where  our 
men  passed  so  close  to  the  "  bivouac  "  that  they  "  lighted 
their  pipes  by  the  enemy's  camp-fires  " ;  and  that  is  the 
way  romance  is  woven  into  history !  But  I  took  it  for 
granted  that  the  famous  Forrest  must  be  on  my  road 
somewhere ;  for  he  was  there  in  the  afternoon,  and  I  had 


174  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

no  cavalry  anywhere  near  to  drive  him  away.  I  could  not 
take  time  to  go  with  or  send  infantry  to  find  out  where  he 
was.  But  I  had  with  me  my  headquarters  troop  and  as  gal 
lant  an  aide  —  Captain  William  J.  Twining — as  ever  wore 
spur.  TwiniDg  was  the  same  gallant  and  accomplished 
aide  and  officer  of  the  corps  of  engineers,  now  dead,  who 
afterward  made  the  famous  ride  of  one  hundred  and  ten 
miles,  through  the  enemy's  country  in  North  Carolina,  to 
carry  a  despatch  from  me  to  Sherman.  He  was  a  com 
missioner  of  the  District  of  Columbia  at  the  time  of  his 
death.  I  ordered  them  to  go  at  full  gallop  down  the  pike 
to  Franklin,  and  to  ride  over  whatever  might  be  found  in 
their  way.  I  sat  motionless  on  my  horse  at  Thompson's 
Station  until  the  clatter  of  hoofs  on  that  hard  road  died 
out  in  the  distance,  and  I  knew  the  road  was  clear.  I 
did  not  tell  the  brave  Twining  the  object  of  that  ride,  but 
simply  to  report  the  situation  to  General  Thomas  by  tele 
graph  from  Franklin,  and  if  any  troops  were  at  that  place, 
as  had  been  reported,  to  order  them  forward  at  once.  I 
had  not  yet  determined  whether  I  could  continue  the  re 
treat  that  night,  or  whether  it  might  be  necessary  to  fight 
Hood  at  Spring  Hill  the  next  day.  In  either  case  the 
troops  at  Franklin,  if  any  were  there,  might  be  useful. 
Upon  returning  to  Spring  Hill  near  midnight,  I  found 
my  column  from  Duck  Eiver  there  in  compact  order. 
As  the  road  was  clear  and  the  Confederates  all  sound 
asleep,  while  the  Union  forces  were  all  wide  awake, 
there  was  no  apparent  reason  for  not  continuing  the 
march  that  night.  A  column  of  artillery  and  wagons, 
and  another  of  infantry,  moved  side  by  side  along  the 
broad  turnpike,  so  that  if  the  redoubtable  Forrest  should 
wake  up  and  make  his  appearance  anywhere,  he  would 
be  quickly  brushed  away.  It  was  reported  that  he  did 
attack  somewhere  in  the  night,  but  I  heard  nothing  of  it 
at  the  time,  perhaps  because  I  was  sleeping  quietly  on 
my  horse  as  we  marched  along ! 


INCIDENTS  OF  THE  NIGHT  RETREAT 

I  arrived  at  Franklin  with  the  head  of  my  column  a  short 
time  before  the  dawn  of  day,  November  30 ;  indicated  to 
General  J.  D.  Cox,  commanding  the  Twenty-third  Corps, 
the  line  upon  which  the  troops  were  to  be  formed;  and 
intrusted  to  him  the  formation,  as  the  several  divisions 
of  both  corps  should  arrive,  General  Stanley  being  in 
the  rear  directing  the  operations  of  the  rear-guard.  The 
Twenty-third  Corps  occupied  the  center  of  the  line  cross 
ing  the  Columbia  turnpike,  and  extended  to  the  river  on 
the  left,  while  the  Fourth  Corps  was  to  extend  the  line 
to  the  river  on  the  right.  Fortunately  the  natural  po 
sition  was  such  that  Kimball's  division  of  the  Fourth 
Corps  was  sufficient,  leaving  both  Wood's  and  Wagner's 
in  reserve.  I  then  gave  my  undivided  attention  to  the 
means  of  crossing  the  Harpeth  River. 

Two  days  before  I  had  telegraphed  to  General  Thomas 
suggesting  that  he  have  a  pontoon  bridge  laid  at  Frank 
lin,  to  which  he  replied:  "You  can  send  some  of  the 
pontoons  you  used  at  Columbia  to  Franklin  to  lay  a 
bridge  there." 1  General  Thomas  or  his  staff  should  have 
known  that  it  was  utterly  impossible  for  me  to  use  the 
pontoons  which  I  had  at  Columbia.  Those  pontoons 
were  heavy  wooden  bateaux,  and  there  were  no  wagons 
to  transport  them,  the  train  that  brought  them  there 
having  been  taken  away,  it  is  presumed  by  his  order, 
certainly  not  by  mine.  Hence  I  was  compelled  to  burn 
that  pontoon  bridge  as  well  as  the  railroad  bridge  (par 
tially)  when  my  troops  retreated  from  Ducktown.  But 
even  if  this  were  not  all  true,  Thomas  knew  the  enemy 
was  already  crossing  Duck  River  on  my  flank,  and  that  I 
must  speedily  take  up  a  new  position  behind  the  Har 
peth,  and  that  I  desired  him  to  provide  the  means  for 
my  army  to  cross  that  river.  It  was  a  reasonable  infer 
ence  that  I  should  not  have  asked  him  to  send  another 
bridge  if  I  already  had  one  that  I  could  use.  Besides,  I 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1108. 


176  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

was  commanding  General  Thomas's  army,  operating  in 
his  department,  wherein  I  had  no  control  of  anything 
in  rear  of  the  troops  under  my  charge.  It  was  his  duty 
to  foresee  and  provide  for  all  the  necessities  that  might 
arise  in  the  rear  of  the  army  in  the  field.  I  telegraphed 
him  again  for  a  bridge  at  the  Harpeth  on  the  29th, 
when  I  found  that  retreat  was  inevitable,  but  he  ap 
parently  did  not  get  that  despatch.  He  nevertheless 
sent  bridge  material  by  rail  to  Franklin,  where  it  arrived 
on  the  morning  of  November  30,  too  late  for  the  pon 
toons  to  be  used,  though  the  flooring  was  useful  in  cov 
ering  the  railroad  bridge  and  the  burned  wagon-bridge. 
I  found  also  on  the  south  side  of  the  river  a  very  large 
park  of  wagons  belonging  to  the  Department  of  the 
Cumberland,  which,  as  well  as  my  own  trains  and  artil 
lery,  must  be  crossed  over  before  I  could  withdraw  my 
troops  to  the  north  side.  The  troops  were  very  much 
fatigued  by  their  long  night  march,  rendering  considera 
ble  rest  indispensable.  Hence  there  could  not  be  much 
time  in  which  to  prepare  defensive  works  with  such  ob 
structions  as  to  insure  successful  defense  against  a  very 
heavy  assault.  But,  much  more  serious,  Hood  might 
cross  the  river  above  Franklin  with  a  considerable  force 
of  infantry,  as  well  as  with  all  his  cavalry,  before  I 
could  get  my  materials  over  and  troops  enough  to  meet 
him  on  the  north  side.  The  situation  at  Franklin  had 
become  vastly  more  serious  than  that  at  Columbia  or 
Spring  Hill,  and  solely  because  of  the  neglect  of  so 
simple  a  thing  as  to  provide  the  bridge  I  had  asked  for 
across  the  Harpeth.  If  that  had  been  done,  my  trains 
could  have  passed  over  at  once,  and  the  entire  army 
could  have  crossed  before  Hood  reached  Franklin. 

To  meet  this  greatest  danger,  Wood's  division  of  the 
Fourth  Corps  was  crossed  to  the  north  side  to  support 
the  cavalry  in  holding  the  fords  above,  if  that  should 
become  necessary;  while  Wagner's  division,  which  had 


THE  NECESSITY  OF  STANDING  GROUND  AT  FRANKLIN    ^77 

acted  as  rear-guard  from  Spring  Hill,  was  ordered  to 
remain  far  enough  in  front  of  the  line  to  compel  Hood 
to  disclose  his  intention  to  attack  in  front  or  to  turn 
the  position,  and  was  to  retire  and  take  its  position  in 
reserve  at  the  proper  time,  if  the  enemy  formed  for  at 
tack.  Only  one  of  those  three  brigades — Opdycke's — 
came  in  at  the  proper  time  and  took  its  appropriate 
place ;  and  that,  it  was  asserted,  no  doubt  truly,  was  by 
the  brigade  commander's  own  volition,  he  having  been 
soldier  enough  to  know  his  duty  in  such  a  case,  without 
the  necessity  for  any  orders.  The  other  two  brigades 
remained  in  their  advanced  position  until  they  were  run 
over  by  the  enemy.  Much  idle  controversy  was  in 
dulged  in  among  officers  of  the  Fourth  Corps  and  others 
in  respect  to  the  action  of  those  two  brigades.  The  only 
proper  way  to  settle  such  a  question  was  by  a  court- 
martial.  As  the  corps  passed  from  my  command  the 
next  morning,  and  had  been  under  my  orders  only  a  few 
days,  I  have  never  made  any  effort  to  fix,  even  in  my 
own  mind,  the  responsibility  for  that  blunder. 

By  great  exertion  on  the  part  of  the  engineers,  the 
means  of  crossing  the  river  were  at  length  provided. 
The  supports  of  the  burned  wagon-bridge  were  still 
standing  at  a  level  with  the  surface  of  the  water.  They 
were  timbered  and  planked  over,  and  the  railroad  bridge 
was  also  covered  with  planking,  thus  giving  us  two  pas 
sable  bridges.  The  trains  had  all  been  crossed  over,  and 
a  part  of  the  artillery.  Orders  had  been  issued  for  the 
troops  to  begin  crossing  at  dark,  when  Hood  disclosed 
his  purpose  to  attack.  The  artillery  was  ordered  back 
to  its  position  in  the  line,  and  General  Stanley  and  I, 
who  were  then  together  on  the  north  side  of  the  river, 
rode  rapidly  to  our  posts,  he  to  his  corps  on  the  south 
side,  and  I  to  the  high  redoubt  on  the  north  bank,  over 
looking  the  entire  field. 

There  I  witnessed  the  grandest  display  possible  in  war. 


178  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Every  battalion  and  battery  of  the  Union  army  in  line 
was  distinctly  seen.  The  corps  of  the  Confederate  army 
which  were  advancing  or  forming  for  the  attack  could 
also  be  seen,  though  less  clearly  on  account  of  their 
greater  distance,  while  the  Confederate  cavalry  could  be 
dimly  discerned  moving  to  the  fords  of  the  river  above 
Franklin.  Only  a  momentary  view  was  permitted  of 
this  scene  of  indescribable  grandeur  when  it  was  changed 
to  one  of  most  tragic  interest  and  anxiety.  The  guns  of 
the  redoubt  on  the  parapet  of  which  I  stood  with  two  or 
three  staff  officers  had  fired  only  a  few  shots  over  the 
heads  of  our  troops  at  the  advancing  enemy  when  his 
heavy  line  overwhelmed  Wagner's  two  brigades  and  rap 
idly  followed  their  fragments  in  a  confused  mass  over 
our  light  intrenchments.  The  charging  ranks  of  the 
enemy,  the  flying  remnants  of  our  broken  troops,  and 
the  double  ranks  of  our  first  line  of  defense,  coming 
back  from  the  trenches  together,  produced  the  momen 
tary  impression  of  an  overwhelming  mass  of  the  enemy 
passing  over  our  parapets. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  for  a  moment  my 
"heart  sank  within  me."  But  instantly  Opdycke's  bri 
gade  and  the  12th  and  16th  Kentucky  sprang  forward, 
and  steadily  advanced  to  the  breach.  Up  to  this  mo 
ment  there  had  been  but  little  firing  at  that  point,  be 
cause  of  our  own  troops  and  the  enemy  coming  in  pell- 
mell  ;  hence  there  was  not  much  smoke,  and  the  whole 
could  be  seen.  But  now  all  became  enveloped  in  a  dense 
mass  of  smoke,  and  not  a  man  was  visible  except  the 
fragments  of  the  broken  brigades  and  others,  afterward 
known  to  be  prisoners,  flocking  to  the  rear.  A  few  sec 
onds  of  suspense  and  intense  anxiety  followed,  then  the 
space  in  the  rear  of  our  line  became  clear  of  fugitives, 
and  the  steady  roar  of  musketry  and  artillery  and  the 
dense  volume  of  smoke  rising  along  the  entire  line  told 
me  that  "  the  breach  is  restored,  the  victory  won  " !  That 


HOOD'S  FORMIDABLE  ATTACK  179 

scene,  and  the  emotion  of  that  one  moment,  were  worth 
all  the  losses  and  dangers  of  a  soldier's  lifetime. 

It  would  hardly  be  possible  to  frame  language  that 
would  do  more  than  justice  to  the  magnificent  conduct 
of  Emerson  Opdycke's  brigade  and  Laurence  H.  Rous 
seau's  12th  Kentucky  and  John  S.  White's  16th  Ken 
tucky,  which  were  also  in  reserve,  and  their  commanders, 
in  that  battle.  Their  action  was  beyond  all  praise,  and 
nothing  that  can  justly  be  said  in  respect  to  the  battle 
can  detract  one  iota  from  their  proud  fame.  Yet  the 
light  in  which  the  part  acted  by  Opdycke's  brigade  (the 
others  not  being  mentioned)  is  presented  by  some  "  histo 
rians,"  to  the  prejudice,  relatively,  of  other  portions  of 
the  army  and  of  their  commanders,  is  essentially  false. 
It  is  represented  as  something  purely  spontaneous,  out  of 
the  ordinary  course,  not  contemplated  in  the  dispositions 
made  for  battle,  unforeseen  and  unexpected;  in  short, 
something  more — yes,  vastly  more — than  the  reasonable 
duty  of  the  brigade ;  or,  "  beyond  all  power  of  general 
ship  to  mold  the  battle  or  control  its  issue,  the  simple 
charge  of  Opdycke's  brigade  stands  in  boldest  relief." 
The  same  might  be  said  with  equal  truth  of  the  action 
of  any  brigade  upon  which  devolves  the  assault  or  de 
fense  of  the  key  of  a  military  position.  The  success  or 
failure  of  "  generalship  to  mold  the  battle  or  control  its 
issue"  depends  absolutely  upon  the  action  of  such  bri 
gades,  their  doing,  or  failure  to  do,  the  duty  belonging 
to  the  position  to  which  they  are  assigned.  Every  sol 
dier  in  the  army  knew  what  his  duty  was  in  such  a  case — 
knew  for  what  he  had  been  placed  in  that  position.  It 
would  have  been  strange  indeed  if  the  gallant  commander 
of  that  brigade  had  waited  for  orders  from  some  higher 
officer  to  move  "forward  to  the  lines."  As  well  might 
the  commander  of  a  brigade  in  the  line  wait  for  orders 
from  the  general-in-chief  before  commencing  to  fire  on 
the  advancing  enemy. 


180  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

The  highest  tribute  that  can  be  paid  to  Opdycke's 
brigade  is  the  just  and  true  one,  that  it  did  exactly  the 
duty  assigned  it  in  the  plan  of  battle,  and  did  that  duty 
nobly  and  with  complete  success.  That  other  brigades 
did  the  same  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  fact  that  twenty 
battle-flags  were  captured  by  a  single  brigade  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  on  the  same  part  of  the  line,  and 
that  the  12th  and  16th  Kentucky  regiments  relatively 
suffered  equally  heavy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded  with 
those  of  Opdycke.1 

As  before  stated,  the  dispositions  for  defense  contem 
plated  the  whole  of  Wagner's  division  as  the  reserve  to 
support  the  center,  that  being  the  only  part  of  the  line 
upon  which  the  enemy  would  have  time  to  make  a  heavy 
assault  that  day.  This  provision  for  an  ample  reserve 
had  been  made  after  full  consideration  and  before  Wood's 
division  was  ordered  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  which 
was  after  the  day  was  well  advanced  and  the  enemy's 
cavalry  had  begun  to  threaten  the  crossing  above.  The 
blunder  respecting  the  two  brigades  of  Wagner's  division 
came  near  being  disastrous,  and  the  repulse  of  the  assault 
in  spite  of  that  blunder  makes  it  highly  probable  that  if 
the  dispositions  ordered  had  been  properly  made,  the  re 
pulse  of  the  enemy  would  have  been  easy  beyond  rea 
sonable  doubt.  Yet  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  fairer 
chance  of  success  in  a  direct  assault  upon  troops  in  posi 
tion.  Our  intrenchments  were  of  the  slightest  kind,  and 
without  any  considerable  obstructions  in  front  to  inter 
fere  seriously  with  the  assault.  The  attack,  no  less  than 
the  defense,  was  characterized  by  incomparable  valor,  and 
the  secret  of  its  failure  is  to  be  found  in  one  of  the  prin 
ciples  taught  by  all  military  experience — the  great  supe 
riority  in  strength  of  a  fresh  body  of  troops  in  perfect 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,     while  the   12th  and  16th  Kentucky 
pp.  241  and  413.    The  loss  at  Franklin    regiments  lost  106  men. 
of  Opdycke's  six  regiments  was  205, 


SERIOUS  ERROR   OF   TWO  BRIGADES 

order  over  another  in  the  state  of  disorder  which  neces 
sarily  results  from  even  the  most  successful  assault. 
There  was  really  no  comparison,  in  effective  strength, 
between  Opdycke's  orderly  and  compact  brigade  and  the 
confused  mass  of  Confederates  that  were  crossing  over  our 
parapet.  The  result  was  nothing  extraordinary  or  at  all 
unprecedented.  It  was  but  one  of  the  numerous  proofs 
afforded  by  military  history  of  the  value  of  that  prudent 
maxim  in  the  art  of  war  which  dictates  the  placing  of  a 
suitable  reserve  in  close  support  of  that  portion  of  a  de 
fensive  line  which  is  liable  to  heavy  assault. 

The  surprising  conduct  of  the  commanders  of  the  two 
brigades  of  Wagner's  division  which  were  run  over  by 
the  enemy,  and  of  the  division  commander  himself,  what 
ever  may  be  true  as  to  the  conflicting  statements  pub 
lished  in  respect  to  their  action,  is  one  of  the  strongest 
possible  illustrations  of  the  necessity  of  the  higher  mili 
tary  education,  and  of  the  folly  of  intrusting  high  com 
mands  to  men  without  such  education,  which,  fortunately 
for  the  country  and  the  army,  is  rarely  learned  by  expe 
rience,  but  must  be  acquired  by  laborious  study  of  the 
rules  and  principles  laid  down  by  standard  authors  as 
derived  from  the  practice  and  teachings  of  the  great 
masters  of  the  art  of  war  in  all  ages.  A  well-educated 
officer,  either  as  brigade  or  division  commander,  would 
not  have  needed  orders  from  any  source  to  tell  him  what 
to  do  in  that  emergency.  He  would  have  known  so  surely 
what  his  duty  was  that  he  would  have  retired  at  the 
proper  time  behind  the  main  line,  without  ever  thinking 
whether  or  not  he  had  orders  to  do  so.  As  well  might  I 
have  waited  for  orders  from  G-eneral  Thomas  to  retire 
across  the  Harpeth  after  my  duty  on  the  south  side  of 
that  river  had  been  accomplished.  The  cases  are  closely 
parallel.  Any  unofficial  discussion  of  the  question  of 
responsibility  for  the  sacrifice  of  those  two  brigades  is 
idle.  According  to  the  established  rules  of  war,  those 


182          FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

three  commanders  ought  to  have  been  tried  by  court, 
martial,  and,  if  found  guilty,  shot  or  cashiered,  for  sac 
rificing  their  own  men  and  endangering  the  army.  One 
example  of  such  punishment  would  do  much  to  deter 
ignorant  and  incompetent  men  from  seeking  high  com 
mands  in  the  field.  But  the  discipline  of  the  volunteer 
army  of  a  republic  must,  it  appears,  inevitably  be,  espe 
cially  in  respect  to  officers  of  high  rank,  quite  imperfect, 
although  it  may  become  in  respect  to  the  great  mass  of 
the  troops,  as  ours  certainly  did,  exceedingly  efficient. 

In  the  Atlanta  campaign  I  sent  a  division  commander 
to  the  rear  in  permanent  disgrace  for  sacrificing  his  men 
in  a  hopeless  assault  upon  a  fortified  line,  contrary  to  the 
general  orders  and  instructions  which  General  Sherman 
had  published  before  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  But  I 
never  heard  of  another  similar  case  of  even  approximate 
justice  to  an  officer  of  high  rank.  It  is  a  striking  proof 
of  the  evil  effect  of  war  upon  the  minds  and  passions  of 
men,  not  only  of  those  who  are  engaged  in  it,  but  even 
more  upon  those  who  see  it  from  a  distance,  that  com 
manders  are  often  severely  condemned  for  prudent  care 
of  the  lives  of  men  under  their  command,  who  have  no 
choice  but  to  march  blindly  to  death  when  ordered,  while 
the  idiotic  sacrifice  of  the  bravest  and  noblest  of  patriotic 
soldiers  is  loudly  applauded  as  a  grand  exhibition  of  "  gal 
lantry  "  in  action.  If  George  H.  Thomas  had  had  no  other 
title  to  honor  or  fame,  he  would  have  deserved  the  pro 
found  gratitude  of  the  American  people,  and  a  very  high 
place  among  the  country's  patriots  and  heroes,  for  the 
reason  that  while  he  never  yielded  ground  to  an  attack 
ing  foe,  he  never  uselessly  sacrificed  the  life  of  a  soldier. 

It  is  a  sin  for  a  soldier  to  throw  away  his  own  life.  It 
is  not  his,  but  belongs  to  his  country.  How  much  greater 
sin  and  crime  in  an  officer  to  throw  away  the  lives  of  a 
thousand  men !  If  he  threw  away  a  thousand  dollars,  he 
would  be  court-martialed  and  cashiered  Are  not  the  sol- 


YELLOW  FEVEE  AVERTED  183 

diers  of  a  republic  worth  even  a  dollar  apiece  !  Patriot 
ism  and  courage  exist  in  great  abundance  in  the  breasts 
of  young  Americans.  All  they  need  is  instruction,  disci 
pline,  a  little  experience,  such  as  our  greatest  soldier  said 
he  himself  needed  at  first,  and,  above  all,  intelligent 
leadership,  which  can  be  acquired  only  by  military  edu 
cation,  to  make  them  the  best  soldiers  the  world  has 
ever  known. 

When  I  joined  my  company  as  second  lieutenant  in 
Florida  in  the  winter  of  1853-4,  I  found  the  company 
had  been  reduced  to  one  lance-sergeant,  two  lance-cor 
porals,  and  thirteen  privates.  Yellow  fever  had  done  its 
deadly  work.  But  that  lesson  was  not  lost.  In  later 
years,  upon  the  approach  of  that  enemy,  which  could  not 
be  conquered  even  by  the  highest  science  then  known  or 
practised,  the  troops  were  marched  a  few  miles  into  the 
pure  air  of  the  piney  woods,  where  the  dreaded  fever 
could  not  reach  them.  At  the  close  of  the  epidemic 
season  which  occurred  when  I  had  the  honor  to  com 
mand  the  army,  I  had  the  great  satisfaction  of  reporting 
that  not  a  single  soldier  had  been  killed  by  that  most 
dreaded  of  all  enemies,  and  the  even  greater  satisfaction 
of  reporting  that  those  bravest  of  the  brave,  the  surgeons 
who  volunteered  to  go  into  the  very  midst  of  the  camp 
of  the  enemy  that  does  not  respect  even  the  red  cross, 
to  minister  to  those  who  had  been  stricken  down  and  to 
study  the  nature  of  the  disease  for  the  future  benefit 
of  the  army  and  of  mankind,  had  also  been  unharmed. 
As  chief  of  those  I  do  not  hesitate  to  name  the  present 
surgeon-general  of  the  army,  George  M.  Sternberg.  Yet 
how  many  of  the  noblest  soldiers  of  humanity  have 
given  their  lives  in  that  cause! 

Hood's  assault  at  Franklin  has  been  severely  criticized. 
Even  so  able  a  man  as  General  J.  E.  Johnston  charac 
terizes  it  as  a  "useless  butchery."  These  criticisms 
are  founded  upon  a  misapprehension  of  the  facts,  and 


184  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

are  essentially  erroneous.  Hood  must  have  been  fully 
aware  of  our  relative  weakness  in  numbers  at  Frank 
lin,  and  of  the  probable,  if  not  certain,  cen  centra tion  of 
large  reinforcements  at  Nashville.  He  could  not  hope 
to  have  at  any  future  time  anything  like  so  great  an 
advantage  in  that  respect.  The  army  at  Franklin  and 
the  troops  at  Nashville  were  within  one  night's  march  of 
each  other;  Hood  must  therefore  attack  on  November 
30,  or  lose  the  advantage  of  greatly  superior  numbers. 
It  was  impossible,  after  the  pursuit  from  Spring  Hill,  in 
a  short  day  to  turn  our  position  or  make  any  other  at 
tack  but  a  direct  one  in  front.  Besides,  our  position, 
with  the  river  in  our  rear,  gave  him  the  chance  of  vastly 
greater  results,  if  his  assault  were  successful,  than  could 
be  hoped  for  by  any  attack  he  could  make  after  we  had 
crossed  the  Harpeth.  Still  more,  there  was  no  unusual 
obstacle  to  a  successful  assault  at  Franklin.  The  de 
fenses  were  of  the  slightest  character,  and  it  was  not 
possible  to  make  them  formidable  during  the  short  time 
our  troops  were  in  position,  after  the  previous  exhaust 
ing  operations  of  both  day  and  night,  which  had  rendered 
some  rest  on  the  30th  absolutely  necessary. 

The  Confederate  cause  had  reached  a  condition  closely 
verging  on  desperation,  and  Hood's  commander-in-chief 
had  called  upon  him  to  undertake  operations  which  he 
thought  appropriate  to  such  an  emergency.  Franklin 
was  the  last  opportunity  he  could  expect  to  have  to 
reap  the  results  hoped  for  in  his  aggressive  movement. 
He  must  strike  there,  as  best  he  could,  or  give  up  his 
cause  as  lost.  I  believe,  therefore,  that  there  can  be  no 
room  for  doubt  that  Hood's  assault  was  entirely  justifi 
able.  It  may  have  been  faulty  in  execution,  in  not  having 
been  sufficiently  supported  by  a  powerful  reserve  at  the 
moment  of  first  success.  I  have  not  the  means  of  know 
ing  the  actual  facts  in  this  regard ;  but  the  result  seems 
to  render  such  a  hypothesis  at  least  probable,  and  the 


HOOD'S  ASSAULTS  REPULSED 

rapidity  and  impetuosity  of  Hood's  advance  and  assault 
add  to  that  probability. 

It  is  interesting  to  consider  what  would  probably  have 
been  the  march  of  events  if  we  had  retreated  from  Duck 
River  in  the  night  of  November  28,  upon  first  learning 
that  Hood  had  forced  the  crossing  of  that  river.  We 
would  have  reached  Franklin  early  on  the  29th,  could  have 
rebuilt  the  bridges  and  crossed  the  Harpeth  that  day  and 
night,  and  Hood  could  not  have  got  up  in  time  to  make 
any  serious  attack  that  day.  So  far  as  our  little  army 
was  concerned,  for  the  moment  all  would  have  been  well. 
But  Hood  would  have  been  in  front  of  Franklin,  with  his 
whole  army,  artillery,  and  ammunition-trains,  by  dawn 
of  day  on  the  30th ;  he  could  have  forced  the  crossing  of 
the  Harpeth  above  Franklin  early  that  day,  compelled  us 
to  retire  to  Nashville,  and  interposed  his  cavalry  between 
Nashville  and  Murfreesboro'  that  night  or  early  on  De 
cember  1.  Thus  Thomas's  remaining  reinforcements  from 
the  south  and  east  would  have  been  cut  off,  and  he  might 
have  been  attacked  in  Nashville,  not  later  than  December 
2,  with  several  thousand  fewer  men  than  he  finally  had 
there,  a  large  part  of  his  army  —  A.  J.  Smith's  three  divi 
sions  —  not  fully  ready  for  battle,  and  with  fewer  effective 
cavalry;  while  Hood  would  have  had  his  whole  army, 
fresh  and  spirited,  without  the  losses  and  depression 
caused  by  its  defeat  at  Franklin,  ready  to  attack  an  infe 
rior  force  at  Nashville  or  to  cross  the  Cumberland  and 
invade  Kentucky.  In  short,  the  day  gained  at  Duck 
River  and  Spring  Hill  was  indispensable  to  Thomas's  suc 
cess.  The  time  gained  by  that  "  temerity  "  made  success 
possible.  The  additional  time  and  relative  strength  gained 
by  Hood's  disastrous  repulse  at  Franklin  made  final  suc 
cess  easy  and  certain.  A  retreat  at  any  time  before  nine 
o'clock  A.  M.  on  the  29th  would  have  led  to  substantially 
the  same  result  as  if  begun  at  2  A.  M. 

If  the  plan  adopted  and  ordered  early  in  the  morning  of 


FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

November  29  had  been  carried  out,  by  which  the  line 
of  Duck  River  would  have  been  abandoned  in  the  middle 
of  that  day,  the  head  of  the  column  from  Spring  Hill 
would  have  arrived  at  Franklin  about  midnight,  expecting 
to  cross  the  Harpeth  without  delay ;  but,  under  the  condi 
tions  actually  found  to  exist  at  Franklin,  not  much  prog 
ress  toward  providing  the  means  of  crossing  the  Harpeth 
could  have  been  made  before  daylight  in  the  morning; 
therefore  our  condition  for  battle  at  Franklin  would  not 
have  been  materially  different,  in  time  or  otherwise,  from 
what  it  actually  was.  Hood's  artillery,  as  well  as  his 
infantry,  could  have  reached  Spring  Hill  before  daylight 
on  the  30th,  and  would  have  had  practically  a  clear  road 
to  Franklin  ;  for  the  enemy's  superior  cavalry  having  been 
interposed  between  our  cavalry  and  infantry,  it  was  ne 
cessary  for  our  infantry,  artillery,  and  trains  to  retreat 
from  Spring  Hill  to  Franklin  in  one  compact  column.  A 
small  force  could  not  have  been  left  at  Spring  Hill,  as 
had  been  suggested,  to  delay  Hood's  advance,  because  of 
the  imminent  danger  that  it  would  be  attacked  in  flank 
and  rear  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  thus  cut  off  and 
captured;  hence  Hood  could  have  made  his  attack  at 
Franklin  about  noon,  instead  of  at  4:30  P.  M.,  and  with  a 
large  force  of  artillery  as  well  as  of  infantry.  Such  an  at 
tack  would,  of  course,  have  been  far  more  formidable 
than  that  which  was  actually  made ;  whether  it  could 
have  been  successfully  resisted  from  noon  until  dark  can 
only  be  conjectured.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  note  that 
the  delay  of  Hood's  advance  very  greatly  diminished  the 
force  of  his  attack  at  Franklin,  besides  making  his  arrival 
before  that  place  so  late  that  he  could  not  turn  that  posi 
tion  that  day  by  crossing  the  Harpeth  above.  The  tena 
city  with  which  the  crossing  of  Duck  River  at  Columbia 
was  held  was  well  rewarded  at  Franklin. 

The  question  has  been  raised  whether  we  ought  not 
to  have  held  our  position  in  front  of  Franklin  after  hav- 


THE  ADVANTAGE  OF  CONTINUING  THE  RETREAT 

ing  repulsed  Hood's  attack  and  inflicted  such  heavy 
losses  upon  his  troops.  General  Sherman  himself  im- 
pliedly  made  this  suggestion  when  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Thomas  ought  to  have  turned  on  Hood 
after  his  repulse  at  Franklin;  and  General  Jacob  D. 
Cox,  who  had  been  in  the  thickest  of  the  fight  all  the 
time,  with  high  soldierly  instinct  sent  me,  by  one  of  my 
staff  officers,  the  suggestion  that  we  stay  there  and  finish 
the  fight  the  next  day.  A  fight  to  a  finish,  then  and 
there,  might  quite  probably  have  given  us  the  prize. 
But  the  reasons  for  declining  that  tempting  opportunity 
for  complete  victory  will,  I  believe,  seem  perfectly  clear 
when  fully  stated. 

In  anticipation  of  orders  from  General  Thomas  to  fall 
back  to  Nashville  that  night,  the  trains  had  been  ordered 
to  the  rear  before  the  battle  began,  so  as  to  clear  the  way 
for  the  march  of  our  troops,  and  to  render  impossible  any 
interference  by  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Our  ammunition 
had  been  well-nigh  exhausted  in  the  battle  at  Franklin, 
as  is  shown  by  my  telegram  to  General  Thomas  to  send  a 
million  rounds  to  Brentwood,  thinking  he  might  want 
me  to  hold  Hood  there  until  he  could  get  A.  J.  Smith's 
troops  in  position  and  supplied  with  ammunition.  If  I 
had  needed  any  such  warning,  that  given  me  by  the  gen 
eral  in  his  despatch,1  "  But  you  must  look  out  that  the 
enemy  does  not  still  persist,"  would  have  been  sufficient 
to  deter  me  from  fighting  him  the  next  day  with  my 
"back  to  the  river."  Besides,  it  is  not  easy  to  estimate 
at  midnight  exactly  the  results  of  a  desperate  battle  then 
just  terminated.  But  all  this  is  insignificant  when  com 
pared  with  the  controlling  reason.  I  had  then  fully  ac 
complished  the  object  (and  I  could  not  then  know  how 
much  more)  for  which  the  command  in  the  field  had  for 
a  time  been  intrusted  to  me.  My  junction  with  rein 
forcements  at  Nashville  was  assured,  as  also  the  future 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1171. 


188  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

success  of  the  army  under  my  superior  in  command. 
Why  run  any  further  risk  ?  If  it  had  been  possible  for 
me,  at  that  moment  of  supreme  satisfaction,  to  have  had 
any  thought  of  self,  I  might  perhaps  have  considered 
the  project  of  turning  upon  my  adversary  at  dawn  the 
next  morning,  in  the  hope  of  routing  his  dispirited  army. 
But  if  any  man  thinks  such  a  thought  possible  under 
such  circumstances,  he  knows  nothing  about  the  char 
acter  of  a  patriotic  soldier.  If  the  troops  I  then  had 
at  Franklin  had  been  the  sole  reliance  for  ultimate  suc 
cess  in  the  campaign,  nothing  could  have  been  clearer 
than  my  duty  to  turn  and  strike  with  all  my  might  at 
dawn  the  next  day. 

(A  copy  of  all  the  correspondence  between  General 
Thomas  and  myself,  with  annotations  showing  the 
time  of  receipt  of  the  several  despatches  from  General 
Thomas,  thereby  showing  their  influence  upon  my  ac 
tions,  has  been  placed  on  file  at  the  War  Department. 
These  copies  of  despatches,  with  annotations,  are  in 
tended  mainly  for  the  military  student  who  may  care  to 
make  a  close  and  critical  study  of  such  military  opera 
tions.  The  original  records  of  such  correspondence  are 
often  worse  than  useless,  for  the  reason  that  the  exact 
time  of  sending  and  receipt  of  a  despatch  is  so  often  omit 
ted.  All  sent  or  received  the  same  day  are  frequently 
printed  in  the  records  indiscriminately,  so  that  the  last  is 
as  likely  to  come  first  as  otherwise ;  and,  sometimes,  his 
torians  have  used  despatches  as  if  they  had  been  received 
at  the  time  they  were  sent,  though  in  fact  many  hours  or 
some  days  had  elapsed.  My  annotations  were  made  in 
1882-3,  at  Black  Point,  San  Francisco,  California,  with 
the  assistance  of  my  ever  faithful  and  efficient  aide,  Colo 
nel  William  M.  Wherry,  now  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  2d 
United  States  Infantry,  and  were  attached  to  the  copies 
of  the  records  in  1886.) 


CHAPTER  XI 

THE  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS  PREVIOUS  TO 
THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  —  THE  UNTENABLE  POSITION 
AT  PULASKI — AVAILABLE  TROOPS  WHICH  WERE  NOT 
SENT  TO  THE  FRONT  —  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GEN 
ERAL  THOMAS  —  INSTRUCTIONS  USUALLY  RECEIVED  TOO 
LATE  —  ADVANTAGE  OF  DELAYING  THE  RETREAT  FROM 
DUCK  RIVER  —  NO  SERIOUS  DANGER  AT  SPRING  HILL 
—  GENERAL  THOMAS  HOPING  THAT  HOOD  MIGHT  BE 
DELAYED  FOR  THREE  DAYS  AT  FRANKLIN. 

I  WILL  now  add  to  the  foregoing  sketch  what  seems 
to  me  necessary  to  a  full  understanding  of  the  op 
erations  preceding  and  immediately  following  the  battle 
of  Franklin,  referring  briefly,  as  necessary  to  an  exact  un 
derstanding  of  some  things  that  occurred,  to  the  relation 
in  which  I  stood  to  General  Thomas.  He  was  my  senior 
by  thirteen  years  as  a  graduate  of  the  Military  Academy, 
where  I  had  known  him  well  as  my  highly  respected 
instructor.  He  had  won  high  distinction  in  Mexico,  and 
had  been  twice  brevetted  for  gallant  services  in  that 
war.  He  had  seen  far  more  service  in  the  field  than 
I  had,  and  in  much  larger  commands,  though  almost 
always  under  the  immediate  command  of  a  superior — 
Buell,  Rosecrans,  and  Sherman.  Even  in  the  Atlanta 
campaign,  then  recently  ended,  his  command  was  nearly 
five  times  as  large  as  mine.  In  1864  he  had  already  be 
come  a  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army,  having 
risen  to  that  rank  by  regular  stages,  while  I  was  only  a 
captain  thirty-three  years  of  age.  It  will  also  be  neces- 


190  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

sary  for  the  reader  to  realize  that  when  I  asked  for  and 
received  orders  to  report  with  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
to  General  Thomas  in  Tennessee,  I  felt  in  the  fullest 
degree  all  the  deference  and  respect  which  were  due  to 
his  seniority  in  years  and  rank  and  services. 

When  I  went  back  to  Tennessee  my  only  anxiety 
respecting  the  situation,  so  far  as  G-eneral  Thomas's 
personality  affected  it,  was  on  account  of  his  constitu 
tional  habit  of  very  deliberate  action.  I  was  appre 
hensive  that,  in  some  emergency  created  by  the  action 
of  the  daring  and  reckless,  though  not  over-talented, 
antagonist  he  would  have  to  meet,  General  Thomas 
might  not  be  able  to  determine  and  act  quickly  enough 
to  save  from  defeat  his  army,  then  understood  to  be  so 
far  inferior  to  the  enemy  in  numerical  strength.  I  had 
far  too  high  an  opinion  of  his  capacity  as  a  general  to 
doubt  for  a  moment  that  with  sufficient  time  in  which 
to  mature  his  plans  to  resist  Hood's  invasion  and  to  exe 
cute  those  plans  so  far  as  was  in  his  power,  he  would  do 
all  that  the  wisest  generalship  could  suggest. 

I  will  also  refer  to  the  official  returns  of  that  period, 
which  show  what  troops  General  Thomas  had  elsewhere 
in  his  department  and  available  for  service,  as  well  as 
the  effective  strength  of  the  force  then  under  my  im 
mediate  command  in  the  field,  and  that  of  General  A.  J. 
Smith's  three  divisions,  which  had  been  ordered  from 
Missouri  to  join  the  forces  of  General  Thomas.  In  his 
entire  department,  excluding  the  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
third  corps  in  the  field,  the  infantry  and  artillery  force, 
present  for  duty  equipped,  officers  and  men,  November 
20,  1864,  amounted  to  29,322 ;  the  two  corps  in  the  field, 
to  24,265 ;  and  A.  J.  Smith's  corps,  to  about  10,000.  The 
entire  cavalry  force,  mounted  and  equipped,  was  about 
4800 ;  that  unmounted,  about  6700. 

It  is  necessary  to  exclude  from  this  statement  of 
troops  available  for  service  in  middle  Tennessee  those 


THE  CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS 

in  Kentucky  and  East  Tennessee,  belonging  to  the  De 
partment  of  the  Ohio,  for  the  reason  that  just  at  that 
time  unusual  demand  was  made  upon  those  troops  for 
service  in  East  Tennessee,  where  some  of  the  State  forces 
had  met  with  disaster.  This  probably  accounts  in  part 
for  the  discrepancies  in  General  Sherman's  estimates  re 
ferred  to  later. 

Hood's  forces  were  then  understood  by  General  Thomas 
to  consist  of  from  40,000  to  45,000  infantry  and  artillery, 
and  10,000  to  12,000  cavalry,  including  Forrest's  command. 
I  find  from  General  Sherman's  despatch  to  Thomas, 
dated  October  19,  that  his  estimate  of  Hood's  strength, 
October  19,  1864,  was  about  40,000  men  of  all  arms. 

I  do  not  find  in  General  Thomas's  report  or  despatches 
any  exact  statement  of  his  own  estimate;  but  the  fol 
lowing  language  in  his  official  report  of  January  20, 
1865,  seems  quite  sufficiently  explicit  on  that  point: 
"Two  divisions  of  infantry,  under  Major-General  A.  J. 
Smith,  were  reported  on  their  way  to  join  me  from  Mis 
souri,  which,  with  several  one-year  regiments  then  arriv 
ing  in  the  department,  and  detachments  collected  from 
points  of  minor  importance,  would  swell  my  command, 
when  concentrated,  to  an  army  nearly  as  large  as  that 
of  the  enemy.  Had  the  enemy  delayed  his  advance  a 
week  or  ten  days  longer,  I  would  have  been  ready  to 
meet  him  at  some  point  south  of  Duck  River.  .  .  ." 

This  must  of  course  be  accepted  as  General  Thomas's 
own  estimate  of  the  enemy's  strength,  on  which  his  own 
action  was  based.  And  it  should  be  remembered  that 
military  operations  must  be  based  upon  the  information 
then  in  possession  of  the  commander,  and  just  criticism 
must  also  be  based  upon  his  action  upon  that  informa 
tion,  and  not  upon  any  afterward  obtained. 

General  Sherman  estimated  the  force  left  with  Thomas l 
at  about  45,000  (exclusive  of  the  Fourth  and  Twenty- 

l  See  his  "Memoirs/'  Vol.  H,  pp.  162,  163. 


192  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

third  corps,  and  Smith's  corps  coming  from  Missouri), 
in  which  he  included  about  8000  or  10,000  new  troops  at 
Nashville,  and  the  same  number  of  civil  employees  of  the 
quartermaster's  department.  The  Fourth  and  Twenty- 
third  corps  he  estimated  at  27,000  men,  and  Smith's  at 
10,000,  and  the  cavalry  in  the  field  at  7700.  All  this 
was  sufficiently  accurate  if  no  account  were  taken  of 
men  unfit  for  duty  or  not  equipped.  But  the  official 
returns  show  that  the  number  of  officers  and  men  present 
for  duty  equipped  amounted  to  29,322  in  the  department, 
and  in  the  two  corps  in  the  field  to  24,265,  and  in  the 
cavalry  in  the  field,  to  4800.  There  were  therefore  the 
following  discrepancies  in  Sherman's  estimate,  due  in 
part  to  the  discharge  of  men  whose  terms  had  expired,  as 
well  as  to  the  usual  number  of  men  not  equipped  for 
duty  in  the  ranks:  in  the  troops  in  the  department,  a 
discrepancy  of  8000;  in  the  army  corps  in  the  field, 
2735;  in  the  cavalry  in  the  field,  2900 x  —  a  total  dis 
crepancy  of  13,635.  That  is  to  say,  Sherman's  own  esti 
mate  was  in  excess  of  Thomas's  actual  strength  by  a 
force  greater  than  either  of  the  two  army  corps  he  sent 
back  to  help  Thomas.  If  he  had  sent  back  another  large 
corps, —  say  the  Fourteenth,  13,000  strong,  having  besides 
the  moral  strength  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was  Thomas's 
old  corps, —  the  discrepancy  in  his  own  estimate  would 
doubtless  have  been  sufficiently  overcome,  and  the  line 
of  Duck  Eiver  at  least,  if  not  that  of  the  Tennessee,  as 
Sherman  had  assured  Grant,  would  have  been  securely 
held  until  A.  J.  Smith  arrived  and  Thomas  could  assume 
the  offensive. 
Hood's  force  was  ready  to  invade  Tennessee  in  one 

1  It  appears  from  General  Thomas's  fore  the  enemy  forced  the  crossing  of 
report  that  he  did  have  in  his  depart-  Duck  Eiver.  The  remaining  2900 
ment,  by  November  29,  the  mounted  were  not  available  for  service  in  the 
cavalry  force  stated  by  General  Sher-  field  until  after  the  crisis  of  the  cam- 
man — viz. ,7700;  but  only  4800  of  that  paign  was  passed  so  far  as  the  cav- 
force  joined  the  army  in  the  field  be-  airy  could  affect  it. 


MAP  OF  OPERATIONS  IN  MIDDLE  TENNESSEE  AND  NORTH  ALABAMA,  1863-65. 


THE  UNTENABLE  POSITION  AT   PULASKI 

compact  army,  while  Thomas  then  had  in  the  field  ready 
to  oppose  it  a  decidedly  inferior  force,  even  admitting 
the  lowest  estimate  made  of  that  hostile  army. 

The  superiority  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  made  it  neces 
sary  that  the  garrisons  of  all  essential  posts  and  the 
guards  of  important  railroad  bridges  should  be  strong 
enough  to  resist  attack  from  a  large  force  of  dismounted 
cavalry  and  light  artillery,  so  long  as  Thomas  was  com 
pelled  to  remain  on  the  defensive.  The  records  of  that 
time  indicate  that  Thomas  then  appreciated,  what  mature 
consideration  now  confirms,  that  if  Hood's  advance  had 
induced  him  (Thomas)  to  draw  off  sufficient  troops  from 
garrisons  and  railroad  guards  to  enable  him  to  give  bat 
tle  on  equal  terms  to  Hood  at  Pulaski  or  Columbia,  a 
raid  by  Hood's  cavalry  would  probably  have  resulted  in 
the  destruction  or  capture  of  nearly  everything  in  the 
rear,  not  only  in  Tennessee,  but  also  in  Kentucky,  ex 
cept  perhaps  Nashville  and  Chattanooga.  It  was  only 
wise  forethought  which  suggested  that  such  might  be 
the  nature  of  Hood's  plans,  especially  in  view  of  the 
season  of  the  year  and  the  condition  of  the  roads,  which 
made  aggressive  operations  of  a  large  army,  where  all  the 
hard  roads  were  held  by  the  opposing  forces,  extremely 
difficult.  The  official  returns,  now  published  in  the  War 
Records,1  show  that  the  troops  were  sufficient  only  for  the 
purpose  of  garrisons  and  guards  and  defensive  action  in 
the  field  until  after  the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith ;  and  this 
is  true  even  if  Hood's  cavalry  force  was  no  larger  than 
that  which  now  appears  from  Forrest's  report  —  5000 ;  for 
Forrest  might  easily  have  got  a  day  or  two  the  start  of 
his  pursuer  at  any  time,  as  had  often  been  done  on 
both  sides  during  the  war. 

It  is  true  that  Sherman's  instructions  to  Thomas  ap 
pear  to  have  contemplated  the  possibility,  at  least,  that 
Thomas  might  be  reduced  to  the  extreme  necessity  of 

i  See  Vol.  XLV,  parts  i  and  ii. 


13 


194          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

holding  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur  defensively, 
even  during  a  long  siege,  and  of  abandoning  all  points 
of  less  importance  than  the  three  named,  so  that  all  the 
garrisons  of  such  minor  points  and  all  the  railroad 
guards  might  be  concentrated  with  the  garrisons  of  those 
three  important  strategic  points,  for  their  defense  during 
a  siege.  This  must  of  course  have  referred  to  the  de 
fensive  period  of  the  campaign  only,  for  the  moment  that 
Thomas's  reinforcements  should  enable  him  to  assume 
the  offensive  all  the  necessities  above  referred  to  must 
have  disappeared.  It  must,  I  think,  be  admitted  as  be 
yond  question  that,  in  view  of  his  daily  expectation  of 
the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  from  Missouri,  Thomas 
was  perfectly  right  in  not  acting  upon  Sherman's  sug 
gestion  of  extreme  defensive  action,  and  thus  abandoning 
his  railroads  to  destruction. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  Thomas's  reinforcements  had  ar 
rived  in  time  to  enable  him  to  take  the  initiative  by  mov 
ing  against  Hood  from  Pulaski  or  Columbia,  then  he 
might  have  drawn  quite  largely  from  his  garrisons  in  the 
rear  to  reinforce  his  army  in  the  field,  since  his  "  active 
offensive "  operations  would  have  fully  occupied  Hood's 
cavalry,  and  thus  have  prevented  a  raid  in  Thomas's  rear. 
But  until  he  was  strong  enough  to  advance,  unless  forced 
to  the  extreme  necessity  of  defending  Nashville,  Chatta 
nooga,  and  Decatur,  and  abandoning  all  else,  Thomas 
could  not  prudently  have  reduced  his  garrisons  or  guards. 

I  knew  nothing  at  that  time  of  Sherman's  instruc 
tions  to  Thomas,  and  little  about  the  actual  strength  of 
Thomas's  garrisons  and  railroad  guards.  But  I  was 
under  the  impression  that  some  reinforcements  must  be 
available  from  his  own  department,  and  felt  a  little  im 
patient  about  the  long  delay  in  their  arrival,  and  hence 
telegraphed  General  Thomas,  November  24,  suggesting 
the  concentration  of  R.  S.  Granger's  troops  and  those 
along  the  railroad.  The  despatches  to  me  at  that  time, 


AVAILABLE  TROOPS  NOT  SENT  TO  THE  FRONT        ^95 

to  be  found  in  the  War  Records,1  fully  show  the  earnest 
determination  of  General  Thomas  to  send  forward  rein 
forcements  as  soon  as  possible,  and  even  in  detail,  and 
to  fight  Hood  at  or  near  Columbia.  Indeed,  those  de 
spatches  misled  me  somewhat  as  to  what  I  might  expect. 
Notwithstanding  this  earnest  desire,  General  Thomas 
does  not  appear  to  have  realized  the  existence  of  a  force 
available  for  the  purpose  he  had  in  view.  The  railroad 
guards  from  Atlanta  to  Chattanooga  or  Dalton,  with 
drawn  after  Sherman  started  on  his  march,  and  conva 
lescents,  men  returning  from  furlough  and  others  going 
to  the  front,  but  failing  to  reach  Sherman's  army  in  time, 
all  assembled  at  Chattanooga,  made  a  surplus  force  at 
that  point  of  about  7000  men.2  Some  of  these  troops 
had  been  sent  to  East  Tennessee,  as  well  as  all  the 
mounted  troops  available  in  Kentucky,  for  the  purpose 
of  retrieving  the  disaster  which  had  befallen  the  Tennes 
see  military  governor's  troops  there,  under  Gillem.  But 
all  sent  from  Chattanooga  had  been  returned  by  Novem 
ber  21,  about  the  time  when  Hood's  advance  from  Flor 
ence  had  become  certainly  known.  Yet  it  does  not 
appear  that  General  Thomas  even  inquired  what  force 
was  available  at  Chattanooga  until  November  25,  when, 
in  reply  to  a  telegram,  he  learned  that  Steedman  'could 
raise  5000  men  (in  fact,  7000),  in  addition  to  all  necessary 
garrisons  and  guards,  "to  threaten  enemy  in  rear,"  in  case 
he  should  "  get  on  Chattanooga  railroad."  It  may  then 
(November  25)  have  been  too  late  to  send  those  5000  or 
7000  men  to  the  line  of  Duck  River,  or  perhaps  even  to 
Franklin.  They  were  sent  to  Nashville,  reaching  there 
after  the  battle  of  Franklin.  If  they  had  been  ordered 
to  Columbia  by  rail,  via  Nashville,  as  soon  as  Hood's  ad 
vance  was  known  to  General  Thomas,  they  must  have 
reached  Duck  River  some  time  before  Hood  attempted 

1  See  Vols.  XXXIX  and  XLV. 

2  See  General  Thomas's  report :  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  33. 


196  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

to  cross  that  stream.  This  addition  to  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third  corps  would  have  raised  the  infantry  in  the 
field  to  nearly  an  equality  with  that  of  Hood  in  fact, 
though  not  nearly  to  what  Hood's  force  was  then  sup 
posed  to  be.  That  increased  force  would  doubtless  have 
made  it  possible  to  prevent  Hood  from  crossing  Duck 
Eiver  anywhere  near  Columbia  for  several  days,  and  per 
haps  to  force  him  to  select  some  other  line  of  operations, 
or  to  content  himself  with  sending  his  cavalry  on  an 
other  raid.  In  any  case,  the  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith  a  few 
days  later  would  have  enabled  Thomas  to  assume  the 
aggressive  before  Hood  could  have  struck  a  serious  blow 
at  Thomas's  army  in  the  field.  In  view  of  the  earnest 
desire  of  General  Thomas  to  reinforce  the  army  in  the 
field  at  Columbia,  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any  rational 
explanation  of  the  fact  that  he  did  not  send  those  7000 
men  from  Chattanooga  to  Columbia.  His  own  report 
states  the  fact  about  those  "  7000  men  belonging  to  his 
[General  Sherman's]  column,"  but  does  not  give  any 
reason  why  they  were  not  used  in  his  "  measures  to  act  on 
the  defensive."  As  General  Thomas  says :  "  These  men 
had  been  organized  into  brigades,  to  be  made  available  at 
such  points  as  they  might  be  needed."  At  what  other 
point  could  they  possibly  be  so  much  needed  as  that 
where  the  two  corps  were  trying  to  oppose  the  advance 
of  the  enemy  long  enough  for  Thomas  to  get  up  his  other 
reinforcements  ? 

General  Thomas  appears  to  have  been  puzzled  by 
doubt  whether  Hood  would  aim  for  Nashville  or  some 
point  on  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  and  not 
to  have  realized  that  his  own  plan  should  have  been  to 
concentrate  all  his  available  active  force  into  one  army, 
so  as  to  move  against  the  enemy  with  the  greatest  pos 
sible  force,  no  matter  what  the  enemy  might  do.  With 
the  exception  of  those  7000  men  belonging  to  Sherman's 
column,  Thomas  had  for  necessary  garrisons  and  railroad 


AVAILABLE  TROOPS  NOT  SENT  TO  THE  FRONT    197 

guards  essentially  the  same  number  of  men  as  had  been 
employed  in  that  service  all  the  preceding  summer, —  no 
more  and  no  less, — and  the  necessity  for  that  service  had 
not  been  very  much  diminished,  except  at  and  about 
Decatur,  Stevenson,  and  Tullahoma,  which  Hood's  ad 
vance  from  Florence  had  rendered  of  no  further  conse 
quence  at  that  time.  But  the  7000  men  available  at 
Chattanooga  ought  unquestionably  to  have  been  sent  to 
Columbia,  or  at  least  moved  up  to  Nashville  or  Franklin, 
where  they  could  "join  the  main  force,"  as  suggested 
in  my  despatch  of  November  24  to  Thomas,1  instead  of 
being  left  at  Chattanooga  "  to  threaten  enemy  in  rear." 2 
As  suggested  in  my  despatch  of  November  24,  R.  S. 
Granger's  force  and  others  along  the  railroad  south  of 
Duck  River,  as  well  as  Steedman's,  might  have  joined 
the  main  force  at  Columbia,  if  orders  had  been  given  in 
time,  thus  increasing  the  army  in  the  field  by  fully  10,000 
men. 

If  R.  S.  Granger's  force  had  been  left  at  Decatur,  it 
would  have  drawn  off  from  Hood's  invading  army  at 
least  an  equal  force  to  guard  his  bridges  at  Florence,  or 
else  would  have  destroyed  those  bridges  and  cut  off  his 
retreat  after  the  battle  of  Nashville.  This  was  prac 
tically  what  had  been  suggested  by  Sherman  in  his  in 
structions  to  Thomas.  But  the  withdrawal  of  Granger's 
troops  and  their  detention  at  Murfreesboro',  instead  of 
sending  them  to  "  join  the  main  force,"  served  no  good 
purpose  at  the  time,  and  prevented  their  use  in  the  cap 
ture  of  Hood's  defeated  and  retreating  troops.  The  fail 
ure  to  make  this  timely  concentration  was  the  one  great 
fault  in  Thomas's  action,  instead  of  his  delay  in  attacking 
at  Nashville,  for  which  he  was  so  much  criticized.  But 
Hood's  repulse  at  Franklin  had  made  this  previous  mis 
take  a  matter  of  past  history,  and  hence  it  was  lost  sight 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1017. 

2  Thomas  to  Steedman,  November  25 :  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.1050. 


198  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  in  view  of  the  imminent  danger  afterward  supposed  to 
exist  at  Nashville,  just  as  the  brilliant  victory  at  Nash 
ville  was  accepted  as  demonstrating  the  wisdom  of  all 
that  had  gone  before,  even  including  Sherman's  division 
of  his  army  between  himself  and  Thomas  before  his 
march  to  the  sea.  Such  is  the  logic  of  contemporaneous 
military  history ! 

In  my  long  conversations  with  General  Grant  on  the 
steamer  Rhode  Island  in  January,  1865,  I  explained  to 
him  fully  the  error  into  which  he  had  been  led  in  respect 
to  Thomas's  action  or  non-action  at  Nashville  in  Decem 
ber,  and  he  seemed  to  be  perfectly  satisfied  on  that  point. 
But  he  did  not  ask  me  anything  about  what  had  occurred 
before  the  battle  of  Franklin,  and  hence  I  did  not  tell 
him  anything. 

In  connection  with  the  action  of  General  Thomas  pre 
vious  to  the  battle  of  Franklin,  the  following  instructions 
from  General  Sherman  on  October  31  are  important: 
"  You  must  unite  all  your  men  into  one  army,  and  aban 
don  all  minor  points,  if  you  expect  to  defeat  Hood 
General  Schofield  is  marching  to-day  from  here.  .  .  ." 1 
Again,  on  the  same  date,  he  telegraphed :  "  Bear  in  mind 
my  instructions  as  to  concentration,  and  not  let  Hood 
catch  you  in  detail."2 

Sherman  thus  gave  the  most  emphatic  warning  against 
the  mistake  which  Thomas  nevertheless  made  by  failing 
to  concentrate  all  his  own  available  troops  until  it  was 
too  late  to  meet  Hood's  advance,  thus  leaving  two  corps 
to  bear  the  entire  brunt  of  battle  until  the  crisis  of  the 
campaign  was  passed  at  Franklin. 

The  following  correspondence  relating  to  the  command 
of  the  army  in  the  field,  to  increasing  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third  corps,  and  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  R.  S. 
Granger's  troops,  and  the  reason  why  Thomas  should  as 
sume  the  offensive  as  soon  as  possible,  is  also  important, 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  535.         2  iud.,  p.  536. 


CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS  199 

especially  as  showing  that  Sherman  expected  the  two 
corps  to  be  increased  to  50,000  men,  and  that  Thomas 
should  command  in  person : 

KINGSTON,  November  7, 1864, 10  A.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS  :  Despatch  of  12 : 30  p.  M.  yesterday 
received.  General  Schofield  is  entitled  to  the  command  lover 
Stanley]  by  virtue  of  a  recent  decision  of  the  War  Department. 
I  would  advise  you  to  add  to  those  corps  new  regiments  until 
they  number  25,000  men  each.  If  Beauregard  advances  from 
Corinth,  it  will  be  better  for  you  to  command  in  person.  Your 
presence  alone  will  give  confidence.  Granger  should  continue 
all  the  time  to  threaten  the  rear,  and  as  soon  as  possible  some 
demonstration  should  be  made  from  the  direction  of  Vicksburg 
against  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad.  Also  I  want  you  to  as 
sume  the  offensive  as  quick  as  possible,  as  I  have  reason  to  be 
lieve  all  of  Beauregard's  army  is  not  there,  but  that  he  has  also 

divided  his  forces. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Major-Gen eral.1 

On  the  same  day  Thomas  telegraphed  to  Sherman  in 
reply  to  the  above : 

It  is,  and  always  has  been,  my  intention  to  command  the  troops 
with  me  in  person.  My  object  in  giving  the  preference  to  Gen 
eral  Schofield  [over  Stanley]  was  merely  that  he  should  exercise 
command  should  accidental  circumstances  prevent  my  presence.2 

Sherman  and  Thomas  were  equally  right  —  Sherman 
in  saying,  "  It  will  be  better  for  you  to  command  in  per 
son.  Your  presence  alone  will  give  confidence";  and 
Thomas  in  replying,  "  It  is,  and  always  has  been,  my  in 
tention  to  command  the  troops  with  me  in  person."  The 
proper  place  for  a  general-in-chief  is  with  his  army  in  the 
field,  where  battles  are  to  be  fought,  and  not  in  the  rear, 
where  there  is  little  to  do  but  to  assemble  reinforcements, 
which  his  chief  of  staff  could  do  as  well  as  he.  Thomas 
could  have  reached  the  army  at  Columbia  by  rail  in  two 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  685. 


200  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

hours,  and  at  Franklin  in  one  hour ;  yet  he  left  a  subor 
dinate  to  fight  against  a  superior  force,  while  he  remained 
in  Nashville  until  he  had  collected  there  an  army  superior 
to  that  of  his  adversary.  But  General  Thomas  must 
have  had  some  reason  which  seemed  to  him  good  and 
sufficient  for  his  absence  from  the  field.  He  was  the  last 
man  in  the  world  to  shrink  from  his  duty  in  battle. 

Before  the  above  correspondence  between  General  Sher 
man  and  General  Thomas  was  known  to  me  I  had  writ 
ten  the  following :  "  The  relations  existing  between  Gen 
eral  Thomas  and  me,  and  the  confidence  he  had  shown 
in  all  his  despatches,  commencing  with  those  received  at 
Pulaski,  left  little  room  for  hesitation  or  doubt  about 
doing,  in  every  emergency,  what  my  own  judgment  dic 
tated,  as  if  I  had  been  in  chief  command,  confident  of  the 
approval  which  he  so  fully  expressed  after  the  events. 
Yet  my  experience  then,  as  always,  led  me  to  the  opinion 
that  it  is  better  for  the  general-in-chief,  in  all  operations 
of  a  critical  nature,  to  be  present  with  the  troops  in  the 
field,  if  possible ;  he  must  be  able  to  act  with  more  confi 
dence  than  any  subordinate  can  possibly  feel.  He  was 
the  sole  judge  as  to  the  necessity  of  his  remaining  in 
Nashville,  and  no  good  reason  could  now  be  given  for 
questioning  the  correctness  of  his  judgment.  It  is  only 
intended  as  an  expression  of  a  general  rule  for  the  con 
sideration  of  military  students." 

General  Thomas's  orders  to  General  D.  S.  Stanley  upon 
his  being  sent  to  Pulaski,  and  his  subsequent  orders  to  me, 
dated  November  19,  to  fight  the  enemy  at  Pulaski  if  he 
advanced  against  that  place,  were,  as  shown  in  the  follow 
ing  despatch  from  me,  quite  inapplicable  to  the  then 
existing  situation: 

PULASKI,  November  20,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  THOMAS  :  After  full  consideration  I  am  of 
the  opinion  that  this  is  not  the  best  position  for  the  main  body 
of  our  troops,  at  least  so  long  as  we  are  inferior  in  strength  to 


CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS  201 

the  enemy.  If  Hood  advances,  whether  his  design  be  to  strike 
this  place  or  Columbia,  he  must  move  via  Lawrenceburg  on  ac 
count  of  the  difficulty  of  crossing  Shoal  Creek.  Under  cover 
of  his  cavalry,  he  can  probably  reach  Lawrenceburg  without 
our  knowledge,  and  move  his  forces  a  day's  march  from  that 
point  toward  Columbia  before  we  could  learn  his  designs,  and 
thus  reach  that  point  ahead  of  us ;  or  he  might  move  upon  this 
place,  and  while  demonstrating  against  it  throw  his  forces  on  to 
the  pike  north  of  us,  and  thus  cut  us  off  from  Columbia  and 
from  our  reinforcements.  Lynnville  would  be  free  from  these 
objections  as  a  point  of  concentration  for  our  forces.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  force  at  this  point  covers  the  Nashville  and  Chat 
tanooga  Railroad  to  the  best  advantage ;  but  a  brigade  in  the 
inclosed  works  at  this  place  could  hold  out  against  any  force  until 
relieved,  while  the  main  force  at  Lynnville  would  be  sure  of  con 
centrating  with  the  troops  still  in  rear.  I  respectfully  submit 
these  views  for  your  consideration. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

To  this  General  Thomas  replied  at  once : 

NASHVILLE,  November  20, 1864. 

GENERAL  SCHOFIELD  :  Your  despatch  of  2  p.  M,  this  day  just 
received.  Two  other  despatches  of  to-day  were  received  previous 
to  this  one.  Do  you  mean  that  one  brigade  in  the  intrenchments 
at  Pulaski  could  hold  out  for  a  week  !  The  reason  I  ask  is,  Gen 
eral  Smith  cannot  get  here  before  next  Friday.  If  one  brigade 
can  hold  the  fortifications  of  Pulaski  for  a  week  or  ten  days,  you 
are  authorized  to  leave  a  brigade  or  a  division  there,  and  con 
centrate  the  rest  of  your  force  at  Lynnville  preparatory  to  sup 
port  Hatch,  or  fall  back  on  Columbia,  whichever  may  be  neces 
sary.  Part  of  Ruger's  troops  will  start  for  Columbia  to-night, 
the  remainder  at  two  o'clock  to-morrow,  and  the  railroad  super 
intendent  says  he  will  have  them  at  Columbia  by  to-morrow 
night.  The  very  moment  Smith's  troops  arrive  I  will  start  them 
for  Columbia.  In  any  event,  all  surplus  transportation  should 
be  sent  to  Columbia.  I  have  just  received  General  Hatch's  of 
this  P.  M.,  and  it  seems  from  it  that  Hood  is  advancing.  His 
movements  will  indicate  to  you  what  disposition  you  should 
make  —  whether  to  concentrate  at  Columbia  or  remain  at  Lynn- 


202  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ville.  If  Hood's  entire  army  should  advance,  you  must  use  your 
own  discretion  as  to  holding  the  fortifications  at  Pulaski  or  with 
drawing  the  troops. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General. 

General  Thomas  thus  gave  me  the  full  freedom  of  ac 
tion  demanded  by  the  situation  in  which  I  was  placed,  in 
lieu  of  his  previous  embarrassing  orders  about  fighting 
the  enemy  at  Pulaski. 

The  following  correspondence,1  with  the  above,  shows 
the  situation  as  reported  by  me  to  General  Thomas,  and 
his  "  plans  and  wishes "  as  then  explained  to  me  imme 
diately  before  and  after  Hood  began  his  advance : 

THOMAS  TO  SCHOFIELD. 

November  24,  1864. 

.  .  .  Have  the  fords  above  Columbia  as  well  guarded  as  you 
can,  and  I  think  you  will  then  have  checked  the  advance  of 
Hood,  and  we  shall  have  time  to  get  up  our  reinforcements. 

SCHOFIELD  TO  THOMAS. 

November  24,  1864,  1:39  p.  M. 

Do  you  think  it  important  to  hold  Columbia?  My  force  is 
not  large  enough  to  cover  the  town  and  railroad  bridge.  I  can 
hold  a  shorter  line  covering  the  railroad  bridge,  leaving  the  town 
and  railroad  depot  outside ;  but  in  any  case  the  enemy  can  turn 
the  position  by  crossing  above  or  below,  and  render  my  with 
drawal  to  the  north  bank  very  difficult.  Please  give  me  your 
views  soon. 

THOMAS  TO  SCHOFIELD. 

November  24,  1864. 

If  you  cannot  hold  Columbia,  you  had  better  withdraw  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  river.  From  the  description  given  I  supposed 
the  line  was  sufficiently  short  to  enable  you  and  Stanley  to  hold 
it  securely  and  have  a  reserve.  But  it  is  better,  of  course,  to 
substantially  check  the  enemy  than  to  run  the  risk  of  defeat  by 
risking  too  much.  "Where  is  Stanley  ?  Is  he  with  you  ? 

l  War  Eecords,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i. 


CORRESPONDENCE  WITH  GENERAL  THOMAS  203 

SCHOFIELD  TO   THOMAS. 

COLUMBIA,  November  24, 1864,  8:30  p.  M. 

I  have  examined  the  ground  and  considered  the  situation  care 
fully.  My  troops  are  in  position  on  the  outer  line,  covering  the 
railroad  depot  and  bridge,  and  pretty  well  intrenched.  The  line 
is  too  long;  yet  if  Hood  wishes  to  fight  me  on  it  to-morrow,  I  am 
willing.  I  think  he  will  attack  to-morrow,  if  at  all.  If  he  does 
not,  I  must  prepare  to  meet  any  attempt  to  cross  Duck  River 
above  or  below.  For  this  purpose  I  am  preparing  an  interior  line 
covering  the  railroad  bridge,  which  can  be  held  by  about  seven 
thousand  men,  which  I  propose  to  occupy,  and  put  the  rest  of 
my  troops  and  material  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river,  ready  to 
move  as  may  be  necessary.  With  the  fords  guarded,  as  will 
then  be  practicable,  I  think  Hood  cannot  get  the  start  of  me.  I 
think  it  best  not  to  risk  much  now;  for  a  few  days7  delay,  if  we 
concentrate  rapidly,  will  make  us  strong  enough  to  drive  Hood 
back.  My  theory  is  that  he  will  operate  against  the  Chattanooga 
Railroad,  and  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  save  it  from  some  damage 
at  least.  But  if  we  concentrate  Granger's  troops  and  those  along 
the  road  promptly,  so  that  they  can  join  the  main  force,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  of  the  final  result.  Please  inform  me  whether 
my  proposed  arrangements  meet  with  your  approval. 

THOMAS  TO  SCHOFIELD. 

NASHVILLE,  November  24,  1864. 

.  .  .  Can  you  not  cover  the  pontoon  bridge  with  a  bridge 
head,  and  hold  it  so  as  to  preserve  the  bridge  for  crossing 
whenever  we  get  ready  to  advance  ?  General  Rousseau  informed 
me  that  the  blockhouses  protecting  the  railroad  bridge  cannot 
be  reached  by  the  enemy's  artillery ;  therefore  the  enemy  could 
not  get  near  enough  to  the  bridge  to  destroy  it  if  the  block 
houses  are  held.  t  .  , 

As  stated  in  my  official  report,  I  did  prepare  and  hold 
a  bridge-head  covering  both  the  railroad  and  the  pontoon 
bridges  over  Duck  River  at  the  same  time,  for  which  pur 
pose  I  floated  the  pontoons  down  the  river  to  a  point  near 
the  railroad  bridge,  having  found  that  the  blockhouses 


204  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

referred  to  by  General  Rousseau  could  not  be  made  avail 
able  for  the  protection  of  the  pontoon  bridge  where  it 
before  was  —  at  the  crossing  of  the  turnpike.  I  abandoned 
that  bridge-head  on  the  night  of  November  27,  upon  re 
ceipt  of  information  leading  me  to  believe  that  Hood  in 
tended  to  cross  Duck  River  above  Columbia. 

On  November  25  General  Thomas  telegraphed  me,  in 
the  following  terms,  his  approval  of  the  dispositions  I  had 
made,  and  the  information  that  he  had  already  ordered 
the  concentration  of  troops  which  I  suggested  in  my  de 
spatch  of  the  24th : 

Your  cipher  despatch  of  8:30  P.  M.  is  just  received ;  some  diffi 
culty  in  transmission  the  cause.  Your  arrangements  are  judi 
cious  and  approved.  I  gave  orders  two  days  ago  to  make  the 
concentration  you  suggest,  and  hope  it  will  be  nearly  or  quite 
completed  to-day.  Will  telegraph  you  further  this  morning. 

This  despatch  was  more  than  twelve  hours  in  trans 
mission. 

Again,  November  26, 1  reported  the  situation  at  Colum 
bia,  and  my  action,  as  follows;  also  suggesting  that  infan 
try  be  sent  forward  at  once : 

The  enemy  has  kept  up  a  strong  demonstration  with  dis 
mounted  cavalry  since  yesterday  morning.  He  now  shows  a 
column  of  infantry  on  the  Mount  Pleasant  pike,  about  three 
miles  distant,  I  cannot  yet  tell  how  great  the  force.  I  have 
drawn  my  force  in  the  interior  line,  and  will  fight  him  there.  If 
you  have  any  infantry  available,  I  think  it  should  be  sent  forward 
at  once. 

Yet  no  infantry  reinforcements  were  sent,  although  the 
"  7000  men "  at  Chattanooga  could  easily  have  reached 
Columbia  before  that  time. 

At  8  A.  M.  the  next  day  General  Thomas  replied  as 
follows : 


DELAYING   THE  RETREAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER  205 

Your  despatch  of  10  A.  M.  yesterday  received.  I  will  send  you 
all  the  available  infantry  force  I  can  raise.  I  expect  some  of 
Smith's  command  here  to-day,  and  will  send  it  forward  as  rapidly 
as  possible.  Sent  you  two  regiments  of  cavalry  day  before  yes 
terday,  two  yesterday,  and  will  send  another  to-day.  If  you  can 
hold  Hood  in  check  until  I  can  get  Smith  up,  we  can  whip  him. 


Thus  it  appears  that  even  as  late  as  November  27  Gen 
eral  Thomas  had  not  thought  of  sending  the  7000  men  at 
Chattanooga  to  "join  the  main  force,"  although  so  anx 
ious  that  I  should  hold  Hood  in  check  until  he  could  get 
Smith  up.  He  was  still  relying  entirely  upon  A.  J.  Smith, 
whose  advance,  so  surely  expected  on  the  25th,  was  still 
expected  on  the  27th.  It  seems  incredible  that  General 
Thomas  had  not  thought  of  sending  Steedman's  troops 
from  Chattanooga,  instead  of  waiting  for  the  uncertain 
arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith. 

On  November  27  I  received  an  important  despatch 
from  General  Thomas,  dated  November  25.  It  was 
written  under  the  apprehension  that  Hood's  design 
might  be  to  move  upon  the  Nashville  and  Chattanooga 
Railroad,  as  I  had  suggested  to  Thomas  on  the  24th,  and 
informed  me  fully  of  his  plans  and  instructions  to  meet 
such  a.  movement,  requesting  me  to  give  him  my  views 
in  reply.  In  that  despatch  General  Thomas  said : 

In  case  you  have  to  move  to  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River,  I 
wish  you  to  keep  some  cavalry  on  the  south  side  to  observe  and 
delay  Hood's  advance  on  the  Chattanooga  Railroad  as  much  as 
possible.  I  hope  to  have  five  regiments  of  Granger's  troops  in 
Murfreesboro'  to-day.  Have  made  arrangements  for  Milroy  to 
fall  back  to  Murfreesboro'  or  this  side  of  Duck  River  also,  if 
the  enemy  advances.  The  cavalry  on  the  south  side  of  Duck 
River  should  cover  the  approaches  to  Shelbyville,  and  cross  at 
that  place,  and  hold  the  bridge  in  case  of  an  advance  in  force. 
I  have  asked  General  Steedman  how  large  a  force  he  can  raise  to 
threaten  the  enemy's  rear,  should  he  get  on  the  Chattanooga 
road,  and  expect  an  answer  soon.  About  1000  of  Hatch's 


206  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

cavalry  have  arrived  here  from  Memphis,  dismounted,  but  they 
will  be  mounted  here  as  soon  as  possible  and  sent  to  the  front ; 
three  regiments  should  start  to-day,  making  about  1000  men. 
I  have  not  heard  from  any  of  Smith's  troops  yet  j  some  of  them 
will  surely  be  here  to-day.  If  Hood  moves  on  the  Chattanooga 
road,  I  will  send  Smith  to  Murfreesboro',  as  we  shall  be  enabled 
thereby  to  concentrate  more  rapidly.  If  you  can  hold  Hood  on 
the  south  side  of  Duck  River,  I  think  we  shall  be  able  to  drive 
him  back  easily  after  concentrating.  Answer,  giving  your  views. 

Although  that  despatch  of  the  25th  was  not  deciphered 
so  as  to  be  read  by  me  until  the  27th,  forty-eight  hours 
after  it  was  sent,  nevertheless  it  gave  me  timely  infor 
mation  that  Thomas  had  concentrated  all  his  available 
troops  (except  Steedman's,  which  he  appears  to  have 
overlooked  until  the  25th,  and  about  which  I  had  no 
knowledge)  at  Murfreesboro',  from  which  place  they 
could  "join  the  main  force,"  as  I  had  suggested,  in  a 
few  hours,  either  by  rail  or  by  wagon-road,  as  circum 
stances  might  indicate.  I  was  also  led  to  infer  from 
Thomas's  language  on  the  25th  —  "  Some  of  them  [A.  J. 
Smith's  troops]  will  surely  be  here  to-day  "  —  that  on  the 
27th  Smith's  corps  was  already  at  Nashville,  and  that 
Thomas  was  only  waiting  for  information  respecting  the 
enemy's  designs  to  select  his  point  of  concentration  and 
order  all  his  available  troops  to  join  the  army  in  the 
field  at  that  point.  And  it  was  still  expected  on  the 
27th  that  this  junction  might  be  effected  on  the  north 
bank  of  Duck  Eiver,  opposite  Columbia.  Hence  I  tele 
graphed  General  Thomas,  November  27,  at  12:30  P.  M.  : 

The  enemy  has  made  no  real  attack,  and  I  am  satisfied  he  does 
not  intend  to  attack.  My  information,  though  not  very  satisfac 
tory,  leads  me  to  believe  that  Hood  intends  to  cross  Duck  River 
above  Columbia,  and  as  near  it  as  he  can.  I  shall  withdraw  to 
the  north  bank  to-night  and  endeavor  to  prevent  him  from  cross 
ing.  Wilson  is  operating  mainly  on  my  left,  with  a  portion  of 
his  command  south  of  the  river.  I  have  no  late  information 


DELAYING  THE  EETREAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER  207 

from  him.     I  have  succeeded  in  getting  your  cipher  of  the  25th 
translated.    I  believe  your  dispositions  are  wise. 

It  appears  from  his  despatch  of  November  25  that 
Thomas  hoped  we  might  be  able  to  hold  the  line  of 
Duck  River  from  Columbia  as  far  east  as  Shelbyville,  as 
well  as  west  to  the  Tennessee  River.  Although  this 
proved  to  be  impracticable  on  account  of  the  enemy's 
superiority  in  cavalry  at  that  time,  the  point  (Murfrees- 
boro')  which  Thomas  had  selected  for  his  concentration 
was  far  enough  in  the  rear  of  that  line  (Duck  River)  to 
make  the  concentration  certain  if  orders  were  given  in 
due  time. 

I  learned  in  the  afternoon  of  November  27,  by  General 
Thomas's  despatch  of  8  A.  M.,  already  quoted,  that  A.  J. 
Smith's  troops  were  not,  as  I  had  supposed,  already  in 
Nashville,  but  that  some  of  them  were  expected  there 
that  day,  and  would  come  forward  to  join  me  at  once. 

In  the  morning  of  November  28,  at  8:45,  I  reported 
my  withdrawal  to  the  north  side  of  the  river,  saying : 

My  troops  and  material  are  all  on  the  north  side  of  Duck 
River.  The  withdrawal  was  completed  at  daylight  this  morning 
without  serious  difficulty.  Cox  holds  the  ford  in  front  of  Co 
lumbia,  and  Ruger  the  railroad  bridge,  which  I  partially  de 
stroyed.  Stanley  is  going  into  position  a  short  distance  in  rear 
of  Cox.  I  think  I  can  now  stop  Hood's  advance  by  any  line  near 
this,  and  meet  in  time  any  distant  movement  to  turn  my  position. 
I  regret  extremely  the  necessity  of  withdrawing  from  Columbia, 
but  believe  it  was  absolute.  I  will  explain  fully  in  time.  Rein 
forcements  will  have  to  march  from  Spring  Hill  or  Thompson's 
Station.  Supplies  should  be  sent  to  Thompson's  Station. 

After  withdrawing  to  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River  I 
telegraphed  on  the  morniilg  of  November  28 : 

I  am  in  doubt  whether  it  is  advisable,  with  reference  to  future 
operations,  to  hold  this  position  or  to  retire  to  some  point  from 


208  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

which  we  can  move  offensively.  Of  course  we  cannot  recross  the 
river  here.  I  could  easily  have  held  the  bridge-head  at  the  rail 
road,  but  it  would  have  been  useless,  as  we  could  not  possibly 
advance  from  that  point.  Please  give  me  your  views  and  wishes. 

This  was  answered  by  General  Tbomas  at  "  8  P.  M.," 
the  answer  being  received  by  me  next  morning,  Novem 
ber  29. 

It  is  thus  seen  tbat  up  to  the  morning  of  November  28 
I  was  still  hoping  for  reinforcements  on  the  line  of  Duck 
River,  and  thought  I  could  stop  Hood's  advance  by  any 
line  near  the  Columbia  and  Franklin  pike,  which  I  then 
held,  as  well  as  meet  in  good  time  any  distant  movement 
to  turn  my  position.  Accordingly,  at  9 : 10  A.  M.  that  day 
I  telegraphed  General  Thomas : 

I  have  all  the  fords  above  and  below  this  place  well  watched 
and  guarded  as  far  as  possible.  Wilson  is  operating  with  his 
main  force  on  my  left.  The  enemy  does  not  appear  to  have 
moved  in  that  direction  yet  to  any  considerable  distance.  I  will 
probably  be  able  to  give  you  pretty  full  information  this  even 
ing.  Do  you  not  think  the  infantry  at  the  distant  crossings 
below  here  should  now  be  withdrawn  and  cavalry  substituted  ? 
I  do  not  think  we  can  prevent  the  crossing  of  even  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  because  the  places  are  so  numerous.  I  think  the  best  we 
can  do  is  to  hold  the  crossings  near  us  and  watch  the  distant  ones. 

But  I  learned  soon  after  noon  of  the  same  day  that  our 
cavalry  found  the  fords  so  numerous  that  they  could 
hardly  watch  them  all,  much  less  guard  any  of  them  se 
curely;  and  a  little  later  I  learned  that  the  enemy's 
cavalry  had  forced  a  crossing  at  some  point  only  a  few 
miles  above,  between  Huey's  Mill  and  the  Lewisburg- 
Franklin  pike.  At  2:30  P.  M.  I  telegraphed  General 
Thomas : 

The  enemy  was  crossing  in  force  a  short  distance  this  side  of 
the  Lewisburg  pike  at  noon  to-day,  and  had  driven  our  cavalry 


DELAYING  THE  KETEEAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER          209 

back  across  the  river  on  the  pike  at  the  same  time.  The  force  is 
reported  to  be  infantry,  but  I  do  not  regard  it  as  being  probable. 
Wilson  has  gone  with  his  main  force  to  learn  the  facts,  and  drive 
the  enemy  back,  if  practicable. 

In  the  appendix  to  General  Thomas's  report  the  date 
of  the  above  despatch  is  given  as  "3:30  A.  M."  It  was  an 
swered  by  General  Thomas  at  "  10:30  P.  M."  and  his  an 
swer  was  received  by  me  November  29  (no  hour  men 
tioned  in  the  records).  The  Department  of  the  Ohio 
records  say  that  I  sent  it  at  "  2:30  p.  M."  The  appendix 
to  my  report  mentions  the  date  "November  29," but  does 
not  give  the  hour.  My  official  report,  as  published,  also 
says  this  information  was  received  "about  2  A.  M.  on  the 
29th  n ;  but  this  is  evidently  a  clerical  error :  clearly  the 
report  should  read,  "  about  2  p.  M.  on  the  28th." 

But  our  cavalry  was  unable  to  drive  that  of  the  enemy 
back,  and  hence  Hood  was  free  to  lay  his  pontoon  bridge 
and  cross  Ms  infantry  and  artillery  at  any  point  above 
Columbia.  We  had  not  been  able  to  hold  even  the  cross 
ings  near  us. 

The  same  day,  November  28,  at  4  p.  M.,  I  telegraphed : 

If  Hood  advances  on  the  Lewisburg  and  Franklin  pike,  where 
do  you  propose  to  fight  him  I  I  have  all  the  force  that  is  neces 
sary  here,  and  General  Smith's  troops  should  be  placed  with 
reference  to  the  proposed  point  of  concentration. 

And  again,  at  6  p.  M. : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  in  force  has  crossed  the  river  on  the 
Lewisburg  pike,  and  is  now  in  possession  of  Rally  Hill. 

Wilson  is  trying  to  get  on  to  the  Franklin  road  ahead  of  them. 
He  thinks  the  enemy  may  swing  around  in  between  him  and  me, 
and  strike  Spring  Hill,  and  wants  Hammond's  brigade  to  halt 
there.  Please  give  it  orders  if  you  know  where  it  is.  Also,  I 
think  it  would  be  well  to  send  A.  J.  Smith's  force  to  that 
place. 

14 


210  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

In  the  night  of  November  28-9,  about  2  A,  M.,  I  re 
ceived  the  report  of  the  cavalry  commander,  conveying 
the  information  given  him  by  prisoners  that  the  enemy 
had  commenced  to  bridge  the  river  near  Huey's  Mill,  and 
urging  the  necessity  of  immediate  retreat  to  Franklin.1 
The  staff  officer  who  handed  me  the  despatch  called  my 
attention  especially  to  the  words  urging  immediate  ac 
tion,  and  I  considered  the  subject  quite  a  long  time.  But 
there  did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  any  necessity  for  such 
haste.  The  enemy  could  not  accomplish  much  before 
morning.  It  would  then  be  early  enough  to  decide  what 
must  be  done.  Besides,  it  was  not  yet  certain  that  Hood 
was  attempting  to  cross  his  infantry  at  Huey's  Mill. 
The  vigorous  action  of  his  cavalry  might  be  intended 
only  to  induce  me  to  fall  back,  and  thus  give  him  the 
use  of  the  crossing  at  Columbia,  and  of  the  turnpike  from 
that  place,  for  the  movement  of  his  infantry,  artillery, 
and  trains. 

In  the  morning,  November  29,  I  sent  a  brigade  of  in 
fantry  toward  Huey's  Mill  to  reconnoiter  and  report  the 
enemy's  movements.  At  the  same  time  Stanley  was 
ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  with  two  divisions  of  his  corps, 
to  occupy  and  intrench  a  good  position  commanding  the 
roads  at  that  place  and  protecting  the  trains  and 'reserve 
artillery  which  had  been  ordered  to  be  parked  there. 
Ruger's  division  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  except  one 
regiment,  was  ordered  to  follow  Stanley.  The  army  was 
ready  to  occupy  Spring  Hill  in  full  force,  and  in  ample 
time  to  meet  any  possible  movement  of  the  enemy  either 
on  that  place  or,  by  the  Lewisburg  pike,  on  Franklin. 

In  my  orders  to  Euger,  dated  8  A.  M.,  directing  him  to 
move  at  once  to  Spring  Hill,  he  was  ordered  to  leave 
one  regiment  to  guard  the  river  until  dark  and  then  join 
him  at  Spring  Hill.  It  was  then  intended,  in  any  event, 
to  hold  Spring  Hill  until  the  morning  of  November  30. 

i  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1143. 


DELAYING  THE  RETREAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER          211 

At  the  same  time  Ruger  was  directed  to  order  his  troops 
guarding  the  river  below  to  march  at  once  for  Franklin. 
But  very  soon  after  those  orders  were  issued — that  is, 
soon  after  8  A.  M. — a  courier  from  Franklin  brought  me 
the  two  following  despatches  from  General  Thomas : 

FRANKLIN,  November  28,  1864. 
(By  telegraph  from  Nashville.    9  P.  M.) 
To  MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD: 

If  you  are  confident  you  can  hold  your  present  position,  I  wish 
you  to  do  so  until  I  can  get  General  Smith  here.  After  his  ar 
rival  we  can  withdraw  gradually  and  invite  Hood  across  Duck 
Eiver,  and  fall  upon  him  with  our  whole  force,  or  wait  until 
Wilson  can  organize  his  entire  cavalry  force,  and  then  withdraw 
from  your  present  position.  Should  Hood  then  cross  river,  we 
can  surely  ruin  him.  You  may  have  fords  at  Centreville,  Bean's 
[Beard's]  Ferry,  Gordon's  Ferry,  and  Williamsport  thoroughly  ob 
structed  by  filling  up  all  the  roads  leading  from  them  with  trees, 
and  then  replace  your  infantry  by  cavalry.  Send  an  intelligent 
staff  officer  to  see  that  the  work  is  properly  done.  As  soon  as 
relieved,  concentrate  your  infantry ;  the  cavalry  will  be  able  to 
retard,  if  not  prevent,  Hood's  crossing,  after  the  roads  are  thor 
oughly  obstructed,  if  they  do  their  duty.  The  road  leading  from 
Centreville  to  Nashville  should  be  thoroughly  obstructed.  I  am 
not  sure  but  it  would  be  a  good  plan  to  invite  Hood  across  Duck 
Eiver  if  we  can  get  him  to  move  toward  Clarksville.  Is  there 
no  convenience  for  unloading  beyond  Thompson's  Station  ? 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General,  Commanding.1 

The  published  records  give  this  despatch  as  having 
been  sent  at  "  8  p.  M."  The  Department  of  the  Cumber 
land  records  say  that  it  was  telegraphed  in  cipher  to 
Franklin  at  9  p.  M.,  and  there  deciphered  and  sent  by 
courier  to  my  position  near  Columbia.  The  records  do 
not  show  the  hour  of  receipt  by  me;  but  my  reply  to 
General  Thomas  of  8:30  A.  M.,  November  29,  and  my 
orders  to  Euger  of  8  and  8:45  A.  M.,  and  to  Stanley  be- 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1108. 


212  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

fore  and  after  8  A.  M.,  and  my  despatch  to  Wilson  of  8:15 
A.  M.,  fix  the  time  of  the  receipt  by  me  of  this  despatch 
from  General  Thomas  at  a  few  minutes  after  8  A.  M., 
November  29. 

The  other  despatch  was  as  follows : 

(U.  S.  Military  Telegraph.) 

FRANKLIN,  TENN.,  November  28, 1864. 
(By  telegraph  from  Nashville.     9:30  P.  M.) 
To  MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD  : 

Your  despatch  of  3:30  [2:30]  P.  M.  just  received.  If  Wilson 
cannot  succeed  in  driving  back  the  enemy,  should  it  prove  true 
that  he  has  crossed  the  river,  you  will  necessarily  have  to  make 
preparation  to  take  up  a  new  position  at  Franklin,  behind  Har- 
peth,  [while]  immediately,  if  it  become  necessary  to  fall  back. 
(Signed)  GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major- General,  Commanding. 

The  records  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland 
merely  state  that  this  despatch  was  sent  in  "  cipher." 
The  appendix  to  my  report  gives  the  hour  "9:30  P.  M." 
The  appendix  to  General  Thomas's  report  fixes  it  at  "10: 30 
p.  M."  The  despatch  from  General  Thomas  to  General  Hal- 
leek  of  10  P.  M.,  November  28,  forwarding  my  despatch 
of  "8:45  A.  M.,"  indicates  that  at  10  P.  M.  Thomas  had  not 
received  my  report  of  "2:30  P.  M."  Hence  "  10:30  P.  M.," 
as  given  by  General  Thomas,  must  be  the  correct  hour 
of  the  above  despatch.  It  was  answered  by  me,  together 
with  the  preceding  telegram,  at  8:30  A.  M.,  November  29 ; 
and  was  probably  received  by  me  at  the  same  time  as 
the  previous  despatch, —  very  soon  after  8  A.  M., —  as  in 
dicated  by  my  despatch  to  Wilson  of  8:15  A.  M. 

I  thus  learned,  a  short  time  after  eight  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th,  that  A.  J.  Smith  had  not  yet  ar 
rived  at  Nashville,  and  that  the  position  behind  the  Har- 
peth  Eiver  at  Franklin  was  that  to  which  I  must  retire 
when  compelled  to  fall  back. 


DELAYING  THE  RETREAT  FROM  DUCK  RIVER  213 

(Another  despatch  from  Thomas,  dated  November  28, 
10  A.  M.,  appears  in  the  records,  in  which  he  said :  " .  .  . 
General  Smith  will  certainly  be  here  in  three  days.  .  .  ." 
But  when  that  despatch  reached  my  headquarters  in  the 
field,  the  cipher-operator  had  left  his  post  and  gone  to 
Franklin.  Hence  the  despatch  could  not  be  read  by  me 
in  time  to  be  of  any  service.  The  records  do  not  show 
when  I  received  it.) 

I  was  then  confronted  with  the  grave  question,  How 
long  might  it  be  possible  to  hold  Hood  back,  and  thus 
gain  time  for  Thomas  to  get  up  his  reinforcements  ?  By 
holding  on  to  the  crossing  of  Duck  River  at  Columbia 
until  dark  that  night,  and  thus  preventing  Hood  from 
using  the  turnpike  for  the  movement  of  his  artillery  and 
trains  until  the  next  day,  we  would  practically  gain 
twenty-four  hours ;  for  he  could  not  move  them  readily 
over  his  mud  road  from  Huey's  Mill.  To  do  this,  I  must 
not  only  head  Hood  off  at  Spring  Hill,  but  defeat  any 
attempt  he  might  make  to  dislodge  me  from  the  north 
bank  of  Duck  River. 

Early  on  November  29,  I  sent  the  following  brief  de 
spatch  in  reply  to  both  of  those  which  had  been  received 
a  few  minutes  before  from  General  Thomas  : 

The  enemy's  cavalry  has  crossed  in  force  on  the  Lewisburg 
pike,  and  General  Wilson  reports  the  infantry  crossing  above 
Huey's  Mill,  about  five  miles  from  this  place.  I  have  sent  an 
infantry  reconnoissance  to  learn  the  facts.  If  it  proves  true,  I 
will  act  according  to  your  instructions  received  this  morning. 
Please  send  orders  to  General  Cooper,1  via  Johnsonville.  It 
may  be  doubtful  whether  my  messenger  from  here  will  reach 
him. 

The  appendix  to  General  Thomas's  report  says  that 
I  sent  this  despatch  at  "8:30  A.  M."  The  appendix  to  my 
report  says  "8:20  A.  M."  This  despatch  was  evidently  in 

1  Cooper  commanded  the  brigade  guarding  the  river  below  Columbia. 


214         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

answer  to  those  from  General  Thomas  of  8  p.  M.  and  10:30 
p.  M.,  November  28,  as  indicated  by  my  orders  to  Stanley 
and  Euger,  and  my  despatch  of  8 : 15  A.  M.  to  Wilson. 

Soon  after  10  A.  M.,  November  29,  the  first  report  from 
the  brigade  sent  toward  Huey's  Mill  showed  that  the 
enemy's  infantry  was  crossing  the  river  at  that  place. 
That  report  is  not  found  in  the  records,  and  I  do  not 
recollect  its  words.  But  it  did  not  produce  the  impres 
sion  upon  my  mind  that  Hood's  movement  was  so  rapid 
or  energetic  as  to  prevent  me  from  doing  what  seemed  of 
such  vital  importance.  Therefore  I  decided  not  to  yield 
my  position  unless  compelled  by  force  to  do  so.  While 
considering  this  question  I  had  detained  one  of  Stanley's 
two  divisions  (Kimball's),  and  had  suspended  the  orders 
for  Euger's  division  to  march  to  Spring  Hill.  When  the 
decision  was  reached,  I  put  Kimball's  and  Wood's  divi 
sions  in  position  between  Duck  Eiver  and  Eutherford's 
Creek,  and  Euger's  north  of  that  creek,  to  resist  any  at 
tempt  the  enemy  might  make  upon  our  position.  I  then 
sent  the  following  to  Stanley  at  Spring  Hill : 

NEAR  COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  November  29,  1864,  10 : 45  A.  M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  STANLEY,  Commanding  Fourth  Army  Corps. 

GENERAL  :  General  Wood's  reconnoissance  shows  a  consider 
able  force,  at  least,  on  this  side  of  the  river.  I  have  halted  Kim- 
ball's  division  this  side  of  the  creek  and  put  it  in  position.  I  will 
try  to  hold  the  enemy  until  dark,  and  then  draw  back.  Select  a 
good  position  at  Spring  Hill,  covering  the  approaches,  and  send 
out  parties  to  reconnoiter  on  all  roads  leading  east  and  southeast. 
Try  to  communicate  with  Wilson  on  the  Lewisburg  pike.  Tell 
him  to  cover  Franklin  and  Spring  Hill,  and  try  not  to  let  the 
enemy  get  between  us. 

Very  respectfully, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

The  situation  early  in  the  morning  had  been  a  very 
simple  one,  free  from  any  embarrassment  or  unusual 


NO  SEKIOUS  DANGER  AT   SPRING  HILL  215 

danger.  If  the  plan  then  decided  on  and  ordered  had 
been  carried  out,  three  divisions  of  infantry  and  nearly 
all  the  artillery  of  the  army  would  have  been  in  position 
at  Spring  Hill  and  well  intrenched  long  before  the  head 
of  Hood's  infantry  column,  without  any  artillery,  came  in 
sight  of  that  place  late  in  the  afternoon.  That  position 
would  have  been  secured  beyond  doubt  until  the  next 
morning.  The  other  two  divisions  (Cox's  and  Wood's) 
would  have  withdrawn  from  Duck  River  and  marched 
to  Spring  Hill  early  in  the  afternoon,  before  the  enemy 
could  seriously  interfere  with  them.  Ruger's  one  regi 
ment,  without  impedimenta,  was  directed  to  march  along 
the  railway  track  to  Spring  Hill,  and  thus  avoid  any 
interference  from  the  enemy.  The  army  would  have 
marched  to  Franklin  early  in  the  night  of  the  29th,  in 
stead  of  after  midnight  as  it  actually  did.  That  would 
have  given  the  enemy  the  afternoon  and  night  in  which 
to  lay  his  pontoons  and  cross  his  artillery  and  trains  at 
Columbia.  But  that  would  not  have  been  a  serious  mat 
ter,  in  view  of  the  situation  as  it  was  understood  by  me 
up  to  about  8  A.  M.  of  the  29th;  for  the  information  I  had 
received  up  to  that  hour  justified  the  belief  that  both 
A.  J.  Smith's  troops  and  those  concentrated  at  Murfrees- 
boro'  would  meet  me  at  Franklin,  or  perhaps  at  Spring 
Hill,  where  we  would  be  able  to  give  battle  to  the  enemy 
on  equal  terms. 

But  in  view  of  the  information  received  by  me  after 
eight  o'clock  that  morning,  and  the  altered  plan  decided 
on  soon  after  ten  o'clock,  the  situation  became  very  ma 
terially  different.  Under  this  plan  the  army  must  be 
ready  to  encounter  a  formidable  enemy  either  in  the  po 
sition  then  occupied  on  Duck  River,  or  at  some  point  on 
the  road  between  that  place  and  Spring  Hill.  Hence  I 
determined  to  keep  the  main  body  of  the  troops  to 
gether,  and  trust  to  Stanley's  one  division  to  hold  Spring 
Hill  until  the  army  should  reach  that  point.  That  is  to 


216  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

say,  I  decided  to  take  the  chances  of  a  pitched  battle  at 
any  point  the  enemy  might  select  between  Duck  River 
and  Spring  Hill,  as  well  as  that  of  holding  the  latter 
place  with  one  division  against  any  hostile  force  which 
might  reach  it  before  dark. 

There  was  no  anxiety  in  my  mind  about  what  might 
happen  at  Spring  Hill  after  dark.  The  danger  which 
actually  developed  there  between  dark  and  midnight 
— of  which  I  knew  nothing  until  several  days  after 
ward —  resulted  entirely  from  faulty  execution  of  my 
orders. 

I  arrived  at  Spring  Hill  at  dusk  with  the  head  of  the 
main  column,  having  ordered  all  the  troops  to  follow  in 
close  order,  and  (except  Ruger's  troops,  which  I  took  to 
Thompson's)  to  form  line  on  the  right  of  Stanley's  di 
vision  at  Spring  Hill,  covering  the  pike  back  toward 
Columbia.  Cox's  division,  being  the  last,  was  to  form 
our  extreme  right.  In  that  contemplated  position,  if 
Hood  had  attacked  at  any  time  in  the  night  we  would 
have  had  decidedly  the  advantage  of  him.  I  had  no 
anxiety  on  that  point.  When  informed,  about  midnight, 
that  Cox  had  arrived,  I  understood  that  my  orders  had 
been  exactly  executed,  and  then  ordered  Cox  to  take  the 
lead  and  the  other  divisions  to  follow,  from  the  right  by 
the  rear,  in  the  march  to  Franklin. 

But  it  happened  that  only  Whitaker's  brigade  of  Kim- 
ball's  division,  to  which  I  gave  the  orders  in  person,  fol 
lowed  Ruger's.  Hence  that  one  brigade  was  the  only 
force  we  had  in  line  between  Hood's  bivouac  and  the  turn 
pike  that  night.  If  that  fact  had  been  known  to  the 
enemy,  the  result  would  have  been  embarrassing,  but  not 
very  serious.  If  the  enemy  had  got  possession  of  a  point 
on  the  pike,  the  column  from  Duck  River  would  have 
taken  the  country  road  a  short  distance  to  the  west  of 
Spring  Hill  and  Thompson's  Station,  and  marched  on  to 
Franklin.  The  situation  at  Spring  Hill  in  the  night  was 


NO  SERIOUS  DANGER  AT   SPRING  HILL  217 

not  by  any  means  a  desperate  one.  Veteran  troops  are 
not  so  easily  cut  off  in  an  open  country. 

The  annotation  upon  the  copy  filed  in  the  War  Depart 
ment  of  the  order  actually  given  to  the  troops  on  Novem 
ber  29  explains  how  that  mistake  occurred.  In  brief,  the 
draft  of  an  order  prepared  in  writing  for  another  pur 
pose,  but  not  issued,  was  by  some  unexplained  blunder 
substituted  for  the  oral  orders  actually  dictated  to  a  staff 
officer.  It  was  an  example  of  how  the  improvised  staff 
of  a  volunteer  army,  like  the  "  non-military  agencies  of 
government,"  may  interfere  with  military  operations. 

The  serious  danger  at  Spring  Hill  ended  at  dark.  The 
gallant  action  of  Stanley  and  his  one  division  at  that 
place  in  the  afternoon  of  November  29  cannot  be  over 
estimated  or  too  highly  praised.  If  the  enemy  had  gained 
a  position  there  in  the  afternoon  which  we  could  not  have 
passed  round  in  the  night,  the  situation  would  then  have 
become  very  serious.  But,  as  I  had  calculated,  the  enemy 
did  not  have  time  to  do  that  before  dark,  against  Stan 
ley's  stubborn  resistance. 

The  following,  from  the  official  records,  has  been  quoted 
as  an  order  from  General  Thomas  to  me,  though  I  never 
received  it,  the  enemy's  cavalry  having  got  possession 
of  the  road  between  Franklin  and  Spring  Hill : 

NASHVILLE,  November  29, 1864,  3:30  A.  M. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  near  Columbia : 

Your  despatches  of  6  P.  M.  and  9  p.  M.  yesterday  are  received. 
I  have  directed  General  Hammond  to  halt  his  command  at 
Spring  Hill  and  report  to  you  for  orders,  if  he  cannot  commu 
nicate  with  General  Wilson,  and  also  instructing  him  to  keep 
you  well  advised  of  the  enemy's  movements.  I  desire  you  to 
fall  back  from  Columbia  and  take  up  your  position  at  Franklin, 
leaving  a  sufficient  force  at  Spring  Hill  to  contest  the  enemy's 
progress  until  you  are  securely  posted  at  Franklin.  The  troops 
at  the  fords  below  Williamsport,  etc.,  will  be  withdrawn  and 
take  up  a  position  behind  Franklin.  General  A.  J.  Smith's 


218  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

command  has  not  yet  reached  Nashville  j  as  soon  as  he  arrives 
I  will  make  immediate  disposition  of  his  troops  and  notify  you 
of  the  same.  Please  send  me  a  report  as  to  how  matters  stand 
upon  your  receipt  of  this. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Commanding.1 

This  despatch  does  not  appear  upon  any  of  the  records 
as  having  been  received  by  me.  If  it  was  telegraphed 
in  cipher  to  Franklin,  and  there  deciphered  and  sent  by 
courier,  the  same  time  being  occupied  as  with  other  such 
despatches,  this  should  have  reached  me  not  long  after 
noon.  But  the  courier  was  probably  driven  back  or  cap 
tured  by  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who  had  possession  of  the 
direct  road,  near  Spring  Hill,  about  noon. 

If  any  "orders"  had  been  necessary  in  such  a  case, 
they  had  been  rendered  unnecessary  by  Hood's  move 
ment  to  cross  Duck  River,  of  which  I  had  already 
learned  at  2  A.  M.  the  same  day  (November  29).  The  only 
question  in  my  mind  that  General  Thomas  could  solve — 
namely,  to  what  place  I  must  retire — was  settled  by  his 
despatch  of  10:30  P.  M.,  November  28,  above  quoted,  re 
ceived  by  me  about  8  A.  M.  of  the  29th.  But  there  still 
remained  the  question  when  I  must  do  it;  and  that  I 
must  solve  myself,  for  General  Thomas  was  much  too 
far  away,  and  communication  was  much  too  slow  and 
uncertain,  for  him  to  give  me  any  help  on  that  subject. 

I  had  received  information  of  Hood's  movement  at 
2  A.  M.,  six  hours  earlier,  and  I  had  had  ample  time  to 
get  out  of  his  way  before  morning.  After  8  A.  M.  it 
would,  of  course,  not  have  been  so  easy.  Yet  a  retreat 
to  Franklin  that  day  (November  29),  commencing  at  eight 
or  nine  in  the  morning,  and  across  the  Harpeth  that 
night,  would  not  have  been  at  all  difficult  or  dangerous. 
There  would  have  been  some  fighting  with  Hood's  cav 
alry,  but  little  or  none  with  his  infantry.  Hood  would 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1137. 


NO  SERIOUS  DANGER  AT  SPRING  HILL  219 

have  had  to  lay  a  pontoon  bridge  at  Columbia,  after  my 
rear-guard  had  withdrawn,  before  his  advance  from  that 
point  could  begin ;  and,  as  events  proved,  he  could  not 
reach  Spring  Hill  by  his  mud  road  from  Huey's  Mill 
until  late  in  the  afternoon.  I  had  time  to  pass  Spring 
Hill  with  my  entire  army  before  Hood's  infantry  advance- 
guard  could  reach  that  place.  Hence  I  had  ample  time 
to  consider  the  mathematical  and  physical  questions  in 
volved  before  deciding  finally  that  I  would  not  let  Hood 
drive  me  back  from  Duck  River  that  day.  But  I  did 
not  at  any  time  contemplate  a  retreat  that  day  farther 
back  than  Spring  Hill,  as  is  shown  by  my  direction  to 
Ruger  to  have  his  regiment  from  Ducktown  join  him 
there  that  night. 

I  am  entirely  willing  to  leave  to  intelligent  military 
criticism  any  question  in  respect  to  the  accuracy  of  my 
calculations,  also  the  question  whether  I  was  justifiable, 
under  the  conditions  then  existing  or  understood  to  ex 
ist  respecting  Thomas's  preparations  in  the  rear  to  fight 
a  decisive  battle,  in  taking  the  risks,  which  are  always 
more  or  less  unavoidable,  of  failure  in  the  execution  of 
plans  based  upon  so  close  an  estimate  of  what  could  be 
done  by  my  adversary  as  well  as  by  myself.  I  content 
myself  with  the  simple  remark  that,  in  my  opinion,  if  my 
own  orders  had  been  carried  out  as  I  gave  them,  and  my 
reasonable  suggestion  to  my  superior  in  the  rear  to 
bridge  the  Harpeth  at  Franklin  had  been  promptly  acted 
on,  there  would  have  been  far  less  risk  of  failure  than 
must  frequently  be  incurred  in  war. 

If  I  had  had  satisfactory  assurance  of  the  timely  arri 
val  of  sufficient  reinforcements  on  the  line  of  Duck  River, 
I  would  have  been  justified  in  dividing  my  infantry  into 
several  detachments  to  support  the  cavalry  in  opposing 
the  crossing  of  Duck  River  at  the  numerous  places  above 
Columbia.  But,  sooner  or  later,  Hood  could  have  forced 
a  crossing  at  some  one  of  those  places,  and  thus  have  in- 


220  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

terposed  a  compact  body  of  troops,  larger  than  my  entire 
army,  between  my  detachments.  If  that  had  occurred 
before  my  reinforcements  arrived,  I  would  have  been 
caught  in  the  worst  possible  condition.  Hence,  in  the 
absence  of  certain  information  in  respect  to  when  rein 
forcements  would  arrive,  and  their  aggregate  strength,  a 
division  of  my  force  was  inadmissible.  An  inferior  force 
should  generally  be  kept  in  one  compact  body,  while  a 
superior  force  may  often  be  divided  to  great  advantage. 

I  now  direct  attention  to  the  correspondence  between 
General  Thomas  and  myself,  on  November  30,  before  the 
battle  of  Franklin,  showing  that  he  was  not  ready  for 
battle  at  Nashville,  and  his  desire  that  I  should,  if  possible, 
hold  Hood  back  three  days  longer ;  and  showing  that  my 
estimate  of  the  importance  of  time  when  I  was  at  Co 
lumbia  was  by  no  means  exaggerated;  also  showing 
General  Thomas's  views  and  mine  of  the  military  situa 
tion  before  the  battle,  and  the  action  then  determined  on 
and  ordered  and  partially  executed  by  the  movement  of 
trains  toward  Nashville  before  the  battle  opened.  The 
results  of  the  battle  were  not  such,  even  if  they  had  been 
fully  known  at  the  time,  as  to  have  rendered  admissible 
any  change  in  those  orders. 

NASHVILLE,  [November]  30,  [1864,]  4  A.  M. 
CAPTAIN  W.  J.  TWINING,  Franklin: 

Your  despatch  of  1  A.  M.  to-day  is  received.  Please  inform 
General  Schofield  that  Major- General  Smith's  troops  have  just 
arrived  at  the  levee  and  are  still  on  boats,  and  that  it  is  impossi 
ble  for  them  to  reach  Franklin  to-day.  He  must  make  strong 
efforts  to  cover  his  wagon-train,  protecting  it  against  the  enemy, 
as  well  as  to  reach  Franklin  with  his  command  and  get  into  po 
sition  there.  I  will-  despatch  him  further  in  a  few  hours. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS. 

The  next  despatch  from  General  Thomas  was  at  10:25 
A.  M.  By  that  time  he  had  received  two  more  despatches 


HOPING  TO  DELAY  HOOD  FOK  THKEE  DAYS  AT  FKAJNKJjiiN    ^2 


from  me,  as  follows,  I  having  arrived  at  Franklin  between 
4  and  5  A.  M.  : 

FRANKLIN,  November  30,  1864,  5  A.  M. 

Have  just  seen  your  despatch  to  Captain  Twining  of  4  A.  M. 
If  Smith  is  not  needed  for  the  immediate  defense  of  Nashville,  I 
think  he  had  better  march  for  Franklin  at  once.  He  could  at 
least  cover  my  wagon-train  if  I  have  to  fall  back  from  here. 

FRANKLIN,  November  30,  1864,  5:30  A.  M. 

I  hope  to  get  my  troops  and  material  safely  across  the  Har- 
peth  this  morning.  We  have  suffered  no  material  loss  so  far. 
I  shall  try  and  get  Wilson  on  my  flank  this  morning.  Forrest 
was  all  around  us  yesterday,  but  we  brushed  him  away  in  the 
evening  and  came  through.  Hood  attacked  in  the  front  and 
flank,  but  did  not  hurt  us. 

This  last  despatch  was  written  before  daylight,  on  my 
arrival  at  Franklin,  before  I  learned  that  there  were  no 
bridges  across  the  river.  If  pontoons  had  been  laid  or 
the  wagon  and  railroad  bridges  improved  on  the  29th,  as 
was  done  by  me  after  my  arrival,  all  could  have  crossed 
by  noon  of  the  30th. 

General  Thomas's  reply  of  10:25  A.  M.  was  as  follows: 

Your  despatches  of  5:30  and  5:50,  and  Wilson's  despatches, 
forwarded  to  you,  have  been  received.  It  will  take  Smith  quite 
all  day  to  disembark  ;  but  if  I  find  there  is  no  immediate  neces 
sity  to  retain  him  here,  will  send  him  to  Franklin  or  Brentwood, 
according  to  circumstances.  If  you  can  prevent  Hood  from 
turning  your  position  at  Franklin,  it  should  be  held  ;  but  I  do 
not  wish  you  to  risk  too  much.  I  send  you  a  map  of  the  en 
virons  of  Franklin. 

Again  I  telegraphed  at  9:50  A.  M.  : 

My  trains  are  coming  in  all  right,  and  half  of  the  troops  are 
here  and  the  other  half  about  five  miles  out,  coming  on  in  good 
order,  with  light  skirmishing.  I  will  have  all  across  the  river 


222  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

this  evening.  Wilson  is  here,  and  has  his  cavalry  on  my  flank. 
I  do  not  know  where  Forrest  is.  He  may  have  gone  east,  but, 
no  doubt,  will  strike  our  flank  and  rear  again  soon.  Wilson  is 
entirely  unable  to  cope  with  him.  Of  course  I  cannot  prevent 
Hood  from  crossing  the  Harpeth  whenever  he  may  attempt  it. 
Do  you  desire  me  to  hold  on  here  until  compelled  to  fall  back  ? 

And  at  11  A.  M.  I  telegraphed :  "  Troops  and  trains  in 
all  right." 

At  noon  I  answered  as  follows  General  Thomas's  last 
despatch : 

Your  despatch  of  10:25  A.  M.  is  received.  I  am  satisfied  that 
I  have  heretofore  run  too  much  risk  in  trying  to  hold  Hood  in 
check  while  so  far  inferior  to  him  in  both  infantry  and  cavalry. 
The  slightest  mistake  on  my  part,  or  failure  of  a  subordinate, 
during  the  last  three  days  might  have  proved  disastrous.  I 
don't  want  to  get  into  so  tight  a  place  again ;  yet  I  will  cheer 
fully  act  in  accordance  with  your  views  of  expediency,  if  you 
think  it  important  to  hold  Hood  back  as  long  as  possible.  When 
you  get  all  your  troops  together,  and  the  cavalry  in  effective 
condition,  we  can  easily  whip  Hood,  and,  I  believe,  make  the 
campaign  a  decisive  one.  Before  that,  the  most  we  can  do  is  to 
husband  our  strength  and  increase  it  as  much  as  possible.  I 
fear  the  troops  which  were  stationed  on  the  river  below  Colum 
bia  will  be  lost.  I  will  get  my  trains  out  of  the  way  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  watch  Hood  carefully.  Possibly  I  may  be  able  to 
hold  him  here,  but  do  not  expect  to  be  able  to  do  so  long. 

This  despatch  shows  not  only  my  opinion  at  that  time 
of  the  kind  of  "  place  "  I  had  been  in,  "but  my  belief  that 
the  character  of  that  situation  had  been  due  largely  to 
Thomas's  action  in  leaving  me  without  the  expected  rein 
forcements,  and  in  not  providing  the  means  of  crossing 
the  Harpeth  Eiver. 

The  following  seems  to  show  that  General  Thomas  did 
not  even  then  see  the  importance  of  prompt  concentra 
tion  of  all  his  available  force  in  front  of  the  enemy,  but 
expected  me,  with  two  corps,  to  fight  the  entire  hostile 


HOPING  TO  DELAY  HOOD  FOR  THREE  DAYS  AT  FRANKLIN  223 

force  until  he  could  complete  his  concentration  at  Nash 
ville.  Even  before  the  battle  of  Franklin  he  seems  to 
have  thought  he  could  take  his  time  to  concentrate,  re 
organize  his  cavalry,  and  then  "  try  Hood  again." 

NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1864. 
MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Franklin : 

General  Smith  reported  to  me  this  morning  that  one  division 
of  his  troops  is  still  behind ;  we  must  therefore  try  to  hold  Hood 
where  he  now  is  until  those  troops  can  get  up,  and  the  steamers 
return.  After  that  we  will  concentrate  here,  reorganize  our  cav 
alry,  and  try  Hood  again.  Do  you  think  you  can  hold  Hood  at 
Franklin  for  three  days  longer?  Answer,  giving  your  views; 
and  I  should  like  to  know  what  Wilson  thinks  he  can  do  to  aid 
you  in  holding  Hood. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  Vols.,  Commanding. 

Thereupon,  in  the  following  telegram,  dated  3  p.  M.,  I 
proposed  Brentwood  as  a  point  where  A.  J.  Smith's  and 
all  the  other  troops  could  surely  unite  with  mine : 

I  have  just  received  your  despatch  asking  whether  I  can  hold 
Hood  here  three  days.  I  do  not  believe  I  can.  I  can  doubtless 
hold  him  one  day,  but  will  hazard  something  in  doing  that.  He 
now  has  a  large  force,  probably  two  corps,  in  my  front,  and 
seems  preparing  to  cross  the  river  above  and  below.  I  think  he 
can  effect  a  crossing  to-morrow  in  spite  of  all  my  efforts,  and 
probably  to-night,  if  he  attempts  it.  A  worse  position  than  this 
for  an  inferior  force  could  hardly  be  found.  I  will  refer  your 
question  to  General  Wilson  this  evening.  I  think  he  can  do  very 
little.  I  have  no  doubt  Forrest  will  be  in  my  rear  to-morrow,  or 
doing  some  greater  mischief.  It  appears  to  me  that  I  ought  to 
take  position  at  Brentwood  at  once.  If  A.  J.  Smith's  division  and 
the  Murfreesboro'  garrison  join  me  there,  I  ought  to  be  able  to 
hold  Hood  in  check  for  some  time.  I  have  just  learned  that  the 
enemy's  cavalry  is  already  crossing  three  miles  above.  I  will 
have  lively  times  with  my  trains  again. 


224         FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

This  despatch  gives  a  very  accurate  estimate  of  the 
true  situation  at  that  time,  except  perhaps  that  I  did  not 
then  fully  appreciate  how  much  our  cavalry  had  gained 
in  effective  strength  by  the  reinforcements  that  had 
joined  the  corps  in  the  field  during  the  retreat.  I  judged 
by  the  experience  of  the  previous  day  (November  29). 
But  the  result  was  very  different  in  the  afternoon  of  the 
30th,  when  our  cavalry  repulsed  and  drove  back  that  of 
the  enemy;  at  the  same  time  the  infantry  assault  was 
repulsed  at  Franklin.  There  was  no  apprehension  of  the 
result  of  an  attack  in  front  at  Franklin,  but  of  a  move 
of  Hood  to  cross  the  river  above  and  strike  for  Nashville 
before  I  could  effect  a  junction  with  the  troops  then  at 
that  place. 

The  following  despatches  must  have  been  sent  either 
during  the  progress  of  the  battle,  or  very  soon  afterward : 

Please  send  A.  J.  Smith's  division  to  Brentwood  early  to-mor 
row  morning.  Also  please  send  to  Brentwood  to-morrow  morn 
ing  1,000,000  rounds  infantry  ammunition,  2000  rounds  3-inch, 
and  1000  rounds  light  twelve  artillery. 

In  reply  to  my  advice,  the  following  order  to  fall  back 
to  Nashville  was  sent  by  Thomas  before  the  battle,  but 
was  received  by  me  after  the  heavy  fighting  had  ceased. 
Communication  was  interrupted  for  a  short  time  during 
the  transfer  of  the  telegraph  station  from  the  town  of 
Franklin  to  a  place  on  the  north  side  of  the  Harpeth, 
rendered  necessary  by  the  battle. 

NASHVILLE,  November  30,  1864. 

Your  despatch  of  3  P.  M.  is  received.  Send  back  your  trains 
to  this  place  at  once,  and  hold  your  troops  in  readiness  to  march 
to  Brentwood,  and  thence  to  this  place,  as  soon  as  your  trains 
are  fairly  on  the  way,  so  disposing  your  force  as  to  cover  the 
wagon-train.  Have  all  railroad  trains  sent  back  immediately. 
Notify  General  Wilson  of  my  instructions.  He  will  govern 


HOPING  TO  DELAY  HOOD  FOB  THREE  DAYS  AT  FRANKLIN  225 

himself  accordingly.     Relieve  all  garrisons  in  blockhouses  and 
send  back  by  railroad  trains  last  over  the  road.    Acknowledge 

receipt. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS,  Major-General. 


The  following  is  my  first  report  to  General  Thomas, 
sent  immediately  after  the  battle : 

The  enemy  made  a  heavy  and  persistent  attack  with  about 
two  corps,  commencing  at  4  p.  M.  and  lasting  until  after  dark. 
He  was  repulsed  at  all  points  with  very  heavy  loss  —  probably 
five  or  six  thousand  men.  Our  losses  probably  not  more  than 
one  fourth  that  number.1  We  have  captured  about  one  thou 
sand  men,  including  one  brigadier-general.  Your  despatch  of 
this  P.  M.  is  received.  I  had  already  given  the  orders  you  direct, 
and  am  now  executing  them. 

Before  the  battle,  and  in  anticipation  of  the  order  from 
General  Thomas,  the  trains  had  been  sent  back  and  the 
preparations  made  for  the  army  to  retire  to  Brentwood, 
the  troops  to  commence  withdrawing  from  the  line  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river  immediately  after  dark.  In 
consequence  of  the  battle,  the  movement  of  the  troops 
was  suspended  until  midnight.  General  Thomas  promptly 
replied  to  my  first  report  in  these  words : 

Your  telegram  is  just  received.  It  is  glorious  news,  and  I 
congratulate  you  and  the  brave  men  of  your  command ;  but  you 
must  look  out  that  the  enemy  does  not  still  persist.  The  courier 
you  sent  to  General  Cooper,  at  Widow  Dean's,  could  not  reach 
there,  and  reports  that  he  was  chased  by  rebel  cavalry  on  the 
whole  route,  and  finally  came  into  this  place.  Major-General 
Steedman,  with  five  thousand  men,  should  be  here  in  the  morn 
ing.  When  he  arrives  I  will  start  General  A.  J.  Smith's  com 
mand  and  General  Steedman's  troops  to  your  assistance  at 
Brentwood. 

1  At  that  time  I  did  not  know  of     had  come  in  with  those  I  had  seen 
our  loss  in  prisoners,  having  thought     running  to  the  rear, 
nearly  all  of  Wagner's  two  brigades 


CHAPTEE  XII 

AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  —  THE  ARRIVAL  AT  NASH 
VILLE —  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  GREETING — A  REFRESHING 
SLEEP  —  SERVICES  OF  THE  CAVALRY  CORPS  AND  THE 
FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS  —  HOOD'S  MISTAKE  AFTER  CROSS 
ING  DUCK  RIVER  —  AN  INCIDENT  OF  THE  ATLANTA 
CAMPAIGN  BEARING  ON  HOOD'S  CHARACTER — AN  EM 
BARRASSING  METHOD  OF  TRANSMITTING  MESSAGES  IN 
CIPHER — THE  AGGRESSIVE  POLICY  OF  THE  SOUTH. 

EARLY  the  next  morning  (December  1),  after  receiving 
at  Brentwood  oral  orders  from  General  Thomas  to 
continue  the  retreat  to  Nashville,  I  lay  on  the  ground  until 
the  main  body  of  the  troops  had  passed  and  I  had  learned 
from  the  cavalry  and  from  the  infantry  rear-guard  that 
nothing  could  occur  in  the  rear  which  would  require  my 
attention.  I  then  rode  forward  and  reported  to  General 
Thomas,  whom  I  found  waiting  for  me  at  the  place  he 
had  selected  for  the  Twenty-third  Corps  in  the  defensive 
line  about  Nashville.  He  greeted  me  in  his  usual  cordial 
but  undemonstrative  way,  congratulated  me,  and  said  I 
had  done  "  well."  I  have  often  thought  that  I  may  not 
have  shown  due  appreciation  of  his  kindness  at  that  mo 
ment,  for  I  did  not  then  feel  very  grateful  to  him ;  but 
he  gave  no  indication  that  he  thought  me  unapprecia- 
tive  of  his  approbation.  On  the  contrary,  he  said  in  the 
kindest  manner  that  I  appeared  "  tired."  To  which  I 
replied,  "  Yes,  I  am  very  tired."  That  was  about  all  the 
conversation  we  had  that  day. 
As  soon  as  I  saw  that  my  troops  were  moving  into  the 


AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN  227 

position  he  had  indicated  to  the  division  commanders 
before  rny  arrival,  I  rode  to  the  hotel  in  Nashville,  went 
to  bed,  and  slept  from  about  noon  of  the  1st,  without 
awaking  to  full  consciousness,  until  about  sunset  the  next 
day.  I  only  hope  my  weary  soldiers  enjoyed  their  rest 
as  much  as  I  did  mine,  for  they  must  have  needed  it 
even  more.  When  I  awoke  after  that  thoroughly  re 
freshing  sleep  the  annoyance  I  had  felt  on  account  of 
the  embarrassments  experienced  during  the  retreat  was 
replaced  by  reflections  of  a  much  more  satisfactory  char 
acter.  From  that  time  forward  my  relations  with  Gen 
eral  Thomas  were  of  the  same  cordial  character  as  they 
always  had  been ;  and  I  was  much  gratified  by  the  flat 
tering  indorsement  he  placed  on  my  official  report,  of 
which  I  then  knew  the  substance,  if  not  the  exact  words. 
The  Fourth  Army  Corps  and  the  cavalry  corps  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi  having  been  under 
my  command  during  only  the  few  days  occupied  in  the 
operations  between  Pulaski  and  Nashville  (November  14 
to  December  1),  no  reports  of  the  operations  of  those  two 
corps  were  ever  made  to  me  after  the  close  of  that  brief 
period.  Hence  it  was  not  possible  for  me  to  give  any 
full  account  of  the  distinguished  services  of  those  two- 
corps.  The  cavalry  were  never  seen  by  me.  They  were 
far  in  front  or  on  the  flank,  doing  all  the  "  seeing "  for 
me,  giving  me  information  of  vital  importance  in  respect 
to  the  enemy's  movements.  How  important  that  informa 
tion  was  then  regarded  may  be  learned  by  a  perusal  of 
the  despatches  to  and  from  General  Thomas  during  those 
days  of  anxious  uncertainty  as  to  the  enemy's  plans.  I 
believe  no  cavalry  ever  performed  that  important  service 
more  efficiently.  At  no  time  in  that  short  campaign  did 
I  suffer  any  inconvenience  from  lack  of  information  that 
cavalry  could  possibly  give.  If  it  is  true  that  the  opera 
tions  of  our  cavalry  were  to  some  extent  influenced  by 
apprehension  of  a  cavalry  raid  on  Nashville  or  other  vital 


228  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

point  in  our  rear,  that  was  only  what  General  Thomas 
had  been  apprehending  all  the  time,  and  to  meet  which 
he  had  assembled  eight  thousand  troops  in  Nashville, 
perhaps  not  informing  the  commander  of  his  own  cav 
alry  of  that  fact  quite  as  early  as  he  might  have  done.1 

In  fact,  the  redoubtable  Forrest  had  become  famous, 
and  his  troopers  were  esteemed  a  very  large  factor  in  the 
problem  then  undergoing  solution — greater  in  some  re 
spects,  as  I  have  pointed  out,  than  the  events  justified.  In 
my  report  of  the  battle  of  Franklin  I  gave  all  the  infor 
mation  in  my  possession  of  the  gallant  action  of  our  cav 
alry  in  driving  that  of  the  enemy  back  across  the  Harpeth 
at  the  very  time  when  his  infantry  assault  was  decisively 
repulsed. 

I  have  always  regarded  it  as  a  very  remarkable,  and  to 
me  a  very  fortunate,  circumstance  that  the  movements 
of  my  infantry  columns  were  at  no  time  seriously  inter 
fered  with  by  the  enemy's  more  numerous  cavalry  —  not 
even  at  Spring  Hill,  where  Stanley  was  attacked  by  cav 
alry  as  well  as  infantry.  Hence  I  have  had  no  inclination 
to  make  any  investigation  respecting  the  details  of  the 
action  of  troops,  only  temporarily  under  my  command, 
whose  gallant  conduct  and  untiring  vigilance  contributed 
all  that  was  needed  to  the  complete  success  of  the  military 
operations  intrusted  to  my  immediate  direction  by  our 
common  superior,  the  department  commander.  I  have 
now,  as  always  heretofore,  only  words  of  highest  praise 
for  the  services  of  the  cavalry  corps  under  my  command. 

The  Fourth  Corps  was  under  my  own  eye  nearly  all  the 
time ;  and  sometimes,  in  emergencies,  I  even  gave  orders 
directly  to  the  subordinate  commanders,  without  the  for 
mality  of  sending  them  through  the  corps  commander. 
Hence  I  have  spoken  of  that  corps  with  the  same  freedom 
as  of  my  own  Twenty-third ;  and  I  hope  I  have  not  failed 

l  See  Thomas's  despatch  of  8  p.  M.,  November  29,  to  Colonel  H.  C.  Wharton, 
Wilson's  staff  officer :  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  1146, 


HOOD'S  MISTAKE  AFTER  CROSSING  DUCK  RIVER        229 

to  give,  so  far  as  the  very  restricted  scope  of  my  account 
would  permit,  full  justice  to  that  noble  corps  of  veteran 
soldiers,  as  well  as  to  its  officers.  As  I  have  had  special 
occasion  to  say  of  the  action  of  Opdycke's  brigade  and 
of  the  12th  and  16th  Kentucky  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps 
at  Franklin,  the  conduct  of  those  troops  was  beyond  all 
praise. 

I  believe  little  disputes  always  arise  out  of  the  honor 
able  rivalry  which  exists  between  bodies  of  troops  acting 
together  in  a  great  battle.  Franklin  was  no  exception  to 
that  general  rule.  For  the  purpose  of  "pouring  oil  on 
the  troubled  waters"  after  Franklin,  I  said  that  in  my 
opinion  there  was  glory  enough  won  in  that  battle  to 
satisfy  the  reasonable  ambition  of  everybody  who  was  on 
the  field,  and  of  some  who  were  not  there,  but  who  were 
at  first  given  "the  lion's  share";  but  if  the  disputants 
were  not  satisfied  with  that,  they  might  take  whatever 
share  of  credit  was  supposed  to  be  due  to  me,  and  divide 
it  among  themselves.  I  was  then,  as  I  am  now,  perfectly 
satisfied  with  the  sense  of  triumph  which  filled  my  soul 
when  I  saw  my  heroic  comrades  hurl  back  the  hosts  of 
rebellion  with  slaughter  which  to  some  might  seem  dread 
ful,  but  which  I  rejoiced  in  as  being  necessary  to  end  that 
fratricidal  war.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  conceal  the  fact 
that  most  earnest  patriotism  sometimes  arouses  in  the 
soldier's  breast  what  might  seem  to  be  a  fiendish  desire 
to  witness  the  slaughter  of  his  country's  enemies.  Only 
a  soldier  of  fortune  or  a  hireling  can  be  a  stranger  to 
such  feelings.  Yet  I  aver  that  I  had  not  the  slightest 
feeling  of  personal  enmity  toward  my  old  friend  and 
classmate  General  Hood,  or  his  comrades.  It  was  the 
"accursed  politicians"  who  had  led  them  into  such  a 
fratricidal  strife  who  were  the  objects  of  our  maledic 
tions.  But  even  that  feeling  has  been  softened  by  time, 
and  by  reflection  upon  the  deeper  and  more  remote 
causes  of  the  war,  and  that  the  glorious  fruits  of  final 


230  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

victory  have  amply  repaid,  and  will  continue  to  repay  in 
all  time,  for  all  those  immense  sacrifices  and  sufferings. 

Hood  undoubtedly  made  a  mistake  in  his  plan  of  opera 
tions  after  he  crossed  Duck  River  above  Columbia  on  the 
night  of  November  28-9.  His  march  on  Spring  Hill 
would  have  been  the  best  if  it  had  succeeded.  But  he 
failed  to  estimate  accurately  what  he  could  accomplish 
in  a  short  winter  day  over  a  very  bad  road.  In  a  long 
day  of  summer,  with  that  road  in  the  usual  summer 
condition,  he  might  have  reached  Spring  Hill  early  in 
the  afternoon,  with  force  enough  to  accomplish  his  pur 
pose  before  night,  if  he  had  found  a  single  division,  or 
even  two  divisions,  there.  But  he  failed  simply  because 
he  tried  to  do  what  was  not  possible. 

When  Hood  crossed  the  river  he  was  not  more  than 
five  miles  (his  own  journal  says  three)  from  the  left  flank 
of  my  position  on  the  north  bank.  The  intervening 
space  was  open  fields,  not  much,  if  any,  more  difficult 
for  the  march  of  infantry  than  the  dirt  road  he  actu 
ally  used.  If  he  had  moved  directly  upon  my  flank,  he 
could  have  brought  on  a  general  engagement  about 
noon,  with  a  force  at  least  equal  to  mine.  In  anticipa 
tion  of  such  a  movement,  I  sent  a  brigade  toward  Huey's 
Mill  to  watch  Hood's  movements,  and  formed  line  of 
battle  facing  in  that  direction  and  covering  the  turnpike 
to  Spring  Hill,  for  which  purpose  I  detained  one  of  the 
two  divisions  of  Stanley's  corps  which,  at  first,  had  been 
ordered  to  Spring  Hill.  I  was  willing  to  fight  Hood  in 
that  position,  and  expected  to  do  so.  But  I  felt  relieved 
when  I  found  he  had  undertaken  the  much  more  difficult 
task  of  marching  to  Spring  Hill,  where  I  believed  suffi 
cient  preparations  had  been  made  to  oppose  him  until 
I  could  reach  that  place  by  a  broad  macadamized  road 
over  which  I  could  march  rapidly  by  day  or  by  night. 

I  now  believe  my  judgment  at  that  time  was  correct : 
that  what  I  had  most  to  apprehend  was  not  an  attempt 


HOOD'S  MISTAKE  AFTER  CROSSING  DUCK  RIVER       231 

to  get  in  my  rear  at  Spring  Hill,  but  one  to  dislodge  me 
from  my  position  on  Duck  River  by  defeating  me  in 
open  battle.  But  I  believed  I  could  fight  Hood,  even 
where  I  was,  from  noon  until  dark,  and  then  retreat  to 
Spring  Hill  or  Franklin  in  the  night.  At  least  I  was 
willing  to  try  it  rather  than  disappoint  the  expectation 
of  General  Thomas  that  I  would  hold  Hood  in  check  un 
til  he  could  concentrate  his  reinforcements.  It  seems  to 
me  clear  that  Hood's  best  chance  at  Duck  River  was  to 
force  a  general  engagement  as  early  in  the  day  as  pos 
sible,  so  as  to  occupy  the  attention  of  all  my  infantry 
while  his  superior  cavalry  was  sent  to  occupy  some  point 
in  my  rear,  and  try  to  cut  off  my  retreat  in  the  night. 
Perhaps  Hood  did  not  appreciate  the  very  great  ad 
vantage  a  retreating  army  has  in  the  exclusive  use  of 
the  best  roads  at  night,  especially  when  the  nights  are 
long  and  the  days  correspondingly  short  —  an  advantage 
which  cannot  be  overcome  by  any  superiority  of  num 
bers  in  the  pursuing  force,  except  by  a  rapid  circuitous 
march  of  a  detachment. 

As  illustrating  my  accurate  knowledge  of  Hood's  char 
acter  before  we  ever  met  in  battle,  the  following  incident 
seems  worthy  of  mention.  When  Sherman's  army,  after 
crossing  the  Chattahoochee  River,  was  advancing  on  At 
lanta, — my  troops  being  in  the  center, — General  Sher 
man  was  on  the  main  road,  a  little  in  rear  of  me.  My 
advance-guard  sent  back  to  me  an  Atlanta  paper  con 
taining  an  account  of  the  visit  of  President  Davis,  and 
the  order  relieving  General  Johnston  and  assigning  Gen 
eral  Hood  to  the  command  of  the  army.  General  Sher 
man  erroneously  says  one  of  General  Thomas's  staff  offi 
cers  brought  him  that  paper.  General  Thomas  was  then 
off  to  the  right,  on  another  road.  I  stopped  until  Sher 
man  came  up,  and  handed  him  the  paper.  After  reading 
it  he  said,  in  nearly,  if  not  exactly,  the  following  words : 
"  Schofield,  do  you  know  Hood  ?  What  sort  of  a  fellow 


232  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

is  he  ? "  I  answered :  "  Yes,  I  know  him  well,  and  I  will 
tell  you  the  sort  of  man  he  is.  He  '11  hit  you  like  h — 1, 
now,  before  you  know  it."  Soon  afterward,  as  well  de 
scribed  by  Sherman,  the  sound  of  battle  to  our  right  gave 
indication  of  the  heavy  attack  Hood's  troops  made  upon 
Thomas's  advancing  columns  that  day,  which  failed  of 
serious  results,  as  I  believe  all  now  admit,  mainly  if  not 
entirely  because  Thomas  himself  was  near  the  head  of 
the  column  which  received  the  first  blow.  Soon  after,  a 
still  more  heavy  attack  was  made  on  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  our  extreme  left,  which  resulted  in  one  of  the 
severest  and  most  clpsely  contested  battles  of  the  war, 
and  in  which  the  knightly  McPherson  was  killed. 

Under  the  system  enforced  by  the  War  Department  in 
1864-5,  the  commanders  of  troops  in  the  field  were  com 
pelled  to  communicate  with  each  other  either  in  plain 
language  which  the  enemy  could  read  if  a  despatch  fell 
into  his  hands,  or  else  in  a  cipher  which  neither  of  the 
commanders  nor  any  of  their  staff  officers  could  decipher. 
They  were  made  absolutely  dependent  upon  the  cipher- 
operators  of  the  telegraph  corps.  Of  course  all  this  ci 
pher  correspondence  between  commanding  generals  was 
promptly  transmitted  to  the  War  Department,  so  that  the 
Secretary  could  know  what  was  going  on  as  well  as  any 
body.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  object  of  this,  per 
haps  not  difficult  to  conjecture,  its  effect  was  to  make 
rapid  correspondence  in  cipher  impossible  when  rapidity 
was  most  important  and  secrecy  most  necessary.  In  pre 
vious  years  I  and  one  at  least  of  my  staff  officers  were 
always  familiar  with  the  cipher  code,  so  that  we  could 
together,  as  a  rule,  quickly  unravel  a  knotty  telegram. 
Indeed,  I  once  had  to  decipher  a  despatch  to  which  I  had 
no  key,  except  that  I  knew  from  internal  evidence  that 
it  must  be  under  the  War  Department  code,  though  writ 
ten  in  a  different  key.  It  was  a  despatch  from  Grant, 
who  was  then  besieging  Yicksburg.  It  had  been  sent  to 


METHOD  OF  TRANSMITTING  MESSAGES  IN  CIPHER     233 

Memphis  by  steamer,  and  thence  by  telegraph  to  St. 
Louis,  the  place  from  which  Grant's  army  drew  its  sup 
plies.  A  cipher  despatch  sent  under  the  circumstances 
from  Grant  to  me,  who  was  not  at  that  time  under  his 
command,  must  necessarily  be  of  great  importance.  My 
staff  officer  at  once  informed  me  that  it  was  in  some  key 
different  from  that  we  had  in  use.  So  I  took  the  thing  in 
hand  myself,  and  went  to  work  by  the  simplest  possible 
process,  but  one  sure  to  lead  to  the  correct  result  in  time — 
that  is,  to  make  all  possible  arrangements  of  the  words 
until  one  was  found  that  would  convey  a  rational  mean 
ing.  Commencing  about  3  P.  M.,  I  reached  the  desired 
result  at  three  in  the  morning.  Early  that  day  a  steamer 
was  on  the  way  down  the  river  with  the  supplies  Grant 
wanted.  I  never  told  the  general  how  he  came  to  get  his 
supplies  so  promptly,  but  I  imagined  I  knew  why  he  had 
telegraphed  to  me  rather  than  to  the  quartermaster  whose 
duty  it  was  to  furnish  supplies  for  his  army — and  a  most 
capable  and  efficient  quartermaster  he  was.  I  had  only  a 
short  time  before  voluntarily  sent  General  Grant  5000 
men,  and  I  inferred  that  there  was  some  connection  be 
tween  the  incidents. 

The  immense  change  in  the  whole  military  situation 
which  was  produced  in  a  few  minutes  at  Franklin  (for  the 
contest  there  was  in  fact  decided  in  that  time,  by  the  re 
covery  of  the  breach  in  the  line),  and  that  by  a  battle 
which  had  not  been  contemplated  by  either  General 
Thomas  or  myself  (that  is,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Har- 
peth  River,  with  that  stream  in  the  rear  of  the  army),  nor 
yet  by  General  Hood  until  he  saw  the  apparent  opportu 
nity  to  destroy  his  adversary ;  and  the  fact  that  that  dan 
gerous  situation  had  been  produced  and  the  battle  ren 
dered  necessary  by  slight  accidents  or  mistakes  which 
might  easily  have  been  foreseen  or  avoided,  cannot,  it 
seems  to  me,  but  produce  in  every  thoughtful  mind  some 
reflection  upon  the  influence  exercised  by  what  is  called 


234  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

"  accident w  or  "  chance  "  in  war.  The  "  fortune  of  war  " 
was,  upon  the  whole,  always  in  my  favor,  in  spite  of  ad 
verse  accidents  ;  yet  I  have  always  acted  upon  the  princi 
ple  that  the  highest  duty  of  a  commander  is  to  anticipate 
and  provide  for  every  possible  contingency  of  war,  so  as 
to  eliminate  what  is  called  chance. 

Both  Johnston  and  Hood  refer  in  their  narratives  to 
the  earnest  desire  of  their  commander-in-chief,  President 
Davis,  that  the  army  they  in  succession  commanded 
should  undertake  an  aggressive  campaign.  Johnston 
demonstrated  that,  under  the  circumstances  existing 
while  he  was  in  command,  such  an  undertaking  could 
not  possibly  have  been  successful.  Hood  tried  it  under 
far  more  favorable  circumstances,  and  yet  he  failed,  as 
had  every  former  like  attempt  of  the  Confederate  armies. 
The  result  in  every  case  was  costly  failure,  and  in  the 
last  overwhelming  defeat.  How  much  greater  would 
have  been  the  military  strength  of  the  South  if  those 
losses  had  been  avoided,  and  how  much  greater  would 
have  been  her  moral  strength  if  she  had  maintained  from 
the  start  a  firm,  consistent,  and  humane  defensive  policy! 
How  long  would  the  conservative  people  of  the  North 
have  sustained  the  "  invasion  w  of  States  where  the  people 
were  fighting  only  to  "  defend  their  homes  and  families  "  ? 
Did  not  the  South  throw  away  a  great  moral  advantage 
when  it  waged  aggressive  war  upon  the  North?  No 
doubt  it  was  necessary  at  first,  from  the  secession  point 
of  view,  to  "  fire  the  Southern  heart w  by  attacking  Fort 
Sunater.  And,  also  from  that  point  of  view,  that  attack 
was  fully  justifiable  because  that  fort  was  in  "  Confeder 
ate  "  territory.  The  invasions  of  Maryland  and  Pennsyl 
vania  were  far  different,  and  much  more  so  were  the 
relentless  guerrilla  war  waged  in  the  border  States,  at 
tended  with  horrible  massacres  like  that  of  Lawrence, 
Kansas,  which,  though  no  one  charges  them  to  the  gov 
ernment  or  generals  of  the  South,  were  unavoidable  in- 


THE  AGGRESSIVE  POLICY  OF  THE   SOUTH  935 

cidents  of  that  species  of  warfare;  and  the  inhuman 
cruelties  incidentally  suffered  by  Union  prisoners. 

It  is  true  that  the  slavery  question  was  a  very  powerful 
factor  in  our  Civil  War,  and  became  more  and  more  so  as 
the  war  progressed.  But  opinion  on  that  question  at  the 
North  was  very  far  from  unanimous  at  the  first,  and  it  is 
a  fair  and  important  question  how  far  the  growth  of 
sentiment  in  the  free  States  in  favor  of  emancipation 
was  due  to  the  slaveholders'  method  of  carrying  on  war. 

My  desire  here  is  to  refer  to  these  questions  solely 
from  the  military  point  of  view,  and  for  the  considera 
tion  of  military  students.  The  conditions  upon  which 
depends  success  or  failure  in  war  are  so  many, —  some  of 
them  being  more  or  less  obscure, —  that  careful  study  of 
all  such  conditions  is  demanded  of  those  who  aspire  to 
become  military  leaders. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

GEANT  OEDEES  THOMAS  TO  ATTACK  HOOD  OE  EELINQUISH  THE 
COMMAND — THOMAS'S  CORPS  COMMANDEES  SUPPORT  HIM 
IN  DELAY — GEANT'S  INTENTIONS  IN  SENDING  LOGAN  TO 
EELIEVE  THOMAS  — CHANGE  OF  PLAN  BEFOEE  THE  BATTLE 
OF  NASHVILLE  —  THE  FIGHTING  OF  DECEMBEE  15  —  EX 
PECTATION  THAT  HOOD  WOULD  EETEEAT — DELAY  IN  EE- 
NEWING  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  16TH  — HOPELESSNESS  OF 
HOOD'S  POSITION — LETTEES  TO  GEANT  AND  SHEEMAN — 
TEANSFEEEED  TO  THE  EAST — FINANCIAL  BUEDEN  OF  THE 
WAE  —  THOMAS'S  ATTITUDE  TOWAED  THE  WAE. 

THE  perilous  character  of  the  situation  in  Tennessee, 
in  which  it  was  left  by  Sherman's  premature  start 
for  the  sea  and  Thomas's  tardy  concentration  of  troops, 
wholly  disappeared  with  the  repulse  of  Hood  at  Frank 
lin.  There  was  no  further  obstacle  to  the  concentration 
of  Thomas's  forces  at  Nashville,  the  organization  and 
equipment  of  his  army,  and  the  necessary  preparations 
to  assume  the  offensive.  Hood's  army  was  too  much  shat 
tered  and  crippled  to  make  any  serious  movement  for 
some  days,  during  which  it  was  easy  for  Thomas  to  pre 
pare  for  battle  all  his  troops  except  the  cavalry,  of  which 
latter,  however,  it  required  a  longer  time  to  complete  the 
remount.  Indeed,  Thomas  could  have  given  battle  the 
second  or  third  day  after  Franklin  with  more  than  a  fair 
prospect  of  success. 

Considering  the  feeling  of  nervous  anxiety  which  pre 
vailed  in  Washington  and  throughout  the  country  at  the 
time,  possibly  he  ought  to  have  assumed  the  offensive 


THOMAS  TO  ATTACK  HOOD  OB  RELINQUISH  THE  COMMAND  237 

on  the  2d  or  3d  of  December.  But  that  state  of  anx 
iety  was  at  first  unknown  at  Nashville,  even  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  and  was  never  fully  appreciated  or  under 
stood.  No  one  at  Nashville,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  shared 
that  feeling.  We  knew,  or  thought  we  knew,  that  Hood 
could  do  nothing, .  unless  it  were  to  retreat,  before  we 
would  be  prepared  to  meet  him,  and  that  every  day's  de 
lay  strengthened  us  far  more  than  it  possibly  could  him. 
His  operations,  which  were  closely  watched  every  day, 
indicated  no  intention  to  retreat ;  hence  all  at  Nashville 
awaited  with  confidence  the  period  of  complete  prepara 
tion  which  was  to  give  us  decisive  victory. 

The  anxiety  felt  elsewhere,  especially  by  General 
Grant,  was  probably  due  to  some  doubt  of  the  wisdom 
of  Sherman's  plan  of  going  off  with  his  main  army  be 
fore  disposing  of  Hood,  contrary  to  Grant's  first  advice ; 
to  the  discovery  of  Sherman's  error  in  supposing  he  had 
left  Thomas  in  complete  condition  to  cope  with  Hood; 
to  some  misapprehension  as  to  the  degree  in  which  the 
situation  in  Tennessee  had  been  changed  by  the  battle 
of  Franklin ;  as  well  as  to  lack  of  confidence  in  General 
Thomas  on  account  of  his  well-known  deliberation  of 
thought  and  action. 

Little  was  known  of  this  state  of  anxiety  by  me,  or, 
I  believe,  by  the  corps  commanders,  until  December  9, 
when  General  Thomas,  calling  us  together  at  his  head 
quarters,  informed  us  that  he  was  ordered  to  attack  Hood 
at  once  or  surrender  his  command  (not  saying  to  whom), 
and  asked  our  advice  as  to  what  he  ought  to  do.  One 
of  the  officers  present  asked  General  Thomas  to  show  us 
the  order,  which  he  declined  to  do.  This  confirmed  the  be 
lief  which  I  had  at  first  formed  that  the  successor  named 
by  General  Grant  could  be  no  other  than  myself — a  belief 
formed  from  the  fact  that  I  was,  next  to  General  Thomas, 
the  highest  officer  in  rank  on  the  ground  where  imme 
diate  action  was  demanded,  and  from  my  knowledge  of 


238  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

General  Grant's  confidence,  which  belief  has  since  been 
fully  justified  by  the  record.  This,  as  I  conceived,  im 
posed  upon  me  the  duty  of  responding  at  once  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  request  for  advice,  without  waiting  for  the 
junior  members  of  the  council,  according  to  the  usual 
military  custom.  Hence  I  immediately  replied :  "  General 
Thomas,  I  will  sustain  you  in  your  determination  not 
to  fight  until  you  are  fully  ready."  All  the  other  com 
manders  then  promptly  expressed  their  concurrence. 

I  do  not  know  whether  or  not  my  declaration  of  pur 
pose  to  sustain  General  Thomas  was  made  known  to 
General  Grant,  or  to  any  one  in  Washington,  either  then 
or  afterward.  I  have  never  made  any  inquiry  on  that 
subject.  Of  course  such  information  must  have  been 
conveyed  confidentially  and  indirectly,  if  at  all,  and 
hence  would  probably  not  appear  in  the  official  records, 
though  despatches  and  letters  marked  "  confidential "  are 
sometimes  published  as  official.  I  have  only  conjectured 
that  some  knowledge  of  my  opinion  and  decision  may, 
perhaps,  have  influenced  General  Grant's  final  determi 
nation  to  go  to  Nashville  himself.  If  some  officer  must 
go  there  to  fight  a  battle,  Grant  could  get  there  about  as 
soon  as  any  other  he  could  well  select.  The  records  now 
published  seem  to  verify  the  belief  then  (December  9, 
1864)  existing  in  my  mind,  that  I  had  only  to  withhold 
my  support  from  General  Thomas  in  his  determination 
to  delay,  and  the  chief  command  would  have  fallen  to 
my  fortune,  where  I  believed  brilliant  victory  was  as 
nearly  certain  as  anything  in  war  can  be.  But  I  never 
had  the  remotest  idea  of  superseding  General  Thomas. 
As  I  explained  to  General  Sherman,  I  volunteered  to  go 
back  to  Tennessee,  not  to  supersede  Thomas,  but  to  help 
him.  I  knew  him  and  his  subordinates  well,  as  I  did 
also  the  antagonist,  my  West  Point  classmate,  whom 
they  would  have  to  meet.  I  appreciated  Thomas's  high 
qualities,  his  distinguished  services,  and,  above  all,  the 


GRANT'S  INTENTIONS  IN  SENDING  LOGAN  239 

profound  affection  and  confidence  of  his  troops — an  ele 
ment  of  strength  in  a  commander  far  greater  than  is 
generally  understood,  even  by  military  men,  some  of 
whom  appear  to  be  altogether  ignorant  of  its  value  as  a 
factor  in  war.  A  doubt  of  our  complete  success  under 
his  leadership,  after  our  troops  were  united,  never  en 
tered  my  mind,  much  less  a  desire  to  diminish  or  dim 
the  laurels  he  might  win. 

General  Grant's  great  anxiety  on  account  of  the  situ 
ation  at  Nashville  was  manifested  for  several  days  by 
urgent  despatches  to  General  Thomas  to  attack  at  once 
without  waiting  for  further  preparations;  then  by  an 
order  to  Thomas  to  turn  over  the  chief  command  to  me, 
Thomas  to  become  subordinate,  which  order  was  sus 
pended  ;  and  finally  by  starting  for  Nashville  himself  to 
direct  operations  in  person.  In  the  meantime  he  or 
dered  General  John  A.  Logan  to  go  to  Nashville  to  re 
lieve  Thomas  in  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land,  without  thought,  as  he  has  said,  of  the  question 
whether  Logan  or  myself  should  command  the  com 
bined  armies  of  the  Cumberland  and  of  the  Ohio. 
Grant  had  reached  Washington  from  City  Point,  and 
Logan  had  gone  as  far  as  Louisville,  when  the  report  of 
Thomas's  victory  of  December  15  made  it  unnecessary 
for  either  of  them  to  proceed  farther.  The  following 
letters  from  Grant  to  Logan  are  interesting  as  explain 
ing  the  reasons  and  motives  of  his  action  in  sending 
Logan  to  Nashville,  as  well  as  his  estimate  of  the  ser 
vices  I  had  rendered  in  the  preceding  operations: 


NEW  YORK,  February  14,  1884. 
HON.  JOHN  A.  LOGAN,  U.  S.  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  llth,  I  have  to  say 
that  my  response  must  be. from  memory  entirely,  having  no 
data  at  hand  to  refer  to ;  but  in  regard  to  the  order  for  you  to 


240  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

go  to  Louisville  and  Nashville  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  I  never  thought  of  the  question  of  who  should 
command  the  combined  armies  of  the  Cumberland  and  the 
Ohio.  I  was  simply  dissatisfied  with  the  slowness  of  General 
Thomas  moving,  and  sent  you  out  with  orders  to  relieve  him. 
No  doubt  if  the  order  had  been  carried  out,  the  question  would 
immediately  have  arisen  as  to  who  was  entitled  to  the  combined 
command,  provided  General  Schofield  was  senior  in  rank  to 
you,  which  I  do  not  know  that  he  was.  I  know  that  his  con 
firmation  as  a  major-general  took  place  long  after  yours,  but  I 
do  not  know  the  date  of  his  commission.  The  question,  in  that 
case,  of  the  command  of  the  whole  would  have  been  settled  in 
a  very  few  hours  by  the  use  of  the  telegraph  between  Nashville 
and  Washington.  I  was  in  Washington  when  you  arrived  at 
Louisville  and  telegraphed  me  that  General  Thomas  had  moved, 
and,  as  I  remember  the  telegram,  expressing  gratification  that 
he  had  done  so.  I  was  then  on  my  way  to  Nashville  myself,  and 
remained  over  a  day  in  Washington,  hoping  that  Thomas  might 
still  move.  Of  course  I  was  gratified  when  I  learned  that  he 
had  moved,  because  it  was  a  very  delicate  and  unpleasant  mat 
ter  to  remove  a  man  of  General  Thomas's  character  and  stand 
ing  before  the  country;  but  still  I  had  urged  him  so  long  to 
move  that  I  had  come  to  think  it  a  duty.  Of  course  in  sending 
you  to  relieve  General  Thomas,  I  meant  no  reflection  whatever 
upon  General  Schofield,  who  was  commanding  the  Army  of  the 
Ohio,  because  I  thought  that  he  had  done  very  excellent  service 
in  punishing  the  entire  force  under  Hood  a  few  days  before, 
some  twenty-five  miles  south  of  Nashville.  Very  truly  yours, 

U.  S.  GRANT 

(per  FRANK  F.  WOOD). 


NEW  YORK,  February  23,  1884. 
GEN.  JOHN  A.  LOGAN,  U.  S.  Senate,  Washington,  D.  C. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  Since  I  have  been  confined  to  my  room  I  have 
conducted  all  my  correspondence  through  a  secretary,  who  is  a 
stenographer,  and  he  takes  my  dictation  to  the  office  and  writes 
the  letters  out  there  as  dictated,  and  by  my  direction  signs  my 
name.  I  intended  that  the  letter  which  I  wrote  to  you  should 
be  brought  back  to  me  for  my  own  signature,  and  I  sign  this 


GRANT'S  INTENTIONS  IN  SENDING  LOGAN  241 

myself  to  show  my  entire  responsibility  for  the  one  which  you 
have  just  received,  and  which  I  hope  was  satisfactory  to  you. 

Very  truly  yours, 

U.  S.  GRANT. 


The  passion  and  prejudice  begotten  in  the  minds  of 
Thomas's  soldiers  and  their  friends  by  injustice,  real  or 
fancied,  done  or  proposed  to  be  done  to  him  by  his  supe 
riors  in  rank,  have  rendered  impossible  any  calm  discus 
sion  of  questions  touching  his  military  career.  There  is 
not  yet,  and  probably  will  not  be  in  our  lifetime,  a  proper 
audience  for  such  discussion.  But  posterity  will  award 
justice  to  all  if  their  deeds  have  been  such  as  to  save 
their  names  from  oblivion. 

Time  works  legitimate  "  revenge,"  and  makes  all  things 
even.  When  I  was  a  boy  at  West  Point  I  was  court-mar 
tialed  for  tolerating  some  youthful  "deviltry"  of  my 
classmates,  in  which  I  took  no  part  myself,  and  was  sen 
tenced  to  be  dismissed.  Thomas,  then  already  a  veteran 
soldier,  was  a  member  of  the  court,  and  he  and  one  other 
were  the  only  ones  of  the  thirteen  members  who  declined 
to  recommend  that  the  sentence  be  remitted.  This  I 
learned  in  1868,  when  I  was  Secretary  of  War.  Only 
twelve  years  later  I  was  able  to  repay  this  then  unknown 
stern  denial  of  clemency  to  a  youth  by  saving  the  vet 
eran  soldier's  army  from  disaster,  and  himself  from  the 
humiliation  of  dismissal  from  command  on  the  eve  of 
victory.  Five  years  later  still,  I  had  the  satisfaction,  by 
intercession  with  the  President,  of  saving  the  same  vet 
eran  general  from  assignment  to  an  inferior  command, 
and  of  giving  him  the  military  division  to  which  my  as 
signment  had  been  ordered.  When  death  had  finally  re 
lieved  him  from  duty,  and  not  till  then,  did  I  consent  to 
be  his  successor.  In  1879  I  had  the  satisfaction,  after 
many  months  of  patient  investigation,  of  rendering  jus 
tice  to  the  other  of  those  two  unrelenting  soldiers  who, 


16 


242  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  all  the  thirteen,  could  not  find  it  in  their  hearts  to 
recommend  clemency  to  an  erring  youth:  I  was  presi 
dent  of  the  board  which  reversed  the  judgment  of  the 
court-martial  in  the  case  of  Fitz-John  Porter. 

I  believe  it  must  now  be  fully  known  to  all  who  are 
qualified  to  judge  and  have  had  by  personal  association 
or  by  study  of  history  full  opportunities  to  learn  the  truth, 
that  General  Thomas  did  not  possess  in  a  high  degree 
the  activity  of  mind  necessary  to  foresee  and  provide  for 
all  the  exigencies  of  military  operations,  nor  the  mathe 
matical  talent  required  to  estimate  "the  relations  of  time, 
space,  motion,  and  force  "  involved  in  great  problems  of 
war.  His  well-known  high  qualities  in  other  respects 
obscured  these  imperfections  from  the  great  majority  of 
those  who  surrounded  him  during  the  war,  and  rendered 
the  few  educated  soldiers  who  were  able  to  understand 
his  true  merits  the  more  anxious  to  aid  him  and  save 
him  from  personal  defeat.  And  no  one,  I  am  sure,  of  his 
comrades  in  arms  desires  to  detract  from  the  great  fame 
which  is  justly  his  due ;  for,  according  to  the  best  judg 
ment  of  mankind,  moral  qualities,  more  than  intellectual, 
are  the  foundation  of  a  great  and  enduring  fame.  It  was 
"  Old  Pap "  Thomas,  not  General  Thomas,  who  was  be 
loved  by  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland ;  and  it  is  the  hon 
est,  conscientious  patriot,  the  firm,  unflinching  old  soldier, 
not  the  general,  whose  name  will  be  most  respected  in 
history. 

Of  the  general  details  of  the  battle  of  Nashville  I  do 
not  propose  to  speak,  but  simply  to  notice  a  few  of  its 
most  important  points.  The  plan  of  battle,  as  published, 
placed  my  command  —  the  Twenty-third  Corps  —  in  the 
left  center  of  our  line,  where  only  a  feint  was  to  be  made. 
The  Fourth  Corps  was  to  carry  a  salient  advanced  line, 
while  the  main  attack  was  to  be  made  on  the  enemy's 
extreme  left  by  A.  J.  Smith's  corps  and  the  cavalry. 
After  the  order  was  prepared  I  went  to  General  Thomas 


CHANGE  OF  PLAN  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE  OF  NASHVILLE    243 

with  a  map  of  the  position  showing  the  exact  length  of 
the  several  parts  of  the  enemy's  line,  and  explained  to 
him  that  the  force  he  had  assigned  to  our  left  wing  was 
at  least  10,000  men  more  than  could  be  used  to  any  ad 
vantage  unless  for  a  real  attack ;  and  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  Smith's  force  was  not  large  enough  for  the  real  at 
tack,  considering  the  extent  of  the  ground  occupied  by 
the  enemy  on  that  flank.  Hence  I  suggested  that  my 
corps  should  support  Smith  instead  of  remaining  on  the 
left  of  Wood.  To  this  suggestion  General  Thomas  read 
ily  acceded,  and  orally  authorized  me  to  carry  it  into  ef 
fect,  but  made  no  change  in  his  written  order.  The  result 
of  this  change  of  plan  was  that  the  close  of  the  first  day's 
engagement  found  the  Twenty-third  Corps  on  the  ex 
treme  right  of  our  infantry  line,  in  the  most  advanced 
position  captured  from  the  enemy.  Yet  General  Thomas, 
in  his  official  report,  made  no  mention  of  this  change  of 
plan,  but  said  "  the  original  plan  of  battle,  with  but  few 
alterations,  [was]  strictly  adhered  to."1  The  "alterations" 
were  certainly  "few."  A  change  from  10,000  to  20,000 
infantry  in  the  main  attacking  force  may  not  properly  be 
described  as  many  "  alterations,"  but  it  looks  like  one  very 
large  one  —  sufficient,  one  would  suppose,  to  determine 
the  difference  between  failure  and  success. 

The  plan  of  battle  issued  December  14  had  been  ma 
tured  and  made  known  to  the  principal  subordinate 
commanders  several  days  before,  when  General  Thomas 
intended  to  attack,  but  was  prevented  by  the  storm 
Hence  there  had  been  ample  time  for  critical  considera 
tion  and  discussion  of  the  details  of  that  plan,  the  result 
of  which  was  the  modification  made  at  the  conference  in 
the  afternoon  or  evening  of  December  14,  which  modifica 
tion  was  not  embodied  in  the  written  order,  but  was  orally 
directed  to  be  carried  out.  If  General  Thomas  had  caused 
that  clerical  work  to  be  done  in  the  evening  of  December 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  39. 


244  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

14,  his  published  orders  and  Ms  battle  of  December  15 
would  have  been  in  complete  harmony.  There  would 
not,  so  far  as  I  know,  have  been  even  a  "  few  alterations." 
In  this  connection,  the  difference  between  the  "  Special 
Field  Order  No.  342,"  of  December  14,  as  recorded  in  Gen 
eral  Thomas's  order-book,  and  the  copy  embodied  in  his 
official  report,  as  explained  in  a  foot-note  in  the  War  Eec- 
ords,  is  not  unimportant.1  In  the  order-book  he  says : 
"  Major-General  Schofield  will  mass  the  remainder  of  his 
force  in  front  of  the  works  and  cooperate  with  General 
Wood,  protecting  the  latter's  left  flank  against  an  attack 
by  the  enemy " ;  but  in  his  report  the  words  "  will  move 
with  "  are  substituted  for  "  will  mass."  The  latter,  in  mili 
tary  parlance,  meant  placing  my  corps  in  reserve,  with  a 
view  to  "  cooperate  with  General  Wood,"  etc.,  whenever 
such  cooperation  might  be  necessary;  while  the  words 
used  in  Thomas's  final  report  meant  active  cooperation 
with  General  Wood  from  the  beginning  of  the  engage 
ment.  In  the  body  of  his  report  General  Thomas  spoke 
of  the  position  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  as  "  in  reserve," 
from  which  position  it  was  ordered  to  the  right  to  join 
A.  J.  Smith's  troops  in  the  attack.  Hence  it  would  seem 
that  a  position  "  in  reserve "  was  what  General  Thomas 
had  in  mind  both  when  he  prepared  his  order  of  battle 
and  when  he  wrote  his  report,  and  that  the  change  to  the 
words  "  will  move  with  "  was  simply  a  clerical  error. 

After  darkness  had  ended  the  first  day's  battle  (De 
cember  15),  I  received  an  order  in  writing  from  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  which  was  in  substance  to  pursue  the  re 
treating  enemy  early  the  next  morning,  my  corps  to  take 
the  advance  on  the  Granny  White  pike,  and  was  in 
formed  that  the  cavalry  had  been  or  would  be  ordered  to 
start  at  the  same  time  by  a  road  to  the  right,  and  cross 
the  Harpeth  below  Franklin.  These  orders  seemed  to 
be  so  utterly  inapplicable  to  the  actual  situation  that  I 

1  See  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  37. 


EXPECTATION  THAT  HOOD  WOULD  RETREAT  245 

rode  to  the  rear  to  where  General  Thomas's  headquarters 
were  supposed  to  be,  and  there  found  that  he  had  gone 
back  to  his  house  in  Nashville,  to  which  place  I  followed 
him.  He  appeared  surprised  at  my  suggestion  that  we 
would  find  Hood  in  line  of  battle  ready  to  receive  us  in 
the  morning,  or  even  ready  to  strike  our  exposed  right 
flank  before  we  could  renew  the  attack,  instead  of  in 
full  retreat,  as  he  had  assumed.  I  told  him  I  knew  Hood 
much  better  than  he  did,  and  I  was  sure  he  would  not 
retreat.  Finally,  after  considerable  discussion  I  ob 
tained  a  modification  of  the  order  so  far  as  to  direct  the 
cavalry  to  remain  where  it  was  until  Hood's  action 
should  be  known,  and  an  order  for  some  of  A.  J.  Smith's 
troops  to  support  the  right  if  necessary.  But  no  orders 
whatever  were  given,  to  my  knowledge,  looking  to  a 
battle  the  next  day  —  at  least  none  for  my  troops  or  the 
cavalry. 

The  next  morning  revealed  the  enemy  in  his  new 
position,  his  left  remaining  where  it  was  the  night 
before,  in  my  immediate  front,  but  the  rest  of  his  line 
far  back  from  the  ground  on  which  the  other  portions  of 
Thomas's  army  had  passed  the  night.  Some  time  was 
of  course  required  for  the  other  corps  to  come  up  and 
get  in  contact  with  the  enemy,  and  the  whole  forenoom 
was  passed  by  me  in  impatient  anxiety  and  fruitless 
efforts  to  get  from  General  Thomas  some  orders  or  au 
thority  that  would  enable  us  all  to  act  together — that  is, 
the  cavalry  and  the  two  infantry  corps  on  the  right.  At 
length  the  cavalry,  without  orders  from  General  Thomas, 
had  worked  well  round  on  the  enemy's  left  so  as  to 
threaten  his  rear ;  I  had  ordered  Cox,  commanding  my 
right  division,  to  advance  his  right  in  conjunction  with 
the  movement  of  the  cavalry,  and  at  the  proper  time  to 
attack  the  left  of  the  enemy's  intrenchments  covering 
the  Granny  White  pike,  and  that  movement  had  com 
menced  ;  while,  having  been  informed  by  General  Darius 


246  FORTY- SIX!  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

N.  Couch,  commanding  my  left  division,  that  one  of 
Smith's  divisions  was  about  to  assault,  I  had  ordered 
Couch  to  support  that  division,  which  movement  had 
also  commenced.  Then  General  Thomas  arrived  near 
our  right,  where  I  stood  watching  these  movements. 
This,  about  four  o'clock  p.  M.,  was  the  first  time  I  had 
seen  or  heard  from  General  Thomas  during  that  day. 
He  gave  no  order,  nor  was  there  time  to  give  any.  The 
troops  were  already  in  motion,  and  we  had  hardly  ex 
changed  the  usual  salutations  when  shouts  to  our  left 
announced  that  McArthur's  division  of  Smith's  corps  had 
already  carried  the  enemy's  work  in  its  front,  and  our 
whole  line  advanced  and  swept  all  before  it. 

In  my  judgment,  General  Thomas  gave  a  little  less 
than  full  credit  to  McArthur's  division,  and  considerably 
more  than  full  justice  to  the  other  troops,  in  his  descrip 
tion  of  that  assault,  which  was  distinctly  seen  by  him 
and  by  me. 

The  resistance  along  the  whole  left  and  center  of 
Hood's  line  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  strong  or  ob 
stinate.  Our  total  losses  were  comparatively  insignifi 
cant;  and  whatever  may  have  been  the  appearance  to 
the  troops  under  fire,  to  a  cool  observer  out  of  the  smoke 
the  enemy's  fire  seemed  no  more  than  that  of  an  ordi 
nary  skirmish.  But  with  the  exception  of  the  compar 
atively  feeble  resistance  of  the  enemy,  that  splendid 
assault  of  McArthur's  division,  as  I  saw  it,  was  very 
accurately  described  by  its  gallant  commander  in  his 
official  report,  and  also  in  that  of  General  A.  J.  Smith. 

The  fact  is  that  Hood's  left  wing  had  been  much  weak 
ened  to  strengthen  his  right,  which  had  been  heavily 
pressed  a  short  time  before,  as  fully  described  by  General 
Thomas,  and  his  army  was  already  substantially  beaten. 
Its  spirit  seemed  to  be  gone.  What  little  fight  was  left 
in  it  after  November  30  had  been  greatly  diminished  on 
December  15.  Hood,  almost  alone  of  that  army,  was 


DELAY  IN  RENEWING  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  1GTH  247 

not  whipped  until  the  16th.  He,  the  responsible  leader 
of  a  desperate  cause,  could  not  yield  as  long  as  there 
was  a  ray  of  hope.  Under  any  ordinary  circumstances  a 
commander  even  of  the  most  moderate  capacity  must 
have  admitted  his  campaign  a  failure  the  morning  after 
Franklin.  It  would  be  absurd  to  compare  the  righting  of 
Hood's  troops  at  Nashville,  especially  on  the  second  day, 
with  the  magnificent  assaults  at  Atlanta  and  Franklin. 
My  own  appreciation  of  the  result  was  expressed  in  the 
following  despatch : 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

December  16,  1864,  7:45  P.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS, 

Commanding  Department  of  the  Cumberland. 

GENERAL  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  four  pieces  of  artillery 
and  a  considerable  number  of  prisoners  captured  by  General 
Cox's  division  this  afternoon.  General  Cox  also  reported  four 
other  pieces  and  caissons  captured  in  the  valley  between  the 
hill  carried  by  General  Me  Arthur  and  that  taken  by  General 
Cox.  I  learned,  however,  upon  inquiry,  that  General  McArthur's 
troops  claimed,  and  I  have  no  doubt  justly,  the  honor  of  captur 
ing  the  last  four.  My  provost-marshal  reports  seventy-four 
prisoners  captured  this  p.  M.  I  have  conversed  with  some  of 
the  officers  captured,  and  am  satisfied  Hood's  army  is  more 
thoroughly  beaten  than  any  troops  I  have  ever  seen. 

I  congratulate  you  most  heartily  upon  the  result  of  the  two 
days'  operations.  My  messenger  will  wait  for  any  orders  you 
may  have  to  send  me.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

It  now  appears  to  be  fully  established  by  the  records 
that  Hood's  infantry  force  in  the  battle  of  Nashville  was 
very  far  inferior  to  that  of  Thomas,  and  he  had  sent 
a  large  part  of  his  cavalry,  with  some  infantry,  away  to 
Murfreesboro'.  This  disparity  must  have  been  perfectly 
well  known  to  Hood,  though  not  to  Thomas.  Hence  it 
would  seem  that  Hood  must  have  known  that  it  was  ut- 


248  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

teiiy  impossible  for  his  army  to  resist  the  assaults  which 
he  must  expect  on  December  16.  Since  all  this  has  be 
come  known,  it  is  impossible  not  to  see  now  that  the  com 
paratively  feeble  resistance  offered  by  the  Confederate 
troops  at  Nashville  was  due  not  so  much,  perhaps,  to 
any  lack  of  valor  on  the  part  of  those  troops,  as  to  their 
comparatively  small  numbers.  I  recall  distinctly  the 
conversation  I  had  with  a  Confederate  field-officer  a  few 
minutes  after  he  was  captured  that  day,  and  which  I 
reported  to  General  Thomas  that  evening.  In  answer  to 
my  question  as  to  when  the  Confederate  troops  recognized 
the  fact  that  they  were  beaten,  he  answered,  "Not  till 
you  routed  us  just  now."  I  did  not  believe  him  then, 
for  I  thought  they  must  have  recognized  their  defeat  at 
Franklin,  or  at  least  on  the  15th,  at  Nashville.  But  now 
I  think  he  probably  told  me  the  exact  truth.  I  doubt  if 
any  soldiers  in  the  world  ever  needed  so  much  cumulative 
evidence  to  convince  them  that  they  were  beaten.  "  Brave 
boys  were  they ! "  If  they  had  been  fighting  in  a  cause 
that  commanded  the  sympathy  and  support  of  the  public 
conscience  of  the  world,  they  could  never  have  been 
beaten ;  it  is  not  necessary  to  search  for  any  other  cause 
of  the  failure  of  the  Confederate  States. 

The  most  notable  feature,  on  our  side,  of  the  battle  of 
December  16  was  the  wasting  of  nearly  the  entire  day, 
so  that  operations  ended  with  the  successful  assault  at 
dark.  What  was  left  of  Hood's  army  had  time  to  retreat 
across  the  Harpeth  during  the  night  and  destroy  the 
bridges  before  the  pursuit  could  be  commenced. 

But  the  results  of  the  two  days'  operations  at  Nash 
ville  were  too  gratifying  to  admit  of  contemporaneous 
criticism.  The  battle  has  been  generally  accepted  as  a 
perfect  exemplification  of  the  art  of  war.  It  is  certainly 
a  good  subject  for  the  study  of  military  students,  and  it 
is  partly  for  their  benefit  that  I  have  pointed  out  some 
of  its  prominent  defects  as  I  understand  them.  Its  com- 


DELAY  IN  RENEWING  THE  ATTACK  ON  THE  16TH   249 

mendable  features  are  sufficiently  evident ;  but  in  study 
ing  the  actions  that  have  resulted  in  victory,  we  are  apt 
to  overlook  the  errors  without  which  the  victory  might 
have  been  far  more  complete,  or  even  to  mistake  those 
errors  for  real  causes  of  success. 

The  pursuit  from  Nashville  was  necessarily  an  imper 
fect  one  from  the  start,  simply  because  the  successful 
assault  having  been  made  at  the  close  of  day,  the  broken 
enemy  had  time  to  get  across  the  Harpeth  and  destroy 
the  bridges  before  morning.  The  singular  blunder  by 
which  General  Thomas's  pontoon-train  was  sent  toward 
Murfreesboro'  instead  of  Franklin  added  somewhat  to 
the  delay,  but  probably  did  not  essentially  change  the 
result. 

The  state  of  all  the  roads  except  the  one  turnpike,  the 
soft  condition  of  the  fields  everywhere,  the  bad  weather, — 
rain,  sleet,  and  ice, — made  the  movements  of  troops  which 
were  necessary  to  an  effective  pursuit  extremely  difficult, 
and  often  impossible.  The  energy  and  determination  of 
General  Thomas  and  of  all  who  could  take  any  active 
part  in  that  pursuit  were  probably  never  surpassed  in 
military  history,  but  the  difficulties  to  be  overcome  were 
often  insurmountable.  Under  the  conditions  at  that 
season  of  the  year  and  in  that  state  of  weather,  the  only 
possible  chance  of  reaping  fruits  commensurate  with  the 
brilliant  victory  at  Nashville  and  with  the  great  prepara 
tions  which  had  been  made  for  pursuit  was  to  make  the 
final  assault  at  Nashville  early  enough  in  the  day  to 
leave  time  before  dark  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  cross 
ing  the  Harpeth  and  destroying  the  bridges. 

If  Hood  had  retreated  in  the  night  of  December  15,  as 
Thomas  presumed  he  would,  the  result  would  doubtless 
have  been  even  less  serious  to  the  enemy ;  for  he  would 
not  have  suffered  at  Nashville  the  great  losses  and  de 
moralization  which  occurred  to  him  on  the  16th,  and 
would  have  been  in  better  condition  to  make  an  effec- 


250  FOKTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

tive  retreat,  and  even  better  able  to  cross  the  Harpeth 
in  the  night  and  destroy  the  bridges.  But  this  would 
have  been  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  prevent  on 
the  15th,  on  account  of  the  great  extent  and  nature  of 
the  movements  necessarily  required  to  open  the  battle 
on  that  day.  I  now  recall  very  distinctly  the  desire 
manifested  by  General  Thomas  that  those  initial  opera 
tions  might,  if  possible,  be  expedited.  As  we  sat  together 
on  horseback  just  in  rear  of  Wood's  right  and  of  Smith's 
left,  on  ground  overlooking  nearly  the  entire  field,  the 
general  would  frequently  reach  for  my  glasses,  which  he 
had  occasionally  used  before  and  said  were  the  only 
field-glasses  he  had  ever  found  of  much  use  to  him,  and 
try  to  peer  through  the  misty  atmosphere  far  over  the 
woods  and  fields  where  his  infantry  and  cavalry  were 
advancing  against  the  enemy's  left.  After  thus  looking 
long  and  earnestly,  he  would  return  the  glasses  to  me, 
with  what  seemed  to  be  a  sign  of  irritation  or  impa 
tience,  for  he  uttered  very  few  words  in  that  long  time, 
until  late  in  the  afternoon,  when,  after  using  my  field- 
glasses  for  the  last  time,  he  said  to  me,  with  the  energy 
which  battle  alone  could  arouse  in  his  strong  nature : 
"  Smith  has  not  reached  far  enough  to  the  right.  Put 
in  your  troops ! " 

Occasionally,  when  a  shell  struck  and  exploded  near 
where  we  were,  causing  his  horse  to  make  a  slight  start, 
and  only  a  slight  one, —  for  the  nature  of  the  horse  was 
much  the  same  as  that  of  the  rider, —  the  only  change 
visible  in  the  face  or  form  of  that  stout-hearted  soldier 
was  a  slight  motion  of  the  bridle-hand  to  check  the 
horse.  My  own  beautiful  gray  charger,  "  Frank  Blair," 
though  naturally  more  nervous  than  the  other,  had  be 
come  by  that  time  hardly  less  fearless.  But  I  doubt  if 
my  great  senior  ever  noticed  that  day  what  effect  the 
explosion  of  a  shell  produced  on  either  the  gray  horse 
or  his  rider.  He  had  on  his  shoulders  the  responsibili- 


HOPELESSNESS  OF  HOOD'S  POSITION  251 

ties  of  a  great  battle,  while  I  then  had  better  than  ever 
before  opportunity  to  study  the  character  of  my  chief. 

A  wiser  commander  than  Hood  might  very  probably 
have  saved  his  army  from  that  terrible  and  useless  sac 
rifice  of  December  16.  But  that  last  and  bravest  cham 
pion  of  a  desperate  cause  in  the  west  appears  to  have 
decided  to  remain  and  invite  the  total  destruction  of  his 
army.  The  position  which  the  Confederates  occupied  in 
the  morning  of  the  16th  was  so  close  to  that  of  more 
than  half  of  the  Union  troops  that  Hood's  left  could 
easily  have  been  crushed  by  an  infantry  assault  and  his 
rear  reached  by  Thomas's  cavalry  before  noon,  and 
nothing  less  than  a  miracle  could  have  prevented  the 
capture  of  Hood's  army. 

It  is  worthy  of  note  as  instructive  comparisons  that 
on  November  30  Hood  advanced  from  Spring  Hill  to 
Franklin  and  made  his  famous  assault  in  just  about  the 
same  length  of  time  that  it  took  our  troops  to  advance 
from  the  first  to  the  second  position  at  Nashville  and 
make  the  assault  of  December  16;  and  that  the  Fourth 
and  Twenty-third  corps  on  November  29  and  30  fought 
two  battles  —  Spring  Hill  and  Franklin  —  and  marched 
forty  miles,  from  Duck  River  to  Nashville,  in  thirty-six 
hours.  Time  is  an  element  in  military  problems  the 
value  of  which  cannot  be  too  highly  estimated,  yet  how 
seldom  has  it  been  duly  appreciated ! 

The  remnant  of  Hood's  army  having  made  its  escape 
across  the  Tennessee  River,  the  pursuit  terminated,  and 
General  Thomas  issued  his  remarkable  General  Orders, 
No.  169,  announcing  that  "  the  rear-guard  of  the  flying 
and  dispirited  enemy  was  driven  across  the  Tennessee 
River.  .  .  .wl 

Orders  were  then  issued  by  General  Thomas  distribut 
ing  his  army  along  the  Tennessee  River  in  winter  quar 
ters,  and  he  commenced  planning  a  campaign  for  the 

l  War  Kecords,  Vol.  XLV,  part  i,  p.  50. 


252  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ensuing  spring,  the  general  features  of  which  he  tele 
graphed  me,  asking  my  opinion.  His  proposition  seemed 
to  show  so  different  an  appreciation  from  my  own  of 
the  actual  state  of  the  war  and  of  the  demands  of  the 
country  upon  its  army  at  that  momentous  crisis,  and 
views  so  different  from  mine  in  respect  to  the  strategic 
principles  that  should  govern  future  operations,  that  I 
wrote  to  General  Grant  and  General  Sherman,  giving 
them  briefly  my  views  upon  the  subject,  and  requesting 
an  order  to  join  them  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  to  aid  in 
terminating  the  rebellion.  My  letter  to  General  Grant 
was  promptly  followed  by  a  telegram  to  General  Thomas 
directing  him  to  send  me  east  with  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  which  enabled  me  to  participate  in  the  closing 
campaign  of  the  war. 

The  following  are  the  letters,  above  referred  to,  to 
Grant  and  Sherman,  whose  appreciation  of  the  views 
therein  expressed  is  sufficiently  shown  by  the  published 
history  of  subsequent  operations,  and  the  orders  sent 
to  Thomas  by  General  Grant  and  the  "War  Department 
during  that  time: 

(Unofficial.) 

COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  December  27,  1864. 

LiEUTENANT-G-ENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT,  Commanding  U.  S.  Armies, 
City  Point,  Va. 

GENERAL  :  My  corps  was  sent  back  to  Tennessee  by  General 
Sherman,  instead  of  remaining  with  him  on  his  march  through 
Georgia,  according  to  his  original  design,  for  two  reasons,  viz. : 
first,  because  General  Thomas  was  not  regarded  strong  enough 
after  it  became  evident  that  Hood  designed  to  invade  Tennessee  j 
and,  second,  in  order  that  I  might  fill  up  my  corps  from  the  new 
troops  then  arriving  in  Tennessee.  These  reasons  now  no  longer 
exist.  By  uniting  my  troops  with  Stanley's,  we  were  able  to  hold 
Hood  in  check  at  Columbia  and  Franklin  until  General  Thomas 
could  concentrate  at  Nashville,  and  also  to  give  Hood  his  death- 


LETTER  TO  GRANT  253 

blow  at  Franklin.  Subsequent  operations  have  shown  how  little 
fight  was  then  left  in  his  army,  and  have  taken  that  little  out  of 
it.  He  now  has  not  more  than  fifteen  thousand  infantry,  about 
ten  thousand  of  whom  only  are  armed,  and  they  greatly  demor 
alized.  With  time  to  reorganize  and  recruit,  he  could  not  prob 
ably  raise  his  force  to  more  than  half  the  strength  he  had  at 
Franklin. 

General  Thomas  has  assigned  several  new  regiments  to  my 
command,  and  I  hope  soon  to  make  them  effective  by  distributing 
them  in  old  brigades.  I  will  have  from  fifteen  to  eighteen  thou 
sand  effective  men,  two  thirds  of  whom  are  the  veterans  of  the 
campaigns  of  East  Tennessee  and  Georgia :  a  small  force,  it  is 
true,  yet  one  which  would  at  least  be  an  appreciable  addition  to 
your  army  in  Virginia  or  elsewhere  where  decisive  work  is  to 
be  done. 

It  may  not  be  practicable  now  for  me  to  join  General  Sherman, 
but  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  transfer  my  command  to  Virginia. 

I  am  aware  that  General  Thomas  contemplates  a  "  spring 
campaign v  into  Alabama  or  Mississippi,  with  the  Tennessee 
River  as  a  base,  and  believe  he  considers  my  command  a  neces 
sary  part  of  the  operating  force.  Without  reference  to  the  latter 
point,  permit  me  to  express  the  opinion  that  such  a  campaign 
would  not  be  an  economical  or  advantageous  use  of  so  many 
troops. 

If  aggressive  operations  are  to  be  continued  in  the  Gulf  States, 
it  appears  to  me  it  would  be  much  better  to  take  Mobile  and 
operate  from  that  point,  thus  striking  vital  points,  if  there  are 
any  such,  of  rebel  territory  by  much  shorter  lines. 

But  it  appears  to  me  that  Lee's  army  is  virtually  all  that  is  left 
of  the  rebellion.  If  we  can  concentrate  force  enough  to  destroy 
that,  we  will  destroy  with  it  the  rebel  government,  and  the  occu 
pation  of  the  whole  South  will  then  be  but  a  matter  of  a  few 
weeks7  time. 

Excuse,  General,  the  liberty  I  have  taken  in  expressing  my 
views  thus  freely  and  unsolicited.  I  have  no  other  motive  than 
a  desire  for  the  nation's  good,  and  a  personal  wish  to  serve  where 
my  little  command  can  do  the  most. 

The  change  I  suggest  would  of  course  deprive  me  of  my  de 
partment  command,  but  this  would  be  a  small  loss  to  me  or  to 
the  service.  The  present  arrangement  is  an  unsatisfactory  one 
at  best.  Nominally  I  command  both  a  department  and  an  army 


254  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

in  the  field ;  but  in  fact  I  do  neither.     I  am,  General,  very  re 
spectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 


(Unofficial.) 

COLUMBIA,  TENN.,  December  28,  1864. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  Accept  my  hearty  congratulations  on 
the  happy  termination  of  your  "pleasure  excursion"  through 
Georgia.  You  must  have  had  a  merry  Christmas  surely. 

As  was  predicted,  you  have  had  the  fun,  and  we  the  hard  work. 
But  altogether  your  plan  has  been  a  brilliant  success.  Hood 
did  n't  follow  you,  .  .  .  but  he  did  me.  I  held  him  at  Colum 
bia  several  days,  and  hurt  him  considerably.  Finally  he  got 
across  the  Duck  River  above,  and  made  for  Franklin  via  Spring 
Hill.  I  headed  him  off  at  Spring  Hill  with  a  division,  and  con 
centrated  at  Franklin.  There  he  made  the  heaviest  assaults  I 
have  ever  seen,  but  was  fairly  repulsed  and  terribly  punished. 
In  fact  we  pretty  much  knocked  all  the  fight  out  of  him  on  that 
occasion,  and  he  has  shown  very  little  since.  Now  I  reckon  he 
has  n't  any  left. 

I  barely  succeeded  in  delaying  Hood  until  Thomas  could  get 
A.  J.  Smith  and  Steedman  to  Nashville,  when  he  became  abun 
dantly  strong,  and  after  getting  Wilson's  cavalry  together  moved 
out  and  gave  Hood  a  most  thorough  beating  with  all  ease.  The 
fact  is,  Hood's  army  showed  scarcely  any  fight  at  all.  I  have 
never  seen  anybody  except  Jeff  Thompson  so  easily  beaten. 

Stoneman  has  cleaned  out  Breckinridge  and  destroyed  the 
salt-works  and  everything  else  in  southwest  Virginia ;  so  all 
together  matters  are  in  pretty  good  shape  in  this  part  of  the 
military  division. 

Thomas  has  given  me  nine  new  regiments,  and  promises  three 
more.  These  will  make  a  pretty  good  division  for  new  troops. 

All  this  being  true,  I  take  it  the  objects  for  which  I  was  left 
in  this  part  of  the  country  have  been  accomplished,  and  I  would 
like  very  much  to  be  with  you  again,  to  take  part  in  the  future 
operations  of  the  Grand  Army.  Cannot  this  be  brought  about  ? 

Of  course  I  can  only  conjecture  what  your  operations  will  now 
be,  and  can  hardly  judge  of  the  practicability  of  my  joining  you, 


LETTER  TO  SHERMAN  255 

but  I  hope  I  may  be  able  to  do  so.  I  have  written  to  General 
Grant  on  this  subject,  and  suggested  that  if  I  cannot  reach  you, 
I  might  with  propriety  be  sent  to  Virginia.  I  feel  certain  that 
I  am  no  longer  needed  here,  for  without  me  Thomas  is  much 
stronger  than  Hood. 

I  have  not  talked  with  General  Thomas  on  the  subject,  but  in 
tend  to  do  so  as  soon  as  I  can  see  him.1  No  doubt  he  will  be  op 
posed  to  any  reduction  of  his  force,  but  I  go  for  concentrating 
against  Lee.  If  we  can  whip  him  now,  the  rebellion  will  be  vir 
tually  ended. 

My  corps  is  small,  it  is  true,  but  it  is  u  powerful  willing,"  and 
can  help  some  anyhow. 

Please  present  my  kindest  remembrances  to  my  old  comrades, 
and  favor  me  with  an  early  reply.  Yours  very  truly, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major- General. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Com'd'g,  etc.,  Savannah,  Ga. 


On  my  passage  through  Washington  in  January,  1865, 
Mr.  Stanton,  the  Secretary  of  War,  confirmed  the  view  I 
had  taken  of  the  situation,  and  gave  reasons  for  it  before 
unknown  to  me,  by  telling  me  it  was  regarded  by  the 
administration  as  an  absolute  financial  necessity  that  the 
war  be  ended  in  the  campaign  then  about  to  begin.  It 
is,  perhaps,  not  strange  that  General  Thomas  had  not 
thought  of  this;  but  it  does  seem  remarkable  that  he 
should  have  proposed  to  let  a  broken  and  dispirited  en 
emy  have  several  months  in  which  to  recuperate  before 
annoying  him  any  further. 

The  expectation  and  instructions  of  General  Grant 
and  General  Sherman  were  that  General  Thomas  should, 
as  soon  as  he  was  ready  to  take  the  offensive,  pursue 
Hood  into  the  Gulf  States.  General  Thomas  appears  to 
have  forgotten  that  part  of  his  instructions.  As  soon  as 
he  had  driven  Hood  across  the  river,  he  proposed  to  go 
into  winter  quarters,  and  "  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennes 
see  "  till  some  time  the  next  spring.  If  General  Sherman 

1  I  did  not  see  General  Thomas  after  this  letter  was  written. 


256  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

had  confided  to  General  Thomas,  as  he  did  to  General 
Grant,  his  ulterior  purpose  to  march  from  Savannah  to 
ward  Eichmond,  for  which  reason  he  wanted  Hood  kept 
out  of  his  way,  Thomas  would  have  perceived  the  neces 
sity  of  pressing  the  pursuit  of  Hood  into  the  Gulf  States. 
But  if  Thomas  supposed,  as  he  might  naturally  have 
done,  that  Sherman  had  only  shifted  his  base  with  a 
view  to  further  operations  in  Georgia  and  the  Gulf 
States,  under  the  plan  of  the  last  autumn,  with  which 
Thomas  was  perfectly  familiar,  he  may  well  have  seen 
no  necessity  for  his  pressing  the  pursuit  beyond  the 
Tennessee  River  in  midwinter. 

Some  of  our  military  operations  in  the  Civil  War  re 
mind  me  of  the  spirit  of  "  fair  play "  shown  by  our  old 
doctors  in  the  West  in  the  days  of  malarial  fever.  When 
the  poison  had  fully  developed  its  power,  and  threatened 
the  destruction  of  its  victim,  the  good  doctor  would  come 
in  and  attack  the  enemy  with  heroic  doses  of  quinine. 
In  a  few  days  medical  science  would  prevail.  Then  the 
fair-minded  physician  would  retire,  and  give  the  worsted 
malaria  a  chance  to  recuperate  and  "  come  to  time  "  for 
another  attack;  and  so  on  indefinitely  until  either  the 
man  or  the  malaria  —  often  the  man  —  finally  got 
"knocked  out."  It  was  not  until  after  much  study  and 
some  practice  of  the  art  of  war  that  I  conceived  for 
myself  the  idea  of  giving  the  enemy  of  my  youth,  which 
still  clung  to  me,  no  chance  to  recover  after  I  once  got 
him  down.  He  has  never  got  the  better  of  me  since. 

Had  Thomas's  plan  been  carried  out,  he  would  have 
been  ready,  with  a  fine  army  splendidly  equipped  and 
supplied,  to  start  from  the  Tennessee  River  to  invade  the 
Gulf  States,  as  had  been  done  the  year  before,  just  about 
the  time  the  plans  actually  adopted  resulted  in  the  sur 
render  of  all  the  Confederate  armies.  In  Thomas's  mind 
war  seems  to  have  become  the  normal  condition  of  the 
country.  He  had  apparently  as  yet  no  thought  of  its 


THOMAS'S  ATTITUDE   TOWARD  THE  WAR  057 

termination.  The  campaign  from  the  Tennessee  River  as 
a  base  had  then  become,  like  the  •' autumn  maneuvers" 
of  a  European  army,  a  regular  operation  to  be  commenced 
at  the  proper  time  every  year.  In  his  general  order  of 
December  29,  he  said  the  enemy,  "unless  he  is  mad, 
must  forever  relinquish  all  hope  of  bringing  Tennessee 
again  within  the  lines  of  the  accursed  rebellion";  but 
the  possible  termination  of  that  rebellion  appeared  to 
be  a  contingency  too  remote  to  be  taken  into  account 
in  planning  future  military  operations. 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


CHAPTER   XIV 

HOOD'S  MOTIVE  IN  ATTEMPTING  THE  IMPOSSIBLE  AT  NASH 
VILLE  —  DIVERSITY  OF  OPINIONS  CONCEENING  THAT 
BATTLE  —  NO  OEDEES  ON  EECOED  FOE  THE  BATTLE  OF 
DECEMBEE  16  —  THAT  BATTLE  DUE  TO  THE  SPONTANEOUS 
ACTION  OF  SUBOEDINATE  COMMANDEES  —  STATEMENTS 
IN  THE  EEPOETS  OF  THE  COEPS  COMMANDEES  —  EXPLA 
NATION  OF  THE  ABSENCE  OF  OEDEES  —  THE  PHEASEOL- 
OGY  OF  GENEEAL  THOMASES  EEPOET. 


official  records,  Hood's  statement,  and  Sherman's 
estimate,  made  at  the  time,  agree  pretty  closely  in 
placing  Hood's  infantry  force  at  about  30,000  men  when 
he  crossed  the  Tennessee  and  began  his  advance  toward 
Nashville.  He  lost  a  considerable  number  at  Spring 
Hill  on  November  29,  and  over  6000,  besides  thirteen 
general  officers,  at  Franklin  on  November  30.  Therefore 
24,000  must  be  a  liberal  estimate  of  his  infantry  strength 
after  the  battle  of  Franklin.  The  infantry  strength  of 
the  Fourth  and  Twenty-third  corps  did  not  exceed  22,000 
present  for  duty  equipped,  of  which  one  brigade  (Cooper's) 
of  the  Twenty-third  was  sent  by  General  Thomas  to 
guard  the  fords  of  Duck  River  below  Columbia,  and  did 
not  rejoin  the  corps  until  after  the  battle  of  Franklin. 
Hence  Hood's  infantry  force  at  Columbia  and  Franklin 
was  nearly  one  half  greater  than  mine.  The  disparity  in 
cavalry  was  still  greater  at  first,  but  was  reduced  very 
considerably  by  the  arrival  of  cavalry  sent  from  Nash 
ville  by  General  Thomas,  especially  Hammond's  brigade, 
which  arrived  in  the  field  on  the  29th,  too  late  to  assist 
in  holding  the  line  of  Duck  River. 


HOOD'S  MOTIVE  AT  NASHVILLE  259 

It  follows  that  Hood  had  an  opportunity  to  conduct 
operations  against  an  adversary  of,  at  the  most,  only  two 
thirds  his  own  strength  in  infantry  and  in  cavalry  —  an 
opportunity  such  as  had  never  before  been  presented  to 
any  Confederate  general.  That  he  thought  his  chance  a 
very  brilliant  one  is  not  remarkable.  If  he  could  cut  off 
my  retreat  or  force  me  to  a  pitched  battle,  he  had  full 
reason  to  hope  for  the  most  decisive  results.  This  fact 
should  be  given  full  weight  in  connection  with  the  ques 
tion  why  Hood  did  not  avoid  intrenched  positions  and 
make  a  raid  into  Kentucky,  which  he  could  easily  have 
done  at  that  time,  because  Thomas  was  not  yet  ready  to 
meet  him  in  the  open  field.  The  moral  effect  of  such  a 
raid  would,  of  course,  have  been  very  great ;  but  it  must 
haye  proved  disastrous  in  the  end,  for  the  reason  that 
Thomas  would  in  a  short  time  have  had  in  Hood's  rear 
a  far  superior  force  to  cut  off  his  retreat  and  force  him 
to  a  decisive  battle;  whereas  if  Hood  could  defeat  and 
seriously  cripple,  if  not  destroy,  the  only  organized  army 
in  the  field  then  opposed  to  him,  he  could  afterward 
attend  to  Thomas's  scattered  detachments  in  succession,, 
or  invade  Kentucky,  as  he  might  think  expedient.  As* 
Hood  was  operating  in  the  country  of  his  own  friends^, 
he  did  not  lack  full  and  accurate  information  of  the 
strength  and  movements  of  his  adversary.  Indeed,  we 
were  also  fully  informed  in  due  time  of  all  of  Hood's 
movements,  but  overestimated  his  strength  because  we 
did  not  have  friends  residing  in  his  camps. 

But  the  defeat  of  Hood  at  Franklin,  and  Thomas's  con 
centration  of  troops  at  Nashville,  completely  reversed 
the  situation.  When  Hood  recovered  from  the  blow  re 
ceived  at  Franklin  sufficiently  to  make  any  further  move, 
he  found  himself  confronted  no  longer  by  an  inferior 
force,  but  by  one  of  more  than  twice  his  own  strength 
in  infantry,  and  not  far,  if  at  all,  inferior  to  him  in  cav 
alry.  The  artillery  in  the  field  is  not  specially  con- 


260  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

sidered  in  any  of  these  estimates,  because  it  was  ample 
in  quantity  and  efficient  in  quality  on  both  sides,  and 
need  not  be  compared.  This  formidable  army  was  now 
in  Hood's  immediate  front  at  Nashville,  while  the  impor 
tant  strategic  points  of  Murfreesboro'  and  Chattanooga 
were  strongly  garrisoned  and  fortified,  and  the  railroads 
strongly  guarded.  It  had  become  too  late  for  Hood  even 
to  attempt  a  raid  into  Kentucky.  Thomas  would  have 
been  close  upon  his  rear  with  an  army  at  least  twice  as 
strong,  with  all  the  important  points  in  Tennessee  still 
securely  held.  But  successful  operations  against  Nash 
ville  were  far  less  possible  to  Hood  than  an  invasion  of 
Kentucky.  While  no  commander  could  possibly  think 
of  destroying  his  own  army  by  assaulting  a  fortified 
place  in  which  the  garrison  was  more  than  double  his 
own  strength,  or  indulge  the  hope  of  any  valuable  re 
sults  from  a  less  than  half  investment  of  such  a  place, 
so  bold  a  commander  as  Hood  might  possibly  attempt  a 
raid  into  Kentucky,  as  the  only  thing  he  could  possibly 
do  except  retreat  across  the  Tennessee  River,  and  thus 
abandon  his  cause  as  lost.  It  was  this  view  of  the  situa 
tion  by  General  Grant  and  the  authorities  in  Washing 
ton  that  caused  such  intense  anxiety  on  account  of  the 
delay  of  General  Thomas  in  attacking  Hood  at  Nashville. 
It  was  perfectly  evident  that  Thomas  could  beat  Hood 
whenever  he  chose  to  attack  him,  and  that  Hood  must 
be  fully  aware  of  that  fact.  Hence  it  was  naturally  ap 
prehended  that  Hood  would  either  make  a  raid  into 
Kentucky  or  else  retreat  across  the  Tennessee  Eiver 
without  suffering  any  further  damage.  To  those  who 
were  watching  Hood  closely  at  Nashville,  and  especially 
to  those  who  understood  his  character,  there  seemed  no 
ground  for  either  apprehension.  All  his  operations  in 
dicated  a  serious  attempt  to  besiege  Nashville,  though 
it  was  impossible  to  imagine  what  he  could  hope  to 
accomplish}  unless  it  was  to  wait  in  the  most  conve- 


HOOD'S  MOTIVE  AT  NASHVILLE  261 

nient  place  while  his  adversary,  with  all  the  great  re 
sources  of  the  country  at  his  back,  got  ready  to  crush 
him. 

As  stated  in  his  report,  Thomas  estimated  Hood's 
strength  as  being  at  least  equal  to  his  own,  and  with  all 
the  deliberation  of  his  nature,  he  insisted  upon  making 
the  full  preparations  which  he  considered  essential  to  suc 
cess  not  only  in  battle,  but  in  pursuit  of  a  defeated  enemy. 
From  his  point  of  view,  Thomas  was  unquestionably 
right  in  his  action.  How  he  came  to  make  so  great  an 
overestimate  of  the  Confederate  strength,  in  view  of  the 
means  of  information  in  his  possession  and  the  estimate 
General  Sherman  had  given  him  before  he  started  for 
Savannah,  it  is  difficult  to  conjecture.  But  the  fact  is 
now  beyond  question  that  Thomas  made  all  those  elab 
orate  preparations  to  attack  an  enemy  of  less  than  half  his 
own  strength,  under  the  belief  that  his  adversary  was 
at  least  equal  in  strength  to  himself.  That  Hood  then 
knew  his  own  exact  strength  is  a  matter  of  course,  and 
that  he  did  not  underestimate  the  strength  of  his  adver 
sary  is  almost  equally  certain.  During  the  two  weeks  in 
which  his  army  lay  in  front  of  Nashville,  if  not  before, 
he  must  have  ascertained  very  closely  the  strength  of 
the  Union  forces  in  his  front.  Hence  Hood's  "siege" 
of  Nashville  for  two  weeks  could  not  be  regarded  other 
wise  than  as  a  stupendous  farce,  were  it  not  for  the 
desperate  bravery  with  which  he  thus  kept  up  the  ap 
pearance  of  still  fighting  for  a  lost  cause  rather  than 
be  the  first  to  admit  by  his  own  action  that  it  was 
indeed  lost.  It  is  now  well  known  that  the  feeling 
among  the  Southern  people  and  that  of  some  of  the 
highest  officers  of  the  Confederate  government  made  it 
impossible  for  any  officer  of  their  army  to  admit  in  any 
public  way  the  failure  of  the  Confederacy  until  after  the 
enforced  surrender  of  Lee's  army  in  Virginia.  Indeed, 
it  required  much  moral  courage  on  the  part  of  General 


262          FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

Johnston  voluntarily  to  enter  into  a  capitulation  even 
after  the  capture  of  Lee. 

This  is  unquestionably  the  explanation  of  Hood's  des 
perate  act  in  waiting  in  front  of  Nashville  and  inviting 
the  destruction  or  capture  of  his  army.  The  crushing 
blow  he  there  received  was  like  a  death-blow  delivered 
by  a  giant  full  of  strength  and  vigor  upon  a  gladiator 
already  beaten  and  reduced  in  strength  nearly  to  exhaus 
tion.  Sherman  was  not  very  far  wrong  when  he  said 
that  "the  battle  of  Nashville  was  fought  at  Franklin." 
The  gladiator  had  been  reduced  to  less  than  one  third 
of  his  former  strength  by  a  long  series  of  combats  with 
a  more  powerful  antagonist  all  the  past  summer,  and 
finally  by  his  unexpected  repulse  at  Franklin.  It  required 
only  one  or  two  more  blows  from  the  powerful  enemy 
at  Nashville  to  complete  his  destruction.  Any  estimate 
of  the  battle  of  Nashville  which  fails  to  take  into  account 
the  foregoing  facts  must  be  essentially  erroneous,  and  it 
is  not  doing  any  honor  to  the  great  soldier  who  fought 
that  battle  to  compare  it  with  his  previous  achievements 
when  he  heroically  met  and  defeated  superior  numbers 
of  fresh  and  vigorous  troops. 

A  wide  diversity  of  opinion  has  always  existed  among 
military  men  in  respect  to  the  battle  of  Nashville,  ranging 
all  the  way  from  the  view  taken  in  historical  accounts 
heretofore  published  to  the  opinion  expressed  by  General 
Sherman,  in  language  intended  of  course  to  be  hyperbol 
ical,  namely,  that  "the  battle  of  Nashville  was  fought  at 
Franklin."  The  truth  is  to  be  found  somewhere  between 
these  two  extremes.  But  the  exact  truth  respecting  that 
battle  can  perhaps  hardly  yet  be  told.  I  will,  however, 
state  such  facts  of  my  own  knowledge  and  experience, 
and  make  such  references  to  data  to  be  found  in  the  vo 
luminous  records,  as  it  seems  to  me  may  assist  the  future 
historian,  together  with  such  comments  as  I  deem  appro 
priate  upon  the  information  now  available.  As  will  be 
explained  hereafter,  some  important  documents  which 


NO  ORDERS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF  DECEMBER  16         263 

originally  formed  part  of  the  records  have  disappeared 
therefrom.  Their  influence  upon  historical  opinion,  if 
ever  recovered,  may  now  only  be  suggested. 

It  must  be  observed  as  a  very  notable  fact  that  the 
official  records,  replete  with  orders  and  instructions  is 
sued  every  day,  and  almost  every  hour,  contain  no  record 
whatever  of  any  written  order  or  instructions  from  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  given  after  the  close  of  operations  on 
December  15,  for  the  operations  which  actually  took 
place  the  next  day.  The  only  indications  in  the  records, 
so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  that  any  orders 
were  given  by  General  Thomas,  either  orally  or  in  writ 
ing,  on  the  night  of  December  15,  are  the  following 
"  orders  of  the  day  "  for  the  Fourth  Army  Corps,  issued 
by  General  Wood  after  a  personal  interview  with  Gen 
eral  Thomas  that  night;  the  order  in  writing  from 
General  Thomas  to  General  Wilson,  December  15 ;  and 
the  despatch  from  General  Wilson  to  myself,  dated  De 
cember  16,  10 : 10  A.  M.  They  are  as  follow : 

HEADQUARTERS  FOURTH  ARMY  CORPS, 
NEAR  NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  15,  1864,  11 : 20  P.  M. 

Orders  of  the  day  for  the  Fourth  Army  Corps  for  to-morrow, 
December  16,  1864: 

If  the  enemy  is  in  their  front  at  daylight  to-morrow  morning, 
division  commanders  will  advance  at  that  time,  attack,  and 
carry  whatever  may  be  before  them.  If  the  enemy  retreats  to 
night,  we  will  follow  them.  General  Elliott,  commanding  Second 
Division,  will  cross  to  the  east  of  the  Franklin  pike,  then  move 
southward  parallel  to  it.  He  will  deploy  two  regiments,  con 
nect  with  skirmishers,  and  the  rest  of  his  division  will  move  by 
flank.  General  Kimball  will  follow,  then  General  Beatty.  The 
batteries  attached  to  each  division  to-day  will  accompany  them 
to-morrow.  Ten  ambulances  and  five  ammunition-wagons  will 
follow  each  division. 

By  order  of  Brigadier-General  Wood : 

J.  S.  FULLERTON, 

Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


264  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  15,  1864. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  J.  H.  WILSON,  Commanding  Cavalry  Corps, 
Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi. 

GENERAL  :  I  am  directed  by  the  major  general  commanding  to 
say  to  you  that  you  will  remain  in  your  present  position  until 
it  is  satisfactorily  known  whether  the  enemy  will  fight  or  re 
treat.  In  case  he  retreats,  you  will  move  your  command  on  the 
Hillsborough  pike  across  the  Harpeth,  and  then  take  the  most 
direct  road  or  roads  to  the  Franklin  pike,  and  endeavor  to  cap 
ture  or  destroy  the  enemy's  trains  in  their  rear. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  General,  very  respectfully  your 
obedient  servant, 

ROBT.  H.  RAMSEY,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

Both  of  these  orders  indicate  a  not  unnatural  state  of 
doubt  as  to  whether  the  enemy  would  "  fight  or  retreat." 
The  former  directs  what  is  to  be  done  by  the  Fourth 
Corps  in  either  case,  while  the  latter  directs  what  shall 
be  done  in  case  the  enemy  retreats,  but  says  nothing 
about  what  shall  be  done  if  he  does  not  retreat. 

HDQRS.  CAVALRY  CORPS,  MIL.  Div.  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
IN  THE  FIELD,  December  16,  1864,  10:10  A.  M. 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SCHOFIELD,  Commanding  Twenty-third  Army 
Corps. 

GENERAL  :  The  regiment  sent  to  the  Granny  White  pike  reports 
it  strongly  picketed  toward  us,  with  troops  moving  to  our  left. 
This  is  probably  Chalmers's  division.  I  have  heard  nothing 
from  Johnson  this  morning;  but,  from  what  General  Croxton 
reports,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Chalmers  crossed  the  Hardin 
pike,  moving  toward  Brentwood.  The  country  on  the  left  of  the 
Hillsboro'  pike,  toward  the  enemy's  left,  is  too  difficult  for  cav 
alry  operations.  It  seems  to  me  if  I  was  on  the  other  flank  of 
the  army  I  might  do  more  to  annoy  the  enemy,  unless  it  is  in 
tended  that  I  shall  push  out  as  directed  last  night. 
Very  respectfully, 

J.  H.  WILSON,  Brevet  Major-General. 


NO  ORDERS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF  DECEMBER  16    265 

(Indorsement.) 

Respectfully  forwarded  to  Major-General  Thomas. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

This  last,  while  showing  that  General  Wilson  had  not 
received  at  10:10  A.  M.  on  the  16th  any  orders  from 
General  Thomas  later  than  that  above  quoted,  appears 
to  indicate  that  he  had  received  some  previous  order,  re 
ferred  to  in  the  words  "  unless  it  is  intended  that  I  shall 
push  out  as  directed  last  night";  for  the  order  above 
quoted  from  the  records  did  not  indicate  any  intention 
that  he  should  "push  out"  unless  the  enemy  was  in 
retreat. 

An  order  in  writing,  as  heretofore  stated,  was  received 
by  me  very  soon  after  dark  on  the  15th.  It  has  dis 
appeared  from  the  official  records,  both  those  of  Gen 
eral  Thomas  and  mine.  If  any  other  orders  were  issued 
by  General  Thomas,  I  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  the 
fact. 

In  my  judgment,  whatever  orders  were  issued  by  Gen 
eral  Thomas  on  the  night  of  December  15  or  in  the 
morning  of  the  16th  are  essential  to  truthful  history; 
and  I  am  sure  they  must  have  been  more  creditable  to 
General  Thomas,  though  they  may  have  been  based 
upon  erroneous. foresight  of  the  enemy's  action,  which  is 
necessarily  very  common  in  war,  than  the  absence  from 
the  records  of  any  orders  from  him  to  govern  the  opera 
tions  of  the  army  the  next  day,  and  the  fact,  which 
appears  from  the  records,  that  some  of  the  troops  at  least 
did  not  receive  any  orders  from  General  Thomas,  at  any 
time,  upon  which  they  could  act  on  December  16. 

It  seems  at  least  strange  that  this  absence  of  orders 
given  in  the  night  of  the  15th  or  morning  of  the  16th 
should  have  passed  without  comment,  especially  in  view 
of  the  very  full  orders  issued  on  the  14th  and  in  the 
night  of  the  16th. 


266  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

It  will  also  be  observed  that  General  Thomas,  in  his 
official  report  of  the  battle  of  Nashville,  dated  January 
20,  1865,  makes  no  mention  of  any  orders  issued  in  the 
night  of  December  15  or  morning  of  the  16th.  He  sim 
ply  says  in  that  regard:  "The  whole  command  bivouacked 
in  line  of  battle  during  the  night  on  the  ground  occu 
pied  at  dark,  whilst  preparations  were  made  to  renew 
the  battle  at  an  early  hour  on  the  morrow";  but  does  not 
say  what  those  preparations  were.  Then,  after  describ 
ing  what  had  been  done  in  the  forenoon  of  the  16th,  he 
says:  "As  soon  as  the  above  dispositions  were  com 
pleted,  and  having  visited  the  different  commands,  I 
gave  directions  that  the  movement  against  the  enemy's 
left  flank  should  be  continued  " ;  but  no  sub-report  men 
tions  the  receipt  of  any  such  directions.  The  report  then 
proceeds  to  give  a  graphic  and,  I  believe,  nearly  accurate 
though  brief  description  of  what  followed. 

It  may  also  be  observed  that  in  my  official  report  of 
the  battle  of  Nashville,  dated  December  31,  1864,  the  fol 
lowing  appears :  "  In  the  night  of  the  15th  I  waited  upon 
the  major-general  commanding  at  his  headquarters,  and 
received  his  orders  for  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  on  the 
following  day."  This  report  was,  of  course,  before  Gen 
eral  Thomas  when  he  wrote  his  own,  and  had  necessarily 
been  read  by  him  and  doubtless  by  some  of  his  staff  offi 
cers;  yet  no  reference  was  made  in  his  report  to  the 
subject  referred  to  in  the  words  above  quoted  from  mine. 
These  facts  from  the  records  may  perhaps  be  accepted  as 
sufficient  indication  of  the  general  purport  of  whatever 
orders  were  issued  in  the  night  of  the  15th,  after  the  close 
of  that  day's  operations,  and  sufficient  evidence  that  no 
orders  of  a  general  character  were  given  by  General 
Thomas,  either  oral  or  written,  on  the  16th  until  after 
he  had  "  visited  the  different  commands." 

The  report  of  General  Steedman,  dated  January  27, 
1865,  says :  "  December  16,  at  6  A.  M.,  in  obedience  to  the 


NO  ORDERS  FOR  THE  BATTLE  OF  DECEMBER  16     267 

orders  of  Major-General  Thomas,  my  command  moved  on 
the  enemy's  works."  It  is  not  stated  whether  these  orders 
were  oral  or  written.  No  copy  of  them  appears  in  the 
records,  nor  any  mention  of  a  personal  interview  with 
General  Thomas  or  any  of  his  staff.  (Steedman  was  the 
man  who  published  a  falsehood  about  an  alleged  tele 
gram  from  me  to  Grant  about  Thomas.  See  page  296.) 

General  T.  J.  Wood's  report,  dated  January  5,  1865, 
after  describing  the  operations  of  the  morning  of  Decem 
ber  16,  says :  "  After  the  dispositions  above  recounted 
had  been  made,  the  commanding  general  joined  me  near 
our  most  advanced  position  on  the  Franklin  pike,  ex 
amined  the  positions  of  the  troops,  approved  the  same, 
and  ordered  that  the  enemy  should  be  vigorously  pressed 
and  unceasingly  harassed  by  our  fire.  He  further  directed 
that  I  should  be  constantly  on  the  alert  for  any  opening 
for  a  more  decisive  effort,  but  for  the  time  to  bide  events. 
The  general  plan  of  the  battle  for  the  preceding  day  — 
namely,  to  outflank  and  turn  his  left  —  was  still  to  be 
acted  on.  Before  leaving  me,  the  commanding  general 
desired  me  to  confer  with  Major-General  Steedman,  whose 
command  had  moved  out  that  morning  from  Nashville 
by  the  Nolensville  pike,  and  arrange  a  military  connec 
tion  between  his  right  and  my  left."  This  appears  from 
General  Wood's  report  to  have  occurred  a  short  time  be 
fore  noon,  and  seems  to  have  been  the  first  information 
given  to  any  of  the  corps  commanders  of  the  general  plan 
of  operations  for  December  16.  General  Wood's  report 
does  not  suggest  that  even  he,  who  had  visited  the  com 
manding  general  the  night  before,  had  been  given  any 
information  about  any  such  general  plan;  and  that  state 
ment  of  Wood's,  "  the  general  plan  of  the  battle  for  the 
preceding  day  —  namel}T,  to  outflank  and  turn  his  left  — 
was  still  to  be  acted  on,"  was  written  many  days  after  the 
battle,  and  then  did  not  say  that  General  Thomas  had  at 
any  time  so  ordered. 


268  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

In  the  report  of  General  A.  J.  Smith,  dated  January  10, 
1865,  occurs  the  following :  "  About  3  p.  M.  (December  16) 
General  Me  Arthur  sent  word  that  he  could  carry  the  hill 
on  his  right  by  assault.  Major-General  Thomas  being 
present,  the  matter  was  referred  to  him,  and  I  was  re 
quested  to  delay  the  movement  until  he  could  hear  from 
General  Schofield,  to  whom  he  had  sent.  .  .  .  General 
McArthur,  not  receiving  any  reply,  and  fearing  that  if 
the  attack  should  be  longer  delayed  the  enemy  would  use 
the  night  to  strengthen  his  works,  directed  the  first  bri 
gade  (Colonel  W.  L.  McMillen,  95th  Ohio  Infantry,  com 
manding)  to  storm  the  hill  on  which  was  the  left  of  the 
enemy's  line,"  etc.  This  statement,  which  appears  to  be 
nowhere  dissented  from,  seems  to  show  very  nearly  the 
hour  of  the  day  —  not  very  long  after  3  p.  M.  —  when  was 
initiated  by  General  McArthur  the  general  attack  which 
resulted  in  the  brilliant  and  final  success  of  the  day;  that 
this  initial  movement  was  not  made  in  pursuance  of  any 
orders  or  directions  from  General  Thomas,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  during  a  period  in  which  General  Thomas  had 
requested  General  Smith  to  "  delay  the  movement." 

General  Wilson's  report,  dated  December  21,  says: 
"  About  4 : 30  P.  M.  the  enemy,  pressed  in  front,  flank,  and 
rear,  broke  in  disorder.  Croxton's  brigade,  which  had 
been  held  in  reserve  on  the  Hillsboro'  pike,  as  soon  as  the 
success  of  these  dispositions  had  become  apparent  was 
ordered  to  march  rapidly  across  the  country  to  the  Granny 
White  pike,  and  beyond  the  right  flank  of  Hammond's 
brigade ;  but  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  hour  and  heavi 
ness  of  the  road  over  which  he  was  compelled  to  move,  he 
secured  but  few  prisoners."  This  report  also  seems  to  be 
silent  in  respect  to  any  order  from  General  Thomas. 

There  was  another  good  reason  why  the  cavalry  secured 
but  few  prisoners  at  that  time :  there  were  very  few  left 
to  secure  behind  that  part  of  the  line,  the  infantry  hav 
ing  captured  nearly  all  of  them. 


STATEMENTS  IN  THE  REPORTS  OF  CORPS  COMMANDERS  269 

My  own  official  report,  dated  December  31,  gave  the 
following  account  of  the  operations  of  December  16,  to 
the  accuracy  of  which  no  exception  was  taken  by  General 
Thomas.  The  only  order  therein  mentioned  as  coming 
from  General  Thomas  was  that  received  in  the  night  of 
the  15th,  "  for  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy  on  the  following 
day." 

In  the  night  of  the  15th  I  waited  upon  the  major-general  com 
manding  at  his  headquarters,  and  received  his  orders  for  the  pur 
suit  of  the  enemy  on  the  following  day.  Our  operations  during 
the  15th  had  swung  the  right  and  right  center  forward  so  that  the 
general  direction  of  the  line  was  nearly  perpendicular  to  that 
before  the  attack ;  only  the  right  was  in  contact  with  the  enemy, 
and  was  therefore  much  exposed.  Apprehensive  that  the  enemy, 
instead  of  retreating  during  the  night,  would  mass  and  attack 
our  right  in  the  morning,  I  requested  that  a  division  of  infantry 
be  sent  to  reinforce  the  right,  which  was  ordered  accordingly 
from  Major-General  Smith's  command.  In  response  to  this  order, 
General  Smith  sent  five  regiments  and  a  battery  (about  1600 
men),  which  were  put  in  reserve  near  the  right.  In  the  morning 
it  was  found  that  the  enemy  still  held  his  position  in  our  front, 
of  which  the  hill  in  front  of  General  Couch  was  the  key,  and  had 
thrown  up  considerable  breastworks  during  the  night.  He  had 
also  increased  the  force  on  his  left  during  the  night,  and  con 
tinued  to  mass  troops  there  during  the  early  part  of  the  day. 
During  the  morning,  therefore,  our  operations  were  limited  to 
preparations  for  defense  and  cooperation  with  the  cavalry,  which 
was  operating  to  strike  the  Granny  White  pike  in  rear  of  the 
enemy.  About  noon,  the  troops  on  my  left  (Generals  Smith  and 
Wood)  having  advanced  and  come  in  contact  with  the  enemy  in 
his  new  position,  the  enemy  again  withdrew  from  his  left  a  con 
siderable  force  to  strengthen  his  right  and  center,  when  I  ordered 
General  Cox  to  advance  in  conjunction  with  the  cavalry,  and 
endeavor  to  carry  a  high  wooded  hill  beyond  the  flank  of  the 
enemy's  intrenched  line,  and  overlooking  the  Granny  White  pike. 
The  hill  was  occupied  by  the  enemy  in  considerable  force,  but 
was  not  intrenched.  My  order  was  not  executed  with  the  prompt 
ness  or  energy  which  I  had  expected,  yet  probably  with  as  much 
as  I  had  reason  to  expect,  considering  the  attenuated  character 


270  FORTY- SIX  YEAKS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  General  Cox's  line  and  the  great  distance  and  rough  ground 
over  which  the  attacking  force  had  to  move.  The  hill  was,  how 
ever,  carried  by  General  Wilson's  cavalry  (dismounted),  whose 
gallantry  and  energy  on  that  and  other  occasions  which  came 
under  my  observation  cannot  be  too  greatly  praised. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  this  attack  on  the  extreme 
right,  the  salient  hill  in  front  of  General  Couch  was  attacked 
and  carried  by  General  Smith's  troops,  supported  by  a  brigade 
of  General  Couch's  division ;  and  the  fortified  hill  in  front  of 
General  Cox,  which  constituted  the  extreme  flank  of  the  enemy's 
intrenched  line,  was  attacked  and  carried  by  Colonel  Doolittle's 
brigade  of  General  Cox's  division,  the  latter  capturing  eight 
pieces  of  artillery  and  200  to  300  prisoners.  These  several 
successes,  gained  almost  simultaneously,  resulted  in  a  com 
plete  rout  of  the  enemy.  The  cavalry  had  cut  off  his  line  of 
retreat  by  the  Granny  White  pike,  and  such  of  his  troops  as 
were  not  captured  on  the  line  could  only  escape  by  climbing  the 
Brentwood  Hills.  It  is  believed  all  of  the  artillery  along  the 
left  and  center  of  the  enemy's  line  fell  into  our  hands.  Our 
troops  continued  the  pursuit  across  the  valley  and  into  the 
Brentwood  Hills,  when  darkness  compelled  them  to  desist,  and 
they  bivouacked  for  the  night. 

In  the  histories  of  the  battle  of  Nashville  heretofore 
published,  it  appears  to  have  been  assumed  that  the  plan 
of  battle  issued  to  the  troops  before  the  movement  of 
December  15  was  equally  applicable  to  the  operations 
of  the  16th,  was  so  understood  by  the  subordinate  com 
manders,  and  was  the  authoritative  guide  for  their  action 
during  the  entire  day  of  the  16th.  Hence  it  has  seemed 
to  me  necessary  to  direct  attention  to  the  above  extracts 
from  the  official  records,  as  well  as  to  give  my  own  per 
sonal  recollections,  for  the  benefit  of  future  historians. 

Unquestionably  the  general  plan  of  battle  embraced 
in  the  orders  of  December  14  for  the  attack  on  the  15th 
was  well  applicable  to  the  situation  which  actually  ex 
isted  in  the  morning  of  the  16th.  It  was  requisite  only 
to  direct  in  what  manner  the  several  corps  of  the  army 
should  act  in  concert  in  the  changed  situation  of  both 


EXPLANATION  OF  THE  ABSENCE  OF  ORDERS  271 

armies,  as  had  so  clearly  been  done  for  the  15th,  in  the 
situation  then  existing.  But  the  detailed  orders  requisite 
for  such  joint  action  given  in  the  plan  for  the  battle  of 
the  15th  were  absolutely  inapplicable  in  most  essential 
particulars  to  the  situation  of  the  16th,  or  to  the  battle 
actually  fought  on  that  day.  In  view  of  the  fact  that 
much  time  had  very  wisely  been  spent  by  General 
Thomas  in  remounting  his  cavalry  and  in  making  all 
other  preparations  necessary  to  insure  not  only  the  de 
feat,  but  the  destruction  or  capture  of  the  enemy,  and  of 
the  further  fact  that  the  operations  of  the  15th  had  so 
damaged  the  enemy  that  his  retreat  that  night  was 
thought  at  least  probable,  if  not  certain,  it  hardly 
seems  possible  that  General  Thomas  could  have  been 
willing  to  postpone  a  renewal  of  the  attack  until  he 
could  have  time  to  visit  "the  several  commands"  in 
person,  and  see  for  himself  what  the  situation  actually 
was  the  next  day,  as  if  the  operations  he  had  to  deter 
mine  on  and  order  were  the  original  plans  of  a  battle 
yet  to  be  opened,  instead  of  the  final  blow  to  be  struck 
against  an  enemy  already  substantially  beaten  and  quite 
probably  already  in  full  retreat. 

The  only  possible  explanation  of  this  very  remark 
able  absence  of  timely  orders  from  General  Thomas  for 
the  battle  of  December  16,  and  of  the  long  delay  on  that 
day,  seems  to  be  found  in  his  well-known  constitutional 
habit,  sometimes  spoken  of  by  his  brother  officers  who 
had  long  been  familiarly  acquainted  with  him.  Unless 
the  opinions  of  those  familiar  acquaintances  and  friends 
were  substantially  erroneous,  General  Thomas's  habit  of 
great  deliberation  did  not  permit  him  to  formulate  in  the 
night  of  December  15  the  comparatively  simple  orders 
requisite  for  the  several  corps  to  resume,  in  the  morning 
of  the  16th,  the  movement  "  against  the  enemy's  left 
flank,"  which  he  says  he  "  directed  "  to  be  "  continued  " 
some  time  in  the  afternoon  of  that  day — so  late,  however, 


272  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

that  some  of  the  troops  at  least,  becoming  impatient  at 
the  long  delay,  did  not  wait  even  for  the  orders  they  had 
asked  for,  but  initiated  on  their  own  responsibility  the 
action  which  resulted  in  victory  before  any  directions 
whatever  from  General  Thomas  had  reached  them.  Or 
else,  if  General  Thomas  had  clearly  in  his  mind  the  ap 
propriate  action  of  his  several  corps  suggested  by  the 
condition  of  the  enemy  as  lie  himself  liad  seen  it  just 
before  dark,  or  as  it  might  be  modified  during  the  night, 
he  must,  it  would  seem,  have  felt  so  sure  of  Hood's  re 
treat  in  the  night  that  he  did  not  think  it  worth  his 
while  to  give  any  orders  except  for  pursuit.  However 
this  may  be,  it  seems  to  be  clearly  established  by  the 
records  that  the  movements  which  prepared  the  way  for 
the  final  assault,  and  that  assault  itself,  were  both  made 
under  the  orders  of  subordinates,  and  not  in  obedience 
to  any  orders  or  directions  from  General  Thomas,  nor  in 
accordance  with  any  general  plan  which  he  had  informed 
them  was  to  be  the  guide  for  their  action  that  day. 

The  battle  of  the  15th  was  fought  in  very  close  con 
formity  to  the  plan  prepared,  some  time  before  the  14th, 
doubtless  by  General  Thomas  himself,  though  spoken  of 
by  General  Wood,  in  his  confidential  letter  of  the  14th 
to  Thomas,  as  "  our  plan,"  and  modified  at  the  conference 
which  was  called  that  day  upon  the  suggestion  of  Wood 
in  that  confidential  letter,  and,  as  he  said,  "at  the  in 
stance  of  Schofield  and  Smith." 1  But  the  battle  of  the 
16th  appears  to  have  been  emphatically  a  battle  of  the 
troops  themselves,  acting  under  the  independent  orders 
of  their  own  subordinate  commanders,  with  such  cooper 
ation  and  support  as  they  had  arranged  among  them 
selves,  in  the  absence  of  any  orders  or  instructions  from 
their  common  superior. 

It  seems  proper  for  me  to  say  that  I  have  never 
claimed  for  myself  any  part  of  the  credit  due  to  subor- 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XLV,  part  ii,  p.  184. 


THE  PHRASEOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT     273 

dinates  that  day  (December  16).  Having  failed  in  the 
night  of  December  15  to  obtain  any  appropriate  orders 
for  my  action,  or  for  the  conjoint  action  of  the  corps  on 
my  right  and  left,  and  also  to  obtain  any  such  orders  on 
the  16th,  the  only  orders  I  gave  were  those  to  support 
the  movements  on  my  right  and  left  initiated  by  the 
subordinate  commanders  there.  For  this  action  General 
Thomas,  in  his  report,  gave  the  full  credit  due  to  my 
troops,  and,  inferentially  at  least,  more  than  was  due  to 
me.  I  must  also  add,  in  order  that  there  may  be  no 
misunderstanding  on  the  subject,  that  General  Thomas 
also  gave  full  credit  to  me  and  to  the  Twenty- third  Corps 
for  the  part  we  took  in  the  battle  of  December  15. 

The  only  special  credit  to  which  I  have  thought  myself 
entitled  in  respect  to  Nashville  was  for  two  incidental 
services  which  General  Thomas  did  not  seem  to  think 
worthy  even  of  mention.  They  were,  in  fact,  only  such 
services  as  any  efficient  staff  officer  possessed  of  unusual 
knowledge  of  the  character  and  habits  of  the  opposing 
commander  could  have  rendered  to  General  Thomas  as 
well  as  I  could.  The  two  services  referred  to  were  the 
suggestion  relative  to  the  change  in  the  details  of  the 
plan  of  battle  for  December  15,  by  which  the  infantry 
attacking  force  on  our  right  was  increased  from  about 
ten  thousand  to  nearly  twenty  thousand  men;  and  the 
information  I  gave  to  General  Thomas,  in  the  night  of 
the  15th,  that  Hood  would  not  retreat  without  another 
fight,  about  which  I  had  not  the  slightest  doubt,  and 
which  seemed  to  me  more  important  than  the  infor 
mation  I  had  given  about  the  relative  lengths  of  the  sev 
eral  parts  of  the  enemy's  line  of  defense  and  of  his 
(General  Thomas's)  line  of  attack,  as  proposed  in  his 
written  orders.  But  these  little  services,  not  worthy  of 
mention  in  terms  of  special  praise,  seemed  to  me  worthy 
of  record,  especially  the  latter,  since  I  had  made  a  long 
ride  in  a  dark  night,  after  having  already  been  in  the 

18 


274  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AKMY 

saddle  from  daylight  till  dark,  to  carry  that  information 
to  the  commanding  general  in  person,  and  try  to  con 
vince  him  of  its  correctness. 

A  single  word  signifies  sometimes  much  more  than  is 
imagined  by  him  who  uses  it.  If  General  Thomas  had 
said  resumed  instead  of  "  continued,"  his  statement  of 
what  he  said  he  "  directed  "  would  have  corresponded  very 
nearly  with  what  was  actually  done  after  those  direc 
tions  were  given  on  December  16.  But  the  continuation, 
at  3  or  4  p.  M.  of  one  day,  of  action  which  had  been  sus 
pended  at  nightfall  the  preceding  day,  hardly  accords 
with  the  rule  of  accuracy  which  is  demanded  in  maturely 
considered  military  reports.  Indeed,  when  a  military 
movement  is  suspended  at  nightfall  on  account  of  dark 
ness,  it  is  properly  spoken,  of  as  resumed,  not  "  continued," 
even  at  daylight.  The  word  "continued"  was  used  to 
express  what  was  directed  to  be  done  at  three  or  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon — "the  movement  against  the 
enemy's  left  flank,"  which  was  not  any  movement  that 
had  been  going  on  that  day  and  which  could  therefore 
be  continued,  but  the  movement  which,  in  fact,  had  ended 
the  day  before  in  a  very  important  success  which  had 
materially  altered  the  military  situation  under  which 
the  orders  for  the  previous  day  had  been  given.  Hence 
this  use  of  the  word  "continued"  furnishes  food  for 
thought.  To  have  resumed,  some  time  in  the  afternoon, 
those  operations  of  the  preceding  day  would  have  been 
to  state  that  they  had  been  suspended,  not  only  during 
the  night  on  account  of  darkness,  but  during  the  greater 
part  of  the  next  day  for  no  apparent  reason.  That  would 
have  been  manifestly  inconsistent  with  the  theory  that 
the  operations  of  the  second  day  were  only  a  continua 
tion  of  those  of  the  first,  all  in  accordance  with  the  plan 
of  battle  published  two  days  before,  upon  which  theory 
the  reports  of  General  Thomas  and  of  some  of  the  sub- 
commanders  appear  to  have  been  based.  The  logical  con- 


THE  PHRASEOLOGY  OF  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT     275 

elusion  of  this  reflection,  in  view  of  all  the  facts  now 
established  by  the  records,  seems  to  be  that  the  plan  of 
battle  for  December  16  was  matured  and  published  to  the 
army,  as  well  as  to  the  world  at  large,  some  time  after  the 
event. 

It  may  be  worthy  of  note  that  none  of  the  officers 
whose  reports  reveal  their  ignorance  of  that  plan  be 
longed  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  with  which  Gen 
eral  Thomas  had  so  long  been  identified. 


CHAPTER    XV 

GENEKAL  THOMAS'S  INDORSEMENT  ON  THE  REPORT  OF  THE 
BATTLE  OF  FRANKLIN —  COURTESIES  TO  HIM  IN  WASH 
INGTON —  PECULIARITIES  OF  THE  OFFICIAL  RECORDS  IN 
REGARD  TO  FRANKLIN  AND  NASHVILLE  —  DOCUMENTS 
WHICH  HAVE  DISAPPEARED  FROM  THE  RECORDS  —  IN 
CONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT  —  FALSE 
REPRESENTATIONS  MADE  TO  HIM  —  THEIR  FALSITY  CON 
FIRMED  BY  GENERAL  GRANT. 

A  FTEE  I  parted  from  General  Thomas  in  Tennessee, 
J-JL  having  at  our  last  meeting  there  congratulated  him 
upon  his  well-deserved  promotion  to  the  highest  perma 
nent  grade,  that  of  major-general  in  the  regular  army,  I 
had  no  further  official  intercourse  with  him,  and,  so  far  as 
I  can  recollect,  did  not  see  him  until  after  June  1,  1868, 
when  I  entered  the  War  Department.  During  the  inter 
vening  time — more  than  three  years — my  attention  had 
been  absorbed  by  important  duties,  including  a  mission 
to  France  in  defense  of  the  then  violated  "Monroe  doc 
trine,"  and  command  in  Virginia  during  a  part  of  the 
period  of  "  reconstruction."  I  had  not  even  seen  the  of 
ficial  reports  of  the  campaign  in  Tennessee,  they  having 
been  made  public  while  I  was  in  Europe. 

Some  time  in  1868-9  a  staff  officer  in  the  War  Depart 
ment  brought  to  my  notice  the  indorsement  made  by 
General  Thomas  on  my  report  of  the  battle  of  Franklin, 
and  of  the  preceding  operations  from  the  time  when,  by 
his  order,  I  assumed  command  of  the  army  in  the  field, 
as  follows : 


276 


GENERAL  THOMAS'S  INDORSEMENT  277 

HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND, 

NASHVILLE,  TENN.,  December  7,  1864. 

Respectfully  forwarded  to  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army, 
cordially  recommending  the  gallantry  and  skill  of  Major-General 
Schofield  to  the  commendation  of  the  War  Department. 

GEO.  H.  THOMAS, 
Major-General  U.  S.  Volunteers,  Commanding. 

Of  course  I  was  much  gratified  by  this  high  commen 
dation,  of  which  I  had  never  before  seen  the  text,  though 
I  had  known  the  substance.  I  was  also  shown  the  tele 
gram  from  General  Thomas  to  Secretary  Stanton  recom 
mending  that  I  and  Stanley  be  bre vetted  one  grade  in 
the  regular  service  for  our  conduct  at  Franklin.  As  I 
received,  a  short  time  after  that  recommendation  was 
made,  the  appointment  of  brigadier-general  in  the  reg 
ular  service,  I  supposed  that  General  Thomas  had  based 
his  recommendation  for  brevet  upon  his  knowledge  or 
belief  that  I  had  been,  or  soon  would  be,  appointed  brig 
adier-general.  Hence  I  had  the  great  satisfaction  of 
believing  that  I  owed  my  brevet  of  major-general  in  the 
regular  army,  at  least  in  part,  to  General  Thomas's  rec 
ommendation. 

I  cannot  now  recollect  whether  or  not  I  saw  at  that 
time  General  Thomas's  report  of  the  operations  in  Ten 
nessee.  If  I  did,  there  was  nothing  in  it  to  attract  my 
special  attention,  as  I  was  too  much  occupied  with  the 
important  affairs  of  the  time  to  think  or  care  very  much 
about  anything  that  was  already  three  years  old. 

My  relations  with  General  Thomas  during  that  time — 
the  winter  and  spring  of  1868-9,  when  he  was,  by  my 
selection,  president  of  a  very  important  military  court, 
with  General  Hancock  and  General  Terry  as  the  other 
members,  and  General  Holt  as  the  judge-advocate— 
were  very  cordial,  at  least  on  my  part.  He  was  my  guest 
at  a  large  dinner  given  to  the  members  of  the  Presi 
dent's  cabinet  and  the  Diplomatic  Corps,  to  which  the 


278  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

only  other  gentlemen  invited  were  Generals  Thomas  and 
Hancock,  as  a  special  mark  of  distinction  to  two  of  my 
brother  officers  of  the  army.  When  General  Grant  was 
inaugurated  President  I  went  with  General  Sherman  in 
person  to  ask  the  President  to  give  General  Thomas 
command  of  the  Division  of  the  Pacific,  which  I  had 
before  proposed  for  him,  but  which  the  President  had 
designated  for  me,  under  the  impression  that  General 
Thomas  did  not  want  it. 

A  few  days  after  that  we  went  to  our  respective  com 
mands — General  Thomas  to  San  Francisco,  and  I  to  Fort 
Leavenworth.  From  that  time  we  had  no  official  or  per 
sonal  relations  or  correspondence  during  the  short  re 
mainder  of  his  life. 

In  respect  to  what  was  made  public  during  that  brief 
period,  I  long  since  refused  to  believe  that  the  superior 
officer  whom  I  had  always  so  highly  respected  could  pos 
sibly  have  been  capable,  in  his  own  mind  and  heart,  of 
doing  me  the  grievous  wrong  which  I  at  one  time  be 
lieved  he  had  done.  I  now  add,  as  the  result  of  calm  and 
dispassionate  judgment,  that  any  criticism  at  that  time, 
even  under  great  provocation,  that  could  seem  unkind, 
not  to  say  unjust,  to  that  noble,  patriotic,  and  brave  sol 
dier,  from  any  source,  not  excluding  myself,  was  wholly 
unjustifiable  and  worthy  only  of  condemnation.  His 
great  services  had  entitled  him  to  the  kindest  possible 
consideration  of  any  imperfections,  either  real  or  sup 
posed,  in  his  military  operations. 

Now,  in  this  winter  of  1896-7,  I  have  made  a  careful 
examination,  for  the  first  time  since  the  events,  of  all  the 
published  records  of  the  campaign  of  1864  in  Tennessee, 
for  the  purpose  of  doing  exact  justice  to  the  principal 
actors  in  that  campaign,  so  far  as  it  is  possible  for  me 
to  do  so.  In  this  examination  I  have  discovered  some 
things  that  have  surprised  me,  but  they  have  not  altered 
my  deliberate  judgment  of  the  character  of  the  great  sol- 


PECULIARITIES  OF  THE  OFFICIAL  RECORDS  279 

dier  under  whom  I  had  the  honor  to  serve  in  that  cam 
paign.  I  refer  to  them  only  for  the  consideration  of 
others. 

(1)  In  the  report  of  General  Thomas  dated  January 
20,  1865,  covering  the  entire  period  of  the  campaign,  in 
cluding  both  the  battles  of  Franklin  and  Nashville,  in 
his  commendation  of  subordinates  he  made  no  distinc 
tion  between  the  corps  commanders  who  had  served  im 
mediately  under  him  and  only  in  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
and  the  army  commander  who,  besides  the  like  service 
at  Nashville,  had  commanded  the  army  in  the  field,  in 
the  absence  therefrom  of  General  Thomas,  up  to  and  in 
cluding  the  battle  of  Franklin,  where  signal  victory  had 
prepared  the  way  for  the  less  difficult  but  brilliant  suc 
cess  of  General  Thomas  at  Nashville. 

(2)  In  the  first  letter  from  General  Thomas  recom 
mending  promotions  for  services  in  the  campaign,  con 
taining  the  names  of  a  large  number  of  officers,  no 
mention  was  made  of   my  name   or   that  of  General 
Stanley,  who   had  been   conspicuous   for   gallantry  at 
Spring  Hill  and  at  Franklin,  where  he  was  wounded. 

(3)  In  a  telegram  from  the  Secretary  of  War  calling 
for  recommendations  for  promotion,  General   Thomas 
had  been  informed  that  while  there  was  no  vacancy  in 
the  grade  of  major-general  (the  last  having,  in  fact,  been 
given  to  General  Thomas  himself),  there  were  then  two 
vacancies  in  that  of  brigadier-general ;  and  it  was  after 
the  receipt  of  that  information,  and  in  view  of  all  it 
might  be  understood  to  imply,  that  General  Thomas  sent 
his  telegram  to  the  Secretary  of  War  recommending  that 
Stanley  and  I  be  brevetted  one  grade  in  the  regular  ser 
vice,  not,  as  he  had  said  in  his  indorsement  on  my  report 
of  the  battle  of  Franklin,  for  "skill,"  but  for  "good  con 
duct."    As  General  Thomas  well  knew,  I  was  then  only 
a  captain  in  the  regular  army.    Hence  he  recommended 
me  for  the  brevet  of  major  —  that  is,  of  commander  of 


280  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

a  single  battalion  of  four  companies  —  for  my  services 
in  command  of  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men,  includ 
ing  artillery  and  cavalry. 

(4)  The  telegram  from  General  Thomas  to  Secretary 
Stanton  recommending  those  brevets  for  Stanley  and 
me  was  dated  December  31,  1864,  5  p.  M.,  while  my  gen 
eral  report  including  that  of  the  battle  of  Nashville  bears 
the  same  date  without  hour,  but  may  have  been,  and 
probably  was,  received  by  General  Thomas  before  he 
sent  his  telegram  recommending  my  promotion. 

(5)  Neither  the  report  of  General  Thomas  nor  of  any 
of  his  corps  commanders  made  any  mention  of  orders 
for  "  pursuit "  in  the  morning  of  December  16,  and  Gen 
eral  Thomas  himself  in  his  report  took  no  notice  what 
ever  of  the  glaring  discrepancy  between  my  report  and 
some  of  the  others,  nor  of  any  facts  demonstrated  or 
suggested  by  the  correspondence  which  was  made  a  part 
of  my  report,  nor  made  any  mention  of  the  change  in  his 
plan  of  battle  for  December  15,  which  was  made  the  day 
before. 

(6)  In  the  publication  of  my  report  in  the  War  Records 
there  is  a  foot-note  which  says  that  the  orders  and  corre 
spondence  referred  to  are  not  found  with  the  report  filed 
in  the  War  Department — a  fact  similar  to  that  which  I 
had  found  in  respect  to  my  own  retained  copies  of  orders 
and  correspondence,  which  I  understood  had  been  care 
fully  locked  up  in  a  strong  leather  trunk  ever  since  I  left 
Washington  in  March,  1869,  but  which  had  nevertheless 
mysteriously  disappeared. 

In  that  report  of  mine  was  a  reference  to  the  modifica 
tion  made  in  General  Thomas's  published  plan  of  battle 
for  December  15,  though  no  intimation  that  it  was  made 
at  my  suggestion ;  also  the  statement  that  I  had,  after 
the  close  of  the  battle  of  December  15,  "  waited  upon  the 
commanding  general  and  received  his  orders  for  the  pur 
suit,"  but  no  mention  of  the  previous  written  orders  to 


DOCUMENTS  WHICH  DISAPPEARED  FROM  THE  RECORDS  281 

the  same  effect,  which  had  become  obsolete  by  operation 
of  the  subsequent  orders  received  in  person.  There  were 
attached  to  my  report,  and  made  a  part  thereof,  copies 
of  all  the  orders  and  correspondence  in  my  possession 
relating  to  the  battles  of  Franklin  and  Nashville,  and 
to  the  preceding  operations  of  that  campaign,  including 
those  about  the  false  position  of  the  troops  at  Pulaski, 
those  about  concentration  of  the  troops  in  Thomas's  de 
partment,  that  about  the  need  of  a  pontoon  bridge  at 
Franklin,  that  about  punishing  the  telegraph-operator  by 
whose  desertion  I  was  deprived  of  communication  with 
General  Thomas  during  the  most  critical  part  of  the 
campaign,  and,  probably,  the  order  in  writing  which  I 
had  received  from  General  Thomas  after  the  battle  of 
December  15.  But  of  course  there  were  no  copies  of 
orders  or  despatches  which  I  had  not  received;  and  the 
desertion  of  my  telegraph-operator  and  the  operations 
of  Forrest's  cavalry  in  my  rear  had  made  it  probable  that 
there  must  have  been  some  such  despatches  sent  but  not 
received.  There  were  no  annotations  or  other  sugges 
tions  as  to  their  significance  attached  to  any  of  those 
copies  at  that  time.  They  were  simply  included,  without 
comment,  as  an  essential  part  of  the  report.  The  ex 
planations  found  in  this  volume  were  made  many  years 
afterward. 

In  respect  to  that  appendix  to  my  report,  I  am  now 
compelled  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  was  an  ab 
solute  necessity.  I  could  not  possibly  have  made  a 
truthful  and  rational  report  which  would  have  stood  the 
test  of  just  criticism  without  reference  to  the  documents 
in  that  appendix ;  and  it  was  far  more  respectful  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas  simply  to  attach  the  documents,  leaving 
him  to  make  any  explanations  he  might  think  necessary, 
than  to  call  attention  myself  to  the  necessity  for  any 
such  explanations.  It  would  have  been  impossible  to 
give  any  rational  explanation  of  the  false  position  occu- 


282         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

pied  by  the  troops  at  Pulaski  up  to  the  very  last  moment 
of  safety  except  by  reference  to  Thomas's  orders  to 
Stanley  and  me,  and  the  subsequent  correspondence  on 
that  subject.  Stanley,  with  the  blunt  frankness  justified 
by  comradeship,  had  pointed  it  out  to  me  the  moment 
we  met  at  Pulaski,  while  I  was  governed  by  the  utmost 
delicacy  in  discussing  the  question  with  General  Thomas, 
so  as  to  avoid  suggesting  to  him  that  he  had  made  a 
mistake.  Yet  so  evident  was  the  mistake  that  I  stopped 
the  advance  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  some  miles  north 
of  Pulaski,  and  no  part  of  that  corps  actually  went  to 
that  place.  Cox  was  sent  back  to  a  point  where  he  could 
interpose  between  Hood  and  Columbia,  and  Euger  was 
stopped  at  Columbia. 

The  great  tenacity  with  which  I  held  on  at  Columbia 
and  on  the  north  bank  of  Duck  River  could  not  have 
been  justified  except  by  reference  to  the  despatches 
showing  Thomas's  wishes  and  his  assurance  of  reinforce 
ments  at  those  points.  If  I  had  been  free  to  do  so,  no 
thing  could  have  been  plainer  than  my  duty  to  have 
fallen  back  behind  the  Harpeth  when  I  found  that 
Thomas  could  not  or  would  not  reinforce  me  on  the  line 
of  Duck  River,  and  before  Hood  could  endanger  my  re 
treat.  Hence  I  was  compelled  to  include  in  the  history 
of  that  retreat  the  entire  record  of  facts  relating  to  it. 

Again,  necessity  was  the  only  possible  excuse  for 
fighting  the  battle  of  Franklin  on  the  south  side  of  the 
Harpeth,  where  defeat  would  have  been  disastrous ;  and 
that  necessity  had  arisen  absolutely  and  solely  from  the 
want  of  a  bridge  across  that  river,  which  I  had  suggested 
that  General  Thomas  place  there.  It  was  not  possible  for 
me,  without  utter  disregard  for  the  truth  of  history  as 
well  as  for  my  own  military  reputation,  to  attempt  to 
conceal  those  facts. 

It  must  seem  remarkable  that  in  my  report,  dated  De 
cember  7,  of  operations  from  November  14  to  December 


DOCUMENTS  WHICH  DISAPPEARED  FROM  THE  RECORDS  283 

1,  1864,  including  the  battle  of  Franklin,  on  which  Gen 
eral  Thomas  placed  his  indorsement  commending  my 
"  skill,"  no  mention  whatever  was  made  of  any  orders  or 
instructions  from  General  Thomas.  The  simple  fact  was 
that  I  could  not  have  quoted  the  orders  and  instructions 
General  Thomas  had  given  me  for  my  guidance  during 
those  operations  without  implied  criticism  of  General 
Thomas;  hence  it  was  then  thought  best  to  omit  any 
reference  to  any  such  orders  or  instructions,  and  to  limit 
the  report  to  a  simple  recital  of  the  facts,  thus  making  the 
report  strictly  truthful  so  far  as  concerned  my  own  action 
and  that  of  the  troops  under  my  command,  without  any 
reference  whatever  to  my  superior  at  Nashville,  under 
whose  orders  I  was  supposed  to  be  acting ;  and  that  re 
port  of  December  7  appeared  to  be  entirely  satisfactory 
to  General  Thomas  in  that  respect  as  well  as  in  all  others. 
But  when  the  time  came  to  make  my  final  report  of  the 
entire  campaign,  which  must  go  upon  the  public  records 
as  my  full  and  exact  contribution  to  the  history  of  mili 
tary  operations  in  which  I  had  taken  an  important  part, 
truth  and  justice  to  all  required  me  to  make  the  record 
complete  so  far  as  lay  in  my  power;  and  if  there  was 
anything  in  the  record,  as  submitted  by  me  to  General 
Thomas,  to  which  he  took  exception,  it  was  as  plainly 
his  duty  to  truth  and  justice  to  place  those  exceptions 
also  on  the  public  records.  So  far  from  suggesting  in  my 
final  report  any  possible  criticism  of  General  Thomas,  I 
put  the  best  possible  construction  upon  all  the  despatches 
I  had  received  from  him,  by  accepting  them  together  as 
showing  me  that  his  object  was  "  to  hold  the  enemy  in 
check"  until  he  (Tkomas)  could  concentrate  his  reinforce 
ments,  and  not  to  fight  Hood  at  Pulaski,  as  he  (Thomas) 
had  at  first  ordered.  I  simply  submitted  to  him  the  plain 
record,  with  the  best  possible  construction  I  could  put 
upon  it,  and  that  only  so  far  as  it  was  necessary  for  me 
to  construe  it  to  give  the  general  basis  of  my  action.  If 


284  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

any  official  duty  remained  to  be  done  in  that  regard,  that 
duty  devolved  on  General  Thomas,  not  on  me. 

In  my  final  report,  dated  December  31,  1864,  I  said, 
as  above  indicated,  that  my  instructions  from  the  major- 
general  commanding  were  embraced  in  a  telegram  to  Gen 
eral  Stanley  (dated  November  8),  in  which  General  Thomas 
said,  "  Should  the  enemy  overpower  them  [the  cavalry] 
and  march  on  Pulaski,  you  must  hold  that  place,"  "a 
copy  of  which  was  furnished  with  the  order  to  assume 
command  at  Pulaski,  and  subsequent  despatches,  explain 
ing  that  the  object  was  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check,  should 
he  advance,  long  enough  to  enable  General  A.  J.  Smith's 
corps,  then  expected  from  Missouri,  to  reach  Nashville, 
other  troops  in  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  to  be 
concentrated,  and  General  "Wilson's  cavalry  to  be  re. 
mounted  and  fitted  for  the  field.  The  reinforcements  thus 
expected  were  about  equal  to  the  force  we  then  had  in  the 
field,  and  would  make  our  entire  force,  when  concentrated, 
equal,  or  somewhat  superior,  to  that  of  the  enemy.  To 
effect  this  concentration  was  therefore  of  vital  impor 
tance,  a  consideration  to  which  all  others  were  secondary. 
This  required  that  the  enemy's  advance  should  be  delayed 
as  much  as  possible,  and  at  the  same  time  a  decisive 
battle  avoided,  unless  it  could  be  fought  on  favorable 
terms." 

I  refrained  from  quoting  either  of  the  despatches  from 
General  Thomas, — that  dated  November  8  to  Stanley,  or 
that  dated  19,  repeating  in  substance  that  of  the  8th, — or 
nay  reply  of  November  20  pointing  out  the  reasons  why 
the  position  at  Pulaski  was  a  false  one  to  occupy  under 
the  circumstances;  and  I  still  think,  as  I  then  thought, 
that  that  was  done  as  delicately  as  possible  so  as  to  avoid 
suggesting  to  General  Thomas  that  I  thought  his  order  a 
blunder.  His  reply  of  the  same  date  shows  that  he  so 
appreciated  it.  This  despatch  last  referred  to  from  Gen 
eral  Thomas,  and  all  the  other  correspondence  after  I 


INCONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT       285 

reached  Pulaski,  fully  justified  me  in  the  statement  made 
in  my  report,  above  mentioned,  as  to  whence  I  derived 
my  information  of  his  plans. 

But  in  the  report  of  General  Thomas  dated  January 
20,  1865,  appears  the  following:  "Directions  were  then 
sent  to  General  Schofield  to  leave  a  sufficiently  strong 
force  for  the  defense  of  that  point,  and  with  the  balance 
of  his  command  proceed  to  carry  out  the  instructions 
already  given  him,  viz.,  to  join  the  Fourth  Corps  at 
Pulaski,  and  assume  command  of  all  the  troops  in  the 
vicinity,  watch  the  movements  of  Hood,  and  retard  his 
advance  into  Tennessee  as  much  as  possible,  without 
risking  a  general  engagement,  until  Maj.-Gen.  A.  J. 
Smith's  command  could  arrive  from  Missouri,  and  Maj.- 
Gen.  J.  H.  Wilson  could  have  time  to  remount  the  cavalry 
regiments  dismounted  to  furnish  horses  for  Kilpatrick's 
division,  which  was  to  accompany  General  Sherman  in 
his  march  through  Georgia.  .  .  .  My  plans  and  wishes 
were  fully  explained  to  General  Schofield,  and,  as  sub 
sequent  events  will  show,  properly  appreciated  and  exe 
cuted  by  him." 

Thus,  General  Thomas,  being  fully  satisfied  with  the 
operations  of  the  troops  while  under  my  immediate  com 
mand  in  the  field,  asserted  that  those  operations  were 
based  upon  his  "  plans  and  wishes,"  which  had  been  "  fully 
explained  "  to  me  before  I  went  to  Pulaski,  and  "  properly 
appreciated,"  instead  of  upon  what  I  had  gathered  from 
General  Thomas's  orders  to  Stanley  and  subsequent  orders 
to  me  about  fighting  Hood  at  Pulaski,  absolutely  contra 
dictory  to  that  stated  in  his  report,  "  without  risking  a 
general  engagement,"  and  his  assent  to  my  radically 
different  suggestions  made  after  I  assumed  command  at 
Pulaski,  as  stated  in  my  report.  It  is  not  incumbent 
upon  me  to  try  to  reconcile  this  statement  in  General 
Thomas's  report  with  the  correspondence,  above  referred 
to,  found  in  the  official  records ;  and  I  see  no  reason  for 


286  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

desiring  any  further  corroboration  of  the  strict  accuracy 
of  the  contrary  statement  made  by  me  in  my  report.  I 
am  entirely  willing  to  leave  any  discussion  of  that  sub 
ject  to  others. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  I  was  not  one  of  General 
Thomas's  corps  commanders,  but  an  army  commander, 
holding  the  same  grade  of  command,  by  special  assign 
ment  of  the  President  under  the  law,  as  General  Thomas 
himself,  he  might  without  military  impropriety  have 
left  to  me  in  his  report,  as  he  had  before  done  in  fact, 
whether  intentionally  or  not,  the  entire  responsibility  of 
the  operations  of  the  army  under  my  immediate  com 
mand  from  Pulaski  to  Nashville.  The  record  fully 
shows  that,  from  the  necessities  of  the  case,  I  was  com 
pelled  to  act,  and  did  act,  upon  my  own  judgment  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end,  not  only  without  any  timely 
orders,  but  generally  without  timely  or  accurate  infor 
mation  from  General  Thomas;  and  that  he  approved, 
from  time  to  time  and  finally,  all  that  I  had  done.  The 
question  as  to  why  he  afterward  claimed  that  all  had  been 
done  in  pursuance  of  his  plans  and  wishes,  fully  explained 
to  me  in  advance,  I  must  leave  to  others.  He  was  cer 
tainly  under  no  official  obligation  to  take  upon  himself 
any  such  responsibility.  It  may  be  true,  as  General 
Sherman  said  and  General  Thomas  admitted,  that  it  was 
his  duty  to  take  command  in  the  field  himself.  But  it 
was  not  his  duty,  being  in  the  rear,  to  hamper  the  actual 
army  commander  in  the  field  with  embarrassing  orders 
or  instructions,  nor  to  take  upon  himself  the  responsibil 
ity  of  failure  or  success.  If  I  had  failed  in  those  hazar 
dous  operations,  nobody  could  have  held  General  Thomas 
responsible,  unless  for  neglect  of  duty  in  not  command 
ing  himself  in  person,  or  in  not  sending  me  possible  rein 
forcements.  No  obedience  to  any  erroneous  orders  or 
instructions  of  his,  sent  from  a  distance  whence  the 
actual  situation  could  not  be  seen  as  clearly  as  at  the 


INCONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT       287 

front,  could  have  justified  me  in  case  of  failure.  The 
actual  commander  of  an  army  in  the  field  must  act  upon 
his  own  judgment  and  responsibility,  though  with  due 
deference  to  the  plans  and  wishes  of  his  superior,  so  far 
as  they  are  made  known  to  him,  having  in  view  the  gen 
eral  object  of  a  campaign.  This  sound  military  principle 
appears  to  have  been  fully  recognized  by  General  Thomas 
when  he  made  his  report.  He  only  claimed  that  his 
"plans  and  wishes  were  fully  explained"  and  "properly  ap 
preciated  and  executed,"  not  that  he  had  given  any  spe 
cific  orders  or  instructions.  Why,  then,  did  he  assert,  in 
contradiction  of  my  statement  previously  made  to  him, 
and  in  contradiction  of  the  official  record  I  had  submitted 
to  him  with  that  statement  in  my  report,  that  those 
"  plans  and  wishes  "  of  his  had  been  "  fully  explained  "  to 
me  before  instead  of  after  I  went  to  Pulaski  ?  What  pos 
sible  difference  could  it  have  made  to  General  Thomas, 
personally  or  officially,  whether  the  record  showed  that 
his  plans  and  wishes  were  made  known  to  me  before  or 
after  I  assumed  command,  provided  they  were  received 
by  me  in  due  time  for  my  action  ?  What  possible  motive 
could  General  Thomas  have  had  in  putting  on  the  public 
records  what  was  in  substance  a  flat  contradiction  of  an 
official  statement  I  had  made  to  him  with  full  documen 
tary  evidence  to  support  it,  and  that  in  the  absence  of 
any  possible  ground  for  his  own  contradictory  statement, 
except  his  own  recollection  of  some  conversation  we  may 
have  had  more  than  two  months  before,  in  which  he 
might  have  explained  to  me  his  "  plans  and  wishes  "  1  I 
cannot  believe  that  General  Thomas  ever  consciously 
did  any  such  thing.  That  feature  of  the  report  must 
have  had  some  other  author  besides  George  H.  Thomas. 
It  is  true  that  the  orders  telegraphed  to  me  by  General 
Thomas,  November  19,  "  to  fight  him  [Hood]  at  Pulaski, 
if  he  advances  against  that  place,"  were  inconsistent  with 
the  statement  in  his  report  that  he  had  fully  explained 


288  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

to  me  his  plans  and  wishes  as  specified  in  that  report,  and 
in  plain  disregard  of  the  general  principle  recognized  in 
his  report,  as  well  as  likely  to  lead  to  disastrous  results  if 
obeyed.  But  those  orders  were  on  the  records,  and  could 
not  be  expunged,  even  if  such  a  man  as  G-eneral  Tho 
mas  could  possibly  have  wished  to  expunge  anything 
from  his  official  record.  Hence,  I  repeat,  that  feature 
of  the  report  signed  by  General  Thomas  could  not 
have  been  his. 

In  this  connection  it  is  to  be  observed  that  General 
Thomas  had  not,  at  the  time  I  went  back  to  report  to 
him  in  Tennessee,  any  anxiety  about  his  inability  to  cope 
with  Hood  after  the  arrival  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps. 
He  had  assured  General  Sherman  of  his  entire  confi 
dence.1  He  had  ordered  me  to  march,  as  Stanley  had 
done,  from  Tullahoma  to  Pulaski;  but  the  action  of 
Forrest  at  Johnsonville  about  that  time  caused  General 
Thomas  to  change  his  orders  and  hurry  me  by  rail  to 
Nashville,  and  thence  to  Johnsonville,  with  the  advance 
of  my  troops,  he  wishing  to  see  me  in  person  as  I  passed 
through  Nashville.2  It  would  not  be  an  unreasonable 
presumption  that  the  burden  of  conversation  in  that 
brief  interview  was  in  respect  to  the  alarming  condition 
at  Johnsonville  at  that  time,  rather  than  in  respect  to 
some  future  defensive  operations  against  Hood,  then 
hardly  anticipated.  Indeed,  the  entire  correspondence 

1  See  Thomas  to  Sherman,  Novem-  which  will  be  greatly  to  our  advan- 

ber  12, 1864, 8 : 30  A.  M.  : ' '  Your  despatch  tage. 

of  12  last  night  received.  I  have  no  "I  have  no  additional  news  to  re- 
fear  that  Beauregard  can  do  us  any  port  from  the  direction  of  Florence, 
harm  now;  and  if  he  attempts  to  fol-  I  am  now  convinced  that  the  greater 
low  you,  I  will  follow  him  as  far  as  part  of  Beauregard's  army  is  near 
possible.  If  he  does  not  follow  you,  Florence  and  Tuscumbia,  and  that 
I  will  then  thoroughly  organize  my  you  will  at  least  have  a  clear  road 
troops,  and  I  believe  I  shall  have  men  before  you  for  several  days,  and  that 
enough  to  ruin  him  unless  he  gets  out  your  success  will  fully  equal  your 
of  the  way  very  rapidly.  The  coun-  expectations." 

try  through  middle  Alabama,  I  learn,  2  War  Kecords,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part 

is  teeming  with  supplies  this  year,  iii,  p.  624. 


INCONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  EEPOET       289 

of  that  period,  including  that  which  occurred  between 
General  Thomas  and  General  Sherman,  about  which  it 
is  important  to  note  that  I  knew  nothing  at  that  time, 
shows  that  General  Thomas  then  expected  to  concentrate 
his  troops  at  Columbia  or  Pulaski,  or  both,  in  a  very 
short  time,  take  command  in  the  field  in  person,  and  be 
gin  aggressive  operations  against  Hood.  It  seems  ex 
tremely  probable  that  General  Thomas  had  given  very 
little  thought  at  that  time  to  the  subject  of  defensive  ac 
tion,  except  as  against  what  that  troublesome  cavalry 
man  Forrest  might  do.  It  seems  far  more  probable 
from  the  record  that  General  Thomas's  "plans  and 
wishes"  in  respect  to  defensive  action  against  Hood's 
advance  into  Tennessee,  which  I  had  so  "  properly  ap 
preciated  and  executed,"  were,  like  the  plans  of  the  battle 
of  December  16  at  Nashville,  matured  after  the  event,  or 
at  least  after  Hood's  advance  into  Tennessee  had  actually 
begun,  and  after  I  had,  in  my  telegram  to  General  Thomas 
of  November  20,  pointed  out  to  him  the  dangers  of  his 
previous  plan,  telegraphed  to  me  the  day  before. 

I  do  not  think  much  importance  is  generally  to  be  at 
tached  to  what  any  man  may  or  may  not  recall  to  mem 
ory  after  the  lapse  of  many  years,  although  the  recollec 
tion  of  a  recent  event,  repeated  in  the  memory,  for  good 
and  sufficient  reasons,  very  frequently  during  a  long 
time,  may  continue  to  be  very  accurate.  However  this 
may  be,  perfect  candor  compels  me  to  say  here  that  I 
have  never  been  able  to  recall  any  conversation  with  Gen 
eral  Thomas  at  any  time  in  respect  to  his  plans  or  wishes 
in  the  event  of  Hood's  advance  from  the  Tennessee  be 
fore  Thomas  was  ready  to  assume  the  offensive.  I  now 
believe,  as  I  always  have  done,  that  the  only  information 
I  ever  received  from  General  Thomas  on  that  subject  was 
that  contained  in  the  telegraphic  correspondence  quoted 
in  this  volume.  There  is  now  no  doubt  in  my  mind,  and, 
so  far  as  I  can  recall,  never  has  been  any,  that  when  I 

19 


290  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

met  General  Thomas  at  Nashville,  on  my  way  to  John- 
sonville,  he  expected  A.  J.  Smith  to  arrive  from  Missouri 
very  soon,  when  he  intended  to  concentrate  all  his  avail 
able  troops  at  Columbia  and  Pulaski,  take  command  in 
person,  and  move  against  Hood ;  and  that  he  considered 
his  orders  of  November  8  to  Stanley,  to  fight  Hood  at  Pu 
laski  or  Columbia,  as  Hood  might  elect,  until  he  (Thomas) 
could  get  there  with  reinforcements,  all  the  orders  that 
could  be  necessary,  even  if  Hood  did  get  a  little  the  start 
of  him.  The  records  seem  to  show,  still  further,  that 
even  after  Hood's  plans  of  aggression  had  developed  so 
long  in  advance  of  Thomas's  preparations  to  meet  him, 
Thomas  did  not  then  see  the  great  danger  that  might  re 
sult  from  obedience  to  his  orders  of  November  8  to  Stan 
ley,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  repeat  those  orders  to  me 
on  the  19th ;  but  that  he  promptly  corrected  that  mistake 
when  I  pointed  it  out  to  him,  and  then  authorized  me  to 
act  upon  my  own  judgment. 

Now,  at  this  late  day,  when  I  am  so  much  older  than 
General  Thomas  was  at  the  time  of  these  events,  I  feel 
at  liberty  to  discuss  them  without  reserve.  I  am  not 
criticizing  the  acts  of  my  official  superior.  In  my  mature 
judgment,  General  Thomas  was  not  justifiable,  in  1864- 
1865,  in  claiming  the  credit  for  what  had  been  done  by 
his  inferior  in  rank  in  actual  command  of  the  army  in 
the  field  while  General  Thomas  himself  was  absent. 

So,  in  respect  to  the  battle  of  Nashville,  it  would  have 
been  utterly  impossible  to  have  given  any  rational  ex 
planation  of  the  action  of  my  troops  on  December  15 
under  the  published  orders  for  that  battle.  Hence  I  al 
luded,  as  lightly  as  possible,  to  the  modification  in  those 
orders  which  accounted  for  what  I  had  done,  but  gave 
no  hint  of  the  fact  that  I  had  suggested  that  modifica 
tion.  I  cannot  now  recollect  whether  I  had  any  ex 
pectation  at  that  time  in  respect  to  what  General  Thomas 
would  say  on  that  subject  in  his  report;  but,  in  my  opin- 


INCONSISTENCIES  IN  GENERAL  THOMAS'S  REPORT       291 

ion,  his  well-known  character  would  have  fully  justified 
the  expectation  that  he  would  say  in  substance  that 
the  foregoing  plan  of  battle,  which  had  been  previously 
prepared,  was  so  far  modified,  upon  the  suggestion  of 
General  Schofield  and  with  the  concurrence  of  other 
commanders,  as  to  order  the  Twenty-third  Corps  to  a 
position  in  rear  of  our  right,  from  which  it  could  rein 
force  the  main  attack  on  the  enemy's  left,  instead  of  to 
the  reserve  position  on  the  left  of  the  Fourth  Corps.  It 
does  not  seem  to  me  that  a  veteran  general  could  have 
suffered  in  his  own  estimation  or  in  that  of  the  world  by 
such  an  act  of  justice  or  generosity  to  a  young  subor 
dinate.  But  the  plain,  unavoidable  truth  is  that  General 
Thomas  said  in  his  report,  besides  his  statement  about 
the  "  few  alterations  " :  "  Finding  General  Smith  had  not 
taken  as  much  distance  to  the  right  as  I  expected  he 
would  have  done,  I  directed  General  Schofield  to  move 
his  command  (the  Twenty-third  Corps)  from  the  position 
in  reserve  to  which  it  had  been  assigned  over  to  the 
right  of  General  Smith  .  .  ." —  leaving  it  necessarily  to 
be  inferred  that  "the  position  in  reserve"  referred  to 
was  that  to  which  it  had  been  assigned  in  the  published 
orders,  and  that  the  Twenty-third  Corps  moved  "over" 
from  that  position  "  to  the  right  of  General  Smith  "  after 
General  Thomas  gave  directions  to  that  effect  in  the 
afternoon  of  December  15.  Whereas,  in  fact,  that  corps 
had  moved  over  to  the  right  at  daylight  in  the  morning, 
so  as  to  be  ready  for  the  action  which  General  Thomas 
finally  ordered;  otherwise  it  could  not  possibly  have 
moved  over  to  Smith's  right  before  dark.  In  fact,  one 
of  the  divisions  (Couch's)  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps  ad 
vanced  with  Smith's  corps,  "  keeping  within  supporting 
distance,"  as  stated  in  my  report,  so  that  Couch  was  able 
to  take  a  very  important  part  in  the  attack  that  day ; 
while  Cox,  though  much  nearer  than  General  Thomas 
indicated,  could  not  reach  the  right  till  near  the  close  of 


292         FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  day's  operations,  though  in  time  to  take  part  in  the 
final  engagement  in  repelling  the  enemy's  attempt  to 
regain  lost  ground.  When  it  is  remembered  that  General 
Thomas  was  at  the  rear  of  our  right,  where  all  this  could 
be  distinctly  seen,  no  comment  seems  to  be  necessary 
on  this  feature  of  his  report. 

In  respect  to  the  statement  in  my  report  that  I  had  in 
the  night  of  December  15  "  waited  upon  the  commanding 
general  and  received  his  orders  for  the  pursuit,"  that  was 
simply  a  fact  without  which  there  was  possible  no  rational 
explanation  of  what  occurred,  or  did  not  occur,  the  next 
day.  I  must  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  General 
Thomas  would  make  some  frank  and  candid  explanation 
of  all  those  matters  in  his  own  report,  and  I  could  not 
have  imagined  that  I  might  incur  his  displeasure  by  tell 
ing  the  simple  truth.  My  opinion  of  his  character  for 
bade  the  possibility  of  any  supposition  that  he  would 
desire  to  conceal  anything,  even  if  concealment  were 
possible,  of  facts  to  which  there  were  so  many  witnesses. 
Hence  my  astonishment  at  the  discovery  of  so  much  that 
I  cannot  even  attempt  to  explain. 

It  was  publicly  stated,  soon  after  the  death  of  General 
Thomas,  that  his  mortal  stroke  occurred  when  he  was 
trying  to  write  something  in  regard  to  the  use  made  of 
the  Twenty-third  Corps  in  the  battle  of  Nashville.  If  he 
then  saw,  as  it  would  seem  he  must  have  done,  the  wrong 
into  which  he  had  been  betrayed,  his  sudden  death  is 
fully  accounted  for  to  the  minds  of  all  who  knew  his  true 
and  honest  and  sensitive  nature.  He  had  been  betrayed 
by  some  malign  influence  into  an  outrage  upon  his  own 
great  reputation  which  it  was  not  possible  to  explain 
away,  while  the  slight  wrong  he  had  done  to  me,  even  if 
he  had  intended  it,  had  already  proved  utterly  harmless. 
His  own  great  record  could  not  possibly  suffer  from  any 
discussion  of  the  facts,  unless  those  facts  themselves 
proved  damaging  to  him ;  and  he  had  been  too  much  ac- 


FALSE  EEPEESENTATIONS  MADE  TO  GENERAL  THOMAS  293 

customed  to  such  discussions  to  be  disturbed  thereby. 
There  seems  no  possible  explanation  of  the  great  shock 
General  Thomas  received  but  the  discovery  that  he  had 
apparently  done  an  irreparable  injury  to  himself.  But  I 
do  not  believe  General  Thomas  himself  was  the  author 
of  those  acts  which  were  so  foreign  to  his  nature. 

At  Nashville,  in  December,  1864,  and  afterward,  Gen 
eral  Thomas  appears  to  have  been  made  the  victim  of  a 
conspiracy  to  poison  his  mind  by  false  accusations  against 
his  senior  subordinate.  A  press  report  of  a  conversation 
said  to  have  taken  place  in  San  Francisco  in  the  year 
1869,  between  General  Thomas  and  General  Halleck,  gave 
some  indication  of  the  effect  which  had  been  produced 
on  the  mind  of  General  Thomas.  From  that  time  for 
ward  there  appeared  frequent  indications  of  the  secret 
operations  of  that  conspiracy ;  but  no  public  evidence  of 
its  character  or  authors  came  to  my  knowledge  until 
1881,  when  there  appeared  in  the  "  New- York  Times  "  of 
June  22  an  article,  copied  from  the  Toledo  "Northern 
Ohio  Democrat,"  which  disclosed  the  character  of  the  false 
accusations  which  had  been  made  to  General  Thomas 
at  Nashville,  and  the  name  of  their  principal,  if  not  sole, 
author.  That  publication  gave  me  for  the  first  time  the 
means  of  refuting  a  vile  slander  which  had  been  doing 
its  deadly  work  in  secret  for  nearly  seventeen  years.  The 
following  correspondence  with  General  Grant  shows  the 
character  of  that  slander,  and  its  complete  refutation : 

LONDON,  ENGLAND,  July  12,  1881. 
GENERAL  U.  S.  GRANT,  New  York,  U.  S.  A. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  For  a  long  time  I  have  been  made  aware 
of  the  fact  that  a  base  falsehood  was  secretly  circulated  through 
out  the  country,  to  the  effect  that  while  General  Thomas's  army 
was  at  Nashville  in  December,  1864,  I  endeavored  in  some  way 
to  influence  you  or  somebody  in  Washington  to  remove  him 
from  the  command  and  to  place  me  in  his  stead.  I  have  not  here 
tofore  been  able  to  defend  myself  against  this  slander  because  of 


294  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

its  secrecy.  But  now,  for  the  first  time  within  my  knowledge, 
this  falsehood  has  made  its  appearance  in  public  print,  in  the 
form  of  an  article  in  the  Toledo  "Northern  Ohio  Democrat," 
copied  into  the  "  New- York  Times  "  of  June  22,  of  which  I  send 
you  a  slip. 

You,  my  dear  General,  are  probably  the  only  man  now  living 
who  is  able  to  make  an  authoritative  statement  of  the  facts  in 
respect  to  this  matter,  such  as  must  be  accepted  without  question. 

I  hope,  therefore,  it  is  not  asking  too  much  to  request  you  to 
give  me,  in  a  form  which  I  may  use  publicly,  a  full  and  explicit 
statement  of  the  facts  in  respect  to  this  accusation. 

Perhaps  you  may  also  be  able  to  recall  the  substance  of  a  con 
versation  between  you  and  me,  on  the  subject  of  the  delay  of 
Thomas  to  attack  Hood  at  Nashville,  which  occurred  on  the 
naval  steamer  on  our  way  from  Hampton  Eoads  to  Cape  Fear 
River,  when  we  went  down  to  see  Admiral  Porter  and  General 
Terry  while  my  troops  were  delayed  by  the  ice  in  the  Potomac. 

In  that  conversation  I  tried  to  justify  Thomas's  delay  during 
the  storm  at  Nashville,  and,  I  thought,  perhaps  succeeded  in 
modifying  to  some  extent  your  opinion  on  the  subject.  If  you 
are  able  to  recollect  the  substance  of  that  conversation,  a  state 
ment  of  it  would  be  an  effective  answer  to  the  malicious  charges 
that  I  was  not  faithful  to  Thomas  as  my  commanding  officer. 

Not  knowing  where  you  may  be  when  this  letter  reaches  the 
United  States,  I  send  it  to  Colonel  Wherry,  to  be  sent  you  by 
mail  or  handed  you  by  one  of  my  aides,  as  may  be  most  con 
venient.  Please  do  me  the  great  favor  to  send  to  Wherry,  or 
the  other  officer  who  may  call  upon  you,  an  answer  which  he 
may  use  in  public  refutation  of  the  malicious  charge  which  has 
been  made  against  me. 

He  can  then  send  it  to  me.  The  vipers  are  taking  advantage 
of  my  absence  to  publish  falsehoods  and  give  them  a  long  start 
of  the  truth  which  must  be  sent  in  pursuit.  I  am,  dear  General, 
as  ever,  sincerely  yours, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

NEW  YORK,  August  1,  1881. 
GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  Your  letter  of  the  12th  of  July  has  just  been 
handed  me  by  Colonel  Wherry  of  your  staff.  I  have  read  it  care- 


THEIR  FALSITY  CONFIRMED  BY  GENERAL  GRANT   295 

fully,  together  with  the  article  from  the  Toledo  "  Democrat."  The 
elapse  of  time  since  the  event  spoken  of  in  that  article  is  so 
great  that  I  feel  some  hesitation  in  answering  your  letter  and 
the  article  from  the  "  Democrat "  as  I  might  do  if  I  had  access 
to  the  archives  at  Washington ;  but,  writing  from  memory,  I 
think  I  can  say  with  great  positiveness  there  was  never  any 
despatch  from  you  to  me,  or  from  you  to  any  one  in  Washington, 
disparaging  General  Thomas's  movements  at  Nashville.  On  the 
contrary,  my  recollection  is  that  when  I  met  you  on  your  way 
to  Wilmington,  N.  C.,  subsequent  to  the  battle  of  Nashville,  you 
explained  the  situation  at  Nashville  prior  to  General  Thomas's 
movement  against  Hood,  with  a  view  of  removing  the  feeling 
that  I  had  that  Thomas  had  been  slow.  I  was  very  impatient 
at  that  time  with  what  I  thought  was  tardiness  on  the  part  of 
General  Thomas,  and  was  very  much  afraid  that  while  he  was 
lying  there  at  Nashville  and  not  moving  his  army,  Hood  might 
cross  the  Tennessee  River  either  above  or  below  the  city  of 
Nashville,  and  get  between  him  and  the  Ohio  River,  and  make  a 
retrograde  movement  of  our  army  at  Nashville  a  necessity,  and 
very  much  embarrass  and  delay  future  operations  of  the  armies. 
Laboring  under  this  feeling  and  impression,  I  was  telegraphing 
General  Thomas  daily,  and  almost  hourly,  urging  him  to  move 
out  and  attack  Hood,  and  finally  became  so  impatient  that  I 
contemplated  his  removal  and  the  substitution  of  another  officer 
in  his  place ;  but  this  feeling  on  my  part  was  not  added  to  by 
any  despatches  from  any  person  from  the  scene  of  action,  except 
those  from  General  Thomas  himself.  I  have  certainly  no  recol 
lection  of  receiving  any  despatches  from  Nashville,  during  the 
time  spoken  of  in  the  article  in  the  "  Democrat,"  from  any  per 
son  but  General  Thomas  himself.  I  feel  very  sure  that  if  any 
despatches  had  been  received  from  you,  I  should  now  recollect 
it  j  and  I  am  free  to  say  that  it  would  have  created  a  prejudice 
to  your  disadvantage  if  I  had  received  such  despatches.  This 
much  you  are  at  liberty  to  use  in  any  way  you  may  deem 
proper.  The  other  reflections  which  the  author  of  the  article 
alluded  to  [made]  against  you  I  of  course  am  not  called  upon  to 
say  anything  in  regard  to.  The  fact  is,  your  subsequent  promo 
tions  are  proof  positive  that  I  entertained  none  of  the  views  set 
forth  to  your  disadvantage  in  this  article.  Very  truly  yours, 

U.  S.  GRANT. 


296          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

The  article  above  referred  to  asserted  that  "  General 
Thomas  knew  three  days  before  the  battle  of  Nashville 
that  Schofield  was  playing  the  part  of  Judas  by  telegraph 
ing  to  General  Grant,  at  Washington,  disparaging  sugges 
tions  about  the  action  of  Thomas,"  and  pretended  to 
quote  the  language  of  one  of  those  despatches,  as  follows : 
"  It  is  the  opinion  of  all  of  our  officers  with  whom  I  have 
conversed  that  General  Thomas  is  too  tardy  in  moving 
against  the  enemy  .  .  ."  It  also  stated  that  "  it  was 
known  to  a  number  of  our  officers  that  .  .  .  Scho 
field  was  intriguing  with  Grant  to  get  Thomas  relieved, 
in  order  that  he  might  succeed  to  the  command  of  our 
army  as  the  general  next  in  rank  to  Thomas,  .  .  .  and 
he  was  watched  and  exposed  to  Thomas." 

This  boastful  avowal  by  James  B.  Steedman  of  his 
own  crime  in  making  reports  which  were  false  and  slan 
derous  to  his  commanding  general  must  doubtless  be  ac 
cepted  as  conclusive  proof  of  his  own  guilt.  But  a  state 
ment  by  such  a  witness  cannot  be  regarded  as  proof  that 
any  other  officer  was  guilty  of  the  same  crime.  So  far  as 
I  know,  no  other  has  ever  made  any  avowal,  public  or 
private,  of  his  own  guilt,  or  of  that  of  any  one  else.  Nor 
has  any  other,  so  far  as  I  know,  denied  the  truth  of  my 
statements,  repeated  in  this  volume,  of  what  occurred  in 
the  council  held  at  Nashville  on  December  9,  1864. 

It  does  not  seem  probable  that  one  such  man  as  James 
B.  Steedman  could  have  exerted  such  a  powerful  and 
baneful  influence  over  General  George  H.  Thomas  as  that 
which  now  appears  to  have  governed  his  action.  There 
must,  it  would  seem,  have  been  some  others,  as  Steedman 
asserted.  If  so,  it  is  time  for  them,  if  living,  to  come  to 
the  front  and  claim  their  share  in  the  work  of  falsifying 
history,  of  poisoning  the  mind  and  heart  of  their  great 
and  noble  commander,  causing  his  untimely  death,  and 
endangering  his  great  reputation  as  a  man  of  honor, 
truth,  and  justice. 


THEIR  FALSITY  CONFIRMED  BY  GENERAL  GRANT   297 

The  complete  refutation  by  General  Grant  of  the  false 
hood  ended  the  hostility  which  had  been  shown  toward 
me  during  all  that  time,  and  gradually  led  to  a  general 
recognition  of  the  truth,  which  had  always  been  known 
and  maintained  by  the  most  ardent  friends  of  General 
Thomas,  like  the  late  General  J.  S.  Fullerton  and  Gen 
eral  H.  Y.  Boynton,  and  the  staff  officers  and  the  rela 
tives  of  the  general  himself.  Finally,  when  it  was  pro 
posed  in  Congress  to  recognize  my  past  services  by  pro 
motion  to  the  grade  of  lieutenant-general  on  the  eve  of 
my  retirement  from  active  service,  not  a  voice  in  opposi 
tion  was  heard  from  the  old  Army  of  the  Cumberland ; 
and  when  we  met,  for  the  first  time  in  many  years,  by 
their  cordial  invitation,  on  the  historic  fields  of  Chicka- 
mauga  and  Chattanooga,  to  dedicate  those  grounds  as 
sacred  to  the  memory  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
and  its  great  commander,  we  met  again  as  brother  sol 
diers,  without  any  trace  of  the  bitterness  which  malicious 
slander  had  for  so  many  years  sunk  deep  into  our 
hearts. 

For  my  part,  I  had  for  many  years  before  refused  to 
believe  that  my  old  commander,  whom  I  had  so  faithfully 
served  and  so  highly  respected,  could  possibly  have  done 
me  in  his  own  mind  and  heart  the  grievous  wrong  which 
he  appeared  to  have  done.  Not  long  after  his  death,  and 
many  years  before  the  public  refutation  of  the  slander 
which  he  was  said  to  have  accepted  and  believed,  I  put 
on  record  my  deliberate  opinion  that  of  General  Thomas's 
character  as  a  man  and  a  soldier  his  warmest  eulogists  had 
not  spoken  too  highly.  And  now,  no  matter  what  injus 
tice  General  Thomas  may  have  done  me  under  the  malign 
influence  which  surrounded  him,  I  refuse  to  alter  that 
deliberate  judgment.  He  is  to  me  in  memory  the  same 
noble  old  soldier  and  commander  that  he  was  when  he 
intrusted  to  me  the  command  of  his  army  in  Tennessee, 
from  Pulaski  through  Columbia,  Spring  Hill,  and  Franklin 


298  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

to  Nashville,  and  commended  all  I  had  done  in  that  com 
mand. 

Truthful  military  history  cannot  be  written  without 
some  criticism.  "  He  who  never  made  a  mistake  never 
made  war."  I  am  keenly  sensible  of  the  delicacy  of  my 
personal  relation  to  the  history  of  General  Thomas,  as 
well  as  of  my  obligation  to  contribute  my  share  to  that 
history,  which  no  other  man  could  ever  do  if  I  neglected 
it.  I  have  written  it  with  the  greatest  possible  care.  If 
I  have  fallen  into  error  in  anything,  there  are  men  still 
living  who  can  correct  my  mistakes.  It  will  be  more  just 
to  the  memory  of  General  Thomas  to  publish  it  now  than 
to  wait  until  all  who  could  correct  any  errors  of  mine  are 
silent  in  death.  Thus  far  none  of  the  several  friends  of 
General  Thomas  to  whom  I  have  applied  have  been  able 
to  give  me  any  explanation  of  the  record  referred  to 
which  modifies  that  which  I  have  stated.  If  any  one  can 
suggest  a  more  satisfactory  explanation,  he  will  earn 
my  gratitude. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

SHEEMAN'S  "MAECH  TO  THE  SEA"  —  THE  MILITAEY  THEOKY 
ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED  —  DID  IT  INVOLVE  WAK 
OK  STATESMANSHIP  ?  —  THE  CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN 
GKANT  AND  SHEKMAN,  AND  SHERMAN  AND  THOMAS  — 
THE  EFFECT  OF  JEFFEESON  DAVIS'S  SPEECH  ON  SHEE- 
MAN — EAWLINS'S  EEPOETED  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  MAECH, 
AND  GEANT'S  FINAL  JUDGMENT  ON  IT. 

DURING-  the  Atlanta  campaign  the  principal  com 
manders  of  the  army  assumed,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  Atlanta  would  be  ours  in  due  time,  and  hence 
there  was  much  discussion  of  the  question,  What  next?  It 
was  evident  the  army  could  not  go  much  farther  and  rely 
upon  its  present  line  of  supply,  although  G-eneral  Thomas 
said,  immediately  after  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  that  he 
had  "  a  plan  for  the  capture  of  Macon  "  which  he  would 
like  to  execute.  What  the  plan  was  he  did  not  divulge, 
General  Sherman  turning  the  conversation  in  another 
direction.  At  that  time  it  was  presumed  Hood  would 
oppose  whatever  move  was  attempted,  and  hence  a  new 
base,  to  be  provided  in  advance,  if  practicable,  by  the 
capture  of  some  place  on  the  gulf  or  on  the  Atlantic, 
was  evidently  essential  to  further  operations  in  Georgia. 
This  new  base  being  provided,  Sherman  could  move  out 
from  Atlanta  with  twenty  or  thirty  days'  supplies  in 
wagons,  and  swing  round  Hood  so  as  to  place  his  rear 
toward  the  new  base  and  open  communication  therewith. 
Evidently  the  march  to  the  sea,  as  it  was  actually  made, 

299 


300          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

was  impossible,  and  was  not  thought  of  until  Hood 
moved  from  Sherman's  front  and  cleared  the  way. 

In  the  popular  judgment  formed  immediately  after  im 
portant  events,  success  or  failure  is  the  only  criterion  of 
wisdom ;  but  the  historian  must  go  deeper,  and  consider 
the  merits  of  a  general  plan  in  view  of  the  greater  or  less 
probability  of  failure  of  any  one  of  its  parts.  What 
would  have  been  the  just  judgment  of  mankind  upon 
Sherman's  march  to  the  sea  if  Thomas  had  failed,  as 
Sherman  with  a  much  larger  force  had  done,  to  destroy 
or  seriously  cripple  Hood's  army  1  Or  what,  if  Hood  had 
succeeded  in  his  projected  invasion  of  Kentucky  —  an 
event  much  less  improbable  than  many  that  have  actu 
ally  occurred  in  war  I  If  Hood  had  succeeded  in  over 
whelming  the  smaller  force  that  opposed  him  at  Co 
lumbia,  Spring  Hill,  and  Franklin,  as  he  came  near  doing, 
Nashville  would  have  fallen  an  easy  prey,  for  it  was  not 
defensible  by  the  force  Thomas  then  had  there.  Thomas's 
cavalry  was  not  yet  remounted,  and  Forrest,  with  his 
troopers,  would  have  had  nearly  a  clear  field  of  Ken 
tucky  while  Hood  marched  to  the  Ohio.  What  offset 
to  this  would  have  been  the  capture  of  Savannah  as  a 
"  Christmas  gift "  to  the  nation  1 

The  situation  at  that  time  was  certainly  a  perplexing 
one  to  Sherman.  He  could  not  permit  Hood  to  put  him, 
with  his  superior  force,  on  the  defensive,  nor  even  to  ap 
pear  to  do  so  for  a  moment ;  and  it  was  not  easy  for  him 
to  consent  that  his  enemy  should  entirely  nullify  all  his 
elaborately  considered  plans  for  future  operations  in 
Georgia.  What  operations  Sherman  decided  on  in  that 
unprecedented  case  is  well  known. 

When  Sherman  cut  loose  and  started  for  Savannah  on 
November  12,  he  had  not,  as  events  proved,  sufficient 
reason  for  assuming  "  Thomas's  strength  and  ability  to 
meet  Hood  in  the  open  field,"  or  even  to  hold  Nashville 
against  him,  much  less  to  hold  "  the  line  of  the  Tennessee 


SHERMAN'S   "  MARCH  TO  THE  SEA"  3Q1 

River  firmly,"  which  was  the  condition  upon  which  Grant 
at  first  consented  that  Sherman  might  make  "  the  trip 
to  the  sea-coast." 1 

Thomas's  concurrence  in  Sherman's  opinion,  as  shown 
in  his  despatch  of  November  12,  simply  shows  that  they 
were  both  in  the  same  error ;  for  A.  J.  Smith's  troops  did 
not  begin  to  arrive  at  Nashville  until  the  day  of  the 
battle  of  Franklin  (November  30),  and  they  were  a  very 
important  part  of  the  force  relied  upon  in  Sherman's 
plan.  The  whole  fate  of  the  Tennessee  campaign  was 
decided  by  the  delay  of  Hood  at  Columbia  and  Spring 
Hill  and  his  defeat  in  the  desperate  battle  of  Franklin, 
and  this  by  two  of  Sherman's  six  corps,  without  the  aid 
of  any  of  the  reinforcements  upon  which  he  counted  so 
largely,  and  about  which  he  says  so  much.  It  is  not  too 
much  to  say  that  the  hazards  of  that  retreat  from  Pu- 
laski  and  of  the  defense  at  Franklin  were  far  greater 
than  any  portion  of  Sherman's  army  had  ever  before  en 
countered,  and  far  greater  than  any  army  ever  ought  to 
meet  except  in  case  of  necessity  —  hazards  which,  at  that 
stage  of  the  war,  with  our  vastly  superior  armies  in  the 
field,  it  would  have  been  inexcusable  voluntarily  to  in 
cur.  If  it  is  asked  why  such  hazard  was  taken,  the 
answer  has  heretofore  been  given.  By  it  alone  could 
the  time  be  gained  which  was  necessary  for  Thomas's  re 
inforcements  to  reach  Nashville.  The  time  gained  was 
barely  sufficient ;  one  day  less  might  have  been  fatal. 

The  question  that  at  once  arises  is,  Why  have  taken 
even  a  chance  of  error  in  a  matter  of  so  vital  moment — 
an  error  that  might  have  led  to  disastrous  consequences  ? 
Hood  was  already  on  the  Tennessee  Eiver,  preparing  to 
cross  and  begin  his  march  to  Nashville.  Thomas  had 
ready  to  meet  him  only  about  two  thirds  Hood's  strength 
in  infantry,  and  less  than  half  in  effective  cavalry.  A 
few  days'  delay  on  Sherman's  part  in  commencing  his 

i  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  202. 


302  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

march  would  have  disclosed  to  him  the  impossibility  of 
Smith's  arrival  in  time,  and  have  enabled  him  to  send 
another  corps  from  his  superabundant  force  to  assist 
Thomas.  Such  delay  of  only  a  few  days  could  not  have 
been  of  serious  consequence  in  respect  to  Sherman's 
plans.  The  near  approach  of  winter  was  the  only  reason 
why  an  early  start  was  important;  and  that  was  not 
considered  any  very  serious  obstacle  to  the  operations 
of  Hood  or  Thomas  in  a  more  unfavorable  country  for 
winter  operations. 

The  railroad  was  in  running  order  to  Atlanta,  and  the 
enemy's  cavalry  were  then  known  to  be  far  from  it. 
Sherman  could  have  kept  his  army  supplied,  and  ready 
to  start  any  day  he  pleased.  Why  not  have  waited  to 
see  whether  Thomas  could  get  together  troops  enough 
to  cope  with  Hood,  and  then,  when  sufficient  preparation 
had  been  assured  to  fight  the  enemy,  and  only  then, 
start  off  on  a  march  where  there  was  no  considerable 
enemy  to  fight  ? 

In  the  estimate  of  time,  Sherman  had  no  right 
to  disregard  even  Thomas's  well-known  "  slowness  of 
thought  and  action,"  but  was  bound  to  take  that  into 
account. 

I  have  never  yet  been  able  to  see  the  wisdom  of  taking 
any  hazard  of  defeat  in  Tennessee  when  we  had  ample 
force  at  command  to  secure  victory  there,  with  enough 
remaining  to  march  wherever  its  commander  pleased 
through  the  South,  except  where  Hood's  or  Lee's  army 
might  be.  By  this  I  mean  to  say  that  three,  or  even  two, 
of  Sherman's  corps  could  have  gone  to  Savannah,  or 
anywhere  else,  just  as  well  as  four,  and  thus  have  left 
Thomas  force  enough  to  make  the  defeat  of  Hood  sure 
beyond  contingency;  or  that  Sherman  should  have  de 
layed  his  march  to  the  sea  until  Thomas  had  concen 
trated  troops  enough  to  defeat  Hood. 

The  question  which  now  presents  itself  for  critical  con- 


THE  MILITARY  THEORY  ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED     3Q3 

sideration  is,  Upon  what  military  theory  was  Sherman's 
"  march  to  the  sea  n  based  1 

Sherman  himself  explains  it  as  a  change  of  base,  and 
he  estimates  its  value  in  comparison  with  that  of  his  sub 
sequent  operations  in  the  ratio  of  one  to  ten.  But  why 
those  subsequent  operations,  or  a  change  of  base  with  a 
view  to  any  such  ulterior  purpose?  Grant  had  not  at 
that  time  even  suggested  the  need  of  Sherman's  aid 
against  Lee,  and  events  proved  that  no  such  need  ex 
isted.  When  Sherman  started  for  Savannah  from  At 
lanta,  the  Confederate  force  in  the  Gulf  States  was  quite 
equal  to  Lee's  army  in  Virginia,  while  Grant's  army  was 
larger  than  Sherman's.  Could  Sherman  have  contem 
plated  at  that  time  such  a  thing  as  going  to  Grant's  as 
sistance,  where  he  was  not  needed,  and  leaving  Hood's 
army  behind  him  ? 

A  change  of  base  to  Savannah  or  Mobile  had  been  con 
templated  as  a  probable  necessity  of  future  operations  in 
Georgia  or  in  the  Gulf  States,  upon  the  capture  of  At 
lanta  ;  but  that  of  course  upon  the  supposition  that  there 
would  still  be  a  formidable  army  of  the  Confederacy  in 
those  States  against  which  operations  were  to  be  con 
ducted.  When  that  Confederate  army,  under  Hood, 
marched  toward  the  west,  with  the  evident  intention  to 
carry  the  war  into  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  why  a 
change  of  base  by  Sherman  in  the  opposite  direction,  to 
Savannah  ? 

Sherman  appears  to  have  supposed  at  first  that  Hood 
would  follow  him  when  he  started  on  his  march  through 
Georgia,  as  Hood  had  supposed  that  Sherman  would  fol 
low  him  into  Tennessee.  Was  there  any  more  reason  for 
the  one  supposition  than  the  other !  Ought  not  Sherman 
as  well  as  Hood  to  have  known  his  antagonist  better  than 
such  a  supposition  would  imply  ?  Was  it  not  extremely 
unreasonable  to  suppose  that  Hood,  after  he  had  marched 
hundreds  of  miles  west  from  Atlanta  and  reached  the  base 


304  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  his  projected  operations  in  Tennessee,  would  turn  back 
and  follow  Sherman  at  such  a  distance  in  his  rear!  It 
is  perfectly  evident  that  such  a  stern-chase  by  Hood 
was  contemplated  only  as  a  bare  possibility,  not  by  any 
means  as  a  probable  result  of  Sherman's  march.  It  could 
have  had  no  influence  in  forming  Sherman's  final  deter 
mination  to  make  that  march.  In  fact,  the  march  does 
not  appear  to  have  been  finally  decided  on — certainly  it 
was  not  commenced  —  until  Hood  had  gone  so  far  in  the 
opposite  direction  as  to  make  his  pursuit  of  Sherman  out 
of  the  question,  and  had  fully  disclosed  his  plan  to  invade 
Tennessee.  It  was  surely,  therefore,  an  extraordinary 
spectacle  to  see  the  main  Union  army  marching  where 
there  was  no  considerable  hostile  force  to  meet  it,  leav 
ing  a  comparatively  small  detachment  to  cope  with  the 
formidable  enemy ! 

Of  course  Sherman  could  not  fall  back  into  Tennessee, 
and  thus  let  Hood  put  him  on  the  defensive,  even  for  a 
short  time.  He  could  afford  only  to  send  back  a  de 
tachment  large  enough  to  enable  Thomas,  with  the  other 
forces  he  could  assemble,  to  hold  Nashville  and  prevent 
Hood  from  crossing  the  Cumberland.  This  is  virtually 
but  little  more  than  what  Sherman  did  in  that  regard. 

There  then  remained  to  Sherman  practically  only  one 
line  of  action  at  all  consistent  with  the  dictates  of  estab 
lished  principles  in  the  conduct  of  a  military  campaign : 
that  was  to  strike  with  his  superior  remaining  force  for 
Hood's  rear,  south  of  the  Tennessee  Eiver.  Such  a  move 
ment  could  have  been  commenced  immediately  upon 
Hood's  march  in  that  direction.  Supplies  would  have 
been  drawn,  first  from  Chattanooga  and  afterward  from 
Stevenson,  and  then  from  Decatur,  Sherman's  line  of  sup 
ply  being  thus  very  much  shortened.  A  small  detach 
ment  at  Atlanta  could  have  destroyed  the  works  of  mili 
tary  value  in  that  place,  and  the  railroad  thence  back  to 
Chattanooga,  being  completely  covered  in  this  work  by 


THE  MILITARY  THEORY  ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED      395 

Sherman's  army,  without  delaying  its  march  a  single  day. 
Sherman  could  thus  have  easily  struck  Hood  south  of 
the  Tennessee  before  the  latter  could  have  made  his 
preparations  for  crossing  that  river.  Indeed,  with  Sher 
man  marching  in  that  direction,  even  so  bold  a  man  as 
Hood  could  hardly  have  been  so  reckless  as  to  have 
crossed  the  Tennessee;  and  if  he  had,  his  destruction  must 
have  been  sure.  Hence  the  least  result  would  have  been 
simply  to  transfer  the  theater  of  operations  from  Georgia 
to  Alabama,  or  perhaps  to  Mississippi,  and  greatly  to 
shorten  Sherman's  line  of  supply.  And  what  possible  dif 
ference  could  it  make  in  which  part  of  the  revolted  States 
the  theater  of  war  might  be,  so  long  as  the  Confederate 
army,  to  destroy  which  was  the  only  important  object  of 
a  campaign,  was  there  ?  To  avoid  a  transfer  of  the  battle 
field  from  Georgia  to  Alabama  or  Mississippi,  was  it  wise 
to  run  the  risk  of  transferring  it  to  Kentucky  or  Ohio  ? 
Perhaps  no  movement  which  could  have  been  contem 
plated  by  the  Confederate  authorities  would  have  been 
more  greatly  to  Sherman's  advantage  over  Hood  than 
the  one  they  adopted. 

I  cannot  better  show  my  own  exact  impression  at  the 
time  respecting  the  operations  of  Sherman  and  Hood  in 
1864,  than  by  an  illustration  that  will  be  at  once  appre 
ciated  on  every  farm  in  America.  When  two  fighting- 
cocks  meet  for  the  first  time,  battle  is  joined  without  de 
lay,  and  is  prosecuted  with  all  possible  vigor  and  skill. 
If  the  result  is  decisive  the  victor's  triumph  is  loudly  pro 
claimed,  while  the  defeated  combatant,  with  lowered 
crest,  seeks  safety  in  flight.  If,  on  the  contrary,  the  re 
sult  is  a  drawn  battle,  the  two  antagonists,  as  if  by  com 
mon  consent,  slowly  separate,  carrying  their  heads  high, 
and  sharply  watching  each  other.  When  distance  has 
assured  the  close  of  that  contest,  they  severally  go  to 
feeding,  as  if  nothing  unusual  had  happened,  or  else 
march  off  to  seek  some  less  formidable  foe.  Neither 


20 


306  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

utters  a  note  of  defiance  until  he  is  well  beyond  the 
other's  reach. 

The  correspondence  between  Grant  and  Sherman,  es 
pecially  the  letters  from  Grant  of  September  12,  and 
from  Sherman  of  September  20,  both  carried  by  Grant's 
staff  officer,  Colonel  Horace  Porter,  show  a  complete  un 
derstanding  of  the  situation  at  that  time,  and  perfect 
accord  in  respect  to  the  operations  appropriate  to  that 
situation.1  Savannah  was  to  be  captured,  if  practicable, 
by  military  and  naval  forces  from  the  east,  and  Sher 
man  was  so  to  manoeuver  in  respect  to  Hood's  army  as 
to  swing  round  the  latter  and  thus  place  himself  in  posi 
tion  to  open  communication  with  Savannah  as  his  new 
base.  This  was  the  simple,  logical  plan  dictated  by  the 
situation,  which  had  for  a  long  time  been  considered  and 
worked  out  after  weighing  all  the  advantages  and  disad 
vantages  of  other  possible  plans. 

But  very  soon  after  Sherman  despatched  his  letter  of 
September  20  by  Colonel  Porter,  Hood  commenced  his 
movement  to  Sherman's  rear,  and  then  far  to  the  west, 
which  was  designed  to  and  did  radically  change  the  mil 
itary  situation  in  view  of  which  the  carefully  matured 
plan  described  in  Sherman's  letter  of  September  20  had 
been  formed.  Sherman,  as  clearly  appears  from  his  de 
spatches  later  than  September  20,  considered  long  and 
apparently  with  great  doubt  what  change  ought  to  be 
made  in  his  own  plans  in  consequence  of  the  altered  situ 
ation  due  to  the  unexpected  movements  of  his  enterpris 
ing  adversary.  That  some  very  important  change  in 
Sherman's  plans  was  imperative  was  a  matter  of  course. 
A  general  cannot  well  make  his  own  plans  entirely  upon 
his  own  theory  as  to  what  his  enemy  will  or  ought  to  do, 
but  must  be  governed  in  some  measure  by  what  the 
other  actually  does.  General  Sherman  evidently  per 
ceived  quite  clearly  what  established  rules  of  action  re- 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX?  part  ii,  pp.  364,  411. 


THE  MILITARY  THEORY  ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED      3Q7 

quired  to  be  done,  and  General  Grant  even  more  clearly, 
as  was  shown  in  his  despatches  of  October  11,  1864,  and 
others. 

It  seems  hardly  possible  to  speak  seriously  of  many 
of  the  reasons  given  by  Sherman  for  finally  deciding  to 
leave  his  old  adversary  to  the  care  of  Thomas's  inferior 
force.  He  said,  for  instance,  in  his  despatch  to  Grant  of 
November  2:  "If  I  could  hope  to  overhaul  Hood,  I  would 
turn  against  him  with  my  whole  force.  .  .  .  No  single 
army  can  catch  him."  l  Sherman  had  been  "catching"  Hood 
with  a  single  army  all  summer,  and  without  the  slightest 
difficulty.  What  reason  had  he  to  conclude  that  it  would 
be  impossible  to  do  so  later  ?  As  my  experience  proved, 
it  was  as  easy  to  "catch"  him  in  November,  though  with 
a  smaller  force,  as  it  had  been  in  July  and  August  with  a 
much  larger  force,  and  Thomas  had  the  same  experience 
in  December.  As  Sherman  knew  from  his  own  experi 
ence,  as  well  as  I,  whether  the  pursuing  force  was  larger 
or  smaller,  Hood  was  about  the  easiest  man  in  the  world 
to  "  catch,"  even  by  a  "  single  "  army.  But  Sherman  had 
under  his  command  at  that  time,  in  Georgia  and  Ten 
nessee,  as  he  said  with  great  emphasis  and  confidence,  two 
armies,  each  larger  than  Hood's,  even  assuming  the  largest 
estimate  then  made  of  the  strength  of  Hood's  army.  It 
appears  that  Sherman  gave  Hood  credit  at  that  time  for 
only  thirty  thousand  infantry,  besides  cavalry.2  If  that  was 
his  estimate,  then  he  had  at  least  three  or  four  armies 
(including  the  reinforcements  he  counted  on  for  Thomas 
in  Tennessee),  each  equal  in  strength  to  Hood's.  Is  it 
possible  Sherman  thought  he  could  not  catch  Hood  with 
three  or  four  armies  ?  But  another  despatch  from  Sher 
man,  dated  November  2,  seems  to  show  that  his  esti 
mate  of  Hood's  army  was  more  than  50,000,  instead  of 
30,000;  for  in  that  despatch  he  said  in  substance  that 
unless  he  drew  Slocum's  corps  back  from  Atlanta,  and 

1  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  594.          2  ibid.,  p.  576. 


308  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

abandoned  that  place,  his  army  would  be  inferior  to 
Hood's.1  Now  Slocum's  corps  numbered  10,000  men,  and 
Sherman  marched  to  the  sea  with  60,000  after  strip 
ping  down  to  the  best  possible  righting  condition. 
Hence  Sherman,  after  sending  back  the  Fourth  and 
Twenty-third  corps  to  Thomas,  and  leaving  out  Slocum's 
corps,  had  50,000  men,  and  therefore  according  to  this 
reckoning  Hood  had  more  than  50,000.  Forty  thousand 
would  have  been  a  reasonable  estimate  for  Sherman  to 
have  made  of  Hood's  strength,  with  his  more  accurate 
knowledge  than  any  of  his  subordinate  commanders 
could  have.  But,  somehow,  the  estimate  of  Hood's  force 
at  that  time  accepted  by  Thomas  and  his  subordinates 
in  Tennessee  was  45,000,  besides  cavalry,  which  was  un 
derstood  to  be  10,000,  or  even  12,000  including  Forrest's 
separate  command.  But  even  this  was  less  than  half  of 
Sherman's  two  armies. 

Sherman  made  no  attempt  to  "  catch  "  Hood  during  his 
raid  in  Sherman's  rear  in  September,  1864,  nor  to  inter 
fere  with  his  movement  to  the  west.  In  his  "Memoirs,"2 
Sherman  says:  "At  first  I  thought  of  interposing  my 
whole  army  in  the  Chattooga  Valley,  so  as  to  prevent 
Hood's  escape  south.  .  .  .  He  would  be  likely  to  re 
treat  eastward  by  Spring  Place,  which  I  did  not  want 
him  to  do."  Even  thus  early  in  the  game  Sherman  saw 
the  opportunity  Hood  was  probably  going  to  give  him  to 
make  his  projected  change  of  base  to  Savannah,  and 
hence  he  took  care  not  to  prevent  Hood  from  completing 
his  "cooperative"  movement. 

Sherman  determined  to  destroy  Atlanta  and  his  rail 
road  back  to  Chattanooga,  abandon  entirely  his  former 
base  of  operations  and  line  of  supply,  and  assume  a  new 
base  of  future  operations  on  the  Atlantic  or  the  gulf.  In 
other  words,  Sherman  decided  that  he  could  not  attempt 
to  hold  any  part  of  the  territory  he  had  conquered  in  the 

l  Ibid.,  p.  594.  2  Vol.  II.  p.  154. 


THE  MILITARY  THEORY  ON  WHICH  IT  WAS  BASED      3Q9 

Atlanta  campaign ;  that  conquest  was  valuable  only  in 
the  opportunity  it  gave  him  to  destroy  everything  of  mil 
itary  importance  in  that  territory  —  that  is,  Atlanta  and 
the  railroads.  The  question  then  arises,  What  possible  dif 
ference  could  it  make  in  which  direction  he  moved  after 
having  decided  not  to  hold  any  part  of  that  territory,  but 
to  destroy  it  ?  Why  would  a  move  toward  the  west  any 
more  than  a  move  toward  the  east  have  the  appearance 
of  losing  all  that  had  been  gained,  after  he  had  destroyed 
it  1  The  simple  fact  is,  the  Confederate  commander  had 
abandoned  Georgia  to  its  fate  in  the  vain  hope  of  putting 
Sherman  on  the  defensive,  not  realizing,  apparently,  that 
Sherman  had  ample  force  for  defensive  purposes,  besides 
an  army  superior  to  Hood's  for  aggressive  operations. 
The  Southern  army  was  thus  placed  where  Sherman 
could  operate  against  it  by  a  much  shorter  line,  and  hence 
with  a  much  larger  force,  if  that  was  what  he  wished  to 
do.  He  could  at  the  same  time,  if  he  thought  it  neces 
sary  or  desirable,  inflict  upon  Georgia  the  destruction 
which  the  Confederate  commander  wanted  to  prevent, 
but  had  in  fact  invited  by  abandoning  that  State,  and 
that  without  materially  impairing  the  strength  of  his 
(Sherman's)  main  army  operating  against  the  main  force 
of  the  enemy.  As  suggested  by  Grant,  a  cavalry  raid 
through  Georgia  would  have  accomplished  that  destruc 
tion  as  well  as  a  march  of  60,000  men.  Hence,  in  the 
light  of  all  that  appears  in  the  records  up  to  the  time 
when  Sherman  actually  started  on  his  march,  no  valid 
military  reason  had  been  given  why  Sherman  should  not 
have  sent  a  cavalry  raid  into  Georgia,  as  Grant  suggested, 
to  destroy  everything  there,  and  thus  negative  Mr.  Davis's 
promise  of  protection,  while  he  (Sherman)  pursued  re 
lentlessly  the  strictly  military  plan  Grant  had  prescribed 
for  him  to  break  up  Hood's  army  or  capture  it,  which 
Sherman  had  as  yet  failed  to  accomplish. 
Manifestly  some  other  motive  besides  the  motives  stated 


310  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

in  Sherman's  telegraphic  despatches  must  have  decided 
him  to  carry  out  his  plan  to  make  the  march  to  the  sea. 

The  boastful  assurance  and  threat  of  the  Confederate 
commander-in-chief,1  referred  to  by  Sherman,  gave  at 
least  some  reason  for  Sherman's  defiant  response  by  him 
self  marching  through  Georgia  instead  of  sending  a  sub 
ordinate  ;  and  the  partial  execution  of  that  threat  by 
Forrest's  cavalry,  referred  to  in  Sherman's  despatch  of 
November  1  to  Grant,  gave  a  strong  reason  for  Sher 
man's  eager  determination  to  march  at  once,  without 
waiting  for  anything  but  his  own  preparations.  In  his 
article,"  The  Grand  Strategy  of  the  Last  Year  of  the  War,"2 
Sherman  reveals  one  of  the  reasons  for  his  haste  in 
starting  on  his  march.  "How  free  and  glorious  I  felt,"  he 
says,  "when  the  magic  telegraph  was  cut,  which  pre 
vented  the  possibility  of  orders  of  any  kind  from  the 
rear  coming  to  delay  or  hinder  us ! "  A  letter  written  by 
Sherman  to  Grant,  November  6,  on  the  eve  of  his  start 
for  the  sea,  also  gave  reasons,  other  than  military,  for  his 
famous  march.  In  Sherman's  "  Memoirs  "  no  quotation 
is  made  from  this  letter,3  and  it  is  referred  to  very 
briefly  without  giving  any  suggestion  of  its  important 
contents. 

General  Sherman  thus  stated  his  reasons  for  writing 
that  letter :  "  I  have  heretofore  telegraphed  and  written 
yon  pretty  fully,  but  I  still  have  some  thoughts  in  my 
busy  brain  that  should  be  confided  to  you  as  a  key  to 
future  developments." 

Then  Sherman  explained,  with  the  art  of  which  he  was 
master,  clearly,  logically,  and  convincingly,  the  reasons 
for  the  operations  of  his  army  from  the  fall  of  Atlanta 
down  to  the  time  of  his  writing,  by  which  he  had  com- 

1  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis's  speech.   See     "Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil 
General  Sherman's  "  Memoirs,"  Vol.     War,"  Vol.  IV,  p.  257. 

II,  p.  141.  3  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part 

2  See     the    Century    War    Book,     iii,  p.  658. 


DID  IT  INVOLVE  WAR  OR  STATESMANSHIP? 

pletely  defeated  his  adversary's  designs,  closing  with  the 
following  language: 

Now,  as  to  the  second  branch  of  my  proposition,  I  admit  that 
the  first  object  should  be  the  destruction  of  that  army;  and  if 
Beauregard  moves  his  infantry  and  artillery  up  into  that  pocket 
about  Jackson  and  Paris,  I  will  feel  strongly  tempted  to  move 
Thomas  directly  against  him,  and  myself  move  rapidly  by  Deca- 
tur  and  Purdy  to  cut  off  his  retreat.  .  .  .  These  are  the  reasons 
which  have  determined  my  former  movements. 

General  Sherman  then  continues  by  explaining  the 
reasons  which  induced  him  not  to  carry  out  the  move 
ment  above  suggested. 

Now  come  the  reasons  for  the  future  movements  upon 
which  Sherman  had  then  fully  decided,  after  having  ob 
tained  General  Grant's  consent,  and  which  he  was  about 
to  begin.  After  stating  what  he  had  done  "  in  the  last 
ten  days  w  to  prepare  for  his  march,  he  said : 

Then  the  question  presents  itself  what  shall  be  done  ?  On  the 
supposition  always  that  Thomas  can  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennes 
see,  and  very  shortly  be  able  to  assume  the  offensive  as  against 
Beauregard,  I  propose  to  act  in  such  a  manner  against  the  mate 
rial  resources  of  the  South  as  utterly  to  negative  Da  vis's  boasted 
threat  and  promises  of  protection.  If  we  can  march  a  well-ap 
pointed  army  right  through  his  territory,  it  is  a  demonstration 
to  the  world,  foreign  and  domestic,  that  we  have  a  power  which 
Davis  cannot  resist.  This  may  not  be  war,  but  rather  states 
manship  ;  nevertheless  it  is  overwhelming  to  my  mind  that  there 
are  thousands  of  people  abroad  and  in  the  South  who  will  reason 
thus :  If  the  North  can  march  an  army  right  through  the  South, 
it  is  proof  positive  that  the  North  can  prevail  in  this  contest, 
leaving  only  open  the  question  of  its  willingness  to  use  that 
power. 

It  was,  perhaps,  not  ivar,  but  rather  statesmanship  upon 
which  Sherman  was  about  to  enter  —  not  to  defeat  and 
destroy  or  capture  the  Confederate  armies,  but  to  demon- 


312  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

strate  in  the  most  positive  manner  that  the  "North  can 
prevail  in  this  contest,"  provided  only  it  is  willing  to  use 
its  power.  And  by  what  means  was  this  demonstration  to 
be  made  f  By  marching  a  large  army  through  the  South 
where  there  was  and  could  be  no  Confederate  army  able 
to  oppose  it,  destroying  everything  of  military  value,  in 
cluding  food,  and  continuing  this  operation  until  the 
government  and  people  of  the  Southern  States,  and  peo 
ple  abroad,  should  find  the  demonstration  convincing. 
Again  I  quote: 

Now,  Mr.  Lincoln's  election,  which  is  assured,  coupled  with 
the  conclusion  thus  reached,  makes  a  complete,  logical  whole. 
Even  without  a  battle,  the  result,  operating  upon  the  minds  of 
sensible  men,  would  produce  fruits  more  than  compensating  for 
the  expense,  trouble,  and  risk. 

The  election  of  Mr.  Lincoln  meant,  of  course,  continued 
ascendancy  of  the  "  war  party "  at  the  North,  and  that, 
coupled  with  the  conclusion  above  reached,  made,  as 
Sherman  so  forcibly  stated  it,  "  a  complete,  logical  whole." 

General  Sherman  then  went  on  to  give  in  his  masterly 
way  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  the  several  ob 
jectives  open  to  him  as  the  goal  of  his  march,  reserving 
to  himself  finally  the  choice  between  three, —  Savannah, 
Mobile,  and  Pensacola, —  trusting  to  Eichmond  papers  to 
keep  Grant  well  advised  of  his  movements  and  of  his 
final  choice  of  the  objective ;  and  then,  near  the  close  of 
this  letter,  in  discussing  the  military  aspects  of  his  pro 
posed  march,  upon  which  he  was  about  entering,  he  re 
verted  to  the  old  theory  of  the  line  of  the  Tennessee  — 
"  on  the  supposition  always  that  Thomas  can  hold  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee,  and  very  shortly  be  able  to  assume 
the  offensive  as  against  Beauregard." 

It  is  impossible  not  to  admire  the  thoroughness  with 
which  Sherman  had  considered  all  possible  or  even  ima 
ginary  difficulties  in  his  way,  nor  to  suppress  a  smile  at 


DID  IT  INVOLVE  WAR  OR  STATESMANSHIP?  313 

the  supreme  confidence  with  which  he  set  out,  with  sixty 
thousand  of  the  best  soldiers  in  the  world,  upon  a  march 
through  a  fine  healthy  country  laden  with  abundance  of 
supplies  for  men  and  animals,  at  a  time  when  only  two 
armies  in  the  South  were  strong  enough  to  offer  him  any 
serious  opposition,  both  of  them  farther  from  his  line 
of  march  than  he  was  from  his  goal  when  he  started,  one 
besieged  by  Grant  in  Petersburg,  and  the  other  already 
commencing  an  aggressive  campaign  against  Thomas  in 
Tennessee !  It  is  equally  impossible  to  speak  seriously 
of  the  apprehension  of  some  geographers  and  logisticians 
that  Hood  would  interfere  in  some  way  with  Sherman's 
march  through  Georgia.  Hood  could  not  have  got  within 
two  hundred  miles  of  Sherman  before  the  latter  had  de 
stroyed  as  much  of  Georgia  as  he  wished,  and  then  cap 
tured  Savannah.  Of  course  Sherman  was  not  disturbed 
by  any  apprehension  that  Hood  might  possibly  oppose 
his  march  to  Savannah.  He  could  have  meant  by  what 
he  said  in  his  despatches  on  that  subject  only  that  Hood 
would  be  compelled  by  "public  clamor"  to  return  to 
Georgia  to  defend  that  State  against  Sherman's  further 
operations.  Hence  his  strong  insistence  that  Thomas 
pursue  Hood  with  energy,  and  thus  keep  him  out  of 
his  (Sherman's)  way. 

It  had  never  occurred  to  me,  if  the  fact  ever  existed, 
that  the  rebellion  could  not  be  suppressed  by  crushing  or 
capturing  the  Confederate  armies,  or  that  our  vastly  su 
perior  military  strength  must  necessarily  be  employed  in 
crushing  the  Southern  people,  however  much  they  might 
deserve  crushing,  or  else  that  we  must  give  up  the  con 
test.  Yet  while  I  never  saw  the  necessity  for  what  Sher 
man  called  "  statesmanship  "  rather  than  "  war,"  I  would 
never  have  hesitated  for  a  moment  to  say,  what  I  now 
repeat,  if  it  really  was  necessary,  in  order  to  put  down 
the  rebellion  and  restore  the  Union,  to  destroy  all  the 
property  in  the  South,  in  the  name  of  a  just  and  benefi- 


314  FOKTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

cent  God,  destroy  it  all !  Hence  my  objection  to  Sher 
man's  plans  was  based  upon  my  conviction  that  such 
plans  were  not  at  that  time,  and  never  had  been,  neces 
sary.  Yet  such  plans  are  legitimate  and  often  necessary, 
and  no  man  is  wise  enough  to  tell  in  advance  whether 
they  may  prove  to  be  necessary  or  not.  The  surest  way 
to  reach  results  is  the  way  Sherman  adopted.  In  either 
a  civil  or  a  foreign  war,  such  methods  may  be  very  bad 
policy;  but  very  few  men  are  cool-headed  enough  in 
civil  war,  even  if  wise  enough,  to  see  what  good  policy 
dictates,  and  this  is  even  more  true  of  men  at  a  distance 
than  of  those  at  the  front.  Men  who  have  been  fighting 
most  of  the  time  for  three  or  four  years  generally  become 
pretty  cool,  while  those  in  the  rear  seem  to  become  hotter 
and  hotter  as  the  end  approaches,  and  even  for  some  time 
after  it  is  reached.  They  must  in  some  way  work  off  the 
surplus  passion  which  the  soldier  has  already  exhausted 
in  battle.  Whatever  may  be  true  as  to  Sherman's  methods 
before  Lee  surrendered,  the  destruction  inflicted  on  the 
South  after  that  time  was  solely  the  work  of  passion,  and 
not  of  reason.  Of  this  last  Sherman  was  innocent. 

Sherman's  destruction  of  military  supplies  and  rail 
roads  did  undoubtedly  render  impossible  any  great  pro 
longation  of  the  war,  if  that  would  otherwise  have  been 
possible ;  but  it  did  not  materially  hasten  the  actual  col 
lapse  of  the  rebellion,  which  was  due  to  Grant's  capture 
of  Lee's  army.  Besides,  if  Grant  had  not  captured  Lee, 
Sherman  would.  Lee  could  not  possibly  have  escaped 
them  both.  Hence  Sherman's  destruction  of  property  in 
Georgia,  South  Carolina,  and  North  Carolina  did  not 
hasten  the  end  of  the  rebellion.  If  General  Sherman 
was,  at  the  time  he  planned  his  march  to  the  sea,  in 
formed  of  the  nearly  bankrupt  condition  of  the  United 
States  treasury,  that  fact  went  far  toward  justifying  his 
action  in  leaving  as  small  a  force  as  possible  with 
Thomas,  and  even  in  starting  on  his  march  before 
Thomas  was  fully  ready  to  meet  Hood.  For  to  make 


CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  315 

his  demonstration  early  enough  and  as  convincing  as 
possible  to  the  people  of  the  South  and  all  the  world,  it 
was  important  to  move  at  once,  and  to  show  that  his 
march  was  not  a  mere  rapid  raid,  but  a  deliberate  march 
of  a  formidable  army  capable  of  crushing  anything  that 
might  get  in  its  way,  and  that  without  waiting  for  any 
thing  that  might  occur  in  its  rear.  Such  a  march  of 
such  an  army  might  well  havfrbeen  sufficient  to  convince 
everybody  that  the  United  States  had  the  military  power 
to  crush  the  rebellion,  and  even  destroy  everything  in 
the  South,  before  the  world  should  find  out  that  the  re 
sources  of  the  government  had  been  exhausted,  and  that 
the  United  States  had  not  the  financial  strength  neces 
sary  to  make  any  further  military  use  of  the  million  of 
men  they  then  had  on  the  muster-  and  pay-rolls.  To  have 
given  the  still  more  convincing  proof  of  the  power  of  the 
Union,  by  destroying  one  of  the  Confederate  armies, 
would  have  taken  a  longer  time. 

The  following  despatches  fully  show  Sherman's  first 
plan,  assented  to  by  Grant,  the  essential  feature  of  which 
was  that  Thomas  should  be  able  to  "  hold  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  firmly,"  and  the  corresponding  information 
and  instructions  to  Thomas : 

SHERMAN  TO  GRANT. 
CARTERSVILLE,  GA.,  October  10,  1864,  12  M. 

.  .  .  Hood  is  now  crossing  the  Coosa,  twelve  miles  below 
Rome,  bound  west.  If  he  passes  over  to  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
road,  had  I  not  better  execute  the  plan  of  my  letter  sent  by 
Colonel  Porter,  and  leave  General  Thomas  with,  the  troops  now 
in  Tennessee  to  defend  the  State?  He  will  have  an  ample 
force  when  the  reinforcements  ordered  reach  Nashville. 

GRANT  TO  SHERMAN. 

CITY  POINT,  VA.,  October  11,  1864,  11  A.  M. 

Your  despatch  received.  Does  it  not  look  as  if  Hood  was 
going  to  attempt  the  invasion  of  middle  Tennessee  ?  ...  If  he 


316  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

does  this,  he  ought  to  be  met  and  prevented  from  getting  north 
of  the  Tennessee  River.  If  you  were  to  cut  loose,  I  do  not  be 
lieve  you  would  meet  Hood's  army.  .  .  .  Hood  would  probably 
strike  for  Nashville,  thinking  by  going  north  he  could  inflict 
greater  damage  upon  us  than  we  could  upon  the  rebels  by  going 
south.  If  there  is  any  way  of  getting  at  Hood's  army,  I  would 
prefer  that,  but  I  must  trust  to  your  own  judgment.  I  find  I 
shall  not  be  able  to  send  a  force  from  here  to  act  with  you  on 
Savannah.  Your  movements,  therefore,  will  be  independent  of 
mine,  at  least  until  the  fall  of  Richmond  takes  place.  I  am 
afraid  Thomas,  with  such  lines  of  road  as  he  has  to  protect, 
could  not  prevent  Hood  going  north.  With  Wilson  turned 
loose  with  all  your  cavalry,  you  will  find  the  rebels  put  much 
more  on  the  defensive  than  heretofore. 


SHERMAN  TO  GRANT. 

October  11,  1864, 10  A.  M. 

Hood  moved  his  army  from  Palmetto  Station  across  by  Dallas 
and  Cedartown,  and  is  now  on  the  Coosa  River,  south  of  Rome. 
He  threw  one  corps  on  my  road  at  Acworth,  and  I  was  forced 
to  follow.  I  hold  Atlanta  with  the  Twentieth  Corps,  and  have 
strong  detachments  along  my  line.  These  reduce  my  active 
force  to  a  comparatively  small  army.  We  cannot  remain  now 
on  the  defensive.  With  25,000  men,  and  the  bold  cavalry  he 
has,  he  can  constantly  break  my  road.  I  would  infinitely  prefer 
to  make  a  wreck  of  the  road  and  of  the  country  from  Chatta 
nooga  to  Atlanta,  including  the  latter  city,  send  back  all  my 
wounded  and  worthless,  and,  with  my  effective  army,  move 
through  Georgia,  smashing  things  to  the  sea.  Hood  may  turn 
into  Tennessee  and  Kentucky,  but  I  believe  he  will  be  forced  to 
follow  me.  Instead  of  being  on  the  defensive,  I  would  be  on  the 
offensive ;  instead  of  guessing  at  what  he  means  to  do,  he  would 
have  to  guess  at  my  plans.  The  difference  in  war  is  full  25  per 
cent.  I  can  make  Savannah,  Charleston,  or  the  mouth  of  the 
Chattahoochee.  Answer  quick,  as  I  know  we  will  not  have  the 
telegraph  long.1 

i  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  202. 


COEEESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  SHEEMAN  AND  THOMAS    317 
GRANT  TO  SHERMAN. 

October  11,  1864,  11:30  p.  M. 

Your  despatch  of  to-day  received.  If  you  are  satisfied  the 
trip  to  the  sea-coast  can  be  made,  holding  the  line  of  the  Ten 
nessee  firmly,  you  may  make  it,  destroying  all  the  railroad 
south  of  Dalton  or  Chattanooga,  as  you  think  best. 

SHERMAN  TO  THOMAS. 

October  20,  1864. 

...  I  want  all  things  bent  to  the  following  general  plan  of 
action  for  the  next  three  months.  Out  of  the  forces  now  here 
and  at  Atlanta  I  propose  to  organize  an  efficient  army  of  from 
60,000  to  65,000  men,  with  which  I  propose  to  destroy  Macon, 
Augusta,  and,  it  may  be,  Savannah  and  Charleston,  but  I  will 
always  keep  open  the  alternatives  of  the  mouth  of  Appalachi- 
cola  and  Mobile.  By  this  I  propose  to  demonstrate  the  vul 
nerability  of  the  South,  and  make  its  inhabitants  feel  that  war 
and  individual  ruin  are  synonymous  terms.  To  pursue  Hood  is 
folly,  for  he  can  twist  and  turn  like  a  fox  and  wear  out  any 
army  in  pursuit.  To  continue  to  occupy  long  lines  of  railroads 
simply  exposes  our  small  detachments  to  be  picked  up  in  detail, 
and  forces  me  to  make  countermarches  to  protect  lines  of  com 
munication.  I  know  I  am  right  in  this,  and  shall  proceed  to  its 
maturity.  As  to  details,  I  propose  to  take  General  Howard  and 
his  army,  General  Schofield  and  his,  and  two  of  your  corps, 
viz.,  Generals  Davis  and  Slocum.  ...  I  will  send  General  Stan 
ley,  with  the  Fourth  Corps,  across  by  Will's  Valley  and  Caper- 
ton's  to  Stevenson  to  report  to  you.  ...  I  want  you  to  re 
tain  command  in  Tennessee,  and  before  starting  I  will  give  you 
delegated  authority  over  Kentucky,  Mississippi,  Alabama,  etc., 
whereby  there  will  be  unity  of  action  behind  me.  I  will  want 
you  to  hold  Chattanooga  and  Decatur  in  force,  and  on  the  occa 
sion  of  my  departure,  of  which  you  shall  have  ample  notice,  to 
watch  Hood  close.  I  think  he  will  follow  me,  at  least  with  his 
cavalry,  in  which  event  I  want  you  to  push  south  from  Decatur 
and  the  head  of  the  Tennessee  for  Columbus,  Miss.,  and  Selma, 
not  absolutely  to  reach  these  points,  but  to  divert  or  pursue 
according  to  the  state  of  facts.  If,  however,  Hood  turns  on 


318  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

you,  you  must  act  defensively  on  the  line  of  the  Tennessee.  .  .  . 
I  do  not  fear  that  the  Southern  army  will  again  make  a  lodg 
ment  on  the  Mississippi.  .  .  .  The  only  hope  of  a  Southern  suc 
cess  is  in  the  remote  regions  difficult  of  access.  We  have  now 
a  good  entering  wedge,  and  should  drive  it  home.  .  .  . 


SHERMAN  TO  GRANT. 

GAYLESVILLE,  ALA.,  October  22,  1864. 

I  feel  perfectly  master  of  the  situation  here.  I  still  hold  At 
lanta  and  the  road,  with  all  bridges  and  vital  points  well  guarded, 
and  I  have  in  hand  an  army  before  which  Hood  has  retreated 
precipitately  down  the  valley  of  the  Coosa.  It  is  hard  to  divine 
his  future  plans ;  but  by  abandoning  Georgia,  and  taking  posi 
tion  with  his  rear  to  Selma,  he  threatens  the  road  from  Chatta 
nooga  to  Atlanta,  and  may  move  to  Tennessee  by  Decatur.  He 
cannot  cross  the  Tennessee  except  at  Muscle  Shoals,  for  all  other 
points  are  patrolled  by  our  gunboats.  I  am  now  perfecting  ar 
rangements  to  put  into  Tennessee  a  force  able  to  hold  the  line 
of  the  Tennessee  whilst  I  break  up  the  railroad  in  front  of  Dai- 
ton,  including  the  city  of  Atlanta,  and  push  into  Georgia,  and 
break  up  all  its  railroads  and  depots,  capture  its  horses  and 
negroes,  make  desolation  everywhere,  destroy  the  factories  at 
Macon,  Milledgeville,  and  Augusta,  and  bring  up  with  60,000 
men  on  the  sea-shore  about  Savannah  or  Charleston.  1  think 
this  far  better  than  defending  a  long  line  of  railroad.  I  will 
leave  General  George  H.  Thomas  to  command  all  my  division 
behind  me,  and  take  with  me  only  the  best  fighting  material. 

But  a  few  days  later  Sherman  had  made  a  radical 
change  in  his  previous  plan.  He  telegraphed  Grant,  from 
Rome,  Georgia,  November  1,  as  follows : 

As  you  foresaw,  and  as  Jeff.  Davis  threatened,  the  enemy  is 
now  in  the  full  tide  of  execution  of  his  grand  plan  to  destroy  my 
communications  and  defeat  this  army.  His  infantry,  about  30,- 
000,  with  Wheeler's  and  Roddey's  cavalry,  from  7000  to  10,000, 
are  now  in  the  neighborhood  of  Tuscumbia  and  Florence,  and, 
the  water  being  low,  is  able  to  cross  at  will.  Forrest  seems  to  be 


CORRESPONDENCE  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  319 

scattered  from.  Eastport  to  Jackson,  Paris,  and  the  lower  Tennes 
see  ;  and  General  Thomas  reports  the  capture  by  him  of  a  gun 
boat  and  five  transports.  General  Thomas  has  near  Athens  and 
Pulaski  Stanley's  corps,  about  15,000  strong,  and  Schofield's 
corps,  10,000,  en  route  by  rail,  and  has  at  least  20,000  to  25,000 
men,  with  new  regiments  and  conscripts  arriving  all  the  time; 
also  Rosecraus  promises  the  two  divisions  of  Smith  and  Mower^ 
belonging  to  me,  but  I  doubt  if  they  can  reach  Tennessee  in  less 
than  ten  days.  If  I  were  to  let  go  Atlanta  and  north  Georgia 
and  make  for  Hood,  he  would,  as  he  did  here,  retreat  to  the 
southwest,  leaving  his  militia,  now  assembling  at  Macon  and 
Griffin,  to  occupy  our  conquests,  and  the  work  of  last  summer 
would  be  lost.  I  have  retained  about  50,000  good  troops,  and 
have  sent  back  full  25,000;  and  having  instructed  General  Thomas 
to  hold  defensively  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur,  all 
strongly  fortified  and  provisioned  for  a  long  siege,  I  will  de 
stroy  all  the  railroads  of  Georgia  and  do  as  much  substantial 
damage  as  is  possible,  reaching  the  sea-coast  near  one  of  the 
points  hitherto  indicated,  trusting  that  General  Thomas,  with 
his  present  troops  and  the  influx  of  new  troops  promised,  will  be 
able  in  a  very  few  days  to  assume  the  offensive.  Hood's  cavalry 
may  do  a  good  deal  of  damage,  and  I  have  sent  Wilson  back 
with  all  dismounted  cavalry,  retaining  only  about  4500.  This  is 
the  best  I  can  do,  and  shall,  therefore,  when  I  can  get  to  Atlanta 
the  necessary  stores,  move  as  soon  as  possible. 

To  that  despatch  General  Grant  replied,  November  2 : 

Your  despatch  of  9  A.  M.  yesterday  is  just  received.  I  de 
spatched  you  the  same  date,  advising  that  Hood's  army,  now  that 
it  had  worked  so  far  north,  be  looked  upon  more  as  the  objec 
tive.  With  the  force,  however,  you  have  left  with  Thomas,  he 
must  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy  him.  I  do  not 
really  see  that  you  can  withdraw  from  where  you  are  to  follow 
Hood  without  giving  up  all  we  have  gained  in  territory.  I  say, 
then,  go  as  you  propose. 

Thus  Grant  gave  his  assent  to  Sherman's  proposition 
that  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur  be  held  defen 
sively,  even  during  a  long  siege  if  necessary,  instead  of 
the  line  of  the  Tennessee,  as  at  first  insisted  on  by  Gen- 


320  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

eral  Grant.  Yet  Grant's  assent  was  given  in  view  of 
Sherman's  trust  that  Thomas  would  be  able  in  a  very  few 
days  to  assume  the  offensive. 

Sherman's  despatch  to  Thomas  of  the  same  date  (No 
vember  1)  instructed  him  as  to  the  policy  then  deter 
mined  on,  in  lieu  of  that  which  had  contemplated  holding 
the  line  of  the  Tennessee  firmly,  as  follows : 


Despatch  of  last  night  received.  The  fact  that  Forrest  is 
down  about  Johnsonville,  while  Hood,  with  his  infantry,  is  still 
about  Florence  and  Tuscumbia,  gives  you  time  for  concentra 
tion.  The  supplies  about  Chattanooga  are  immense,  and  I  will 
soon  be  independent  of  them;  therefore  I  would  not  risk  sup. 
plies  coming  in  transitu  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga.  In  like 
manner,  we  have  large  supplies  in  Nashville,  and  if  they  be  well 
guarded,  and  Hood  can't  get  our  supplies,  he  can't  stay  in  Ten 
nessee  long.  General  Schofield  will  go  to  you  as  rapidly  as  cars 
can  take  him.  I  have  no  doubt,  after  the  emergency  is  past,  and 
the  enemy  has  done  us  considerable  damage,  reinforcements 
will  pour  to  you  more  than  can  be  provided  for  or  taken  care  of. 
In  the  meantime  do  your  best.  I  will  leave  here  to-morrow  for 
Kingston,  and  keep  things  moving  toward  the  south ;  therefore 
hold  fast  all  new  troops  coming  to  you,  excepting  such  as  are 
now  at  Chattanooga,  to  whom  I  will  give  orders. 


Yet  in  his  letter  to  Grant,  five  days  later,  Sherman 
reverts  to  the  original  plan:  "On  the  supposition,  always, 
that  Thomas  can  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee." 

November  7,  Sherman  telegraphed  Grant:  "...  On 
that  day  [November  10]  or  the  following,  if  affairs  should 
remain  as  now  in  Tennessee,  I  propose  to  begin  the 
movement  which  I  have  hitherto  fully  described  .  .  ." 
To  which  despatch  General  Grant  replied :  " .  .  .  I  see 
no  present  reason  for  changing  your  plan.  .  .  ." 

General  Grant  does  not  refer  to  the  later  despatches  in 
his  general  report,  July  22,  1865,  quoted  in  his  "Mem 
oirs,"  but  uses  the  following  language : 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  321 


With  the  troops  thus  left  at  his  disposal,  there  was  little  doubt 
that  General  Thomas  could  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee,  or,  in 
the  event  Hood  should  force  it,  would  be  able  to  concentrate 
and  beat  him  in  battle.  It  was  therefore  readily  consented  to 
that  Sherman  should  start  for  the  sea-coast. 

General  Sherman  also  omits  to  make  any  reference  in 
his  "Memoirs"  to  the  despatches  respecting  a  possible 
long  siege  of  Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur;  but 
he  says  in  a  despatch  of  November  2  to  Grant,  quoted 
in  his  "Memoirs": 

If  I  turn  back,  the  whole  effect  of  my  campaign  will  be  lost. 
By  my  movements  I  have  thrown  Beauregard  [Hood]  well  to  the 
west,  and  Thomas  will  have  ample  time  and  sufficient  troops  to 
hold  him  until  the  reinforcements  from  Missouri  reach  him. 
We  have  now  ample  supplies  at  Chattanooga  and  Atlanta,  and 
can  stand  a  month's  interruption  to  our  communications.  I  do 
not  believe  the  Confederate  army  can  reach  our  railroad  lines 
except  by  cavalry  raids,  and  Wilson  will  have  cavalry  enough 
to  checkmate  them.  I  am  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  best  re 
sults  will  follow  my  contemplated  movement  through  Georgia. 

The  following  language  is  found  in  a  despatch  dated 
November  11,  midnight,  from  Sherman  to  Thomas, 
which  is  especially  important  as  giving  the  last  expres 
sion  of  his  views  of  the  situation,  and  of  what  Thomas 
would  be  able  to  do  after  Sherman  started  for  the  sea  : 

I  can  hardly  believe  that  Beauregard  would  attempt  to  work 
against  Nashville  from  Corinth  as  a  base  at  this  stage  of  the 
war,  but  all  information  seems  to  point  that  way.  If  he  does, 
you  will  whip  him  out  of  his  boots  ;  but  I  rather  think  you  will 
find  commotion  in  his  camp  in  a  day  or  two.  Last  night  we 
burned  Rome,  and  in  two  or  more  days  will  burn  Atlanta;  and 
he  must  discover  that  I  am  not  retreating,  but,  on  the  contrary, 
fighting  for  the  very  heart  of  Georgia.  .  .  .  These  [some  Con 
federate  movements  about  Eome  and  Atlanta]  also  seem  to  indi 
cate  that  Beauregard  expects  me  to  retreat.  .  .  .  To-morrow  I 
begin  the  movement  laid  down  in  my  Special  Field  Orders,  No. 

115,  and  shall  keep  things  moving  thereafter.  ...  By  using  de- 
21 


322  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

tachments  of  recruits  and  dismounted  cavalry  in  your  fortifica 
tion  s,  you  will  have  Generals  Schofield  and  Stanley  and  General 
A.  J.  Smith,  strengthened  by  eight  or  ten  new  regiments  and 
all  of  Wilson's  cavalry.  You  could  safely  invite  Beauregard 
across  the  Tennessee  River  and  prevent  his  ever  returning.  I 
still  believe,  however,  that  public  clamor  will  force  him  to  turn 
and  follow  me,  in  which  event  you  should  cross  at  Decatur  and 
move  directly  toward  Selma  as  far  as  you  can  transport  sup 
plies.  .  .  .  You  may  act  ...  on  the  certainty  that  I  sally  from 
Atlanta  on  the  16th  instant  with  about  60,000  well  provisioned, 
but  expecting  to  live  chiefly  on  the  country. 

'  The  reason  for  this  sudden  and  radical  change  of  pro 
gram  is  made  perfectly  clear  by  Sherman's  despatch  of 
November  1  and  others :  "  The  enemy  is  now  in  the  full 
tide  of  execution  of  his  grand  plan  to  destroy  my  com 
munications  and  defeat  this  army."  Sherman's  defiant 
spirit,  thus  aroused,  brooked  no  delay.  He  would  not 
wait  for  anything  but  his  own  necessary  preparations. 
Nashville,  Chattanooga,  and  Decatur  could  stand  a  long 
siege,  and  these  alone  he  regarded  as  of  strategical  im 
portance.  The  enemy  would  doubtless  do  "  considerable 
damage,"  but  afterward  "reinforcements  will  pour  to 
you  "  (Thomas).  He  convinced  himself  that  Thomas  had 
troops  enough;  but,  "to  make  things  sure," he  might  "call 
on  the  governors  of  Indiana  and  Kentucky  for  some 
militia"!  In  the  meantime,  he  (Sherman)  would  "de 
stroy  all  the  railroads  in  Georgia  and  do  as  much  sub 
stantial  damage  as  is  possible."  Thus  recklessly  chal 
lenged  by  the  Confederate  chief,  Sherman  must  not  only 
accept  that  challenge,  but  do  it  at  once.  Perhaps  if 
Jefferson  Davis  had  known  William  T.  Sherman  as 
well  as  some  of  us  did,  he  would  not  have  uttered  that 
challenge. 

From  Grant's  "Memoirs"1  it   appears   that  General 
Grant  not  only  confirms  Sherman's  claim  in  respect  to  his 

l  Vol.  II,  pp.  374-6. 


EAWLINS'S  REPORTED  OPPOSITION  TO  THE  MARCH      393 

independent  authorship  of  the  plan,  but  says  he  (General 
Grant)  was  in  favor  of  that  plan  from  the  time  it  was 
first  submitted  to  him,  and  credits  his  chief  of  staff, 
General  Rawlins,  with  having  been  "very  bitterly  op 
posed  to  it,"  and  with  having  appealed  to  the  authorities 
at  Washington  to  stop  it. 

This  recollection  of  General  Grant,  after  the  lapse  of  so 
long  a  time,  and  when  he  was  suffering  almost  beyond 
endurance  from  a  fatal  disease,  may  possibly,  it  seems 
to  me,  not  express  the  views  he  entertained  in  October, 
1864,  quite  so  fully  or  accurately  as  his  despatch  of  Oc 
tober  11,  1864,  11  A.  M.,  to  General  Sherman,  heretofore 
quoted. 

That  despatch  was  a  literal  prediction  of  what  Hood 
actually  did.  It  was  dictated  by  clear  military  foresight, 
whether  of  Grant  or  Rawlins.  How  far  world-wide  ap 
proval  of  Sherman's  plans  after  their  brilliant  success 
may  have  obscured  the  past  can  only  be  conjectured. 
As  distinctly  stated  by  Grant  himself  soon  afterward,  he 
clearly  saw  that  somebody  ought  to  be  criticized;  but,  in 
view  of  the  results,  he  decided  to  let  it  pass. 

However  all  this  may  be,  even  my  respect  for  the 
opinions  of  the  greatest  of  Union  soldiers  cannot  alter 
the  conclusion  I  have  reached  after  many  years  of  study 
and  mature  consideration.  I  can  only  say  that  the 
opinion  ascribed  to  General  Rawlins,  as  opposed  to  Gen 
eral  Grant's,  was  in  my  judgment  the  better  of  the  two  • 
and  that  General  Rawlins,  though  he  had  not  the  advan 
tage  of  an  early  military  education,  was  a  man  of  great 
natural  ability,  and  had  learned  much  from  more  than 
three  years7  experience  in  war,  after  which  the  differences 
in  military  judgment  which  had  existed  at  the  beginning 
must  have  very  largely,  if  not  entirely,  disappeared.  Gen 
eral  Rawlins  was  my  immediate  successor  in  the  War 
Department,  and  would,  I  doubt  not,  have  made  a  great 
reputation  there  if  his  life  had  been  prolonged. 


324  FORTY- SIX   YEAE8  IN  THE  ARMY 

I  believe  Grant's  own  sound  military  judgment  dictated 
his  first  answer  to  Sherman,  dissenting  from  the  propo 
sition  to  begin  the  march  to  the  sea  before  Hood's  army 
was  disposed  of,  or  that  result  assured.  His  great  con 
fidence  in  the  genius  of  his  brilliant  subordinate,  and  in 
Sherman's  judgment  that  he  had  given  Thomas  ample 
means  to  take  care  of  Hood,  no  matter  what  that  bold 
and  reckless  adversary  might  do,  dictated  Grant's  final 
assent  to  Sherman's  project.  Their  correspondence  shows 
this  so  clearly  and  fully  that  there  would  seem  to  be  no 
need  of  my  making  any  special  reference  to  it.  I  do  so  only 
because  of  the  statement  in  G-eneral  Grant's  "  Memoirs." 
Very  possibly  General  Grant  may  have  meant,  in  his 
"  Memoirs,"  only  that  he  approved  the  general  project, 
under  the  condition  that  sufficient  force  would  be  left 
"  to  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy  him,"  not  caring  to 
say  anything  about  the  fulfilment  or  nonfulfilment  of 
that  condition. 

From  about  October  1  till  the  time  Sherman  started  on 
his  march  —  six  weeks  —  he  seems  to  have  been  so  intent 
on  the  execution  of  that  project,  and  upon  doing  it  with 
as  large  an  army  as  possible,  that  no  question  of  military 
principle  or  of  fact  could  be  permitted  to  stand  in  his 
way.  He  assumed  and  maintained  throughout  that  the 
only  question  was  whether  he  should  continue  the  ag 
gressive,  or  allow  the  enemy's  movements  to  put  him  on 
the  defensive,  refusing  to  consider  any  other  possible  plan 
of  aggressive  operations,  except  for  a  moment  in  response 
to  advice  from  Grant,  and  then  brushing  it  aside  as  im 
practicable. —  "If  I  could  hope  to  overhaul  Hood,"  etc.  In 
like  manner,  he  appears  to  have  convinced  himself  that 
his  arrangements  for  direct  operations  against  Hood  by 
Thomas  in  Tennessee  were  very  materially  more  com 
plete  than  they  were  in  fact,  and  he  so  represented  the 
matter  to  General  Grant.  It  seems  quite  certain  that 
Grant  was  laboring  under  a  serious  misapprehension  in 


GRANT'S  FINAL  JUDGMENT  ON  IT  325 

respect  to  Thomas's  condition  to  cope  with  Hood,  and 
no  doubt  Grant's  subsequent  impatience  in  respect  to 
Thomas's  action  was  largely  due  to  this  fact.  This  point 
deserves  close  consideration. 

Grant's  first  assent  to  Sherman's  plan  was  made,  Oc 
tober  11,  on  the  condition  of  "holding  the  line  of  the 
Tennessee  firmly."  On  October  22  Sherman  telegraphed : 
"  I  am  now  perfecting  arrangements  to  put  into  Tennessee 
a  force  able  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee." 

Even  as  late  as  November  1,  Grant  again  suggested  to 
Sherman  that  Hood  ought  to  be  his  "objective,"  now 
that  he  "has  gone  so  far  north."  At  an  earlier  hour 
the  same  day,  in  the  despatch  above  quoted,  Sherman 
telegraphed,  "  trusting  that  General  Thomas  .  .  .  will  be 
able  in  a  very  few  days  to  assume  the  offensive."  To  this 
Grant  replied  November  2 :  "With  the  force,  however,  you 
have  left  with  Thomas,  he  must  be  able  to  take  care  of 
Hood  and  destroy  him."  In  that  despatch  of  November  1 
Sherman  had  made  a  statement  of  the  troops  Thomas 
would  have,  including  A.  J.  Smith's  from  Missouri, 
adding,  "  but  I  doubt  if  they  can  reach  Tennessee  in  less 
than  ten  days."  Now  Smith's  troops  did  not  reach  Ten 
nessee  in  less  than  thirty  days  instead  of  ten  days,  and 
after  the  crisis  of  the  campaign  was  passed ;  and  the  effec 
tive  force  in  Tennessee  before  Smith's  arrival  was  13,000 
men  less  than  Sherman  had  stated  it.  So  that  the  whole 
brunt  of  the  fight  with  Hood  fell  upon  the  two  corps 
which  Sherman  had  sent  back,  without  any  help  from  the 
reinforcements  upon  which  Sherman  counted  so  largely. 
It  was,  in  fact,  six  weeks  instead  of  a  "very  few  days" 
before  Thomas  was  able  "to  assume  the  offensive."  It 
was  not  even  attempted  to  "  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennes 
see  "  either  "  firmly  "  or  at  all. 

Having  been  absent  from  the  army  in  the  field  during 
Hood's  raid  in  Sherman's  rear,  I  knew  little  personally 
about  those  estimates  of  the  strength  of  the  opposing 


326  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

forces.  For  the  same  reason,  I  knew  nothing  of  Sherman's 
plans  or  correspondence  with  Grant  which  were  considered 
or  took  place  after  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  though  I  had  been 
perfectly  familiar  with  the  plans  discussed  previous  to 
that  time  having  in  view  a  change  of  base  to  some  point 
on  the  Atlantic  or  on  the  gulf,  with  a  view  to  further 
operations  in  Georgia  or  the  Gulf  States,  wherever  there 
might  be  a  hostile  army  to  operate  against.  Yet  when 
I  met  Sherman  at  Gaylesburg  I  was  surprised  to  learn 
that  he  was  going  off  to  the  sea  with  five  sixths  of  his 
army,  leaving  Thomas,  with  only  one  of  his  six  corps, 
and  no  other  veteran  troops  then  ready  for  field  service, 
to  take  care  of  Hood  until  he  could  get  A.  J.  Smith  from 
Missouri,  incorporate  new  regiments  into  the  army  and 
make  them  fit  to  meet  the  veteran  enemy,  remount  his 
cavalry,  and  concentrate  his  garrisons  and  railroad  guards 
in  Tennessee !  Of  course  I  knew  far  less  than  Sherman 
did  about  all  that,  for  I  had  no  responsibility  and  little 
knowledge  about  Thomas's  department.  But  I  knew 
enough  to  feel  astonished  when  Sherman  told  me  what 
he  proposed  to  do.  I  plainly  told  Sherman  so,  and  urged 
him  to  send  me  back  with  my  corps  to  join  Stanley  and 
help  Thomas.1 

Here  arise  several  interesting  questions  which  would 
be  worthy  of  consideration,  although  a  satisfactory  solu 
tion  of  them  might  not  be  possible.  Under  Sherman's 
assurance  as  to  what  he  had  done  for  Thomas  in  Ten 
nessee,  Grant  appears  to  have  been  fully  satisfied  that 
Thomas  would  be  able  to  take  care  of  Hood  and  destroy 
him,  thus  eliminating  that  Confederate  army  from  the 
future  problem  in  the  Atlantic  States.  But  could  Sher 
man,  with  his  more  exact  knowledge  of  what  he  actually 
had  done,  have  felt  the  same  confidence?  In  view  of 
that  knowledge  and  of  the  results  of  his  own  previous 
operations  against  Hood,  could  he  have  expected  any 

i  See  my  letter  to  General  Sherman,  December  28,  1864,  p.  254. 


GRANT'S  FINAL  JUDGMENT  ON  IT  327 

such  result  I  Is  it  not  more  probable  that  Sherman 
simply  expected  to  take  advantage  of  Hood's  temporary 
absence  from  Georgia  to  make  his  own  change  of  base 
to  Savannah  1  Did  Sherman  not,  in  fact,  really  expect 
Hood  to  follow  him,  even  though  at  so  great  a  distance, 
and  be  prepared  to  resist  his  future  operations  from 
Savannah  I  Sherman  repeatedly  said,  in  his  despatches 
before  he  started,  that  he  believed  Hood  would  follow 
him,  being  compelled  to  do  so  by  public  clamor.  What 
was  Sherman's  plan  when  he  started  for  Savannah?  Was 
it  simply  to  effect  a  change  of  base,  or  was  it  for  well- 
defined  ulterior  purposes  ?  When  did  Sherman  mature 
his  plan  to  march  to  Virginia,  and  when  did  that  plan 
first  dawn  upon  Sherman's  mind  1  In  this  connection, 
what  significance  is  to  be  attached  to  the  dates  of  events 
in  Tennessee,  especially  the  battles  of  Franklin  and 
Nashville  1 

By  the  first  mails  which  reached  Sherman  after  he  ar 
rived  on  the  coast,  December  14  and  15,  containing  let 
ters  from  Grant  dated  December  3  and  6,  full  information 
was  received  of  the  battle  of  Franklin,  which  had  oc 
curred  November  30.  Thomas's  official  report  of  the  bat 
tle  of  Nashville  was  received  by  Sherman  on  December 
24,  but  rumors  of  that  victory  had  reached  him  earlier. 
Sherman's  first  letter  to  Grant,  relative  to  future  opera 
tions,  written  in  reply  to  those  from  Grant  of  December 
3  and  6,  was  dated  December  16.  In  that  letter  was 
mentioned  Sherman's  plan  in  the  following  words :  "  In 
deed,  with  my  present  command  I  had  expected,  upon 
reducing  Savannah,  instantly  to  march  to  Columbia, 
South  Carolina,  thence  to  Raleigh,  and  thence  to  report 
to  you."  Sherman's  second  letter  to  Grant,  on  the  same 
subject,  written  in  reply  to  Grant's  letter  of  the  18th, 
was  dated  December  24,  the  day  on  which  he  received 
Thomas's  report  of  the  battle  of  Nashville.  In  this  letter 
Sherman  said :  "  I  am  also  gratified  that  you  have  modi- 


328  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

fied  your  former  orders.  ...  I  feel  no  doubt  whatever 
as  to  our  future  plans.  I  have  thought  them  over  so  long 
and  well  that  they  appear  as  clear  as  daylight." 

When  Sherman  first  mentioned  his  future  plan  he 
knew  that  the  success  of  his  past  plan  in  Tennessee  had 
been  assured.  Thomas  had  succeeded  in  concentrating 
his  forces  at  Nashville,  and  Hood  had  suffered  a  serious 
defeat  in  attempting  to  prevent  it.  At  the  time  of  Sher 
man's  second  letter,  mentioning  his  very  mature  con 
sideration  of  his  future  plans  and  perfect  confidence  in 
respect  to  them,  he  knew  that  Hood's  army  had  been 
broken  up,  and  had  become  a  small  factor  in  the  future 
problem.  How  long,  and  to  what  extent,  had  Sherman 
anticipated  these  results  in  Tennessee,  and  matured  his 
plans  of  future  operations,  which  were  dependent  upon 
those  results  ?  I  shall  consider  these  several  questions, 
which  involve  so  intimately  the  character  of  my  old 
commander. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SHERMAN'S  PUKPOSE  IN  MAKCHING  TO  THE  SEA — HIS  EX 
PECTATIONS  THAT  THE  CHANGE  OF  BASE  WOULD  BE 
"  STATESMANSHIP,"  IF  NOT  "WAR" — THE  THOUSAND- 
MILE  MARCH  OF  HOOD'S  MEN  TO  SURRENDER  TO  SHER 
MAN —  THE  CREDIT  GIVEN  BY  GRANT  TO  SHERMAN  — 
"MASTER  OF  THE  SITUATION" — THE  FAME  OF  SHERMAN'S 
GRAND  MARCHES  —  HIS  GREAT  ABILITY  AS  A  STRATEGIST. 

THE  actual  result  in  Tennessee  was  more  decisive  than 
Sherman  had  any  good  reason  to  expect.  But  he  had 
good  reason  to  expect,  and  evidently  did,  that  Thomas 
would  be  able,  after  he  had  concentrated  his  troops,  and 
after  Hood  had  done  considerable  damage,  to  drive  the 
latter  out  of  Tennessee  and  pursue  him  with  such  force 
and  energy  as  fully  to  occupy  his  attention  and  prevent 
him  from  interfering  in  any  manner  with  Sherman's  own 
operations.  Hence  Sherman  as  well  as  Grant  had  reason 
to  assume  that  Hood's  army  would  be  eliminated  from 
the  military  problem  in  the  Atlantic  States.  Again,  the 
general  military  situation  as  known  to  General  Sherman, 
or  probably  to  anybody  else,  in  October  and  November, 
1864,  did  not  indicate  that  Grant,  with  the  force  he  then 
had  in  Virginia,  would  be  able  to  capture  or  destroy  Lee's 
army.  He  might  undoubtedly  capture  Petersburg  and 
Richmond,  but  Lee  would  probably  be  able  to  withdraw 
his  army  toward  the  south,  nearer  to  his  sources  of  sup 
ply,  and  by  skilful  manoeuvers  prolong  the  contest  until 
the  National  Government  might  abandon  it.  Grant's 

329 


330  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

letters  at  that  time  confirm  this  view  of  the  military 
situation. 

Some  writers  have  attempted  to  explain  and  justify 
Sherman's  action  in  taking  with  him  so  large  an  army, 
while  leaving  with  Thomas  one  so  much  smaller,  on  the 
ground  that  he  might  meet  in  his  march  to  the  sea  such 
opposition  as  possibly  to  require  so  large  a  force  to  over 
come  it.  But  to  any  one  familiar  with  the  facts,  and  to 
no  one  more  than  to  Sherman,  his  army  of  60,000  men 
was  evidently  out  of  all  proportion  to  any  possible  resist 
ance  it  could  meet  in  Georgia.  But  when  he  should  start 
northward  from  Savannah  the  case  would  become  vastly 
different.  At  any  point  in  the  Carolinas  he  might  pos 
sibly  meet  the  whole  of  Lee's  army.  That  is  to  say, 
Sherman's  ulterior  plan  could  not  be  prudently  under 
taken  at  all  without  an  army  as  large  as  that  with  which 
he  actually  marched  to  the  sea,  namely,  60,000  men.  In 
deed,  as  the  records  show,  Sherman  considered  a  long 
time  before  he  decided  that  he  could  spare  the  Twenty- 
third  Corps  to  go  back  and  help  Thomas.  If  any  question 
can  possibly  exist  as  to  what  was  the  essential  part  of 
Sherman's  plan  in  marching  to  Savannah,  what  other 
possible  military  reason  can  be  given  for  that  march  ex 
cept  to  make  the  subsequent  march  to  Virginia  with  so 
large  an  army!  "Why  change  his  base  to  Savannah? 
What  was  he  to  operate  against  after  he  got  there  1 

Nothing  could  have  been  clearer  to  any  military  mind  in 
the  fall  of  1864,  than  that  if  either  Lee's  or  Hood's  army 
could  be  captured  or  destroyed,  the  surrender  of  the  other 
must  necessarily  follow  very  quickly,  and  the  rebellion 
be  ended.  No  man  could  have  been  more  earnest  than 
Sherman  in  his  laudable  desire  to  make  the  capture  of 
his  own  adversary  the  beginning  of  the  end.  Sher 
man's  well-known  character  leaves  this  beyond  question. 
It  is  not  possible  that  he  could  have  preferred  a  manifes 
tation  of  the  power  of  the  nation  by  destroying  South- 


SHERMAN'S  PURPOSE  IN  MARCHING  TO  THE  SEA      331 

ern  property  rather  than  by  destroying  a  Southern 
army. 

But  there  was  one  objection  —  absolutely  overruling, 
apparently,  in  Sherman's  mind  —  to  any  further  attempt 
by  Sherman  himself,  with  the  main  body  of  his  army 
then  in  Georgia,  to  prosecute  the  primary  military  ob 
ject  of  his  campaign  —  the  destruction  or  capture  of 
Hood's  army.  To  have  done  so  would  have  conceded 
a  temporary  triumph  to  the  chief  of  the  Confederate 
armies,  who  had  loudly  proclaimed  his  purpose  to  drive 
Sherman  .out  of  Georgia,  and  protect  that  State  from  any 
further  invasion.  Such  a  concession,  however  temporary, 
was  manifestly  intolerable  to  Sherman's  mind.1  Besides, 
Sherman  had  formed  and  announced,  with  Grant's  cor 
dial  concurrence,  a  well-matured  plan  of  future  operations. 
As  "  master  of  the  situation,"  he  could  afford  to  go  on 
and  substantially  execute  that  plan,  or  at  least  the  pri 
mary  part  of  it, —  the  change  of  base, —  treating  almost 
with  contempt  the  enemy's  bold  design  to  thwart  him. 
Although  this  must,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  compel 
him  personally  to  forego  and  leave  to  a  subordinate  the 
primary  operations  of  a  military  campaign, — those  directly 
against- the  opposing  army, — the  joint  action  of  Sherman 
and  Grant,  each  with  a  powerful  army,  directly  against 
Lee's  army  in  Virginia,  was  the  surest  and  probably  the 
shortest  possible  way  to  end  the  war.  Hence  Sherman's 
broad  view  of  the  entire  national  military  situation,  in 
cluding  the  moral  aspect  of  it,  which  was  then  of  very 
great  importance,  gave  rise  to  that  grand  conception  of 
far-reaching  strategy  which  must  ever  stamp  its  author 
as  a  master  of  that  great  art. 

Sherman  having  thus  come  to  the  conclusion  that  he 
personally  must  abandon  the  attempt  to  "  catch  Hood," 
as  he  called  it,  his  "  busy  brain  "  did  not  fail  to  perceive 
every  possible  alternative  plan  of  operations.  The  aban- 

l  Sherman's  ''Memoirs,"  Vol.  II,  p.  141. 


332  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

donment  of  Georgia  by  Hood  had  completely  opened 
up  two  other  alternatives,  one  of  which  was  before  not 
possible,  and  the  other  only  partly  so.  The  one  was  a 
movement  upon  Richmond  or  its  communications  to 
join  with  Grant  in  the  capture  of  Lee's  army,  and  the 
other  was  to  destroy  the  military  resources  of  the  South 
ern  Atlantic  States.  The  first  was  too  grand,  and  per 
haps  might  seem  too  visionary,  to  be  talked  about  at  first, 
nor  was  any  mention  of  it  at  that  time  necessary.  Be 
sides,  events  might  possibly  render  the  march  to  Rich 
mond  unnecessary  or  impracticable ;  or,  possibly,  Sher 
man  might  be  compelled  for  some  reason  to  make  his 
new  base  at  Pensacola  or  Mobile,  though  he  was  deter 
mined  to  make  it  at  Savannah,  if  possible ;  and  hence 
it  was  necessary  to  have;  in  reserve  as  it  were,  a  suffi 
cient  logical  reason  for  the  preliminary  operation,  if  that 
finally  had  to  stand  alone. 

Again,  that  part  of  the  original  plan  which  contem 
plated  the  capture  of  Savannah  in  advance  could  not  be 
carried  out.  Grant  could  not  spare  the  troops  from  the 
east  for  that  purpose.  If  that  had  been  done,  Sherman 
could  have  marched  to  Augusta,  there  replenished  his 
supplies  by  the  river  from  Savannah,  and  marched 
thence  northward  by  the  upland  route  instead  of  through 
the  swamps  of  South  Carolina.  But,  as  it  was,  Sherman 
was,  as  he  thought,  compelled  to  go  to  Savannah  first, 
capture  that  place  himself,  and  make  that  the  base  for 
his  northward  march.  Hence  there  was  no  need  to  say 
anything  to  anybody  about  what  further  was  to  be  done 
until  after  Savannah  was  in  Sherman's  possession,  and 
the  time  had  arrived  for  him  to  consult  Grant  about  the 
future.  Yet  in  Sherman's  remarkable  letter  to  Grant, 
dated  November  6,  1864,1  written  after  it  was  too  late  to 
have  any  influence  upon  Grant's  approval  of  Sherman's 
march,  he  disclosed  to  Grant  the  ulterior  object  he  had  in 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXIX,  part  iii,  p.  658. 


SHERMAN'S  PURPOSE  IN  MARCHING   TO  THE  SEA      333 

view.  In  discussing  the  reasons  for  selecting  the  route 
to  Savannah  rather  than  either  of  the  others,  he  said: 
"Incidentally  I  might  destroy  the  enemy's  depots  at 
Macon  and  Augusta,  and  reach  the  sea-shore  at  Charles 
ton  or  Savannah,  from  either  of  which  points  I  could  re 
inforce  our  armies  in  Virginia." 

Of  course  Grant,  no  less  than  Sherman,  must  have 
perceived  instantly  the  full  significance  of  Sherman's 
change  of  base  to  Savannah  the  moment  that  move  was 
suggested.  The  question  in  what  manner  that  concerted 
action  between  Grant  and  Sherman  against  Lee  should 
be  arranged  could  well  be  considered  later,  after  that 
march  had  been  made  and  a  new  base  established  at  Sa 
vannah.  The  correspondence  between  Grant  and  Sher 
man  previous  to  Hood's  march  to  the  west,  including 
the  letters  of  September  12  and  20,  simply  shows  that 
neither  had  at  that  time  conceived  the  possibility  of 
any  movement  of  Sherman  toward  Virginia.  All  their 
thoughts  had  reference  to  continuing  operations  in  the 
south,  Sherman's  most  important  object  being  to  get  con 
trol  of  the  Savannah  River ;  or,  as  expressed,  in  his  last 
words :  "  If  you  can  whip  Lee,  and  I  can  march  to  the 
Atlantic,  I  think  Uncle  Abe  will  give  us  a  twenty  days' 
leave  of  absence  to  see  the  young  folks."  Their  joint  ac 
tion  against  Lee  does  not  appear  to  have  been  suggested 
by  either  until  Sherman's  letter  of  November  6,  which 
was  probably  received  by  Grant  after  Sherman  started. 

The  first  thought  suggested  to  Sherman  by  Hood's 
movement  "leaving  open  the  road  to  Macon,  as  also  to 
Augusta,"  as  embodied  in  his  despatch  to  Halleck  on 
September  25,  related  simply  to  the  opportunity  thus 
offered  to  carry  into  effect  without  difficulty  the  original 
plan  of  a  change  of  base  to  Savannah.  But  when  Hood's 
movement  had  gone  so  far,  and  his  designs  were  so  fully 
disclosed,  as  practically  to  eliminate  his  army  from  the 
problem  in  the  Atlantic  States,  Sherman  determined  to 


334  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

march  as  soon  as  possible,  with  the  ulterior  purpose  to 
"reinforce  our  armies  in  Virginia."  He  telegraphed  his 
determination  to  Grant  on  November  1,  and  on  November 
6  wrote  him  very  fully,  giving  his  reasons,  including  that 
to  reinforce  Grant.  Hence  Sherman  was  well  able  to  say 
at  Savannah  on  December  24 :  "I  feel  no  doubt  whatever 
as  to  our  future  plans.  I  have  thought  them  over  so  long 
and  well  that  they  appear  as  clear  as  daylight." 

It  should  be  observed  that  Sherman's  letter  of  Novem 
ber  6  to  Grant  was  strictly  confidential.  "  I  have  still 
some  thoughts  .  .  .  that  should  be  confided  to  you  [that 
is,  to  Grant  and  to  nobody  else]  as  a  key  to  future 
developments."  Neither  Grant  nor  Sherman  appears  to 
have  made  any  use  of  that  "  key  "  for  the  public  benefit. 
But  it  now  unlocks  the  store-house  of  Sherman's  mind, 
and  shows  to  the  world  more  of  the  real  character  of  the 
great  strategist  than  any  other  public  document  he  ever 
wrote. 

Then  Grant  was  ready  with  his  plan,  first  to  seize  and 
hold  the  Southern  railroads  by  which  supplies  could 
reach  Lee,  and  second,  for  Sherman  and  the  most  of  his 
army  to  come  to  Virginia  by  sea,  to  which  Sherman  re 
sponded  with  all  the  loyalty  of  his  most  loyal  nature, 
only  mentioning  incidentally  his  own  plan.  Thereupon, 
when  Grant  gave  him  an  invitation  to  speak  freely,  he 
replied  as  above  quoted,  and  explained  in  detail  his  plans 
for  the  northward  march,  to  "  be  on  the  Roanoke,  either 
at  Raleigh  or  Weldon,  by  the  time  the  spring  fairly  opens ; 
and  if  you  feel  confident  that  you  can  whip  Lee  outside 
of  his  intrenchments,  I  feel  equally  confident  that  I  can 
handle  him  in  the  open  country." 

But  Sherman's  "  busy  brain  "  had  provided  in  advance 
even  for  the  worst  possible  contingency  —  that  after 
all  his  long  march,  however  long  it  might  prove  to  be, 
that  march  might  have  to  "stand  alone"  —  he  might  not 
actually  take  part  in  the  capture  of  either  of  the  Confed- 


SHERMAN'S  PURPOSE  IN  MARCHING  TO  THE  SEA      335 

erate  armies.  Hence,  before  starting  on  his  march,  in  his 
letter  of  November  6  to  Grant  he  explained  that  his 
march  would  be  "  statesmanship  "  anyway,  even  if  it  was 
not  "  war."  Sherman  was  not  a  man  to  be  "  left  out,"  no 
matter  what  might  happen. 

But  Sherman's  good  fortune  was  almost  equal  to  his 
strategy  and  his  skill  in  marching  an  army.  Although,  as 
fate  would  have  it,  he  did  not  have  a  chance  to  assist  in 
the  capture  of  Lee,  Thomas  had  failed  to  obey  his  in 
structions  to  pursue  Hood  into  the  Gulf  States,  whereby 
the  fragments  of  that  "broken  and  dispirited"  army,  as 
Thomas  well  called  it,  were  gathered  together,  under  their 
old,  able  commander,  General  Johnston,  and  appeared 
in  Sherman's  front  to  oppose  his  northward  march;  and 
finally  to  capitulate  to  him  at  "  Bennett's  House  "  in  North 
Carolina.  The  remnant  of  that  army  which  Sherman 
had  disdained  to  pursue  into  Alabama  or  Mississippi  had 
traveled  a  thousand  miles  to  surrender  to  him !  No  story 
of  fiction  could  be  more  romantic  than  that  fact  of  real 
war  history. 

It  was  not  necessary  for  Sherman  to  produce  his  letter 
of  November  6, 1864;  but  I  have  quoted  from  it  here  very 
largely  to  show  that  there  was  no  possible  contingency 
which  his  far-reaching  mind  had  not  foreseen  and  pro 
vided  for. 

Sherman's  plan  was  so  firmly  fixed  in  his  own  mind, 
almost  from  the  very  start,  that  he  was  determined  to 
adhere  to  it  in  spite  of  all  possible  opposition,  even  in 
cluding  the  adverse  opinions  and  advice  of  General  Grant. 
Hence,  as  was  his  habit  in  such  cases,  he  invented  every 
imaginable  reason,  without  regard  to  their  logical  or  il 
logical  character,  to  convince  others  of  the  soundness  of 
his  conclusion.  But  the  logic  of  the  real  reasons  which 
convinced  his  own  mind  is,  when  the  chaff  is  all  win 
nowed  away,  as  clear  and  bright  as  the  golden  grain. 

In  view  of  the  great  strategical  project  which  Sherman 


336  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

had  mapped  out  for  himself  and  which  required  a  formid 
able  army,  and  of  his  responsibility  for  what  might  be  the 
result  of  operations  against  Hood  in  Tennessee,  it  was  a 
difficult  and  delicate  question  to  decide  what  force  he 
should  take  with  him,  and  what  send  back.  My  own  be 
lief  always  has  been,  and  is  now,  that  in  view  of  his  exact 
knowledge  of  Thomas's  character  and  habits  of  thought 
and  action,  Sherman  ought  to  have  sent  back  another 
corps  of  veteran  troops,  or  else  have  waited  to  see  that 
Thomas  was  actually  prepared  to  cope  with  Hood,  pref 
erably  the  latter,  before  going  so  far  away  that  he  could 
not  render  him  any  assistance.  Yet,  as  has  heretofore 
been  shown,  if  Thomas  had  carried  out  Sherman's  in 
structions  by  promptly  concentrating  his  troops,  there 
would  have  been  no  risk  of  serious  results  in  Tennessee. 

In  connection  with  Sherman's  operations  it  is  essential 
to  bear  in  mind  the  distinction  between  two  radically 
different  kinds  of  strategy,  one  of  which  has  for  its  object 
the  conquest  of  territory  or  the  capture  of  places  by  defeat 
ing  in  battle  or  out-manceuvering  the  defending  armies ; 
while  the  other  has  for  its  object  the  destruction  or  cap 
ture  of  those  armies,  resulting,  of  course,  in  the  conquest 
of  all  of  the  enemy's  territory.  The  first  kind  may  be  all- 
sufficient,  and  hence  best,  in  a  foreign  war  having  for  its 
object  anything  less  than  total  conquest;  but  in  the 
suppression  of  a  rebellion,  as  in  a  foreign  conquest,  the 
occupation  of  places  or  territory  ought  to  be  entirely  ig 
nored  except  so  far  as  this  contributes  to  the  successful 
operation  of  armies  against  opposing  forces.  This  funda 
mental  principle  appears  to  have  been  duly  appreciated 
by  the  leading  Union  commanders  near  the  close  of  the 
Civil  War,  though  not  so  fully  in  its  earlier  stages.  Mili 
tary  critics  are  apt  to  fall  into  error  by  not  understand 
ing  the  principle  itself,  or  by  overlooking  the  change  of 
policy  above  referred  to. 

It  is  necessary  not  to  confound  the  "march  to  the 


SHERMAN'S  PURPOSE  IN  MARCHING  TO  THE  SEA      337 

sea"  as  actually  conceived  and  executed  by  Sherman  as 
a  preliminary  to  the  march  northward  for  the  capture  of 
Lee's  army,  with  the  previous  far-reaching  strategic  plans 
of  Grant,  of  which  Sherman  and  other  chief  commanders 
were  informed  in  the  spring  of  1864. 

Grant's  plans  had  in  view,  as  their  great  object,  again 
to  cut  in  two  the  Confederate  territory,  as  had  been 
done  by  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River  to  the  gulf. 
This  next  line  of  section  might  be  Chattanooga,  Atlanta, 
and  Savannah,  or  Chattanooga,  Atlanta,  Montgomery, 
and  Mobile.  But  with  the  disappearance  of  Hood's  army 
from  that  theater  of  operations,  all  reason  for  that  plan 
of  "territorial"  strategy  had  disappeared,  and  the  occa 
sion  was  then  presented,  for  the  first  time,  for  the  wholly 
different  strategical  plan  of  Sherman,  of  which  Lee's  army 
was  the  sole  military  objective.  Grant  was  perfectly  just 
to  himself  as  well  as  to  Sherman  in  giving  the  latter  full 
credit  for  this  last  plan ;  and  he  modestly  refrained  from 
any  more  than  a  brief  mention  of  his  own  plans,  which  un 
foreseen  events  had  made  it  unnecessary  fully  to  execute. 
But  history  will  do  justice  to  Grant's  great  strategical  de 
signs  as  well  as  to  his  great  achievements.  I  trust  it 
may  be  my  good  fortune  to  contribute  something  here 
after  toward  the  payment  of  this  debt  of  gratitude 
which  all  Americans  owe  to  the  greatest  soldier  of  the 
Union. 

The  fact  that  Savannah  was  one  of  the  points  in  both 
Grant's  plans  and  Sherman's  was  merely  an  incident,  and 
a  very  unimportant  one.  Indeed,  after  Hood  got  out  of 
his  way,  Sherman  might  as  well,  and  I  think  better,  have 
marched  direct  to  Augusta,  and  thence  northward,  wholly 
ignoring  Savannah  as  well  as  Charleston,  except  that  he 
would  have  arrived  in  Virginia  rather  early  in  the  sea 
son.  Savannah  was  a  good  place  to  go  to  in  order  to 
spend  the  winter,  besides  destroying  Georgia  en  route. 

Of  course  it  is  much  easier  to  see  what  might  have  been 


338  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

done  than  to  see  in  advance  what  can  or  ought  to  be 
done.  But  it  can  hardly  be  believed  that  Sherman  did 
not  think  of  everything  that  was  possible,  as  well  as  many 
things  that  were  not.  At  least,  so  simple  a  proposition 
as  the  following  could  not  have  escaped  his  mind. 

Sherman  was,  as  he  so  confidently  said,  absolute  "  mas 
ter  of  the  situation "  before  he  started  for  Savannah. 
Hood  and  Forrest  had  utterly  failed  so  to  damage  his 
communications  that  they  could  not  be  put  in  order  again 
in  a  few  days.  He  was  able,  if  he  chose,  to  remain  in 
perfect  security  at  Atlanta  all  winter,  with  two  or  three 
corps,  while  he  sent  back  to  Thomas  ample  force  to  dis 
pose  of  Hood.  Then,  if  the  result  of  the  operations  of 
a  larger  force  in  Tennessee  had  been  as  decisive  as  they 
actually  were  with  the  smaller  one  Thomas  had,  Sherman 
could  have  recalled  to  Atlanta  all  of  the  troops  he  had 
sent  to  Tennessee,  and  thus  marched  toward  Virginia 
with  eighty-five  or  ninety  or  even  one  hundred  thousand 
men,  instead  of  sixty  thousand.  All  this  could  have 
surely  been  accomplished  by  the  middle  of  January,  or 
before  the  time  when  Sherman  actually  began  his  march 
from  Savannah.  From  Atlanta  to  Columbia,  South  Caro 
lina,  crossing  the  Savannah  Eiver  at  or  above  Augusta, 
is  an  easier  march  than  that  from  Savannah  to  Columbia. 
Or  if  Sherman  had  not  cared  about  paying  a  visit  to  Co 
lumbia  en  route,  he  could  have  taken  the  much  shorter 
"  Piedmont  route "  to  Charlotte,  North  Carolina,  and 
thence  northward  by  whichever  route  he  pleased.  In 
stead  of  retaining  the  dominant  attitude  of  "master," 
Sherman  lost  it  the  moment  he  started  eastward  with  his 
main  army,  leaving  an  inferior  force  to  cope  with  his 
enemy ;  and  the  march  through  Georgia  and  the  capture 
of  Savannah  did  not  by  any  means  restore  that  mastery 
to  Sherman.  It  was  not  restored  until  Hood  was  actually 
defeated  in  Tennessee. 

I  have  referred  to  the  possibilities  of  a  direct  march 


THE  FAME  OF  SHERMAN'S  GRAND  MARCHES     339 

from  Atlanta  via  Columbia  or  Charlotte,  with  a  much 
larger  army,  at  exactly  the  same  time,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  that  even  Sherman's  grand  strategic  plan  to  as 
sist  in  the  capture  of  Lee's  army  did  not  necessitate  or 
justify  his  action  in  marching  to  Savannah  and  quitting 
his  own  theater  of  operations  before  his  adversary  there 
had  been  disposed  of.  The  plan  above  suggested  would 
have  negatived  even  more  positively  the  boast  and  prom 
ise  of  the  Confederate  chief  that  Sherman  should  be 
driven  out  of  Georgia.  The  fact  that  Sherman  personally, 
with  an  army  about  as  large  as,  or  larger  than,  Hood's, 
could  and  did  remain  quietly  at  Atlanta  while  one  of  his 
subordinates  disposed  of  Hood  and  his  army,  would  have 
been  the  most  emphatic  possible  defeat  of  the  Confederate 
plan  to  force  him  back  by  operations  in  his  rear.  Only 
one  part  of  Sherman's  earnest  desires  would  have  been 
unrealized  —  namely,  to  destroy  Georgia.  But  even  that 
could  have  been,  at  least  in  a  great  measure,  compensated 
for  by  the  more  complete  destruction  of  South  Carolina, 
the  cradle  of  secession  and  rebellion. 

The  more  carefully  Sherman's  great  operations  are  ex 
amined,  the  more  clearly  it  will  appear  that  while  his 
plans  were  magnificent,  their  execution  was  not  perfect. 
And  this  is  the  legitimate  aim  of  just  military  criticism, 
not  to  build  up  or  pull  down  the  reputations  of  com 
manders,  but  to  assist  military  students  in  their  efforts 
to  perfect  themselves  in  the  art  and  science  of  war. 

Sherman's  great  marches,  especially  through  the  en 
emy's  country  and  over  such  obstacles  as  those  found  from 
Savannah  to  Goldsboro',  showed  him  to  be  a  master  of  the 
auxiliary  art  of  logistics  no  less  than  of  the  great  science 
of  strategy.  Even  to  those  who  have  had  no  means  of 
duly  appreciating  the  higher  merits  of  Sherman's  general 
plans,  his  marches  have  seemed  the  wonder  of  the  world. 
Yet,  strangely  enough,  the  march  through  Georgia,  which 
was  in  fact  the  simplest  thing  possible,  has  been  regarded 


340  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

as  the  great  exploit,  while  the  vastly  in  ore  difficult  and 
important  march  through  the  Carolinas  appears  to  have 
been  taken  as  a  matter  of  course,  perhaps  because  of  the 
conviction,  which  had  by  that  time  become  general,  that 
Sherman  could  do  anything  he  might  undertake. 

In  respect  to  Sherman's  skill  in  grand  tactics,  I  have 
only  a  few  words  to  say  here.  The  part  assigned  him  in 
Grant's  general  plan  of  operations  for  all  the  armies,  in 
1864,  in  his  "  private  and  confidential "  letter  of  April  4, 
was  as  follows :  "  You  I  propose  to  move  against  John 
ston's  army  to  break  it  up,  and  to  get  into  the  interior  of 
the  enemy's  country  as  far  as  you  can,  inflicting  all  the 
damage  you  can  against  their  war  resources."  It  is  a 
simple,  plain  matter  of  history  that  Sherman  did  not  ac 
complish  the  first  and  more  important  part  of  the  task 
assigned  him — uto  break  it  up" — in  the  four  months  of  al 
most  constant  fighting  with  Johnston's  army.  In  the  com 
ments  I  have  made  upon  the  Atlanta  campaign,  I  believe 
I  have  shown  clearly  why  Sherman  did  not  accomplish 
that  result  by  the  tactical  operations  to  which  he  limited 
himself.  The  manner  in  which  that  army,  then  un 
der  Hood  instead  of  Johnston,  was  finally  broken  up, 
by  Sherman's  subordinates  in  Tennessee,  shows  clearly 
enough  what  kind  of  modification  of  Sherman's  tactical 
methods  was  requisite  to  enable  him  to  reach  the  same 
result  in  Georgia. 

Sherman's  tactical  operations  during  the  entire  Atlanta 
campaign  were  marked  by  the  highest  degree  of  prudence 
and  caution.  Even  his  one  assault  upon  fortified  lines 
at  Kenesaw  was  no  exception ;  for  the  worst  that  could 
happen  in  that  was  what  actually  did  happen,  namely, 
a  fruitless  loss  of  a  considerable  number  of  men,  yet  a 
number  quite  insignificant  in  comparison  with  the  total 
strength  of  his  army.  Johnston  displayed  similar  quali 
ties  in  an  equal  degree  so  long  as  he  was  in  command; 
and  his  well-known  ability  may  have  suggested  to  Sher- 


SHERMAN'S  GREAT  ABILITY  AS  A  STRATEGIST         341 

man  the  wisdom  of  like  prudence  in  all  his  own  opera 
tions.  But  Hood  signalized  his  accession  to  the  command 
by  the  boldest  kind  of  tactics,  amounting  even  to  rash 
ness  in  the  commander  of  a  force  so  inferior  to  that  of 
his  adversary.  Yet  Sherman  continued  his  own  cautious 
methods  to  the  end.  Even  his  last  move,  which  resulted 
in  the  capture  of  Atlanta, — the  only  one  which  had  even 
the  general  appearance  of  boldness, — was,  in  fact,  marked 
by  the  greatest  prudence  throughout.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  occupied  a  strongly  fortified  bridge-head  at  the 
Chattahoochee  River,  and  the  Twenty-third  Corps  an 
other  equally  strongly  fortified  "  pivot "  around  which 
the  grand  wheel  of  the  army  was  made.  That  moving 
army  was  much  larger  than  Hood's  entire  force,  and  had 
all  the  advantage  of  the  initiative,  which  completely  dis 
concerted  the  opposing  commander,  and  caused  him  to 
commit  a  blunder  that  ought  to  have  proved  fatal, 
namely,  that  of  dividing  his  inferior  force  and  permitting 
his  superior  opponent  to  occupy  a  position  between  the 
widely  separated  wings  of  his  own  army.  Yet  Sherman 
refused  to  take  any  advantage  of  that  blunder,  and  sat 
still  while  Hood  leisurely  reunited  his  divided  forces. 

Even  if  such  extreme  caution  in  handling  a  superior- 
force  against  such  an  antagonist  as  Johnston  could  be^ 
regarded  as  wise,  it  surely  could  not  against  such  an  an 
tagonist  as  Hood,  whose  character  of  extreme  audacity 
in  the  aggressive  should  have  assured  his  destruction 
by  a  more  skilful  adversary  in  command  of  a  superior 
force.  But  Sherman's  own  knowledge  of  his  own  impul 
sive  nature  made  him  unduly  distrustful  of  his  own  judg 
ment  when  under  great  responsibility  in  emergencies, 
and  this  in  spite  of  his  unusual  intellectual  activity 
and  his  great  confidence  in  his  deliberately  matured 
judgment.  This  is  the  opinion  of  Sherman's  character 
formed  by  me  after  the  closest  possible  observation  and 
study.  For  this  reason  Sherman's  capacity  as  a  tacti- 


342  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

cian  was  not  by  any  means  equal  to  his  ability  as  a  strat 
egist.  He  lacked  the  element  of  confident  boldness  or 
audacity  in  action  which  is  necessary  to  gain  the  greatest 
results  by  taking  advantage  of  his  adversary's  blunders, 
and  by  tempting  or  forcing  his  adversary  into  positions  of 
which  he  might  take  advantage.  Yet  Sherman  was  very 
far  from  lacking  skill  as  a  tactician.  Both  he  and  John 
ston  might  well  be  likened  to  masters  of  the  sword  so 
skilful  and  so  equally  matched  that  neither  could  gain 
any  material  advantage  over  the  other.  In  my  opinion, 
their  duel  of  ten  weeks'  duration  was  never  surpassed  in 
the  history  of  the  world  for  the  masterly  skill  and  cau 
tion  with  which  the  one  pressed  the  other  back  step  by 
step,  and  the  other  disputed  every  foot  of  the  ground, 
neither  giving  nor  attempting  to  make  an  opportunity 
to  strike  a  decisive  blow.  If  the  object  of  that  campaign 
was  to  capture  Atlanta  on  the  one  side,  and  to  defend  it 
on  the  other,  the  handling  of  those  two  splendid  armies 
was  simply  magnificent.  It  would  be  a  great  pity  that 
an  end  was  put  to  that  duel  by  the  removal  of  Johnston, 
and  the  military  world  thus  deprived  of  a  complete  les 
son,  except  for  the  fact  that,  whether  or  not  the  contest 
finally  resulted  in  the  fall  of  Atlanta,  the  rebellion  in 
that  part  of  the  South  would  have  been  practically  as 
far  from  an  end  as  it  was  the  first  of  May!  Johnston 
would  have  been  there  in  front  of  Sherman,  all  the  same, 
and  at  least  one  more  campaign  would  have  been  re 
quired  before  the  march  to  the  sea  could  have  been 
made. 

Although  Sherman  did  not  himself  accomplish  the 
first  part  of  Grant's  plan  in  respect  to  Johnston's  army, — 
namely,  "  to  break  it  up," —  the  second  part,  "  to  get  into 
the  interior  of  the  enemy's  country,  .  .  .  inflicting  all  the 
damage  you  can  against  their  war  resources," 1  was  carried 
out  as  thoroughly  as  Grant  or  anybody  else  could  have 

l  War  Records,  Vol.  XXXII,  part  iii,  p.  245. 


SHERMAN'S  GREAT  ABILITY  AS  A  STRATEGIST         343 

wished.  It  is  also  true  that  Sherman  claimed  the  credit 
for  the  breaking  up  of  Hood's  army  in  Tennessee,  while  he 
was  marching  to  Savannah,  as  a  legitimate  and  foreseen 
part  of  his  general  plan,  like  his  successful  march  and  cap 
ture  of  Savannah.  But  he  appeared  not  to  see  that  in 
such  a  claim  he  was  condemning  himself  for  not  having 
done  with  a  superior  force  what  Thomas  actually  did 
with  a  smaller  one.  That  result  was,  in  fact,  due  largely 
to  an  accident  which,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  military 
operations,  ought  not  to  have  happened,  and  by  which 
Hood  was  tempted  to  make  at  Franklin  one  of  those  fu 
rious  assaults  upon  troops  in  position  and  ready  to  re 
ceive  him  which  are  almost  always  disastrous.  It  was 
just  the  kind  of  temptation  to  Hood's  army  that  was  ne 
cessary  "  to  break  it  up,11  and  it  did  so  very  effectually. 
The  old  "Army  of  Tennessee,"  which  had  been  so  for 
midable,  ceased  to  be  a  formidable  army  on  November 
30.  Its  fighting  days  were  nearly  over.  After  that  it 
never  did  any  fighting  at  all  worthy  of  its  old  record. 
And  there  was  hardly  a  single  day  while  Hood  was  in 
command  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  when  a  similar  result 
might  not  have  been  reached  by  a  similar  method,  and 
that  without  any  risk  of  disaster  to  the  Union  army,  be 
cause  the  force  assaulted  by  Hood  might  always  have 
had  a  more  powerful  army  near  at  hand  to  support  it 
if  necessary. 

In  his  special  field  order  of  January  8,  1865,  an 
nouncing  to  all  the  troops  of  his  military  division  the 
results  of  his  great  campaign,  General  Sherman  said : 
"G-enerals  Thomas  and  Schofield,  commanding  the  de 
partments  to  our  rear,  returned  to  their  posts  and  pre 
pared  to  decoy  General  Hood  into  their  meshes."  If 
the  purpose  that  prompted  Sherman  to  send  me  back  to 
Tennessee  was  to  serve  as  a  "  decoy  "  to  Hood,  I  must  say 
that  my  part  of  the  sport  would  have  been  more  enjoy 
able  if  it  had  taken  place  earlier  in  the  season,  when 


344          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Sherman  was  near  by  with  his  sixty  thousand  men  to 
help  "  bag  the  game." 

It  has  occurred  to  me  as  at  least  possible  that  Sher 
man's  recollection  of  the  suggestions  I  had  repeatedly 
made  to  him  during  the  Atlanta  campaign  may  have 
been  in  his  mind  when  he  ordered  me  back  to  report  to 
Thomas,  and  when  he  wrote  his  special  field  order.  If 
so,  I  must  protest  my  innocence  of  any  intention  to  play 
the  role  of  "  decoy  "  at  Franklin  when  one  of  the  great 
gunners  was  twenty  miles  away,  and  the  other  several 
hundred ! 

Yet,  accepting  even  the  most  unfavorable  view  of 
Sherman's  tactical  as  well  as  of  his  strategical  operations 
in  connection  with  the  operations  of  all  the  other  armies 
under  Grant's  general  plans  and  direction,  there  was  no 
thing  in  them  all  that  could  possibly  have  prevented 
their  complete  ultimate  success  in  the  capture  of  Lee's 
army.  If  Grant  had  not  captured  that  army,  Sherman 
would.  And  the  surrender  of  Lee  was  necessarily  fol 
lowed  by  that  of  all  the  other  Confederate  armies. 
Hence,  whatever  might  have  happened  if  Sherman's 
great  march  had  not  been  made,  that  march  with  so 
large  an  army  made  the  end  of  the  rebellion  in  the 
spring  of  1865  sure  beyond  any  possible  doubt.  In  view 
of  a  public  service  so  original  in  its  conception,  so  grand 
in  its  magnitude,  and  so  brilliant  in  its  execution,  any 
criticism  respecting  details  cannot  diminish  the  fame  of 
the  general  who  planned  and  executed  that  grand  cam 
paign,  nor  that  of  the  general-in-chief,  the  success  of 
whose  far-reaching  plans  had  made  the  brilliant  exploit 
of  his  subordinate  possible.  Such  criticisms  are  justifi 
able  only  in  the  interest  of  exact  truth  and  of  exact  mili 
tary  science,  so  that  imperfections  in  the  operations  of 
the  greatest  commanders  may  not  be  mistaken  by  the 
military  student  as  having  been  among  the  causes  which 
led  to  success. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

TRANSFER  OF  THE  TWENTY-THIRD  CORPS  TO  NORTH  CARO 
LINA — SHERMAN'S  PLAN  OF  MARCHING  TO  THE  REAR  OF 

LEE  —  THE  SURRENDER  OF  J.  E.  JOHNSTON'S  ARMY — 
AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  APPROVED  TERMS  OF  SURRENDER 
— POLITICAL  RECONSTRUCTION  —  SHERMAN'S  GENIUS  — 
CONTRAST  BETWEEN  GRANT  AND  SHERMAN  —  HALLECK'S 
CHARACTERISTICS  —  HIS  ATTEMPT  TO  SUPPLANT  GRANT 
— PERSONAL  FEELING  IN  BATTLE  —  THE  SCARS  OF  WAR. 

UPON  the  termination  of  the  campaign  of  1864  in 
Tennessee,  General  Grant  ordered  me,  with  the 
Twenty- third  Corps,  to  the  coast  of  North  Carolina,  via 
Louisville,  Cincinnati,  Pittsburg,  Washington,  and  the 
sea.  Under  the  direction  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
War,  Charles  A.  Dana,  and  the  personal  management  of 
Colonel  Lewis  B.  Parsons  of  the  quartermaster's  de 
partment,  that  movement  was  made  without  any  neces 
sity  for  the  exercise  of  direction  or  control  on  my  part, 
in  respect  to  routes  or  otherwise.  I  enjoyed  very  much 
being  a  simple  passenger  on  that  comfortable  journey, 
one  of  the  most  remarkable  in  military  history,  and  ex 
ceedingly  creditable  to  the  officers  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  who  directed  and  conducted  it.  I  did  not  know  at 
the  time  anything  about  the  details  of  the  arrangements 
made  for  transportation,  nor  who  made  them;  but  I 
have  always  thought  it  an  excellent  illustration  of  the 
good  results  to  be  obtained  by  a  judicious  distribution 
and  division  of  duty,  authority,  and  responsibility  in 
military  operations  on  a  large  scale.  This  being  done 

345 


346  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

under  one  common,  competent  head,  to  whom  all  sub 
ordinates  are  alike  responsible,  the  military  system  be 
comes  as  nearly  perfect  as  possible. 

While  the  transports  were  detained  by  an  ice  blockade 
in  the  Potomac,  I  joined  Greneral  Grant  at  Fort  Monroe, 
and  went  with  him  on  the  war-steamer  Rhode  Island  to 
Cape  Fear  River,  where  we  met  Greneral  Terry  and  Ad 
miral  Porter,  discussed  the  military  situation,  and  de 
cided  on  the  general  plan  of  operations  for  the  capture 
of  the  defenses  of  Cape  Fear  River  and  the  city  of  Wil 
mington,  and  subsequent  operations.  On  our  return  to 
Fort  Monroe,  I  proceeded  to  Washington,  and  sailed  with 
the  advance  of  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  arriving  at  the 
mouth  of  Cape  Fear  River  on  February  9,  1865,  where 
we  joined  General  Terry,  who  with  two  divisions  had 
already  captured  Fort  Fisher.  I  was  then  assigned  to 
command  the  new  department  of  North  Carolina.  We 
turned  the  defenses  of  Cape  Fear  River  by  marching 
round  the  swamps,  and  occupied  Wilmington  with  little 
loss;  then  we  captured  Kinston,  after  a  pretty  sharp 
fight  of  three  days,  and  occupied  Goldsboro'  on  March 
21,  within  one  day  of  the  time  indicated  by  Sherman, 
from  Laurel  Hill,  N.  C.,  March  8,  for  our  junction  at 
Goldsboro'.  General  Sherman,  who  had  been  delayed 
by  his  battle  at  Bentonville,  did  not  reach  Goldsboro' 
until  the  23d,  but  the  sound  of  his  guns  on  the  20th  and 
21st  informed  me  that  he  was  near,  and  I  put  a  bridge 
across  the  Neuse  River,  so  as  to  go  to  his  assistance  if 
necessary.  After  the  junction  at  G-oldsboro',  I  com 
manded  the  "center,"  one  of  the  three  grand  divisions 
of  Sherman's  army. 

For  the  elucidation  of  some  things  in  this  campaign 
which  have  seemed  obscure,  and  some  acts  of  General 
Sherman  which  have  been  severely  criticized,  it  is  neces 
sary  to  know  the  ruling  ideas  which  actuated  him.  As 
Sherman  says,  in  his  own  estimate  of  the  relative  im- 


SHERMAN'S  PLAN  OF  MARCHING  TO  THE  REAR  OF  LEE  347 

portance  of  his  march  through  Georgia  and  that  through 
the  Carolinas,  the  former  was  only  a  change  of  base  pre 
paratory  to  the  latter,  the  great  final  campaign  of  the 
war,  which  had  for  its  end  the  defeat  and  capture  of 
Lee's  army.  Sherman  and  his  army  expected  to  share 
the  glory  of  capturing  Richmond  and  Lee's  army,  which 
had  baffled  the  Eastern  troops  for  four  years.  This  feel 
ing  in  the  army  was  very  general  and  very  manifest  at 
the  time. 

After  the  concentration  at  Goldsboro',  Sherman's  plan 
was  to  march  straight  for  Lee's  rear  at  Petersburg,  and 
he  expected  Johnston  to  keep  ahead  of  him  and  to  unite 
with  Lee  for  the  final  struggle  at  or  near  Richmond. 
Grant's  idea  was  quite  different:  he  wanted  Sherman 
to  keep  between  Lee  and  Johnston  and  prevent  their 
union,  as  well  as  to  cut  off  Lee's  retreat  if  he  should 
escape  before  Grant  was  ready  to  move,  the  latter  alleg 
ing  that  he  had  ample  force  to  take  care  of  Lee  as  soon 
as  the  necessary  preparations  were  made  and  the  roads 
would  permit  him  to  move.  It  was  this  important  dif 
ference  of  plan  that  occasioned  Sherman's  visit  to  City 
Point,  where  he  hoped  to  gain  Grant's  acquiescence  in 
his  own  plans.  The  result  was  the  movement  ordered 
by  Sherman  on  his  return  to  Goldsboro',  which  was  sub 
stantially  the  same  as  that  which  Grant  had  before  pro 
posed.  Grant's  immediate  army  proved  to  be,  as  he  pre 
dicted  it  would,  amply  sufficient  for  the  capture  of  the 
whole  of  Lee's  army.  Hence  it  is  difficult  to  see  in 
what  respect  Sherman's  campaign  of  the  Carolinas  was 
essential  to  that  great  result,  or  proved  to  be  more  im 
portant  than  his  march  through  Georgia.  Each  was  a 
great  raid,  inflicting  immense  damage  upon  the  enemy's 
country  and  resources,  demoralizing  to  the  people  at 
home  and  the  army  in  Virginia,  cutting  off  supplies  ne 
cessary  to  the  support  of  the  latter,  possibly  expediting 
somewhat  the  final  crisis  at  Richmond,  and  certainly 


348  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

making  the  subjugation  more  complete  of  those  of  the 
Southern  people  who  were  thus  made  to  "feel  the  weight 
of  war."  Considered  as  to  its  military  results,  Sherman's 
march  cannot  be  regarded  as  more  than  I  have  stated — 
a  grand  raid.  The  defeat  and  practical  destruction  of 
Hood's  army  in  Tennessee  was  what  paved  the  way  to 
the  speedy  termination  of  the  war,  which  the  capture  of 
Lee  by  Grant  fully  accomplished;  and  the  result  ought 
to  have  been  essentially  the  same  as  to  time  if  Sherman's 
march  had  never  been  made.  The  capitulation  of  John 
ston  was  but  the  natural  sequence  of  Lee's  surrender; 
for  Johnston's  army  was  not  surrounded,  and  could  not 
have  been  compelled  to  surrender.  Indeed  Sherman 
could  not  have  prevented  that  army  from  marching 
back  into  the  Gulf  States  and  continuing  the  war  for 
a  time.  In  military  history  Sherman's  great  march 
must  rank  only  as  auxiliary  to  the  far  more  important 
operations  of  Grant  and  Thomas.  Sherman  at  the  time 
saw  clearly  enough  this  view  of  the  case ;  hence  his  un- 
deviating  bent  toward  the  final  object  of  his  march,  dis 
regarding  all  minor  ends — to  take  part  in  the  capture  of 
Lee's  army. 

During  General  Sherman's  interviews  with  the  Presi 
dent  and  General  Grant  at  City  Point,  his  mind  must 
have  been  absorbed  with  this  one  idea  which  was  the 
sole  reason  of  his  visit.  Terms  of  surrender  and  the 
policy  to  be  pursued  toward  the  conquered  South  must 
have  been  referred  to  very  casually,  and  nothing  ap 
proximating  instructions  on  the  subject  can  have  been 
received  or  asked  for  by  General  Sherman.  Else  how  is 
it  possible  that  the  very  pointed  and  emphatic  instruc 
tions  of  the  President  to  General  Grant,  dated  March  3, 
1865,1  were  not  made  known  to  him  or  the  spirit  of  them 
conveyed  to  him  in  conversation  ? 

The  question  of  the  abstract  wisdom  of  the  terms  of  the 

i  War  Records,  Vol.  XLVI,  part  ii,  p.  802. 


THE  SURRENDER  OF  J.  E.  JOHNSTON'S  ARMY    349 

Sherman-Johnston  "  memorandum  "  has  little  to  do  with 
that  of  Sherman  in  agreeing  to  it.  Any  person  at  all 
acquainted  with  the  politics  of  the  dominant  party  at 
that  time  would  have  known  that  it  was  at  least  unwise 
to  introduce  political  questions  at  all.  Besides,  he  had 
the  example  of  his  superior,  the  general-in-chief,  who 
had  just  accepted  the  surrender  of  the  principal  Confed 
erate  army  from  the  Confederate  generalissimo  without 
any  political  conditions ;  and  the  knowledge  of  President 
Lincoln's  assassination,  which  must  have  made  the  coun 
try  unwilling  to  consent  to  more  liberal  terms  than  had 
before  been  granted.  Yet,  however  unwise  Sherman's 
action  may  have  been,  the  uproar  it  created,  and  the 
attacks  upon  his  honor  and  integrity  for  which  it  was 
made  the  excuse,  were  utterly  inexcusable.  They  were 
probably  unexampled  as  an  exhibition  of  the  effect  of 
great  and  unusual  excitement  upon  the  minds  of  men 
unaccustomed  to  such  moral  and  mental  strain. 

The  most  charitable  view  of  this  matter  seems  also  to 
be  the  most  just — namely,  that  the  high  officers  of  gov 
ernment  were  completely  unnerved  and  lost  their  heads 
under  the  terrible  strain  produced  by  President  Lincoln's 
assassination,  increased  somewhat,  perhaps,  by  a  natural 
apprehension  of  what  might  come  next.  The  contrast 
between  this  state  of  excitement  in  Washington  and  the 
marked  calm  that  prevailed  throughout  the  army  was 
very  instructive,  and  it  was  difficult  for  any  soldier 
to  understand  at  that  time  the  state  of  mind  in  Wash 
ington.  No  part  of  the  people  could  have  felt  more 
deeply  or  with  greater  indignation  the  loss  the  country 
had  suffered,  and  the  infamous  crime  by  which  it  had 
been  accomplished.  Yet  not  a  ripple  of  excitement 
could  be  seen  anywhere  in  the  army.  The  profound 
calm  which  pervades  the  atmosphere  surrounding  a 
great,  disciplined,  self-confident  army  is  one  of  the  most 
sublime  exhibitions  of  human  nature. 


350  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

That  Sherman  felt  "outraged  beyond  measure,"  was 
natural  and  indeed  inevitable.  He  had  committed  an 
error  of  judgment  arising  from  political  inexperience 
and  a  failure  to  appreciate  the  difference  between  Mr. 
Lincoln's  humane  purposes  toward  individual  Confeder 
ates  and  his  political  policy.  But  the  error  was  of  the 
least  possible  practical  consequence,  and  there  was  not 
the  slightest  excuse  for  making  it  public  at  the  time,  in 
violation  of  all  rules  of  official  courtesy.  All  that  it  was 
necessary  or  right  to  do  was  to  tell  Sherman  to  correct 
his  error. 

While  the  effect  of  these  ferocious  bulletins  received 
some  time  later  was  such  as  General  Sherman  fully 
describes,  the  first  effect  of  the  simple  disapproval  of 
the  convention,  both  upon  Sherman  and  Johnston,  not 
referred  to  by  either  in  their  published  narratives,  may 
be  interesting  to  the  readers  of  history.  General  Sher 
man  was  manifestly  much  disappointed  and  morti 
fied  at  the  rejection  of  his  terms,  although  he  had  been 
prepared  somewhat  by  expressions  of  opinion  from 
others  in  the  interval,  and  both  he  and  Johnston  at  their 
last  meeting  seemed  sad  and  dejected. 

To  understand  this,  it  must  be  remembered  that  John 
ston's  army  was  not  surrounded,  and  its  surrender  could 
not  have  been  compelled.  Unless  the  terms  of  capitula 
tion  could  be  made  such  as  the  troops  themselves  would 
be  willing  to  accept,  they  would,  it  was  apprehended, 
break  up  into  guerrilla  bands  of  greater  or  less  strength 
and  carry  on  the  war  in  that  way  indefinitely.  So 
strongly  was  I  impressed  at  the  time  with  General  John 
ston's  apprehension,  that  I  was  often  thereafter  haunted 
in  my  dreams  with  the  difficulties  I  was  actually  encoun 
tering  in  the  prosecution  of  military  operations  against 
those  remnants  of  the  Confederate  armies,  in  marshy 
and  mountainous  countries,  through  summer  heats  and 
winter  storms.  It  was  several  years  after  the  war  that 


AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  APPROVED  TERMS  OF  SURRENDER 

I  became  fully  satisfied,  at  night,   that  it  was  really 
over. 

At  the  time  of  Sherman's  first  interview  with  John 
ston  I  hinted  that  I  would  like  to  accompany  him ;  but 
he  desired  me  to  remain  in  immediate  command,  as  I 
was  next  in  rank,  and  we  could  not  tell  what  might 
happen.  He  took  some  others  with  him,  but  I  believe 
had  no  one  present  in  the  room  to  assist  him  in  his 
discussion  with  Johnston  and  Breckinridge.  At  his  last 
interview  I  accompanied  him,  by  his  special  request.  On 
meeting  at  Bennett's  House,  after  the  usual  salutations 
Generals  Sherman  and  Johnston  retired  to  the  confer 
ence  room,  and  were  there  a  long  time  with  closed  doors. 
At  length  I  was  summoned  to  their  presence,  and  in 
formed  in  substance  that  they  were  unable  to  arrange 
the  terms  of  capitulation  to  their  satisfaction.  They 
seemed  discouraged  at  the  failure  of  the  arrangement  to 
which  they  had  attached  so  much  importance,  apprehen 
sive  that  the  terms  of  Grant  and  Lee,  pure  and  simple, 
could  not  be  executed,  and  that  if  modified  at  all,  they 
would  meet  with  a  second  disapproval.  I  listened  to 
their  statements  of  the  difficulties  they  had  encountered, 
and  then  stated  how  I  thought  they  could  all  be  ar 
ranged.  General  Johnston  replied,  in  substance,  "I 
think  General  Schofield  can  fix  it" ;  and  General  Sherman 
intimated  to  me  to  write,  pen  and  paper  being  on  the 
table  where  I  was  sitting,  while  the  two  great  antago 
nists  were  nervously  pacing  the  floor.  I  at  once  wrote 
the  "military  convention"  of  April  26,  handed  it  to 
General  Sherman,  and  he,  after  reading  it,  to  General 
Johnston.  Having  explained  that  I,  as  department  com 
mander,  after  General  Sherman  was  gone,  could  do  all 
that  might  be  necessary  to  remove  the  difficulties  which 
seemed  to  them  so  serious,  the  terms  as  written  by  me 
were  agreed  to,  as  General  Sherman  says,  "  without  hesi 
tation,"  and  General  Johnston,  "  without  difficulty,"  and 


352  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

after  being  copied  without  alteration  were  signed  by  the 
two  commanders.  Johnston's  words,  on  handing  the 
paper  back  to  Sherman,  were :  "  I  believe  that  is  the  best 
we  can  do."  It  was  in  pursuance  of  this  understanding 
that  I  made  with  General  Johnston  the  "  supplemental 
terms,"  and  gave  his  disbanded  men  the  two  hundred 
and  fifty  thousand  rations,  with  wagons  to  haul  them,  to 
prevent  the  troops  from  robbing  their  own  people,  for 
which,  in  his  "  Narrative,"  he  very  properly  credits  Gen 
eral  Sherman. 

But  I  also  gave  to  the  troops  from  each  State  arms 
enough  to  arm  a  guard  to  preserve  order  and  protect 
citizens  en  route,  the  arms  so  used  to  be  turned  over  to 
United  States  officers  after  the  troops  got  home.  This 
was  one  of  the  things  most  bitterly  condemned  in  Sher 
man's  first  agreement.  Yet  not  a  word  was  said  when  I 
did  it!  It  would  be  difficult  for  a  soldier  to  imagine 
anything  more  monstrous  than  the  suggestion  that  he 
could  not  trust  the  officers  and  men  whom  he  had  been 
fighting  four  years  to  go  home  and  turn  in  their  arms 
after  they  had  voluntarily  surrendered  and  given  their 
parole  of  honor  to  do  so.  Yet  there  seem  to  be  even  in 
high  places  some  men  who  have  no  conception  of  the 
sense  of  honor  which  exists  among  brave  men. 

When  that  second  "  convention "  was  handed  to  Gen 
eral  Grant  the  same  evening,  he  said  that  the  only 
change  he  would  have  made  would  have  been  to  write 
General  Sherman's  name  before  General  Johnston's.  So 
would  I  if  I  had  thought  about  it ;  but  I  presume  an  un 
conscious  feeling  of  courtesy  toward  a  fallen  foe  dictated 
the  order  in  which  their  names  were  written. 

It  seems  to  me  a  little  singular  that  neither  General 
Sherman  nor  General  Johnston  thought  the  circum 
stances  above  referred  to  worthy  of  being  preserved  in 
memory,  and  I  am  not  quite  willing  that  General  Breck- 
inridge  shall  carry  off  all  the  honor  of  assisting  the  great 


AUTHORSHIP  OF  THE  APPROVED  TERMS  OF  SURRENDER  353 

commanders  to  make  " memoranda "  and  "military  con 
ventions'7  at  "Bennett's  House."  But  Sherman  and 
Johnston  were  writing  their  own  defense,  and  it  was 
natural  that  they  should  omit  matter  not  pertaining 
thereto.  Besides,  I  was  General  Sherman's  subordinate, 
and  owed  him  all  the  help  I  could  give  in  every  way. 
He  may  have  regarded  my  services,  and  perhaps  justly, 
as  little  more  than  clerical,  after  it  was  all  over,  even  if 
he  thought  of  the  matter  at  all.1 

The  Confederate  troops  were  promptly  furnished  with 
all  needed  supplies  of  food  and  transportation  and  sent 
in  comfort  to  their  homes,  freed  from  the  necessity  of 
taxing  the  slender  resources  of  the  impoverished  people 
on  their  routes.  The  surplus  animals  and  wagons  re 
maining  with  the  army  were  given  to  the  people  of 
North  Carolina  in  large  numbers,  and  they  were  encour 
aged  at  once  to  resume  their  industrial  pursuits.  In  the 
meantime,  all  who  were  in  want  were  furnished  with 
food. 

It  may  not  be  possible  to  judge  how  wise  or  unwise 
Sherman's  first  "  memorandum  "  might  have  proved  if  it 
had  been  ratified.  It  is  always  difficult  to  tell  how 
things  that  have  not  been  tried  would  have  worked  if 
they  had  been.  We  now  know  only  this  much — that  the 
imagination  of  man  could  hardly  picture  worse  results 
than  those  wrought  out  by  the  plan  that  was  finally 
adopted — namely,  to  destroy  everything  that  existed  in 
the  way  of  government,  and  then  build  from  the  bottom 
on  the  foundation  of  ignorance  and  rascality. 

The  de  facto  State  governments  existing  at  the  time 
of  the  surrender  would  have  been  of  infinite  service  in 
restoring  order  and  material  prosperity,  if  they  had  been 
recognized  by  the  military  authority  of  the  United  States 

.  1  For  the  military  convention  of  terras,  signed  by  Johnston  and  Scho- 
April  26,  1865,  signed  by  Sherman  field,  see  War  Records,  Vol.  XL VII, 
and  Johnston,  and  the  supplemental  part  iii,  pp.  313,  482. 

23 


354  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

and  kept  under  military  control  similar  to  that  exercised 
by  the  district  commanders  under  the  "reconstruction 
acts."  And  such  recognition  would  in  no  manner  have 
interfered  with  any  action  Congress  might  have  thought 
it  wise  to  take  looking  to  the  organization  of  permanent 
governments  and  the  admission  of  senators  and  repre 
sentatives  in  Congress.  After  two  years  of  "  reconstruc 
tion"  under  President  Johnson's  "policy,"  the  Southern 
State  governments  were  no  better  than  those  he  had 
destroyed.  Then  Congress  took  the  matter  in  hand,  and 
after  years  of  labor  brought  forth  State  governments  far 
worse  than  either  of  those  that  had  been  torn  down. 

Party  ambition  on  the  one  hand,  and  timidity  on  the 
other,  were  the  parents  of  these  great  follies.  The  presi 
dential  succession  was  the  mainspring  of  the  first  move 
ment  and  of  the  opposition  thereto,  while  that  and  party 
majority  in  Congress  were  the  motives  of  the  later  "  re 
construction."  Both  ingloriously  failed,  as  they  deserved 
to  do.  How  much  stronger  the  Republican  party  would 
have  been  if  it  had  relied  upon  the  loyal  States  which 
had  sustained  it  through  the  war,  instead  of  timidly  dis 
trusting  them  and  trying  to  bolster  itself  up  by  the  aid 
of  the  negro  and  "  carpet-bag"  governments  in  the  South  ! 

Political  reconstruction  ought  not  to  have  been  thought 
of  at  the  close  of  the  war.  What  was  then  needed  was 
local  civil  government  under  such  military  control  as 
might  be  necessary,  restoration  of  order,  industry,  and 
material  prosperity,  leading  to  a  gradual  reorganization 
of  the  society  which  had  been  completely  broken  up  by 
the  war.  After  this  had  been  done,  and  Congress  had 
decided  upon  the  conditions  of  full  restoration,  it  would 
have  been  time  enough  to  inaugurate  political  recon 
struction.  This  was  clear  enough  at  the  time  to  those 
who  had  studied  the  subject  and  knew  by  personal  ob 
servation  the  real  condition  and  feeling  of  the  Southern 
people.  But  the  leading  politicians  of  either  party  do 


POLITICAL  RECONSTRUCTION  355 

not  appear  to  have  had  the  wisdom  and  moral  courage 
to  advocate  such  a  policy.  Both  were  impatient  to  see 
their  party  represented  on  the  floors  of  Congress  by 
members  from  the  South. 

It  was  something  of  the  kind  above  suggested  which 
was  aimed  at  by  Generals  Sherman  and  Johnston,  and 
which  was  deemed  wise  by  the  leading  generals  both 
North  and  South.  There  were  several  conditions  in  the 
memorandum  that  were  clearly  inadmissible,  though 
easy  of  correction  without  changing  the  essential  fea 
tures  of  the  document.  This  was  to  be  expected  from  a 
hasty  effort  to  solve  a  great  political  problem  by  a  man 
without  political  education  or  experience.  Sherman's 
failure  was  not  unlike  that  of  great  politicians  who  un 
dertake  to  command  armies.  Their  general  ideas  may 
be  very  good,  but  they  have  no  knowledge  of  details, 
and  hence  make  mistakes  resulting  in  failure. 

As  now  seen,  projected  upon  the  dark  background  of 
the  political  history  of  the  Southern  States  during  the 
twelve  years  from  1865  to  1877,  and  compared  with  the 
plans  of  political  doctrinaires  in  1865,  under  the  light  of 
experience  and  reason,  the  Sherman-Johnston  memo 
randum  and  Sherman's  letters  of  that  period  seem  self- 
luminous  with  political  wisdom.  Sherman  needed  only 
the  aid  of  competent  military  advisers  in  whom  he  had 
confidence  to  have  made  him  one  of  the  greatest  generals 
of  any  age,  and  he  would  have  needed  only  the  aid  of 
competent  political  advisers  to  have  made  him  a  great 
statesman.  But  he  looked  almost  with  contempt  upon  a 
"  staff,"  and  would  doubtless  have  thought  little  better  of 
a  "  cabinet." 

The  efforts  of  political  leaders  to  establish  an  absolutely 
impossible  popular  government  in  the  South  seem  to 
show  the  necessity  of  general  political  education,  no  less 
than  the  military  blunders  of  the  war  show  the  necessity 
of  general  military  education.  If  our  schools  would  drop 


356  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

from  their  course  of  studies  some  of  the  comparatively 
unimportant  "  ologies,"  and  substitute  the  qualifications 
for  good  citizenship,  the  change  would  be  greatly  for  the 
better. 

General  Sherman  was  one  of  those  rare  actors  in  his 
toric  events  who  require  no  eulogy.  All  his  important 
acts  were  so  unqualifiedly  his  own,  and  so  emphatically 
speak  for  themselves,  that  it  is  only  necessary  to  judge 
of  the  quality  and  merits  of  those  acts.  There  is  no 
question  of  division  of  honors  between  him  and  any 
other  respecting  any  of  his  important  operations.  It  is 
not  meant  by  this  that  he  was  disdainful  of  the  advice  or 
opinions  of  others.  On  the  contrary,  although  naturally 
impulsive  and  self-reliant,  his  acquired  habit  was  to 
study  carefully  and  consult  freely  with  his  subordinate 
commanders  respecting  all  important  movements.  Yet 
discussion  resulted  almost  if  not  quite  invariably  in  the 
adoption  of  his  own  original  plans.  As  to  details,  he  was 
wont  to  leave  them  very  much  to  his  subordinates,  and,  I 
think,  did  not  estimate  very  accurately  the  possibilities  or 
probabilities  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  details  neces 
sary  to  the  success  of  his  general  plans.  It  is  certainly 
not  too  much  to  say  that  his  expectations  in  this  regard 
were  very  frequently  unrealized.  But  of  this  it  must  be 
observed  that  the  character  of  the  theater  of  war  made 
the  handling  of  a  large  army  extremely  difficult,  preci 
sion  of  movements  impossible,  and  any  accurate  estimate 
of  the  time  in  which  projected  operations  could  be  ac 
complished  by  no  means  easy.  Criticism  of  General 
Sherman,  or  of  his  subordinates,  based  upon  military 
experience  in  other  countries  or  upon  the  success  of  his 
able  antagonist  General  Johnston,  to  whom  Sherman's 
difficulties  were  corresponding  advantages,  is  likely  to 
be  extremely  unjust.  In  short,  Sherman's  campaigns 
stand  alone,  without  a  parallel  in  military  history ;  alike 
unique  in  their  conception,  execution,  and  final  results ; 


SHERMAN'S  GENIUS  357 

in  most  respects  among  the  highest  examples  of  the  art 
of  war.  Plans  so  general  and  original  in  conception  and 
successful  in  execution  point  unmistakably  to  a  very 
high  order  of  military  genius. 

In  the  order  of  nature,  comparison  with  those  that  fol 
low  as  well  as  those  that  precede  is  needed  to  establish 
the  merits  of  any  individual.  A  commander  may  be  a 
great  captain  compared  with  his  military  predecessors, 
and  yet  some  of  his  operations  be  regarded  as  very 
faulty  by  more  modern  commanders. 

Some  future  historian,  with  the  example  before  him 
of  a  later  chieftain  who,  on  a  similar  field  and  under 
similar  but  improved  conditions,  may  have  won  more 
brilliant  successes,  may  be  able  to  determine  Sherman's 
rank  among  the  commanders  of  past,  present,  and  future 
ages. 

Sufficient  is  not  yet  known  in  this  country  of  the 
credit  due  any  one  individual  for  the  success  achieved 
in  the  recent  campaigns  in  Europe  to  furnish  the  means 
of  just  comparison  between  the  European  and  American 
commanders  of  this  generation.  And  even  between 
Grant  and  Sherman  there  are  so  few  points  of  resem 
blance  in  military  character  or  methods,  that  they  must 
be  judged  by  contrasts  rather  than  by  comparison. 
Hence  it  may  always  be  difficult  to  determine  their  ex 
act  relative  merits  as  military  leaders.  Upon  this  point 
I  forbear,  for  the  present,  -to  express  any  opinion. 

In  some  other  respects  Grant  and  Sherman  were 
hardly  less  in  contrast  than  in  their  military  character 
istics.  At  the  close  of  the  Atlanta  campaign,  in  his  let 
ter  of  September  12,  1864,  Grant  paid  to  Sherman  the 
following  generous  and  glowing  tribute :  "  In  conclusion, 
it  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  say  that  I  feel  you  have 
accomplished  the  most  gigantic  undertaking  given  to 
any  general  in  this  war,  and  with  a  skill  and  ability  that 
will  be  acknowledged  in  history  as  unsurpassed,  if  not 


358  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

unequaled.  It  gives  me  as  much  pleasure  to  record  this 
in  your  favor  as  it  would  in  favor  of  any  living  man, 
myself  included." 

To  this  Sherman  replied,  September  20 :  "  In  the 
meantime,  know  that  I  admire  your  dogged  persever 
ance  and  pluck  more  than  ever." 

There  has  been  much  learned  discussion  of  the  relative 
merits  of  McClellan's,  Grant's,  and  other  plans  for  the 
"  capture  of  Richmond,"  as  if  that  was  the  object  of  the 
campaign.  In  fact,  though  the  capture  of  Richmond  at 
any  time  during  the  war  would  have  produced  some 
moral  effect  injurious  to  the  rebellion  and  beneficial  to 
the  Union  in  public  opinion,  it  would  have  been  a  real 
injury  to  the  Union  cause  in  a  military  sense,  because  it 
would  have  given  us  one  more  important  place  to  gar 
rison,  and  have  increased  the  length  of  our  line  of  sup 
plies,  always  liable  to  be  broken  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

The  worst  form  of  operations  in  such  a  war  is  "  terri 
torial"  strategy,  or  that  which  aims  at  the  capture  and 
occupation  of  territory  as  a  primary  object.  The  best  is 
that  which  aims  at  the  destruction  or  capture  of  the  op 
posing  armies  as  the  first  and  only  important  object. 
Grant  at  Donelson,  Vicksburg,  and  in  Virginia  best  il 
lustrated  this  kind  of  strategy. 

Halleck  was  probably  the  chief  of  the  "territorial" 
strategists  of  our  Civil  "War  period.  In  the  winter  of  1861- 
1862  the  counties  of  north  Missouri  bordering  on  the  Mis 
souri  River  were  infested  with  guerrillas.  Halleck  sent 
Pope,  with  a  force  of  all  arms  amounting  to  a  considera 
ble  army,  to  "clear  them  out."  Pope  marched  in  triumph 
from  one  end  of  that  tier  of  counties  to  the  other,  and 
Halleck  then  informed  me  with  evident  satisfaction  that 
north  Missouri  was  cleared  of  rebels,  and  that  the  war 
was  ended  in  that  part  of  the  State!  In  fact,  the  guer 
rillas,  "flushed"  like  a  flock  of  quail  by  Pope's  advance- 
guard,  had  taken  to  the  bush  until  the  rear-guard  had 


HALLECK'S  CHARACTERISTICS  359 

passed  out  of  sight,  and  then  were  found  "feeding" 
again  on  their  old  ground. 

I  felt  greatly  complimented  when  Halleck,  on  his  re 
turn  from  Corinth  to  St.  Louis,  en  route  to  Washington 
to  take  command  of  the  army,  gave  me  a  full  explana 
tion  of  his  "  siege  of  Corinth,"  including  his  application 
of  the  standard  European  tactics  of  a  former  generation, 
with  its  rule  of  10,000  men  to  the  mile  in  line  and  regu 
lar  approaches. 

I  was  many  years  younger  than  Halleck,  Thomas, 
Sherman,  Grant,  and  the  other  chief  commanders,  and 
hence  had  much  more  to  learn  than  they.  Perhaps  I 
was  also,  on  account  of  comparative  youth,  more  teach 
able.  At  any  rate,  the  two  lessons  from  Halleck  above 
referred  to,  and  later  experience,  caused  me  to  do  "  a 
world  of  thinking";  so  that  I  was  amazed  beyond  ex 
pression  when,  in  the  winter  of  1863-64,  just  before 
Grant  was  made  lieutenant-general,  Halleck  told  me  that 
his  plan  for  the  next  campaign  was  to  send  west  of  the 
Mississippi  Eiver  force  enough  to  finish  the  war  in  all 
that  region  of  country,  and  then  return  and  clear  up  the 
States  east  of  that  river !  I  said  nothing,  but  could  not 
help  thinking  that  it  was,  sure  enough,  time  to  have 
another  general-in-chief  of  the  army.  But  accepting  his 
strategic  theory  of  operations  in  the  American  Civil 
War, — territorial  conquest, — his  plans  of  campaign  were 
unquestionably  sound. 

Halleck  was,  I  believe,  a  man  of  great  ability  and  of 
high  military  education,  though  with  little  practical  ex 
perience  in  war ;  yet  his  peculiar  views,  and  still  more 
singular  action,  have  seemed  to  me  very  remarkable. 
He  remained  in  Washington,  practically  inert,  while  one 
of  the  great  armies  of  which  he  was  general-in-chief  was 
suffering  sore  reverses,  almost  in  sight  of  the  Capitol,  and 
the  country's  cause  greatly  imperiled  for  want  of  a  com 
petent  commander  for  that  army.  How  could  a  soldier 


360  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

resist  the  impulse  to  "  do  or  die "  at  the  head  of  that 
army?  But  General  Halleck  must  have  known  better 
than  any  one  else  at  that  time  the  limits  of  his  own  ca 
pacity.  He  probably  knew  that  even  his  great  ability 
and  education  did  not  suffice  to  qualify  him  for  the 
command  of  an  army  in  the  field.  If  so,  his  action  af 
forded  a  patriotic  example  which  some  others  would  have 
done  well  to  imitate. 

As  I  have  before  stated,  General  Halleck  was  always 
kind  and  just  to  me,  so  far  as  I  ever  knew,  and  I  was 
much  indebted  to  him  for  support  when  it  was  needed. 
Now  I  find  in  the  records  the  following  letter : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  May  10, 1865,  10 : 30  A.  M. 
HON.  EDWIN  M.  STANTON,  Secretary  of  War : 

I  beg  leave  to  withdraw  for  the  present  my  recommendation 
of  Schofield  as  military  governor  of  North  Carolina.  It  is  rep 
resented  to  me  that  he  and  General  Blair  were  the  principal  ad 
visers  of  Sherman  in  his  armistice  with  the  rebel  General  John 
ston.  If  so,  he  is  not  a  proper  person  to  command  in  North 
Carolina.  I  therefore  suspend  my  recommendation  for  further 
developments. 

H.  "W.  HALLECK,  Major-General. 

The  fact  was  that  I  had  not  been  present  when  Sher 
man's  memorandum  was  agreed  upon,  had  not  been 
consulted  about  it  in  any  way,  and  knew  nothing  of  its 
character  until  after  it  had  been  sent  to  Washington. 
All  of  this  Halleck  could  have  learned  at  once  if  he  had 
inquired,  which  he  did  not.  So  far  as  I  know,  he  left  on 
record,  without  any  subsequent  explanation  or  correc 
tion,  a  report  which  was  without  the  slightest  founda 
tion  in  fact,  and  which  he  understood  to  be  very  damag 
ing  to  my  reputation.  Hence  it  seems  necessary  for  me 
to  record  the  fact  that  there  was  no  foundation  for  that 
report.  Beyond  this  I  will  only  say  that  I  think  General 
Halleck,  in  this  slight  matter,  as.  in  his  far  more  seri- 


HALLECK'S  ATTEMPT   TO  SUPPLANT  GRANT  3(31 

ous  conduct  toward  General  Sherman,  was  inexcusably 
thoughtless  respecting  the  damage  he  might  do  to  the 
reputation  of  a  brother  soldier.  The  least  a  true  man 
can  do  is  to  make  suitable  public  reparation  if  he  has 
for  any  reason  done  publicly  a  personal  injustice. 

I  knew  personally  at  the  time  the  exact  truth  respect 
ing  the  action  of  General  Halleck  toward  General  Grant 
before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  especially  in  ordering  Grant 
to  remain  in  the  rear  while  General  C.  F.  Smith  was  sent 
with  the  advance  of  the  army  to  Pittsburg  Landing,  as 
described  by  General  Grant  in  his  "  Memoirs."  Halleck 
hoped  Smith  might  fight  a  battle  and  win  a  victory  in 
Grant's  absence,  which  would  naturally  be  followed  by 
an  order  putting  Smith  in  command  in  place  of  Grant. 
But  Halleck  had  not  anticipated  Grant's  soldierly  action 
in  applying  to  be  relieved,  and  was  not  prepared  to  face 
that  emergency.  As  soon  as  Grant's  application  reached 
St.  Louis,  Halleck  abandoned  that  line  of  action,  but  he 
did  not  abandon  his  purpose  to  supersede  Grant  in  some 
way  until  some  time  later.  Whatever  excuse  there  may 
have  been  at  that  time  for  Halleck's  opinion  of  Grant, 
nothing  can  be  said  in  favor  of  the  method  he  adopted  to 
accomplish  his  purpose  to  supersede  him. 

The  action  of  Grant  in  this  case  well  foreshadowed 
that  which  occurred  when  he  was  tendered  the  commis 
sion  of  lieutenant-general  and  the  command  of  all  the 
armies.  Grant  would  not  hold  any  commission  or  com 
mand  without  full  authority  to  perform  the  duties  be 
longing  to  it.  In  his  "Memoirs"  he  modestly  refrains 
from  relating  the  most  important  part  of  that  action,  as 
he  told  it  to  me  on  the  war-steamer  JRhode  Island  the 
next  January.  Before  accepting  the  commission  from 
President  Lincoln,  as  Grant  describes,  he  said  in  sub 
stance  that  if  it  meant  that  he  was  to  exercise  actual 
command  of  all  the  armies,  without  any  interference 
from  the  War  Department,  he  was  willing  to  accept  it, 


362  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

otherwise  he  could  not.  To  illustrate  what  he  meant, 
Grant  said  to  me  that  when  he  was  coming  East  to  ac 
cept  that  commission  he  determined  that  he  would  not 
be  "McClellanized." 

The  personal  observation,  experience,  and  emotions 
of  an  individual  soldier  may  perhaps  be  interesting  to 
the  reader.  I  have  never  been  a  lover  of  war  or  strife, 
and  have  never  been  disposed  to  seek  a  fight  or  quarrel. 
But  when  once  engaged  in  or  challenged  to  battle  all  the 
combativeness  in  human  nature  is  at  once  aroused.  It 
is  then  difficult,  if  not  morally  impossible,  to  decline 
the  challenge.  At  all  events,  that  question  is  not  even 
thought  of  at  times.  One  of  the  most  difficult  lessons  a 
commander  has  to  learn  is  when  to  offer  or  accept  battle, 
and  when  to  refrain  or  decline  —  that  is,  to  be  complete 
master  of  his  own  natural  combativeness.  That  courage 
which  is  the  highest  quality  of  a  private  or  a  subordinate 
officer  may  become  extremely  dangerous  in  a  commander, 
unless  dominated  by  that  higher  moral  courage  which  is 
undisturbed  by  excitement  or  passion.  Grant  probably 
possessed  this  higher  quality  in  a  greater  degree  than 
any  other  commander  of  our  time.  Sherman  and 
Thomas  also  possessed  it  in  a  very  high  degree.  In 
Sherman  it  was  the  more  remarkable  because  he  was 
naturally  impulsive,  and  often  manifested  this  trait, 
especially  in  minor  matters.  He  acquired  the  power  of 
absolute  self-command  in  battle.  With  Thomas  this 
quality  appeared  to  be  perfectly  natural,  as  it  did  with 
Grant. 

Since  I  had  to  fight,  I  sometimes  regretted  that  I  could 
not  have  a  chance  with  a  musket  in  the  ranks  (behind  a 
good  parapet  and  "  head-log,"  of  course !),  for  I  was 
a  remarkably  good  shot  in  my  youth.  But  I  never  had  a 
chance  to  fire  a  shot  in  battle  except  once,  and  that  was 
with  my  artillery  at  Fredericktown,  Missouri,  where  not 
an  officer  or  man  in  the  battery  had  any  idea  how  to 


PERSONAL  FEELING  IN  BATTLE          353 

point  a  field-piece  and  give  it  proper  elevation  according 
to  the  distance.  I  quickly  found  the  proper  elevation  by 
the  means  well  known  to  artillerists,  and  then  directed 
the  battery  to  go  on  firing  at  that  elevation,  while  I  was 
called  upon  by  the  commanding  officer  to  devote  myself 
to  some  men  with  muskets.  I  have  seen  this  passion  so 
strong  that  a  major-general  commanding  an  army  corps 
would  dismount  and  act  the  part  of  gunner  to  a  field- 
piece,  apparently  oblivious  to  the  battle  raging  all  along 
the  line  of  his  corps. 

Personal  feeling  in  battle  is  sometimes  remarkable, 
even  to  the  person  himself.  In  my  own  experience,  the 
degree  of  danger  was  not  often  entirely  unthought  of ; 
and  in  the  comparatively  few  cases  where  it  was,  the 
actual  danger  was  much  the  greatest  ever  experienced 
by  me.  That  such  should  be  the  experience  of  a 
general  in  chief  command,  under  the  responsibilities  of 
a  great  battle,  is  natural  enough;  but  that  the  same 
should  occur  when  there  is  little  or  no  responsibility 
seems  worthy  of  remark  in  reference  to  its  apparent 
cause.  In  my  first  battle, — that  of  Wilson's  Creek, —  where 
I  was  a  staff  officer  under  a  soldier  of  great  experience, 
ability,  and  unsurpassed  courage, — General  Lyon, —  I  felt 
for  a  long  time  no  sense  of  responsibility  whatever.  I 
had  only  to  convey  his  orders  to  the  troops.  Yet  the 
absorption  of  my  mind  in  the  discharge  of  this  simple 
duty,  and  in  watching  the  progress  of  the  battle,  was  so 
complete  that  I  absolutely  had  no  thought  whatever  of 
self.  Even  after  Lyon  had  been  twice  wounded,  both  of 
our  horses  killed,  the  troops  on  our  left  given  way  in 
disorder,  leaving  us  standing  in  the  line,  only  a  few  feet 
to  the  left  of  Totten's  battery,  under  a  murderous  fire, 
it  did  not  occur  to  me  that  I  also  might  possibly  be  hit. 
I  had  not  even  thought  for  a  moment  that  the  com 
manding  general  ought  not  to  be  in  such  an  exposed 
position,  or  that  his  wounds  ought  to  have  surgical  treat- 


364  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ment !  My  absolute  confidence  in  my  chief  left  no  room 
in  my  mind  for  even  such  thoughts  as  those.  It  was  not 
until  wounds  had  produced  discouragement  in  the  bravest 
soul  I  ever  knew  that  I  was  aroused  to  some  sense  of  my 
own  responsibility  as  his  senior  staff  officer,  and  spon 
taneously  said:  "No,  general;  let  us  try  it  again."  I 
was  so  much  absorbed  in  the  battle  itself  at  that  time, 
and  even  after  Lyon's  death,  that  it  did  not  occur  to  me 
that  wounds  and  death,  even  of  the  commanding  general 
himself,  were  of  any  consequence  except  as  they  might 
influence  the  progress  and  final  result  of  the  battle. 
This  is  the  feeling  that  must  dominate  the  action  of 
every  successful  commander.  It  is  remarkable  only  be 
cause  of  its  early  development  in  one  not  then  under 
any  such  responsibility. 

It  may  not  be  a  proper  subject  for  criticism  at  this 
time,  and  certainly  is  not  for  any  that  might  seem 
harsh  or  unkind,  yet  it  is  an  instructive  lesson  which 
ought  never  to  be  forgotten,  that  feeling  and  passion 
sometimes  more  than  reason,  sound  military  principles, 
or  wise  statesmanship,  dictated  military  as  well  as  politi 
cal  policy  during  and  long  after  the  Civil  War. 

No  doubt  all  are  now  ready  to  admit  this  in  respect  to 
the  political  measures  which  wrought  so  much  evil  in 
the  South  during  the  so-called  reconstruction  period. 
But  those  who  are  not  familiar  with  the  facts  will,  I 
think,  be  amazed  when  they  see  the  evidences  of  this 
influence  in  military  operations,  and  perhaps  at  no  time 
more  strikingly  than  during  the  last  period  of  the  Civil 
War.  It  would  seem  that  the  official  correspondence  of 
that  period  ought  to  be  a  sufficient  warning  to  deter  any 
future  generation  from  bringing  the  country  into  a  condi 
tion  where  even  some  of  the  most  distinguished  citizens, 
statesmen,  and  soldiers  seem  to  be  governed  more  by 
passion  than  by  reason  in  the  conduct  of  public  affairs. 
The  inevitable  horrors  of  war  are  bad  enough  in  any 


THE  SCABS  OF  WAR  3(55 

case,  but  they  are  vastly  increased  when  the  passions 
begotten  of  civil  strife  become  dominant.  While  all 
parts  of  the  United  States  have  reason  for  pride  in  the 
manhood  and  valor  of  American  soldiers,  and  in  the 
patriotic  devotion  of  citizens  to  the  cause  which  they 
believed  to  be  right,  and  profound  gratitude  for  the 
restoration  of  the  Union  of  the  States,  the  people  of  this 
entire  country  should  bow  their  heads  in  humiliation 
when  they  think  of  the  general  low  state  of  civilization 
which  made  such  a  war  possible,  and  much  of  its  con 
duct  the  dictate  of  passion  and  hate  rather  than  of  rea 
son  or  regard  for  the  public  good.  Even  if  it  is  true,  as 
some  soldier-statesmen  have  said,  but  which  I  do  not  be 
lieve,  that  occasional  wars  are  necessary  to  the  vitality  of 
a  nation, — necessary  to  keep  up  the  fires  of  patriotism  and 
military  ardor  upon  which  the  national  life  depends, — 
let  them  be  foreign  and  not  civil  wars.  It  is  a  great  mis 
take,  though  apparently  a  common  one,  to  suppose  that 
a  country  benefits  ultimately,  in  some  mysterious  way, 
by  civil  war,  in  spite  of  all  its  losses  during  the  war. 
That  able  scientist  General  M.  C.  Meigs  demonstrated 
years  ago  that  this  country  had,  in  accordance  with  a 
general  law,  suffered  permanent  national  injury,  irrepar 
able  in  all  future  time,  by  its  Civil  War,  and  showed  very 
closely  the  amount  of  that  injury. 

It  is,  no  doubt,  true  that  the  body  politic,  like  the  nat 
ural  body,  may  in  extreme  cases  be  so  diseased  either 
by  inheritance  or  from  violation  of  natural  laws,  as  to  re 
quire  the  surgeon's  knife  to  remove  the  diseased  part. 
But  in  such  a  case  there  is  little  cause  for  pride  except  in 
the  skill  of  the  surgeon,  and  little  cause  for  rejoicing 
except  in  the  fact  that  the  operation  was  successful,  that 
neither  the  disease  nor  the  surgeon's  knife  killed  the 
patient. 

While  the  great  Yon  Moltke  and  others  were  unques 
tionably  right  in  their  views  of  the  necessity  for  thorough 


3(36  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

preparation  for  war  at  all  times,  I  believe  that  indispen 
sable  preparation  can  be  made  in  a  way  vastly  more  sat 
isfactory  than  by  actual  war.  And  this  can  be  done 
with  only  a  trifling  expenditure  of  treasure,  and  at  no 
cost  whatever  in  blood  and  sorrow,  nor  in  suspension  of 
peaceful  pursuits,  nor  in  burdensome  debts,  nor  in  enor 
mous  disbursements  for  pensions.  Let  the  schools  of 
all  kinds  and  all  grades  teach  patriotism,  respect  for  law, 
obedience  to  authority,  discipline,  courage,  physical  de 
velopment,  and  the  rudiments  of  practical  military  ma- 
nceuvers ;  let  the  national  and  State  military  schools  be 
fostered  and  perfected,  and  the  volunteer  citizen  soldiery 
given  material  aid  proportionate  to  their  patriotic  mili 
tary  zeal.  Let  the  fortifications  of  the  sea-coasts  and 
the  fleets  of  battle-ships  and  cruisers  on  the  ocean  be 
commensurate  with  the  vast  national  interests  and  honor 
intrusted  to  their  protection  and  defense ;  let  the  stand 
ing  army  be  sufficient  to  discharge  the  duties  which 
require  long  and  scientific  education  and  training,  and 
to  serve  as  models  and  instructors  for  the  millions  of 
young  citizens:  then  will  the  United  States,  by  being 
always  ready  for  war,  insure  to  themselves  all  the  bless 
ings  of  peace,  and  this  at  a  cost  utterly  insignificant  in 
comparison  with  the  cost  of  one  great  war.  It  is  a 
source  of  profound  gratification  to  an  old  soldier  who 
has  long  worked  toward  this  great  end  to  know  that  his 
country  has  already,  in  his  short  lifetime,  come  so  near 
this  perfect  ideal  of  a  peace-loving  yet  military  republic. 
Only  a  few  more  years  of  progress  in  the  direction  al 
ready  taken,  and  the  usual  prolongation  of  natural  life 
will  yet  enable  me  to  witness  the  realization  of  this  one 
great  object  of  my  earthly  ambition. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  RESTORATION  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  SOUTHERN 
STATES — THE  COURSE  PURSUED  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA 
— AN  ORDER  FROM  GENERAL  GRANT  IN  REGARD  TO 
COTTON  AND  PRODUCE  —  SUGGESTIONS  FOR  THE  REOR 
GANIZATION  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT  —  A  PROVISIONAL 
GOVERNOR  FOR  NORTH  CAROLINA. 

BEING  in  command  in  North  Carolina  at  the  close  of 
the  war,  I  was  connected  for  a  short  period  with 
the  very  earliest  consideration  of  the  vital  question  of 
the  restoration  of  civil  government  in  the  Southern 
States,  in  which  I  acted  a  more  important  part  at  a  later 
period.  The  moment  the  surrender  of  Johnston's  army 
made  it  evident  that  the  end  was  near,  the  question 
arose,  and  was  much  discussed  among  some  of  the 
prominent  officers,  as  to  the  status  of  the  negroes  in 
the  South.  The  position  was  promptly  taken  by  me, 
as  the  responsible  commander  in  North  Carolina,  that  the 
question  at  that  time  was  solely  one  of  fact.  The  Presi 
dent's  proclamation  of  emancipation  was  virtually  a 
military  order  to  the  army  to  free  all  the  slaves  in  the 
insurgent  States  as  rapidly  as  military  operations  should 
bring  them  within  its  control.  Whatever  the  legal  effect 
of  the  proclamation  upon  the  status  of  slaves  not  within 
the  reach  of  the  army  when  it  was  issued,  there  could  be 
no  question  of  its  binding  obligation,  as  an  order  to  the 
army,  to  be  executed  and  made  practically  effective  as 
rapidly  as  it  came  within  the  power  of  the  army  to  exe 
cute  it.  Accordingly,  the  following  order  was  issued  by 
me  to  give  full  practical  effect  to  the  proclamation,  and 

367 


368  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

to  maintain  the  freedom  of  all  former  slaves,  so  long  as 
the  subject-matter  should  remain  under  military  control. 
This  order,  which  was  the  first  public  official  declaration 
on  the  subject,  was  mentioned  by  one  of  the  leading 
journals  of  New  York  at  the  time  as  having  at  least  the 
merit  of  "  saving  a  world  of  discussion."  However  this 
may  be,  little  or  no  discussion  followed,  and  the  freedom 
of  all  slaves  in  the  States  lately  in  insurrection  at  once 
became  an  established  fact. 

(General  Orders,  No.  32.) 

HDQRS.  DEPT.  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 
RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  27,  1865. 

To  remove  a  doubt  which  seems  to  exist  in  the  minds  of  some 
of  the  people  of  North  Carolina,  it  is  hereby  declared  that  by 
virtue  of  the  proclamation  of  the  President  of  the  United 
States  dated  January  1,  1863,  all  persons  in  this  State  hereto 
fore  held  as  slaves  are  now  free,  and  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
army  to  maintain  the  freedom  of  such  persons. 

It  is  recommended  to  the  former  owners  of  the  freedmen  to 
employ  them  as  hired  servants  at  reasonable  wages ;  and  it  is 
recommended  to  the  freedmen  that,  when  allowed  to  do  so,  they 
remain  with  their  former  masters,  and  labor  faithfully  so  long 
as  they  shall  be  treated  kindly  and  paid  reasonable  wages,. or 
that  they  immediately  seek  employment  elsewhere  in  the  kind 
of  work  to  which  they  are  accustomed.  It  is  not  well  for  them 
to  congregate  about  towns  or  military  camps.  They  will  not  be 
supported  in  idleness. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Schofield  : 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

On  the  same  day  I  issued  the  following : 

(General  Orders,  No.  31.) 

HDQRS.  DEPT.  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA,  ARMY  OF  THE  OHIO, 

RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  April  27, 1865. 

The  commanding  general  has  the  great  satisfaction  of  an 
nouncing  to  the  army  and  to  the  people  of  North  Carolina  that 


THE  COURSE  PURSUED  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA 

hostilities  within  this  State  have  definitively  ceased ;  that  for  us 
the  war  is  ended;  and  it  is  hoped  that  peace  will  soon  be  re 
stored  throughout  our  country. 

It  is  now  the  duty  of  all  to  cultivate  friendly  relations  with 
the  same  zeal  which  has  characterized  our  conduct  of  the  war, 
that  the  blessings  of  Union,  peace,  and  material  prosperity  may 
be  speedily  restored  to  the  entire  country.  It  is  confidently 
believed  and  expected  that  the  troops  of  this  army  and  the  peo 
ple  of  North  Carolina  will  cordially  unite  in  honest  endeavors 
to  accomplish  this  great  end. 

All  good  and  peaceable  citizens  will  be  protected  and  treated 
with  kindness,  while  those  who  disturb  the  peace  or  violate  the 
laws  will  be  punished  with  the  severity  of  martial  law. 

The  troops  will  be  distributed  so  as  best  to  secure  the  inter 
ests  of  the  United  States  government  and  protect  the  people 
until  a  civil  government  can  be  established  in  harmony  with 
the  constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States. 

The  most  perfect  discipline  and  good  conduct  are  enjoined 
upon  all  officers  and  soldiers,  and  cordial  support  upon  all  good 
citizens. 

All  who  are  peaceably  disposed  are  invited  to  return  to  their 
homes  and  resume  their  industrial  pursuits.  Such  as  have 
been  deprived  of  their  animals  and  wagons  by  the  hostile  ar 
mies  will  be  temporarily  supplied,  as  far  as  practicable,  upon 
application  to  the  nearest  provost-marshal,  by  loans  of  the  cap 
tured  property  in  possession  of  the  quartermaster's  department. 
The  needy  will  also  be  supplied,  for  the  time  being,  with  sub 
sistence  stores  from  the  commissary  department.  .  .  . 

By  command  of  Major-General  Schofield : 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 


On  May  4,  I  issued  a  circular  to  this  effect : 

Local  commanders  and  provost-marshals  will  encourage  all 
refugees,  white  and  colored,  to  return  to  their  homes ;  and  for 
this  purpose  will  furnish  them  the  necessary  railroad  passes 
and  subsistence. 

Such  persons  must  not  be  given  passes  to  Raleigh  or  points 
on  the  sea-coast,  nor  be  permitted  to  congregate  about  towns  or 
camps,  there  to  live  in  idleness. 

24 


370  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

On  May  5,  I  wrote  to  General  Sherman : 

When  General  Grant  was  here,  as  you  doubtless  recollect,  he 
said  the  lines  had  been  extended  to  embrace  this  and  other 
States  south.  The  order,  it  seems,  has  been  modified  so  as  to  in 
clude  only  Virginia  and  Tennessee.  I  think  it  would  be  an  act 
of  wisdom  to  open  this  State  to  trade  at  once.  I  hope  the 
government  will  make  known  its  policy  as  to  organization  of 
State  governments  without  delay.  Affairs  must  necessarily  be 
in  a  very  unsettled  state  until  that  is  done.  The  people  are  now 
in  a  mood  to  accept  almost  anything  which  promises  a  definite 
settlement.  What  is  to  be  done  with  the  freedmen  is  the  ques 
tion  of  all,  and  it  is  the  all-important  question.  It  requires 
prompt  and  wise  action  to  prevent  the  negro  from  becoming  a 
huge  elephant  on  our  hands. 

If  I  am  to  govern  this  State,  it  is  important  for  me  to  know  it 
at  once.  If  another  is  to  be  sent  here,  it  cannot  be  done  too 
soon,  for  he  will  probably  undo  the  most  of  what  I  shall  have 
done.  I  shall  be  most  glad  to  hear  from  you  fully  when  you 
have  time  to  write.  .  .  . 

Two  days  later  I  wrote  to  General  Halleck : 

I  have  received  your  despatch  concerning  slavery,  the  treat 
ment  of  freedmen,  etc.  I  will  send  you  my  orders  issued  some 
days  ago,  which  agree  perfectly  with  your  views  on  this  subject. 
I  have  not  recognized  in  any  way  any  of  the  civil  officers  of  the 
State  —  not  being  willing  to  act  in  such  matters  in  the  absence 
of  any  indication  of  the  policy  of  the  government,  and  taking  it 
for  granted  that  instructions  would  be  given  soon.  In  this  con 
nection,  I  desire  to  suggest  that  the  sooner  a  military  governor 
is  appointed  for  this  State,  and  steps  taken  to  organize  a  civil 
government,  the  better.  The  people  are  now  in  a  mood  to  accept 
anything  in  reason,  and  to  do  what  the  government  desires.  If 
I  am,  by  virtue  of  my  command,  to  perform  the  duties  of  mili 
tary  governor,  I  would  like  to  know  it. 

If  another  is  to  be  appointed,  it  ought  to  be  done  before  I  have 
been  compelled  to  do  something  which  he  may  think  it  necessary 
to  undo.  I  think  it  would  be  eminently  wise  to  retain  in  office 
justices  of  the  peace,  sheriffs,  and  other  inferior  officers  who 
may  prove  to  be  loyal  and  worthy ;  but  this  should  be  done  by 


THE  COURSE  PURSUED  IN  NORTH  CAROLINA    37! 

the  military  governor.  I  believe  the  administration  need  have 
no  anxiety  about  the  question  of  slavery,  or  any  other  important 
question,  in  this  State.  But  the  proper  care  of  the  freedmen 
should  be  provided  for  by  State  legislation  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  shall  be  thankful  for  any  information  or  instructions  you  may 
be  able  to  give  me  on  these  subjects. 

A  week  later  more  precise  rules  governing  the  freed 
men  were  issued : 

(General  Orders,  No.  46.) 

HDQRS.  DEPT.  OF  NORTH  CAROLINA,  ARMY  OP  THE  OHIO, 

RALEIGH,  N.  C.,  May  15,  1865. 

The  following  rules  are  published  for  the  government  of  freed 
men  in  North  Carolina  until  the  restoration  of  civil  government 
in  the  State : 

I.  The  common  laws  governing  the  domestic  relations,  such  as 
those  giving  parents  authority  and  control  over  their  children, 
and  guardians  control  over  their  wards,  are  in  force.     The  pa 
rent's  or  guardian's  authority  and  obligations  take  the  place  of 
those  of  the  former  master. 

II.  The  former  masters   are  constituted  the   guardians   of 
minors  and  of  the  aged  and  infirm,  in  the  absence  of  parents  or 
other  relatives  capable  of  supporting  them. 

III.  Young  men  and  women  under  twenty-one  years  of  age 
remain  under  the  control  of  their  parents  or  guardians  until 
they  become  of  age,  thus  aiding  to  support  their  parents  and 
younger  brothers  and  sisters. 

IV.  The  former  masters  of  freedmen  may  not  turn  away  the 
young  or  the  infirm,  nor  refuse  to  give  them  food  and  shelter ; 
nor  may  the  able-bodied  men  or  women  go  away  from  their 
homes,  or  live  in  idleness,  and  leave  their  parents,  children,,  or 
young  brothers  and  sisters  to  be  supported  by  others. 

V.  Persons  of  age  who  are  free  from  any  of  the  obligations  re 
ferred  to  above  are  at  liberty  to  find  new  homes  wherever  they  can 
obtain  proper  employment;  but  they  will  not  be  supported  by 
the  government,  nor  by  their  former  masters,  unless  they  work. 

VI.  It  will  be  left  to  the  employer  and  servants  to  agree  upon 
the  wages  to  be  paid;  but  freedmen  are  advised  that  for  the 
present  season  they  ought  to  expect  only  moderate  wages,  and 


372  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

where  their  employers  cannot  pay  them  money,  they  ought  to 
be  contented  with  a  fair  share  in  the  crops  to  be  raised.  They 
have  gained  their  personal  freedom.  By  industry  and  good 
conduct  they  may  rise  to  independence  and  even  wealth. 

VII.  All  officers,  soldiers,  and  citizens  are  requested  to  give 
publicity  to  these  rules,  and  to  instruct  the  freed  people  as  to 
their  new  rights  and  obligations. 

VIII.  All  officers  of  the  army  and  of  the  county  police  com 
panies  are  authorized  and  required  to  correct  any  violation  of 
the  above  rules  within  their  jurisdiction. 

IX.  Each  district  commander  will  appoint  a  superintendent 
of  freedmen, —  a  commissioned  officer, —  with  such  number  of 
assistants  —  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  —  as  may  be 
necessary,  whose  duty  it  will  be  to  take  charge  of  all  the  freed 
people  in  his  district  who  are  without  homes  or  proper  employ 
ment.     The  superintendents  will  send  back  to  their  homes  all 
who  have  left  them  in  violation  of  the  above  rules,  and  will  en 
deavor  to  find  homes  and  suitable  employment  for  all  others. 
They  will  provide  suitable  camps  or  quarters  for  such  as  cannot 
be  otherwise  provided  for,  and  attend  to  their  discipline,  police, 
subsistence,  etc. 

X.  The  superintendents  will  hear  all  complaints  of  guardians 
or  wards,  and  report  the  facts  to  their  district  commanders,  who 
are  authorized  to  dissolve  the  existing  relations  of  guardian  and 
ward  in  any  case  which  may  seem  to  require  it,  and  to  direct 
the  superintendent  to  otherwise  provide  for  the  wards,  in  accor 
dance  with  the  above  rules. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Schofield : 

J.  A.  CAMPBELL,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

On  May  29,  General  Grant,  from  Washington,  ordered 
me  to  "  give  every  facility  and  encouragement  to  getting 
to  market  cotton  and  other  Southern  products.  Let  there 
be  no  seizure  of  private  property  or  searching  to  look 
after  Confederate  cotton.  The  finances  of  the  country 
demand  that  all  articles  of  export  should  be  gotten  to 
market  as  speedily  as  possible."  I  answered  at  once : 

Your  despatch  concerning  cotton  and  other  products  is  re 
ceived.  I  some  time  ago  removed  all  military  restrictions  upon 


AN  OEDEE  FEOM  GENEEAL  GEANT         373 

trade,  and  have  given  every  facility  for  carrying  cotton  and  other 
products  to  market.  The  only  obstacles  in  the  way  are  the  re 
strictions  of  the  Treasury  Department.  It  would  be  a  blessing 
to  the  country  if  the  whole  system  could  be  abolished.  Now 
only  one  man  in  North  Carolina  is  authorized  to  buy  cotton,  and 
he  does  not  pay  money  for  it.  It  is  impossible  for  people  to  get 
their  products  to  market  in  this  way. 

The  imperative  need  of  the  Southern  States  at  the  close 
of  the  war  was  temporary  military  government,  and  per 
mission,  under  such  full  military  protection,  to  reorgan 
ize  their  civil  governments.  In  the  following  letter 
to  General  Grant,  dated  May  10,  I  submitted  my  views 
concerning  the  policy  that  ought  to  be  pursued : 

I  desire  to  submit  to  you  my  views  concerning  the  policy 
that  ought  to  be  pursued  in  North  Carolina,  leaving  it  to  your 
judgment  whether  or  not  to  submit  them  to  the  President  or 
Secretary  of  War.  I  am  now  led  to  this  mainly  by  a  letter  which 
I  received  on  the  7th  from  Chief  Justice  Chase,  giving  some 
points  of  the  policy  advocated  by  him,  which,  if  adopted  in  this 
State,  would  in  my  opinion  lead  to  disastrous  results. 

The  points  I  refer  to  are  briefly  as  follows,  viz. : 

The  organization  of  the  State  government  to  be  left  to  the 
people  acting  in  their  original  sovereign  capacity. 

In  determining  the  right  of  suffrage,  the  old  Constitution, 
amended  in  1835,  to  be  followed  in  preference  to  the  new  one 
which  was  in  force  at  the  commencement  of  the  rebellion  —  the 
object  being  to  give  negroes  the  right  to  vote. 

The  first  proposition  is  not,  I  think,  open  to  serious  objection. 
With  proper  assistance  from  the  military  authorities,  it  can  be 
successfully  carried  out. 

The  second  proposition  is  the  one  to  which  I  refer  as  specially 
objectionable,  and  this  for  two  reasons. 

First.  The  Constitution  of  the  State  as  it  existed  immedi 
ately  prior  to  the  rebellion  is  still  the  State  Constitution,  and 
there  is  no  power  on  earth  but  the  people  of  the  State  that  can 
alter  it. 

The  operations  of  the  war  have  freed  the  slaves  in  this  and 
most  other  States,  and,  doubtless,  slavery  will  be  constitution- 


374  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ally  abolished  throughout  the  country.  But  the  United  States 
cannot  make  a  negro,  nor  even  a  white  man,  an  elector  in  any 
State.  That  is  a  power  expressly  reserved  by  the  Constitution 
to  the  several  States.  We  cannot  alter  or  amend  the  Constitu 
tion  of  North  Carolina,  as  it  now  exists,  without  either  first 
altering  or  else  violating  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

If  we  hold  that  by  the  rebellion  the  States  have  lost  their 
existence  as  States,  and  have  been  reduced  to  unorganized  Terri 
tories  under  the  absolute  sovereign  authority  of  the  United 
States,  then  undoubtedly  we  may  declare  that  all  inhabitants, 
white  and  black,  shall  have  equal  political  rights  and  an  equal 
voice  in  the  organization  of  a  State  to  be  admitted  into  the 
Union.  But  I  understand  President  Johnson  repudiates  this 
doctrine  5  hence  it  may  be  left  out  of  the  question. 

It  appears  to  me  beyond  question  that  the  Constitution  of 
North  Carolina  is  now  valid  and  binding  as  the  law  of  the  State, 
and  that  any  measures  for  the  reorganization  of  the  State  govern 
ment  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  that  instru 
ment.  This,  I  am  convinced,  is  the  unanimous  opinion  of  the 
leading  Union  men  of  the  State. 

My  second  reason  for  objecting  to  the  proposition  is  the 
absolute  unfitness  of  the  negroes,  as  a  class,  for  any  such  respon 
sibility.  They  can  neither  read  nor  write.  They  have  no  know 
ledge  whatever  of  law  or  government.  They  do  not  even  know 
the  meaning  of  the  freedom  that  has  been  given  them,  and  are 
much  astonished  when  informed  that  it  does  not  mean  that  they 
are  to  live  in  idleness  and  be  fed  by  the  government. 

It  is  true  they  are  docile,  obedient,  and  anxious  to  learn ; 
but  we  certainly  ought  to  teach  them  something  before  we  give 
them  an  equal  voice  with  ourselves  in  government.  This  view 
is  so  fully  recognized  as  correct  by  all  who  are  familiar,  by  actual 
contact,  with  the  negro  character  and  condition,  that  argument 
seems  superfluous.  I  have  yet  to  see  a  single  one  among  the 
many  Union  men  in  North  Carolina  who  would  willingly  submit 
for  a  moment  to  the  immediate  elevation  of  the  negro  to  political 
equality  with  the  white  man. 

They  are  all,  or  nearly  all,  content  with  the  abolition  of  sla 
very.  Many  of  them  are  rejoiced  that  it  is  done.  But  to  raise 
the  negro,  in  his  present  ignorant  and  degraded  condition,  to 
be  their  political  equals  would  be,  in  their  opinion,  to  enslave 
them  [the  white  citizens].  If  they  did  not  rebel  against  it,  it 


THE  REORGANIZATION  OF  CIVIL  GOVERNMENT         375 

would  only  be  because  rebellion  would  be  hopeless.  A  govern 
ment  so  organized  would  in  no  sense  be  a  popular  government. 

After  careful  consideration  of  all  the  questions  involved,  I 
am  fully  convinced  as  to  the  best  policy  to  be  adopted  in  this 
State,  which  I  will  submit  in  outline : 

A  military  governor  to  be  appointed,  who  shall  have  com 
mand  of  all  the  troops  in  the  State ;  or  the  department  com 
mander  be  authorized  to  assume,  by  virtue  of  his  command,  the 
functions  of  military  governor,  which  naturally  devolve  upon 
him. 

The  military  governor  to  declare  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  State  in  force  immediately  preceding  the  pretended  Act 
of  Secession  (so  far  as  the  same  are  not  inconsistent  with  the 
Constitution  and  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  war  proc 
lamations  of  the  President)  to  be  still  in  force. 

To  make  provisional  appointments  of  justices  of  the  peace, 
sheriffs,  and  such  other  inferior  officers  as  the  State  laws  em 
power  the  governor  to  appoint,  to  serve  until  the  organization 
of  a  civil  government. 

To  order  an  enrolment  of  all  electors  who  may  take  the 
President's  amnesty  oath. 

As  soon  as  this  enrolment  shall  be  completed,  to  call  an  elec 
tion  for  delegates  to  a  State  convention.  The  qualifications  of 
voters  and  candidates  to  be  those  prescribed  by  the  State  laws, 
and  that  they  shall  take  the  amnesty  oath.  All  acts  of  the 
convention  to  be  submitted  to  the  people,  for  their  ratification 
or  rejection,  at  the  same  time  with  the  election  of  governor  and 
members  of  the  legislature,  which  would  be  ordered  by  the 
convention. 

I  would  confidently  expect  a  convention,  so  chosen,  to  repudi 
ate  the  doctrine  of  secession,  abolish  slavery,  and  fully  restore 
the  State  to  its  practical  constitutional  relations  to  the  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  The  people  are  now  ripe  for  such 
action.  They  only  ask  to  know  what  the  government  desires 
them  to  do,  and  how  they  are  to  do  it. 

If,  however,  they  should  fail  to  do  this,  I  would  regard  them 
as  having  violated  their  oaths,  would  dissolve  the  convention, 
and  hold  the  State  under  military  government  until  the  people 
should  come  to  their  senses.  I  would  have  a  lawful  popular 
government  or  a  military  government  —  the  latter  being  a  ne 
cessary  substitute  in  the  absence  of  the  former. 


376  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

I  am  willing  to  discharge,  to  the  best  of  my  ability,  any  duty 
which  may  properly  devolve  upon  me.  Yet  if  a  policy  so  op 
posed  to  my  views  as  that  proposed  by  Mr.  Chase  is  to  be  adopted, 
I  respectfully  suggest  that  I  am  not  the  proper  person  to  carry 
it  out. 

If,  however,  after  knowing  my  views  fully,  it  be  desired  that 
I  execute  the  President's  wishes,  would  it  not  be  well  for  me 
to  have  a  personal  interview  with  him,  in  order  that  I  may 
fully  understand  his  plan  and  the  principles  upon  which  it  is 
founded? 


The  fundamental  principles  of  my  suggestion  were : 

First.  The  Constitution  and  laws  as  they  were  before 
secession,  modified  to  embrace  the  legitimate  results 
of  the  war  —  namely,  national  integrity  and  universal 
freedom. 

Second.  Intelligent  suffrage,  to  be  regulated  by  the 
States  themselves;  and 

Third.  Military  governments,  in  the  absence  of  popu 
lar  civil  governments,  as  being  the  only  lawful  substi 
tute,  under  our  system,  for  a  government  by  the  people 
during  their  temporary  inability,  from  whatever  cause, 
to  govern  themselves. 

But  these  constitutional  methods  were  rejected.  First 
came  the  unauthorized  system  of  "provisional"  gover 
nors,  civilians  without  any  shadow  of  lawful  authority 
for  their  appointments,  and  their  abortive  attempts  at 
"  reconstruction." 

Next  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  disfranchising 
nearly  all  the  trusted  leaders  of  the  Southern  people, 
and  then  the  "iron-clad  oath,"  universal  enfranchisement 
of  the  ignorant  blacks,  and  "carpet-bag"  governments, 
with  all  their  offensive  consequences.  If  wise  states 
manship  instead  of  party  passion  had  ruled  the  hour, 
how  easily  could  those  twelve  years  of  misrule  in 
the  South,  and  consequent  disappointment  and  shame 
among  its  authors  in  the  North,  have  been  avoided! 


A  PROVISIONAL  GOVERNOR  FOR  NORTH  CAROLINA  377 

A  "provisional"  governor  (William  W.  Holden)  having 
been  appointed  for  North  Carolina,  I  relinquished  com 
mand  of  the  department  in  June,  1865,  to  enter  upon 
more  important  service  in  respect  to  the  then  existing 
military  intervention  in  Mexico  by  the  Emperor  of  the 
French. 


CHAPTER  XX 

FRENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO — A  PLAN  TO  COMPEL  THE 
WITHDRAWAL  OF  THE  FRENCH  ARMY — GRANT'S  LETTER 
OF  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  GENERAL  SHERIDAN  —  SECRETARY 
SEWARD  ADVOCATES  MORAL  SUASION  —  A  MISSION  TO 
PARIS  WITH  THAT  END  IN  VIEW — SPEECHMAKING  AT  THE 
AMERICAN  THANKSGIVING  DINNER — NAPOLEON'S  METHOD 
OF  RETREATING  WITH  DIGNITY — A  PRESENTATION  TO  THE 
EMPEROR  AND  EMPRESS. 

WHILE  the  government  of  the  United  States  was 
fully  occupied  with  the  contest  for  the  preserva 
tion  of  the  Union,  Napoleon  III,  Emperor  of  the  French, 
attempted  to  overthrow  the  republican  government  in 
Mexico,  and  establish  in  its  stead  an  empire  under  the 
Archduke  Maximilian  of  Austria.  If  the  American  con 
flict  had  resulted  in  the  triumph  of  secession,  so  also  might 
Napoleon  have  succeeded  in  reestablishing  monarchical 
government  on  the  American  continent.  But  from  the 
moment  when  the  Union  of  the  States  became  reassured, 
European  interference  in  the  political  affairs  of  the 
American  republic  became  impossible.  Upon  this  sub 
ject  there  appeared  to  be  no  division  of  sentiment  among 
the  people  of  the  United  States.  Certainly  there  was 
none  among  the  responsible  American  statesmen  of  that 
time.  It  was  their  unanimous  voice  that  the  French  in 
tervention  in  Mexico  must  be  speedily  terminated;  but 
there  was  naturally  some  division  of  opinion  respecting 
the  means  by  which  this  should  be  effected.  Some  fa- 

378 


FEENCH  INTERVENTION  IN  MEXICO  379 

vored  the  most  prompt  and  vigorous  military  action, 
while  others,  not  unmindful  of  the  long-existing  friend 
ship  between  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  France, 
preferred  more  peaceful  measures. 

As  the  first  and  necessary  step  in  either  line  of  policy, 
whether  for  immediate  active  military  operations  or  as 
conclusive  evidence  of  ultimate  military  purpose  in  aid 
of  diplomacy.  General  Sheridan  was  sent,  with  an  army 
of  about  fifty  thousand  men,  to  the  line  of  the  Rio 
Grande.  But  Sheridan's  troops  were  Union  volunteers 
who  had  been  enlisted  especially  for  the  Civil  War,  then 
terminated ;  and  the  necessity  was  at  once  recognized  of 
organizing  a  new  army  for  the  express  purpose  of  acting 
against  the  French  army  in  Mexico,  in  case  of  need. 
It  was  proposed  that  this  new  army  should  be  enlisted 
and  organized  under  the  republican  government  of  Mex 
ico,  the  only  government  recognized  by  the  United 
States  in  that  country.  This  course  would  avoid  the 
necessity  of  any  political  action  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  in  the  premises.  Lieutenant-General 
U.  S.  Grant,  then  commander-in-chief  of  the  armies  of 
the  United  States,  was  requested  to  select  an  officer  to 
organize  and  command  the  proposed  army. 

In  June,  1865,  at  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  I  received  a 
message  from  General  Grant  informing  me  of  my  selec 
tion,  and  desiring  me,  if  I  was  willing  to  consider  the 
proposition,  to  come  to  Washington  for  consultation  on 
the  subject.  Upon  my  arrival  in  Washington,  I  con 
sulted  freely  with  General  Grant,  Senor  Romero  (the 
Mexican  minister),  President  Johnson,  Secretary  of  State 
Seward,  and  Secretary  of  War  Stanton,  all  of  whom  ap 
proved  the  general  proposition  that  I  should  assume  the 
control  and  direction  of  the  measures  to  be  adopted  for 
the  purpose  of  causing  the  French  army  to  evacuate 
Mexico.  Not  much  was  said  between  me  and  the  Presi 
dent  or  either  of  the  secretaries  at  that  time  about  the 


380  FOKTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AKMY 

means  to  be  employed ;  but  it  appeared  to  be  understood 
by  all  that  force  would  probably  be  necessary,  and  for 
some  time  no  other  means  were  considered.  The  subject 
was  fully  discussed  with  General  Grant  and  Senor 
Romero,  and  I  then  consented  to  take  charge  of  the 
matter,  with  the  understanding  that  I  should  have  per 
fect  freedom  of  action  and  choice  of  means  and  of  time, 
so  far  as  circumstances  would  permit.  To  enable  me  to 
do  this,  the  War  Department  gave  me  leave  of  absence 
for  twelve  months,  with  permission  to  go  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  United  States  and  to  take  with  me  any 
officers  of  my  staff  whom  I  might  designate.  It  was 
proposed  to  organize  in  Mexican  territory  an  army  corps 
under  commissions  from  the  government  of  Mexico,  the 
officers  and  soldiers  to  be  taken  from  the  Union  and 
Confederate  forces,  who  were  reported  to  be  eager  to 
enlist  in  such  an  enterprise. 

The  Mexican  authorities  proposed  to  furnish  the  means 
by  which  this  army  should  be  paid  and  the  expenses  of 
military  operations  defrayed,  and  to  that  end  a  loan  was 
to  be  negotiated  in  the  United  States.  To  facilitate  the 
enlistment  and  equipment  of  the  proposed  army  corps, 
General  Grant  gave  me  a  manuscript  order,  dated  "West 
Point,  July  25, 1865,  addressed  to  General  P.  H.  Sheridan, 
then  commanding  the  Military  Division  of  the  Gulf,  with 
a  large  force  near  the  Mexican  frontier.  The  following 
is  a  copy  of  General  Grant's  order : 

HEAD  QUARTERS  ARMIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

WEST  POINT,  N.  Y.,  July  25,  1865. 
MAJ.-GEN.  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  Com'd'g  Mil.  Div.  of  the  Gulf. 

GENERAL:  Maj. -General  J.  M.  Schofield  goes  to  the  Rio 
Grande  on  an  inspection  tour,  carrying  with  him  a  leave  of  ab 
sence  for  one  year,  with  authority  to  leave  the  United  States. 
If  he  avails  himself  of  this  leave  he  will  explain  to  you  the  ob 
ject  more  fully  than  I  could  do  in  the  limits  of  a  letter,  and 


GRANT'S  LETTER  OF  INSTRUCTIONS  TO  SHERIDAN 

much  more  fully  than  I  could  do  now,  under  any  circumstances, 
because  much  that  will  have  to  be  learned  to  fix  his  determina 
tion,  whether  to  go  or  not,  has  yet  to  be  found  out  in  Washing 
ton  whilst  I  shall  be  away.  This,  however,  I  can  say :  Gen. 
Schofield's  leave  has  been  given  with  the  concurrence  of  the 
President,  he  having  full  knowledge  of  the  object.  I  have  both 
written  my  views  to  the  President  and  had  conversations  with 
him  on  the  subject.  In  all  that  relates  to  Mexican  affairs  he 
agrees  in  the  duty  we  owe  to  ourselves  to  maintain  the  Monroe 
doctrine,  both  as  a  principle  and  as  a  security  for  our  future 
peace. 

On  the  Eio  Grande,  or  in  Texas,  convenient  to  get  there,  we 
must  have  a  large  amount  of  surrendered  ordnance  and  ord 
nance  stores,  or  such  articles  accumulating  from  discharging 
men  who  leave  their  stores  behind.  Without  special  orders  to 
do  so,  send  none  of  these  articles  back,  but  rather  place  them 
convenient  to  be  permitted  to  go  into  Mexico  if  they  can  be  got 
into  the  hands  of  the  defenders  of  the  only  Government  we 
recognize  in  that  country.  I  hope  Gen.  Schofield  may  go  with 
orders  direct  to  receive  these  articles ;  but  if  he  does  not,  I  know 
it  will  meet  with  general  approbation  to  let  him  have  them  if 
contrary  orders  are  not  received. 

It  is  a  fixed  determination  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States,  and  I  think  myself  safe  in  saying  on  the  part  of 
the  President  also,  that  an  empire  shall  not  be  established  on 
this  continent  by  the  aid  of  foreign  bayonets.  A  war  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  is  to  be  avoided,  if  possible;  but  it  will 
be  better  to  go  to  war  now,  when  but  little  aid  given  to  the  Mexi 
cans  will  settle  the  question,  than  to  have  in  prospect  a  greater 
war,  sure  to  come  if  delayed  until  the  empire  is  established. 
We  want,  then,  to  aid  the  Mexicans  without  giving  cause  of  war 
between  the  United  States  and  France.  Between  the  would-be 
empire  of  Maximilian  and  the  United  States  all  difficulty  can 
easily  be  settled  by  observing  the  same  sort  of  neutrality  that 
has  been  observed  toward  us  for  the  last  four  years. 

This  is  a  little  indefinite  as  a  letter  of  instructions  to  be  gov 
erned  by.  I  hope  with  this  you  may  receive  them  —  instructions  — 
in  much  more  positive  terms.  With  a  knowledge  of  the  fact 
before  you,  however,  that  the  greatest  desire  is  felt  to  see  the 
Liberal  Government  restored  in  Mexico, —  and  no  doubt  exists  of 
the  strict  justice  of  our  right  to  demand  this,  and  enforce  the 


382  POET Y- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

demand  with  the  whole  strength  of  the  United  States, —  your 
own  judgment  gives  you  a  basis  of  action  that  will  aid  you. 

I  will  recommend  in  a  few  days  that  you  be  directed  to  dis 
charge  all  the  men  you  think  can  be  spared  from  the  Dept.  of 
Texas,  where  they  are,  giving  transportation  to  their  homes  to 
all  who  desire  to  return.  You  are  aware  that  existing  orders 
permit  discharged  soldiers  to  retain  their  arms  and  accoutre 
ments  at  low  rates,  fixed  in  orders. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obt.  svt., 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Lt.-Gen. 


In  effect  this  order  required  General  Sheridan  to  turn 
over  to  me  all  of  Ms  volunteer  troops  who  might  wish 
to  take  part  in  the  Mexican  enterprise,  with  their  arms 
and  equipments,  and  all  "surrendered  ordnance  and 
ordnance  stores,"  etc.,  thus  making  it  easy  for  me  to 
arm  and  equip  at  small  cost  the  ex-Confederates  and 
others  who  would  join  my  standard.  Soon  after  the 
date  of  General  Grant's  order  to  General  Sheridan,  and 
at  the  request  of  Secretary  Seward,  conveyed  to  me  by 
Mr.  Stanton,  I  met  Mr.  Seward  at  Cape  May.  He  then 
proposed  to  me  to  go  to  France,  under  authority  of  the 
State  Department,  to  see  if  the  French  emperor  could 
not  be  made  to  understand  the  necessity  of  withdrawing 
his  army  from  Mexico,  and  thus  save  us  the  necessity 
of  expelling  it  by  force.  Mr.  Seward  expressed  the  belief 
that  if  Napoleon  could  be  made  to  understand  that  the 
people  of  the  United  States  would  never,  under  any  cir 
cumstances,  consent  to  -the  existence  in  Mexico  of  a  gov 
ernment  established  and  sustained  by  foreign  power,  he 
would  withdraw  his  army  from  that  country.  If  this 
were  done,  the  friendly  relations  between  the  people  of 
France  and  the  United  States  would  not  be  disturbed, 
while  the  expulsion  of  a  French  army  from  Mexico  by 
American  volunteers  would  engender  great  bitterness  of 
feeling  among  the  French  people,  even  if  it  did  not  lead 
to  war  between  France  and  the  United  States. 


SECRETARY  SEWARD  ADVOCATES  MORAL  SUASION     333 

This  proposition  from  Mr.  Seward  seemed  to  put  upon 
me  the  responsibility  of  deciding  the  momentous  ques 
tion  of  future  friendship  or  enmity  between  my  own 
country  and  our  ancient  ally  and  friend.  I  had,  on  the 
one  hand,  full  authority  from  the  War  Department  and 
the  general-in-chief  of  the  army,  given  with  the  know 
ledge  and  consent  of  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
to  organize  and  equip  an  army  for  the  purpose  of  driv 
ing  the  French  out  of  Mexico,  and  on  the  other  hand  a 
request  from  the  State  Department  to  go  to  France  and 
try  by  peaceful  means  to  accomplish  the  same  end. 

As  the  negotiation  of  the  Mexican  loan  had  not  made 
great  progress,  the  funds  were  not  yet  available  for  the 
support  of  an  army.  It  was  expected  that  the  actual 
beginning  of  operations  on  the  Rio  Grande  would  stimu 
late  subscriptions  to  the  loan,  yet  the  lack  of  ready 
money  was  a  sufficient  cause  for  some  delay  in  making 
the  proposed  "  inspection  tour  "  to  the  Rio  Grande ;  and 
this  fact,  added  to  a  natural  love  of  peace  rather  than 
of  war,  and  a  due  sense  of  the  dictates  of  patriotism  as 
contrasted  with  mere  military  ambition,  determined  the 
decision  of  that  question.  It  is  reason  for  profound 
thankfulness  that  the  peaceful  course  was  adopted. 

In  a  letter  dated  August  4,  1865,  I  informed  Mr. 
Seward  of  my  decision,  "after  mature  reflection,"  "to 
undertake  the  mission"  which  he  had  proposed.  Mr. 
Seward  acknowledged  my  letter  on  August  -9,  and  on 
the  19th  I  received  a  telegram  from  the  War  Department 
to  "report  at  the  State  Department  upon  your  [my] 
next  visit  to  Washington."  This  order  was  promptly 
obeyed.  On  August  23  the  Secretary  of  War  sent  a 
letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  accrediting  me  as  an 
officer  of  the  army,  in  which  capacity,  and  unofficially,  I 
was  to  be  understood  by  the  public  as  visiting  Europe. 
A  copy  of  this  letter,  inclosed  in  one  from  the  State 
Department,  was  sent  to  Mr.  Bigelow,  United  States 


384          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

minister  at  Paris ;  and  similar  letters  were  sent  to  sev 
eral  other  United  States  ministers  in  Europe.  But  time 
passed  until  November  4,  and  thus  more  than  two 
months  elapsed  before  the  Secretary  of  State  was  ready 
for  me  to  start  for  Europe.  Mr.  Seward  then  gave  me 
a  confidential  letter,  dated  November  4,  1865,  addressed 
to  Mr.  Bigelow,  and  a  letter  of  credit  on  the  Barings, 
and  requested  me  to  proceed  on  my  mission. 

In  his  letter  to  Mr.  Bigelow  he  said :  "  General  Scho- 
field  proceeds  to  Paris.  He  is,  I  believe,  fully  informed 
of  the  feelings  and  sentiments,  not  only  of  this  govern 
ment,  but  of  the  American  people.  I  commend  him  to 
your  confidence,"  etc.  Mr.  Seward  explained  to  me  sev 
eral  times  during  this  period  of  delay  that  correspondence 
then  going  on  with  the  French  government  rendered  it 
advisable  that  my  visit  be  delayed  until  he  should  re 
ceive  expected  answers  from  that  government.  The  At 
lantic  cable  did  not  then  exist,  and  hence  correspondence 
across  the  ocean  was  necessarily  slow.  The  expected 
despatch — viz.,  that  from  the  French  Foreign  Office  to 
their  minister  at  Washington,  dated  October  18,  1865, 
and  communicated  to  Mr.  Seward  on  the  29th  of  the 
same  month — was  no  more  satisfactory,  though  in  better 
tone,  than  those  which  had  preceded.  In  effect  it  de 
manded  a  recognition  by  the  United  States  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  Maximilian  in  Mexico  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  recall  of  the  French  army.  The  time  had  evidently 
arrived  when  Napoleon  must  be  informed  in  language 
which  could  not  be  misunderstood  what  was  the  real 
sentiment  of  the  government  and  people  of  the  United 
States  on  the  Mexican  question.  It  was  difficult,  perhaps 
impossible,  to  express  that  sentiment  in  official  diplo 
matic  language  that  an  emperor  could  afford  to  receive 
from  a  friendly  power.  It  was  therefore  desirable  that 
the  disagreeable  information  be  conveyed  to  Napoleon 
in  a  way  which  would  command  his  full  credence,  and 


A  MISSION  TO  PAEIS  385 

which  he  yet  need  not  regard  as  offensive.  Mr.  Seward's 
explanation  and  instructions  to  me,  after  several  long 
conversations  on  this  subject,  were  summed  up  in  the 
words :  "  I  want  you  to  get  your  legs  under  Napoleon's 
mahogany,  and  tell  him  he  must  get  out  of  Mexico." 

In  my  visit  to  Paris  I  was  accompanied  by  two  officers 
of  my  staff,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  William  M.  Wherry 
and  Brevet  Brigadier-General  G.  W.  Schofield,  who  had 
been  given  leave  of  absence  for  the  purpose  of  going  with 
me  to  Mexico  or  elsewhere.  We  sailed  from  New  York, 
November  15,  1865,  on  the  Cunard  steamer  Java,  and 
stayed  a  day  in  Liverpool  and  several  days  in  London, 
where  I  explained  to  Mr.  Adams,  United  States  minister, 
the  purpose  of  my  visit. 

Mr.  Adams  expressed  hearty  sympathy  with  the  ob 
ject  of  my  mission,  and  gave  cordial  assent  to  my  wish 
that  I  might  feel  at  liberty  to  consult  him  in  regard  to  it 
at  any  time. 

Mr.  Motley,  United  States  minister  at  Vienna,  whom 
I  had  the  pleasure  of  meeting  at  the  residence  of  Mr. 
Adams,  assured  me  that  the  government  of  Austria  was 
especially  desirous  of  not  being  regarded  by  the  United 
States  as  responsible  in  any  manner  for  the  attempt  to 
establish  an  empire  under  the  Austrian  archduke  in 
Mexico.  Mr.  Motley  thought  a  visit  by  me  to  Vienna 
while  the  Mexican  question  was  pending  might  produce 
undue  excitement.  Hence  I  limited  my  tour  in  that  di 
rection  to  Italy. 

We  proceeded  to  Paris  on  the  2d  of  December.  Our 
arrival  had  been  preceded  by  vague  rumors  of  an  official 
mission  more  or  less  hostile  to  the  interests  of  France, 
which  caused  great  excitement  among  the  French  people 
and  the  American  residents  in  Paris,  and  serious  depres 
sion  of  United  States,  Mexican,  and  French  securities  in 
the  financial  markets  of  Europe.  It  was  also  understood 
that  no  little  anxiety  was  felt  at  the  French  court,  then 

25 


386  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

at  Compiegne.  It  was  manifestly  desirable  to  allay  so 
far  as  possible  this  undue  excitement  in  the  public  mind. 
Hence  I  availed  myself  of  an  early  opportunity,  given 
by  the  American  Thanksgiving  dinner  at  the  Grand 
Hotel,  to  intimate  in  unmistakable  terms  that  my  mis 
sion,  if  any,  was  one  entirely  friendly  to  the  people  of 
France. 

The  following  is  a  part  of  the  account  of  that  banquet 
given  by  the  Paris  correspondent  of  the  "New  York 
Herald,"  under  date  of  December  8,  1865 : 

The  American  residents  and  transient  sojourners  in  Paris 
celebrated  the  national  Thanksgiving  by  a  grand  dinner  at  the 
Grand  Hotel,  which  passed  off  in  splendid  style.  .  .  .  The  next 
toast  was  the  long-looked-for  one  of  the  evening,  for  it  was 
known  that  it  would  call  up  a  distinguished  guest  from  whom 
all  were  anxious  to  hear.  It  was  "  The  Army  and  Navy  of  the 
United  States."  When  the  band  had  ceased  playing  "Yankee 
Doodle/'  Major-General  Schofield  rose  to  reply  to  this  toast,  and 
was  received  with  tremendous  enthusiasm.  The  ladies  rose  and 
waved  their  handkerchiefs,  and  gentlemen  shouted  until  they 
were  hoarse.  The  general,  after  bowing  his  acknowledgments, 
said:  "Fellow-countrymen  —  I  want  words  to  express  to  you 
the  satisfaction  which  will  be  felt  in  the  heart  of  every  soldier 
and  sailor  when  he  learns  the  manner  in  which  the  names  of  the 
army  and  navy  have  been  received  by  you  to-night.  I  will  at 
this  time  allude  but  briefly  to  one  of  the  great  lessons  taught  by 
the  American  war  —  the  grandest  lesson  of  modern  times.  A 
great  people  who  have  heretofore  lived  under  a  government  so 
mild  that  they  were  scarcely  aware  of  its  existence  have  found, 
in  time  of  war,  that  government  to  be  one  of  the  strongest  in 
the  world  [cheers],  raising  and  maintaining  armies  and  navies 
vaster  than  any  ever  before  known  [cheers].  In  point  of  character, 
in  point  of  physical  and  moral  qualities,  in  point  of  discipline 
and  of  mobility  in  large  masses,  the  armies  of  the  United  States 
have  never  before  been  equaled  [loud  cheers].  Yet  this,  great 
as  it  is,  is  not  the  greatest  wonder  of  the  American  war.  This 
vast  army,  as  soon  as  its  work  was  done,  was  quietly  disbanded, 
and  every  man  went  to  his  home,  as  quietly  as  the  Christian 


SPEECHMAKING  AT  THE  AMERICAN  THANKSGIVING  DINNER   3^7 

goes  back  from  church  on  Sabbath  morning ;  and  each  soldier 
reentered  upon  the  avocations  of  peace  a  better  citizen  than  he 
was  before  he  became  a  soldier  [renewed  applause].  This  was 
the  grandest  lesson  of  the  war.  It  shows  that  the  power  of  a 
nation  to  maintain  its  dignity  and  integrity  does  not  result 
from  or  depend  upon  its  form  of  government ;  that  the  greatest 
national  strength  —  the  power  to  mass  the  largest  armies  in 
time  of  war  —  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  broadest  liberty 
of  the  citizen  in  time  of  peace  [enthusiasm].  Permit  me,  in 
conclusion,  to  propose  a  toast  which  I  know  will  be  heartily 
responded  to  by  every  true  American  — '  The  old  friendship 
between  France  and  the  United  States :  may  it  be  strengthened 
and  perpetuated  ! ' "  General  Schofield's  toast  was  drunk  with 
great  enthusiasm,  and  upon  his  taking  his  seat  the  applause 
which  followed  his  remarks  was  deafening. 

The  situation  of  Napoleon's  government  at  that  time 
was  extremely  critical.  The  opposition  was  powerful  and 
aggressive.  The  intervention  in  Mexican  affairs  was  very 
unpopular  in  France,  and  yet  the  national  pride  of  the 
people  would  not  permit  the  Emperor  to  yield  to  menace 
even  from  the  United  States,  nor  allow  bis  army  to  be 
driven  by  force  from  Mexico  without  a  supreme  effort  to 
maintain  it  there.  Napoleon  could  not  have  submitted  to 
such  humiliation  without  the  loss  of  his  throne.  In  short, 
forcible  intervention  by  the  American  people  in  the  Mex 
ican  question,  or  the  public  threat  of  such  action,  arous 
ing  the  national  pride  of  France,  must  have  led  to  a  long 
and  bloody  war,  resulting,  doubtless,  in  final  success  in 
America  and  probably  in  a  revolution  in  France. 

Such  a  result  would  have  been  a  just  punishment  to 
Napoleon  for  his  conduct  toward  the  United  States  and 
Mexico  during  our  Civil  War.  But  why  involve  the 
people  of  France  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  in 
this  punishment  ?  Why  make  enemies  of  our  ancient 
friends  ?  Our  sister  republic  of  Mexico  must  be  relieved 
from  foreign  domination,  at  whatever  cost;  but  strife 
and  lasting  enmity  between  the  United  States  and  France 


388  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

would  be  a  fearful  price  to  pay  for  even  so  great  a  good 
as  the  freedom  of  Mexico.  Manifestly  such  extreme  mea 
sures  should  not  be  resorted  to  until  all  peaceful  means 
had  failed.  Considerations  of  this  nature  determined  my 
course  while  in  Paris.  I  had  sufficient  opportunity  in 
two  interviews  with  Prince  Napoleon,  and  in  several  con 
versations  with  officers  of  high  rank  on  the  Emperor's 
staff,  to  make  known  to  the  Emperor  the  views  and  pur 
poses  of  the  government  and  people  of  the  United  States 
in  respect  to  Mexican  affairs.  Our  conversation  was  with 
out  reserve  on  either  side,  and  with  the  understanding 
that  nothing  said  by  me  would  be  withheld  from  the 
Emperor. 

The  principal  of  these  staff-officers  was  the  distin 
guished  Admiral  de  la  Graviere,  who  had  commanded  the 
French  squadron  in  American  waters  in  the  early  part  of 
our  Civil  War  and  in  the  capture  of  Vera  Cruz.  This  gal 
lant  and  honest  old  sailor  had  reported  to  his  government 
the  exact  truth  about  the  enterprise  which  Napoleon  had 
undertaken  when  he  ordered  the  bombardment  and  cap 
ture  of  the  Mexican  seaport  for  the  alleged  purpose  of 
collecting  a  French  claim — namely,  that  he  was  no  better 
able  to  collect  that  claim  after  the  city  was  in  his  posses 
sion  than  he  had  been  before,  and  that  the  conquest  of 
Mexico  by  the  operations  of  a  large  army  would  be  ne 
cessary  before  any  financial  return  could  be  expected. 
This  unwelcome  report  led  to  the  admiral's  recall  to 
France,  and  he  was  sent  to  his  home  in  disgrace.  But  in 
due  time  the  Emperor  learned  that  while  all  others  had 
deceived  him,  the  admiral  had  told  him  the  truth,  where 
upon  he  was  called  to  Paris,  restored  to  the  confidence  of 
his  chief,  and  appointed  aide-de-camp  on  the  staff  of  the 
Emperor.  Admiral  de  la  Graviere  was  a  warm  friend  of 
America,  rejoiced  in  the  triumph  of  the  Union  cause,  un 
derstood  and  appreciated  the  sentiments  of  the  people  of 
the  United  States,  among  whom  he  had  made  many 


NAPOLEON'S  METHOD  OF  RETREATING  WITH  DIGNITY      3Q9 

friends,  and  was  a  very  willing  medium  of  communication 
to  the  Emperor  of  the  exact  attitude  of  the  American 
people  respecting  the  Monroe  doctrine,  which  the  Em 
peror  of  the  French  had  been  betrayed  into  violating 
through  the  influence  of  persons  high  in  his  confidence, 
but  governed  by  sordid  motives. 

Admiral  Reno,  Assistant  Minister  of  Marine,  was  an 
other  of  the  high  French  officials  with  whom  free  conver 
sation  was  held. 

The  fidelity  with  which  Prince  Napoleon  and  others 
reported  to  the  Emperor  the  character  of  the  unofficial 
message  which  I  had  to  deliver  rendered  it  quite  unne 
cessary  that  it  be  delivered  in  person,  and  quite  impossible 
that  the  Emperor  should  be  willing  to  receive  it  in  that 
way.  Hence,  though  I  received  several  intimations  that 
I  would  be  invited  to  a  private  interview,  no  invitation 
came,  and  none  was  sought.  My  letters  from  Paris  to 
Mr.  Seward,  to  General  Grant,  and  to  Senor  Romero,  re 
ported  the  progress  made,  and  the  nature  of  the  situation 
as  it  then  appeared  to  me. 

On  January  22  I  was  present  at  a  dinner  given  by 
Prince  Napoleon  in  the  Palais  Royal.  Every  shade  of 
political  opinion  in  Paris  was  represented  among  the 
guests.  Political  discussion  seemed  to  be  entirely  unre 
strained,  with  one  exception,  when  a  remark  which  sa 
vored  of  disloyalty  to  the  empire  was  rebuked  by  the 
prince. 

In  the  Emperor's  address  to  the  French  legislature  on 
January  22,  his  future  policy  in  respect  to  Mexico  had 
been  hinted  at  in  the  words:  "  [Our  expedition]  louche  a 
son  termed  The  declared  purpose  of  speedily  terminating 
the  intervention  in  Mexico  having  been  applauded  by 
all,  the  prince  inquired  pointedly  of  me  whether,  in  my 
opinion,  the  Emperor's  declaration  would  be  satisfactory 
to  the  United  States,  and  received  the  unreserved  reply 
that  it  would,  as  I  believed,  be  accepted  as  satisfactory. 


390  FOKTY-SIX  YEAKS  IN  THE  ARMY 

In  my  report  to  Mr.  Seward  of  January  24, 1  expressed 
the  belief  that  even  his  enemies  in  France  would  not  be 
disposed  to  embarrass  the  Emperor  in  respect  to  Mexico, 
"  well  satisfied  to  see  him  get  out  of  that  country  by  any 
means,  and  thus  avoid  war  with  the  United  States  " ;  and 
I  ventured  the  suggestion  that  "  this  course  would  also 
seem  wise  on  our  part."  In  my  letter  of  the  same  date 
to  General  Grant  I  said : 

You  will  get  by  this  mail  Napoleon's  speech  delivered  at  the 
opening  of  the  French  legislative  session.  I  was  present  and 
heard  the  speech  delivered.  That  part  of  it  relating  to  Mexico 
and  the  United  States  was  received  with  very  general  tokens  of 
approbation,  while  most  of  the  remainder  met  with  a  cold  re 
ception.  I  have  since  heard  it  discussed  very  freely  by  many 
prominent  men  of  all  shades  of  political  opinion,  among  others 
the  Prince  Napoleon.  All  seem  to  recognize  the  falsity  of  the 
Emperor's  assumptions  where  he  says:  "In  Mexico  the  govern 
ment  founded  by  the  will  of  the  people  is  consolidating  itself/' 
etc.  Yet  his  statements  are,  no  doubt,  believed  by  a  large  ma 
jority  of  the  French  people,  and  therefore  afford  him  a  very 
good  reason  for  yielding  to  the  demand,  made  in  common  by 
the  people  of  France  and  the  United  States,  that  his  intervention 
in  Mexico  shall  be  brought  to  an  end.  This  is  the  logic  of  his 
position  and  his  solution  of  his  difficulty,  viz. :  to  assert  that  he 
has  accomplished  the  object  of  his  expedition  to  Mexico,  and 
hence  to  end  it.  While  we  laugh  at  the  absurdity  of  his  prem 
ises,  we  can  hardly  find  fault  with  his  conclusion,  and  hence  it 
is  not  worth  while  to  criticize  any  part  of  his  argument.  Rather 
I  think  it  well  to  let  him  make  the  most  of  Ms  audacity  in  the 
creation  of  convenient  facts.  The  opinion  seems  to  be  universal 
here  that  the  Emperor  is  sincere  in  his  declarations  of  intention 
as  to  Mexico ;  indeed,  that  he  has  adopted  the  policy  of  making 
the  strongest  possible  bid  for  the  friendship  of  the  United  States. 
It  is  certainly  easy  to  derive  such  an  opinion  from  his  speech,  and 
I  am  strongly  inclined  to  believe  it  correct.  Yet  we  cannot  for 
get  the  fact  that  in  his  speech  of  last  year  he  used  quite  as  strong 
language  as  to  the  speedy  termination  of  his  Mexican  expedition. 
Hence  I  shall  indulge  in  some  doubt  until  I  see  the  actual  de 
velopment  of  his  present  plans.  I  have  no  idea  that  Napoleon 


NAPOLEON'S  METHOD   OF   RETREATING   WITH   DIGNITY 

believes  that  Maximilian  can  remain  long  in  Mexico  after  the 
French  troops  are  withdrawn;  but  it  is  very  important  for  him, 
in  order  to  give  some  appearance  of  truth  to  his  assumed  grounds 
of  action,  that  Maximilian  be  allowed  to  stay  there  some  time 
without  French  aid.  And  for  this  reason  he  wants  some  assur 
ance  of  neutrality  from  the  government  of  the  United  States. 
Prince  Napoleon  and  others  with  whom  I  have  conversed  express 
the  decided  opinion  that  Maximilian  will  come  away  with  Mar 
shal  Bazaine,  in  spite  of  all  the  Emperor  may  say  to  induce  him 
to  try  to  stand  alone.  This,  I  apprehend,  will  be  the  difficulty, 
and  may  cause  much  delay,  unless  the  United  States  kindly  lend 
a  helping  hand.  Would  it  not  be  wise  for  us  to  abstain  for  a 
few  months  from  all  interference,  direct  or  indirect,  and  thus  give 
Napoleon  and  Maximilian  time  to  carry  out  their  farce  ?  Mexico 
would  thus  be  rid  of  the  French  flag  in  the  least  possible  time. 
If  the  French  troops  come  also,  Juarez  can  easily  dispose  of 
Maximilian  at  any  time.  If  they  succeed  in  getting  the  French 
troops  to  remain  as  colonists,  then  the  United  States  can  easily 
find  a  good  reason  for  disposing  of  the  whole  matter,  and  Na 
poleon  will  not  dare  to  interfere.  .  .  .  An  officer  of  the  Em 
peror's  household  left  here  about  ten  days  ago  with  despatches 
for  Mexico  which,  it  is  understood,  contained  the  Emperor's 
declaration  to  Maximilian  of  his  intention  to  recall  his  troops. 
This  will  give  you  some  idea  of  the  time  when  the  matter  may 
be  arranged  if  all  works  well. 

My  views  relative  to  the  purposes  of  the  French  govern 
ment  appear  to  have  been  in  accord  with  those  of  Mr. 
Bigelow  at  the  time,  as  shown  in  his  official  despatches 
afterward  published,  and  adopted  by  Mr.  Seward  in  his 
subsequent  correspondence  with  the  French  minister  at 
Washington.  They  were  soon  afterward  confirmed  by 
the  official  announcement  which  the  French  minister  was 
authorized  to  make  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States.  In  fact,  I  was  in  almost  constant  conference  with 
Mr.  Bigelow  during  that  time,  and  knew  that  my  views, 
as  communicated  to  Mr.  Seward  and  General  Grant, 
were  in  close  accord  with  his,  although  I  could  not  know 
anything  of  Mr.  Bigelow's  despatches  to  the  State  Depart- 


392          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

raent  until  they  were  published.  Mr.  Bigelow's  compre 
hension  of  the  French  view  of  the  Mexican  question  proved 
to  be  perfectly  exact.  While  awaiting  further  instructions 
in  reply  to  my  report  of  January  24,  I  occupied  my  time 
in  visits  to  the  south  of  France,  Italy,  Switzerland,  and 
England. 

Among  the  personal  incidents  connected  with  my  stay 
in  Paris  which  seem  worthy  of  record  were  the  following: 

Soon  after  my  arrival  in  Paris,  in  company  with  Mr. 
Bigelow  I  called  upon  Marshal  Eandon,  Minister  of 
War,  who  was  the  only  minister  of  the  French  govern 
ment  then  in  Paris.  We  were  received  with  cold  and 
formal  politeness.  Some  days  later,  the  Emperor  having 
returned  to  Paris,  and  having  apparently  become  satisfied 
that  I  was  not  occupied  with  any  designs  hostile  to  France, 
I  received  a  very  courteous  letter  from  the  Minister  of 
War,  dated  December  13,  and  addressed  to  Mr.  Bigelow ; 
and  Captain  Guzman,  the  officer  therein  named,  reported 
to  me  immediately.  Under  the  guidance  of  this  accom 
plished  officer  I  saw  in  the  most  agreeable  manner  all  the 
military  establishments  about  Paris.  These  courtesies 
were  acknowledged  in  a  letter  dated  February  25,  1866, 
addressed  to  Mr.  Bigelow. 

My  presentation  to  the  Emperor  and  Empress  occurred 
at  one  of  those  brilliant  occasions  at  the  Tuileries  for 
which  the  second  empire  was  famous.  In  conversing 
with  the  Emperor,  he  desired  to  know  something  of  the 
operations  of  the  American  armies,  and  especially  their 
marvelous  methods  of  supply  at  great  distances  from  a 
base  of  operations. 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  record  here,  as  I  did  in 
my  correspondence  at  the  time,  the  great  courtesy,  the 
kindness,  and  the  charming  hospitality  shown  me  by  Mr. 
Bigelow  and  his  amiable  family  during  my  stay  in  Paris. 
Mr.  Adams,  United  States  minister  at  London,  was 
also  exceedingly  kind,  inviting  a  very  distinguished 


4  PRESENTATION  TO  THE  EMPEROR  AND  EMPRESS     393 

company  to  meet  me  at  dinner,  taking  me  to  several 
charming  entertainments,  and  presenting  me  to  the 
Prince  of  Wales,  who  then  received  in  place  of  the 
Queen.  General  King  at  Borne,  and  Mr.  Marsh  at  Flor 
ence,  also  entertained  me  very  courteously  during  my 
short  stay  at  those  places.  The  warmth  of  greeting  by 
Americans  everywhere,  and  the  courteous  reception  by 
all  foreigners  whom  I  met,  lent  a  peculiar  charm  to  the 
first  visit  of  a  Union  soldier  among  those  who  had 
watched  from  a  distance  the  great  American  conflict. 

I  now  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing,  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  events,  that  whatever  my  mission  to  France 
contributed  toward  the  solution  of  the  momentous  ques 
tion  of  that  day  was  wisely  directed  in  the  interest  of 
peace  at  home,  continued  friendship  with  our  former 
allies,  the  people  of  France,  and  the  relief  of  an  American 
republic  from  foreign  domination ;  these  great  blessings 
were  combined  in  the  final  result. 

Too  much  cannot  be  said  in  praise  of  the  able  and  pa 
triotic  statesmanship  displayed  by  Secretary  Seward  in 
his  treatment  of  the  French  violation  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine. 

Early  in  May,  1866,  I  received  from  Mr.  Seward  his 
final  reply  to  my  report  of  January  24,  in  which  he  said : 
"  The  object  for  which  you  were  detailed  to  visit  Europe 
having  been  sufficiently  accomplished,  there  is  considered 
to  be  no  further  occasion  for  you  to  remain  in  that  quar 
ter  in  the  service  of  this  department."  Whereupon  I 
returned  to  the  United  States,  and  reported  at  the  State 
Department  on  the  4th  of  June. 

The  condition  of  the  Franco-Mexican  question  at  the 
time  of  my  return  from  Europe  gave  no  further  occasion 
for  my  offices  in  either  of  the  ways  which  had  been  con 
templated  in  behalf  of  Mexico.  Subsequent  events  in 
Mexico  included  the  sad  fate  of  Maximilian  and  the 
sadder  fate  of  Carlotta. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

RECONSTRUCTION  IN  VIRGINIA  —  THE  STATE  LEGISLATURE 
ADVISED  TO  ADOPT  THE  FOURTEENTH  AMENDMENT  — 
CONGRESSIONAL  RECONSTRUCTION  AS  A  RESULT  OF 
THE  REFUSAL — THE  MANNER  IN  WHICH  THE  ACTS  OF 
CONGRESS  WERE  EXECUTED  —  NO  RESORT  TO  TRIAL  BY 
MILITARY  COMMISSION  —  THE  OBNOXIOUS  CONSTITUTION 
FRAMED  BY  THE  STATE  CONVENTION  —  HOW  ITS  WORST 
FEATURE  WAS  NULLIFIED  —  APPOINTED  SECRETARY  OF 
WAR. 

IN  August,  1866,  after  my  return  from  Europe,  I  was 
assigned  to  command  the  Department  of  the  Poto 
mac,  which  included  the  State  of  Virginia,  then  governed 
in  part  by  the  Freedmen's  Bureau  and  in  part  by  the 
provisional  government  which  had  been  organized  at 
Alexandria  while  the  war  was  still  in  progress.  The 
State  had  yet  to  obtain  from  Congress  a  recognition 
of  its  government,  which  recognition  was  understood 
to  depend  upon  the  ratification  by  the  State  legisla 
ture  of  the  then  pending  Fourteenth  Amendment  to 
the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  This  subject 
was  very  fully  discussed  between  me  and  the  leading 
members  of  the  legislature.  I  advised  them  to  accept 
the  proposed  amendment  as  the  only  means  of  saving 
the  State  from  the  more  "  radical "  reconstruction  under 
act  of  Congress,  which  was  then  threatened.  It  was 
urged  that  Virginia  would  not  suffer  much  from  the  op 
eration  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  because  of  the 
general  intelligence  of  her  white  population  and  their 


RECONSTRUCTION  IN  VIRGINIA  395 

superiority  in  numbers  over  the  negroes  —  advantages 
which  some  of  the  other  Southern  States  did  not  enjoy ; 
that  if  the  Virginia  legislature  would  ratify  the  pending 
amendment,  Congress  could  not  refuse  to  recognize  the 
existing  State  government  and  make  it  permanent ;  and 
that  Virginia  would  thus  be  restored  at  once  to  her  full 
privileges  as  a  State  in  the  Union.  I  visited  Washing 
ton,  and  obtained  from  leading  Republicans  in  Congress 
the  assurance,  so  far  as  it  was  in  their  power  to  give  it, 
that  such  would  be  the  result.  On  my  return  to  Rich 
mond,  it  at  first  seemed  that  the  amendment  would  be 
speedily  ratified.  But  other  'influences,  understood  to 
come  from  some  source  in  Washington  (probably  Presi 
dent  Johnson),  finally  prevailed;  the  amendment  was 
rejected;  and  Virginia  was  thus  doomed  to  undergo 
"congressional  reconstruction"  in  company  with  her 
sister  States. 

The  "  policy  "  of  President  Johnson  having  resulted  in 
an  u  irrepressible,  conflict "  between  him  and  Congress, 
finally  culminating  in  his  impeachment,  the  reconstruc 
tion  of  the  States  lately  in  insurrection  was  undertaken 
by  Congress.  First  an  act  dated  March  2,  1867,  was 
passed  for  the  military  government  of  the  "  rebel  States," 
and  then  another  act,  datedv  March  23,  1867,  prescribing 
the  conditions  of  organization  of  State -governments  pre 
paratory  to  restoration  to  the  Union ;  the  last-named  act 
was  supplemented  by  the  act  dated  July  19,  1867.  All  of 
these  acts  were  passed  over  the  President's  veto.  They 
provided  for  the  assignment  of  military  commanders  in 
the  several  districts,  with  nearly  absolute  powers  to  gov 
ern  those  States  and  direct  the  steps  in  the  process  of 
reconstruction.  It  fell  to  my  lot  to  command  the  First 
Military  District,  into  which  Virginia  was  converted  by 
the  act  of  Congress. 

The  terrible  oppression  of  the  Southern  people  em 
bodied  in  those  acts  of  Congress  has  hardly  been  appre- 


396  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

elated  by  even  the  most  enlightened  and  conservative 
people  of  the  North.  Only  those  who  actually  suffered 
the  baneful  effects  of  the  unrestrained  working  of  those 
laws  can  ever  realize  their  full  enormity.  The  radical 
Congress  was  not  content  to  impose  upon  the  Southern 
States  impartial  suffrage  to  whites  and  blacks  alike. 
They  were  not  content  even  to  disfranchise  the  leading 
rebels,  according  to  the  terms  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend 
ment  to  the  Constitution.  Even  those  would  not  be  suf 
ficient  to  put  the  Southern  whites  under  the  domination 
of  their  former  slaves  and  of  adventurers  from  the  North, 
and  thus  to  secure  the  radical  supremacy  in  the  recon 
structed  States.  Hence  another  and  an  enormous  stride 
was  taken,  with  the  purpose  of  putting  those  States 
under  what  became  known  as  "  carpet-bag "  govern 
ments,  so  offensive  as  to  be  nearly  intolerable  even  to 
their  authors.  That  stride  consisted  in  imposing  the  so- 
called  "iron-clad  oath"  upon  all  officers,  of  whatever 
grade  or  character,  in  all  the  former  Confederate  States. 
That  oath  excluded  from  office  not  only  all  who  had  in 
any  way  taken  active  part  in  the  rebellion,  but  even  the 
most  constant  Union  men  of  the  South  who  had  re 
mained  at  home  during  the  war;  for  not  one  of  them 
had  escaped  "  giving  aid  or  comfort "  in  some  way  to 
those  engaged  in  the  rebellion.  Even  so  conspicuous 
a  loyalist  as  Judge  Eives,  afterward  United  States  dis 
trict  judge,  declared,  after  mature  deliberation,  that  he 
could  not  take  that  oath,  although  his  constant  fidelity 
to  the  Union  was  known  to  all  in  Virginia. 

I  asked  this  noted  Union  man  to  accept  the  office  of 
chief  justice  of  the  State,  but  he  could  not  take  the  pre 
scribed  oath.  He  had  permitted  his  boy,  about  to  join 
the  Confederate  army,  to  take  one  of  his  horses  rather 
than  see  him  go  afoot.  Perhaps  the  judge  was  too  con 
scientious.  But  it  was  the  evil  effect  of  the  law  to  ex 
clude  the  highly  honorable  and  let  the  rascals  in.  Thus 


EECONSTEUCTION  IN  VIRGINIA  397 

the  Union  could  not  have  the  benefit  of  Judge  Rives's 
eminent  services  in  the  vital  work  of  reconstruction,  and 
some  "  carpet-bagger  "  had  to  take  his  place.  And  thus, 
although  the  acts  of  Congress  permitted  a  majority  of 
the  whites  to  vote,  their  choice  of  officers  was  restricted 
to  negroes  and  "carpet-baggers"!  To  these  latter,  there 
fore,  was  committed  the  entire  work  of  organizing  and 
administering  the  Southern  State  governments,  which 
required  the  aid  of  the  United  States  troops  to  support 
them,  and  which  fell  by  their  own  weight  the  moment 
that  support  was  withdrawn. 

The  manner  in  which  I  executed  those  "reconstruc 
tion"  acts  of  Congress  in  Virginia,  so  as  to  save  that 
State  from  the  great  evils  suffered  by  sister  States,  is 
perhaps  an  instructive  part  of  the  history  of  that  time. 
The  following  extracts  from  my  orders  and  correspon 
dence  clearly  show  the  constitutional  principles  upon 
which  my  administration  was  based.  They  also  give 
the  essential  points  in  the  history  of  Virginia  recon 
struction  up  to  the  time  when  the  Convention  had  com 
pleted  its  work  of  framing  a  constitution.  My  "  General 
Orders,  No.  1,"  dated  Richmond,  Va.,  March  13, 1867,  was 
as  follows : 

I.  In  compliance  with  the  order  of  the  President,  the  under 
signed  hereby  assumes  command  of  the  First  District,  State  of 
Virginia,  under  the  act  of  Congress  of  March  2,  1867. 

II.  All  officers  under  the   existing  provisional  government 
of  the  State  of  Virginia  will  continue  to  perform  the  duties  of 
their  respective  offices  according  to  law,  unless  otherwise  here 
after  ordered  in  individual  cases,  until  their  successors  shall  be 
duly  elected  and  qualified  in  accordance  with  the  above-named 
act  of  Congress. 

III.  It  is  desirable  that  the  military  power  conferred  by  the 
before-mentioned  act  be  exercised  only  so  far  as  may  be  neces 
sary  to  accomplish  the  objects  for  which  that  power  was  con 
ferred,  and  the  undersigned  appeals  to  the  people  of  Virginia, 
and  especially  to  magistrates  and  other  civil  officers,  to  render 


398  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  necessity  for  the  exercise  of  this  power  as  slight  as  possible, 
by  strict  obedience  to  the  laws,  and  by  impartial  administration 
of  justice  to  all  classes.  .  .  . 

On  April  20  was  issued  "  General  Orders,  No.  16": 

I.  Temporary  appointments  to  fill  vacancies  which  may  occur 
in  county  or  city  offices  will,  in  general,  be  made  upon  the  con 
current  recommendations  of  the  County  Court  or  City  Council 
and  of  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Registration1  for  the 
county  or  city. 

II.  The  several  County   Courts   and   City   Councils   are  re 
quested  to  confer  with  the  Presidents  of  the  Boards  of  Registra 
tion  concerning  such  appointments,  and  to  agree  upon  a  suit 
able  person  to  fill  any  vacancy  that  may  occur. 

III.  The  President  of  the  Board  of  Registration  will  forward 
to   the  assistant  adjutant- general  the  recommendation  of  the 
court  or  council,  with  his  own  indorsement  thereon. 

IV.  When  a  County  Court  is  not  in  session,  a  recommenda 
tion  signed  by  five  justices,  including  the  presiding  justice,  will 
be  received  in  lieu  of  the  recommendation  of  the  court. 

V.  County  and  corporation   officers  appointed  by  the  com 
manding  general  will  be  required  to  give  the  bonds  required  by 
law,  and  will  be  subject  to  indictment  for  malfeasance,  misfeas 
ance,  or  neglect  of  official  duty,  the  same  as  if  they  had  been 
elected  by  the  people. 

On  May  28  was  issued  "  General  Orders,  No.  31,"  in 
part  as  follows : 

.  .  .  IV.  The  military  commissioners  [officers  of  the  army] 
will  make  a  prompt  report  to  these  headquarters  of  each  case 
of  which  they  may  take  jurisdiction,  and  the  disposition  made 
of  such  case.  Where  parties  are  held  for  trial,  either  in  con 
finement  or  under  bail,  such  full  statement  will  be  made  of  the 
facts  in  each  case  as  will  enable  the  commanding  general  to 
decide  whether  the  case  shall  be  tried  by  a  military  commission 
or  be  brought  before  a  civil  court. 

l  The  presidents  of  Boards  of  Registration  were  army  officers  detailed  by 
me  for  that  duty. 


NO  RESORT  TO  TRIAL  BY  MILITARY  COMMISSION      399 

V.  Trial  by  the   civil  court  will  be  preferred  in  all  cases 
where  there  is  satisfactory  reason  to  believe  that  justice  will  be 
done.      But  until  the  orders  of  the  commanding  general  are 
made  known  in  any  case,  the  paramount  jurisdiction  assumed 
by  the  military  commissioner  will  be  exclusive. 

VI.  All  persons,  civil  officers  and  others,  are  required  to  obey 
and  execute  the  lawful  orders  of  the  military  commissioners  to 
the  same  extent  as  they  are  required  by  law  to  obey  and  execute 
writs  issued  by  civil  magistrates.     Any  person  who  shall  dis 
obey  or  resist  the  lawful  orders  or  authority  of  a  military  com 
missioner  shall  be  tried  by  a  military  commission,  and  upon 
conviction  shall  be  punished  by  fine  and  imprisonment  accord 
ing  to  the  nature  and  degree  of  the  offense.     .     .     . 

VIII.  This  order  will  not  be  construed  to  excuse  civil  officers, 
in  any  degree,  from  the  faithful  discharge  of  their  duties.  It  is 
intended  to  aid  the  civil  authorities,  and  not  to  supersede  them, 
except  in  cases  of  necessity. 

No  case  arose  in  Virginia  in  which  it  was  found  neces 
sary,  in  my  opinion,  to  supersede  the  civil  authorities  in 
the  administration  of  justice.  Not  a  single  citizen  of  that 
State  was  tried  by  military  commission.  Yet  some  cases 
arose  which  well  illustrate  the  fascinations  of  absolute 
power  to  those  who  desire  the  benefit  of  its  exercise  in 
their  own  interests.  Some  of  the  most  prominent  citi 
zens  of  Virginia,  men  who  had  earnestly  opposed  the 
general  policy  of  military  government  then  in  force, 
came  to  me  to  settle  their  petty  differences  summarily. 
They  seemed  much  disappointed  when  I  declined  to  ad 
judicate  such  cases,  and  informed  them  that  they  must 
be  content  with  the  slow  process  of  trial  before  their  own 
civil  magistrates.  Other  orders  were  in  part  as  follows : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  July  26,  1867. 

.  .  .  III.  The  governor  and  other  executive  officers,  the  courts 
of  law,  and  councils  of  cities  are  invited  to  recommend  suit 
able  persons  for  appointment  to  such  offices  as,  under  the  ex 
isting  laws  of  Virginia,  are  usually  filled  by  their  appointment 
or  upon  their  nomination.  .  .  . 


400  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  August  8,  1867. 

.  .  .  VI.  Military  commissioners  are  reminded  that  they  are 
to  be  "  governed  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties  by  the  laws  of 
Virginia,  so  far  as  the  same  are  not  in  conflict  with  the  laws  of 
the  United  States,  or  orders  issued  from  these  headquarters," 
and  that  they  are  not  to  supersede  the  civil  authorities,  except 
in  cases  of  necessity.  In  such  cases  the  action,  or  failure  to 
act,  of  the  civil  officers  should  be  fully  reported,  in  order  that 
the  commanding  general  may  hold  them  to  a  proper  account 
ability  for  any  neglect  of  duty.  .  .  . 

Upon  the  adjournment  of  the  State  Convention,  I  sent 
the  following  letter  to  General  Grant : 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  April  18, 1868. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  In  spite  of  every  effort  that  could  be  made 
to  prevent  it,  the  Virginia  Convention  has  adhered  to  its  pre 
scriptive  measures,  or  rather  to  the  most  objectionable  of  them. 

After  every  other  means  had  failed,  I  even  went  so  far  as  to 
visit  the  Convention  and  urge  the  repeal  of  the  test  oath.  But 
what  I  said  seemed  not  to  have  the  slightest  influence.  I  inclose 
a  newspaper  report,  which  is  a  pretty  accurate  one,  of  what  I 
said,  and  which  will  show  that  I  have  at  least  done  my  duty  in 
that  regard,  if  not  more. 

The  same  baneful  influence  that  secured  the  election  of  a  ma 
jority  of  ignorant  blacks,  and  equally  ignorant  or  unprincipled 
whites,  to  the  Convention,  has  proved  sufficient  to  hold  them 
firmly  to  their  original  purpose.  They  could  only  hope  to  ob 
tain  office  by  disqualifying  everybody  in  the  State  who  is 
capable  of  discharging  official  duties,  and  all  else  to  them  was 
of  comparatively  slight  importance.  Even  the  question  whether 
their  Constitution  will  be  ratified  or  rejected,  they  treat  with 
indifference.  Congress,  they  say,  will  make  it  all  right  any 
way.  .  .  . 

Of  course  I  may  be  mistaken,  but  my  opinion  is  that  the  Con 
stitution  must  be  adopted.  This  would  not  be  a  serious  matter 
if  it  (the  Constitution)  were  a  good  one,  and  good  officers  could 
be  elected  under  it.  But  it  seems  hardly  possible  that  the 
Union  party  can  organize  upon  a  satisfactory  basis  for  the 
election.  The  negroes  and  their  associates  will  doubtless  insist 


THE  OBNOXIOUS  CONSTITUTION  4Q1 

upon  unqualified  indorsement  of  the  Constitution  by  their  nom 
inees.  This  the  respectable  whites  will  not  give.  Hence  the 
late  Convention  will  be  reproduced  in  the  legislature,  a  large 
majority  being  either  worthless  radicals,  white  and  black,  or 
bitter  opponents  of  reconstruction  upon  the  congressional  plan. 
The  danger  is  that  we  will  have  on  our  hands,  not  only  one  big 
elephant  in  the  Constitution,  but  a  host  of  little  ones  in  the 
shape  of  officers-elect  who  are  not  fit  to  be  installed  —  a  pros 
pect  not  very  encouraging,  at  least. 

My  impression  is  that  the  wisest  course  would  be  to  let  the 
thing  fall  and  die  where  it  is — not  submit  it  to  the  people  at  all. 
We  can  then  go  on  putting  Union  men  in  office  and  reorganizing 
the  provisional  government  upon  a  loyal  basis,  until  the  friends 
of  reconstruction  get  control  of  the  State.  Then  a  convention 
can  be  called  which  will  frame  a  Constitution  fit  to  be  ratified 
by  the  people  of  the  State  and  approved  by  Congress  and  the 
country  at  large. 

If  Congress  would  give  a  little  more  latitude  in  the  selection 
of  officers,  by  modifying  the  test  oath,  there  would  be  no  diffi 
culty  in  filling  all  the  offices  in  the  State  with  men  who  would  aid 
restoration.  Without  some  such  change,  the  work  of  reorgani 
zation  cannot  be  carried  very  far.  The  view  of  the  question 
which  I  have  given  above  is,  of  course,  the  local  one;  but  it 
seems  to  me  the  national  one  leads  to  the  same  conclusion.  I 
can't  see  how  the  indorsement  of  such  a  Constitution  as  this 
one,  by  the  Republican  party,  can  be  otherwise  than  damaging 
to  them  in  the  North.  Would  it  not  be  wise  for  Congress  to  say 
at  once,  We  reject,  once  and  for  all,  prescriptive  constitutions? 

I  have  written  this  letter  merely  to  suggest  points  that  occur 
to  me  as  worthy  of  very  careful  consideration.  I  suppose  Con 
gress  alone  can  determine  what  is  to  be  done. 

As  explained  in  my  official  letter  to-day,  I  feel  bound  to  await 
the  action  of  Congress  before  ordering  an  election.  The  nomi 
nating  conventions  of  the  two  parties  meet  in  Richmond  on  the 
6th  and  7th  of  May.  Perhaps  it  may  be  best  for  Congress  to 
await  their  action  before  determining  the  question.  .  .  . 

The  newspaper  clipping  inclosed  in  the  above  letter  to 
General  Grant  was  a  report  of  the  proceedings  of  the 
Convention  which  appeared  in  the  "  Richmond  Dispatch  " 


402  FORTY- SIX  YEAKS  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  April  18, 1868.  Several  other  letters  to  General  Grant, 
near  the  same  time,  explained  the  situation  in  detail. 

As  was  to  be  expected,  and  in  spite  of  any  influence 
which  the  military  commander  could  properly  exert,  that 
proposed  Constitution,  like  those  framed  in  the  other 
States,  perpetuated  the  worst  features  of  the  acts  of 
Congress.  It  disqualified  all  the  respectable  whites  from 
any  active  part  in  the  government,  leaving  the  negroes 
and  "  carpet-baggers  "  full  sway.  So  sweeping  was  this 
disqualification  that  in  many  parts  of  the  State  not  a 
native  Virginian,  white  or  black,  could  be  found  who 
could  read  or  write,  and  who  would  be  eligible  for  elec 
tion  or  appointment  to  any  office.  In  my  great  anxiety 
to  save  the  State  from  so  great  an  evil,  I  went  to  the  hall 
of  the  Convention  and  explained  the  impossibility  of  or 
ganizing  a  government  under  such  a  Constitution,  and 
besought  the  Convention  to  strike  out  the  disqualifying 
clause.  I  was  listened  to  with  cold  respect,  my  advice 
was  disregarded,  and  promptly  after  my  departure  the 
Constitution  was  finally  adopted,  and  the  Convention 
adjourned  sine  die. 

But  the  State  was,  nevertheless,  saved  from  the  im 
pending  disaster.  The  act  of  Congress  required  that 
the  Constitution  be  submitted  to  the  people  for  ratifica 
tion  or  rejection ;  but  Congress  had  failed  to  appropriate 
money  to  pay  the  expenses  of  an  election.  If  an  elec 
tion  was  to  be  held,  the  money  must  be  taken  from  the 
treasury  of  the  State,  by  the  order  of  the  district  com 
mander,  or  else  Congress  must  make  a  special  appropria 
tion  for  that  purpose.  I  declined  to  sanction  the  use  of 
the  people's  money  for  any  such  purpose,  refused  to 
order  an  election  for  ratification  or  rejection  of  the  ob 
noxious  Constitution,  and  referred  the  matter  to  Con 
gress,  with  a  recommendation  that  the  people  be  author 
ized  to  vote  separately  on  the  disqualifying  clause  —  a 
privilege  which  the  Convention  had  denied. 


HOW  ITS  WORST  FEATURE  WAS  NULLIFIED  4Q3 

The  radicals  in  Congress  were  so  glad,  apparently,  of 
this  mode  of  escape  from  a  result  so  obnoxious  to  the 
better  sense  of  the  Union  people  at  that  time,  that  not  a 
voice  was  raised  in  favor  of  the  "carpet-bag"  Constitu 
tion  or  in  disapprobation  of  my  action  in  regard  to  it. 
The  instrument  was  permitted  to  rest  quietly  in  the 
pigeonhole  of  the  district  commander's  desk  until  the 
next  year.  Then  an  act  was  passed  providing  for  sub 
mitting  that  Constitution  to  the  people  of  Virginia,  with 
the  privilege  of  voting  separately  on  the  disfranchising 
clause,  which  clause  they,  of  course,  rejected.  Thus 
Virginia  was  saved  from  the  vile  government  and  spoli 
ation  which  cursed  the  other  Southern  States,  and  which 
the  same  radical  Congress  and  its  successors  sustained 
until  the  decent  public  sentiment  of  the  North  would 
endure  them  no  longer. 

It  is,  perhaps,  not  too  much  to  say  that  if  the  other 
district  commanders  had  in  like  manner  refused  to 
make  themselves  parties  to  the  spoliation  of  the  people 
placed  under  their  charge,  Congress  would  have  shrunk 
from  the  direct  act  of  imposing  upon  them  such  obnox 
ious  governments,  and  the  country  might  have  been 
saved  the  disgrace  of  the  eight  years  of  carpet-bag  rule 
in  the  South.  At  least  it  is  certain  that  a  large  propor 
tion  of  the  more  moderate  among  the  Republican  ma 
jority  in  Congress  at  that  time  indulged  the  hope  that 
respectable  governments  might  be  organized  under  the 
acts  of  Congress.  But  they  made  this  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  when  they  gave  their  assent  to  the  amend 
ment  of  those  acts,  prepared  by  the  extremist  radicals, 
depriving  the  Southern  whites  of  any  active  part  in  the 
organization  of  their  governments.  Impartial  justice,  as 
expressed  in  "impartial  suffrage,"  might  have  led  to 
tolerable  results  even  in  those  States  where  the  blacks 
were  in  the  majority.  But  under  a  law  which  gave  uni 
versal  suffrage  to  the  blacks  and  disfranchised  the  in- 


404  POET Y- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

fluential  whites,  any  tolerable  result  was  impossible 
unless  under  the  administration  of  a  man  who  had  the 
independence  and  courage  to  disarm  such  a  law  of  its 
poisonous  sting.  However  this  may  be,  it  is  certain  that 
Virginia  owes  her  escape  from  the  sad  fate  of  her  sister 
States  to  the  action  of  her  district  commander,  who  has 
abundant  reason  for  the  belief  that  the  good  people  of 
that  State  fully  appreciated  the  fact. 

With  this  service  to  the  people  of  Virginia,  my  duty 
in  that  State  practically  terminated.  The  impeachment 
trial  of  President  Johnson  had  reached  its  crisis.  It  had 
become  evident  to  those  who  were  wise  enough  to  dis 
cern  the  "signs  of  the  times"  that  the  Senate  would 
probably  not  sustain  the  articles  of  impeachment  by 
the  necessary  two-thirds  majority.  This  would  leave 
unsettled  the  quarrel  between  the  President  and  Con 
gress  over  the  War  Department,  and  that  on  the  eve  of 
an  exciting  Presidential  election,  in  which  several  of  the 
newly  reconstructed  States  were  expected  to  take  part. 
In  not  one  of  these  States  was  the  new  government  able 
to  stand  alone  or  to  preserve  the  peace  within  its  bor 
ders.  A  firm  and  impartial  administration  of  the  War 
Department  in  the  sole  interest  of  peace  and  order  dur 
ing  the  coming  contest  was  the  one  indispensable  want 
of  the  country.  Without  that,  a  revival  of  civil  strife 
seemed  inevitable.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  was 
urged  to  accept  the  office  of  Secretary  of  War,  with  the 
assurance  that  in  this  way  the  contest  which  endangered 
the  peace  of  the  country  could  be  adjusted.  I  gave  my 
consent,  the  nomination  was  promptly  sent  to  the  Senate, 
and  that  body,  in  spite  of  its  very  large  majority  in 
opposition  to  the  President,  confirmed  the  appointment 
with  almost  entire  unanimity.  The  impeachment  was 
dismissed,  and  that  dangerous  farce,  which  had  come 
within  one  or  two  votes  of  inflicting  lasting  disgrace 
upon  the  country,  happily  came  to  an  end. 


APPOINTED  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  4Q5 

Upon  the  inauguration  of  the  newly  elected  President 
in  March,  1869,  I  laid  down  the  war  portfolio  without 
having  incurred  censure  from  either  party  for  any  of 
my  official  acts,  and  with  the  approbation  of  all  for  im 
partial  discharge  of  duty.  But,  apparently  lest  such  a 
thing  might  possibly  happen  again,  Congress  made 
haste  to  pass  a  law  prohibiting  any  army  officer  from 
thereafter  holding  any  civil  office  whatever!  In  1895 
that  law  was  so  modified  as  not  to  apply  to  officers  on 
the  retired  list !  It  is  a  singular  coincidence  that  I  had 
just  then  been  retired. 


CHAPTER    XXII 

DIFFERENCES  BETWEEN  THE  COMMANDING  GENERAL  OF  THE 
ARMY  AND  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  —  GENERAL  GRANT'S 
SPECIAL  POWERS  —  HIS  APPOINTMENT  AS  SECRETARY  OF 
WAR  AD  INTERIM — THE  IMPEACHMENT  OF  PRESIDENT 
JOHNSON — MEMORANDUM  OF  INTERVIEWS  WITH  WILLIAM 
M.  EVARTS  AND  GENERAL  GRANT  IN  REGARD  TO  THE 
SECRETARYSHIP  OF  WAR  —  FAILURE  OF  THE  IMPEACH 
MENT  TRIAL  —  HARMONY  IN  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  — 
A  NEW  POLICY  AT  ARMY  HEADQUARTERS. 

DURING  nearly  the  entire  history  of  the  government 
of  the  United  States  the  relations  between  the 
general-in-chief,  or  nominal  commanding  general  of  the 
army,  and  the  War  Department  have  been  the  cause  of 
discord,  sometimes  descending  to  bitter  personal  contro 
versy,  and  in  a  few  instances  leading  to  very  serious 
results. 

The  differences  between  General  Scott  and  the  Secre 
tary  became  so  serious  that  the  general  removed  his 
headquarters  from  Washington  to  New  York,  and  re 
mained  away  from  the  capital  several  years,  until  the 
time  when  civil  war  was  imminent.  General  Sherman 
also  found  it  necessary  to  escape  from  an  intolerable 
situation  by  removing  to  St.  Louis,  and  did  not  return 
to  Washington  until  the  condition  of  the  War  Depart 
ment  led  to  the  impeachment  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
During  their  long  absence  from  the  capital  neither  of 
these  generals  could  exercise  any  appreciable  influence 
over  either  the  administration  or  the  command  of  the 
army.  It  is  thought  to  be  worthy  of  note  that  during 

406 


THE  COMMANDING  GENERAL  AND  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT      4Q7 

one  of  those  periods  of  absence  of  the  general-in-chief 
the  military  resources  of  the  country  were  mostly  placed 
within  easy  reach  of  those  about  to  engage  in  an  effort 
to  break  up  the  Union,  and  that  during  the  other  period 
corruption  in  the  War  Department  led  to  impeachment. 
It  is  no  reflection  upon  the  many  eminent,  patriotic  citi 
zens  who  have  held  the  war  portfolio  to  say  that  the  very 
few  men  who  have  proved  unworthy  of  that  great  trust 
would  have  been  much  less  likely  to  do  serious  harm  to 
the  public  interests  if  they  had  been  under  the  watchful 
eye  of  a  jealous  old  soldier,  like  Scott  or  Sherman,  who 
was  not  afraid  of  them. 

As  hereafter  explained,  the  controversy  between  Gen 
eral  Grant  and  the  Secretary  of  War  was  the  primary 
cause  which  finally  led  to  the  impeachment  of  the  Presi 
dent  of  the  United  States.  The  cause  of  this  trouble 
has  seemed  to  be  inherent  in  the  form  and  character 
of  the  government.  An  essential  provision  of  the  Con 
stitution  makes  the  President  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  and  navy.  It  is  manifestly  indispensable  that 
the  executive  head  of  a  government  be  clothed  with 
this  authority.  Yet  the  President  is  not,  as  a  rule,  a 
man  of  military  education  or  experience.  The  exigencies 
of  party  politics  also  seem  to  require,  in  general,  that 
the  Secretary  of  War  be  a  party  politician,  equally 
lacking  with  the  President  in  qualifications  for  military 
command. 

The  art  of  war  has  in  all  ages  called  forth  the  highest 
order  of  genius  and  character,  the  great  captains  of  the 
world  having  been  esteemed  as  among  the  greatest  men. 
So,  also,  and  in  continually  increasing  degree  in  modern 
times,  the  military  art  has  called  for  scientific  education 
of  ,the  very  highest  character,  supplemented  by  practical 
experience.  It  cannot  be  questioned  that  the  military 
profession  requires  ability,  education,  and  practical  train 
ing  no  less  than  the  legal  or  any  other  profession.  A 


408         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  composed  of  mer 
chants  and  bankers  would  be  no  more  of  an  anomaly  than 
a  body  of  general  and  staff  officers  of  like  composition. 
The  general  policy  of  our  government  seems  to  be  based 
upon  a  recognition  of  this  self-evident  principle.  We 
have  a  national  military  academy  and  other  military 
schools  inferior  to  none  in  the  world,  and  well-organized 
staff  departments  which  are  thoroughly  efficient  in  war 
as  well  as  in  peace.  The  laws  also  provide  a  due  propor 
tion  of  subordinate  general  officers  for  the  command  of 
geographical  departments  in  time  of  peace,  or  of  divisions 
and  brigades  in  the  field  in  time  of  war.  But  no  pro 
vision  is  made  for  an  actual  military  commander  of  the 
entire  army  either  in  peace  or  in  war.  During  only  one 
single  year  since  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  has  this  not  been  the  fact.  In  pursuance 
of  a  special  act  of  Congress  and  the  orders  of  President 
Lincoln,  General  Grant  in  fact  commanded  "all  the  armies 
of  the  United  States"  during  the  last  year  of  the  Civil 
War;  but  at  no  other  time  has  there  been  an  actual  mili 
tary  commander  of  the  army  or  armies  whose  authority 
as  such  was  recognized  by  the  War  Department. 

Why,  it  may  be  asked,  this  strange  departure  from  the 
recognized  rule  of  organization  in  all  governmental  and 
business  affairs!  Why  provide  educated  and  trained  ex 
perts  for  all  subordinate  positions,  and  none  for  the  head 
or  chief,  vastly  the  most  important  of  all  ? 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  important  to  observe  that  the 
matter  rests  absolutely  in  the  hands  of  the  President : 
Congress  has  no  power  in  the  matter.  To  create  by  law 
a  military  head  for  the  army  would  be  a  violation  of  the 
essential  provision  of  the  Constitution  which  makes  the 
President  commander-in-chief. 

In  the  case  of  General  Grant,  Congress  fully  recog 
nized  this  fact,  saying :  "  Under  the  direction  and  during 
the  pleasure  of  the  President "  he  "  may  "  command  the 


GENERAL  GRANT'S  SPECIAL  POWERS  4Q9 

armies  of  the  United  States.  Even  this,  if  intended  as 
conveying  authority  to  the  President,  was  superfluous, 
and  if  intended  as  more  than  that  would  have  been  un 
constitutional.  In  fact,  it  was  only  a  suggestion,  in 
tended  to  be  entirely  within  the  limits  of  constitutional 
propriety,  of  what  was  the  general  opinion  of  the  people 
and  of  Congress,  that  after  three  years  of  failure  the 
President  ought  to  select  a  soldier  and  put  him  in  actual 
command  of  all  the  armies.  The  President  then  went 
far  beyond  the  suggestion  of  Congress,  and  even  to  the 
extreme  limit  of  military  abdication.  He  not  only  gave 
General  Grant  absolute,  independent  command,  placing 
at  his  disposal  all  the  military  resources  of  the  country, 
but  he  even  denied  to  himself  any  knowledge  whatever 
of  the  general's  plans.  In  this  patriotic  act  of  extreme 
self-abnegation  President  Lincoln  undoubtedly  acted  in 
exact  accord  with  what  he  believed  to  be  the  expressed 
popular  opinion,  and  probably  in  accord  with  his  own 
judgment  and  inclination ;  for  no  one  could  have  been 
more  painfully  aware  than  he  had  by  that  time  become 
of  the  absolute  necessity  of  having  a  military  man  actu 
ally  in  control  of  all  the  armies,  or  more  desirous  than 
he  of  relief  from  a  responsibility  to  which  he  and  his 
advisers  had  proved  so  unequal.  But  it  must  be  ad 
mitted  that  in  this  President  Lincoln  went  beyond  the 
limit  fixed  by  his  constitutional  obligation  as  command- 
er-in-chief.  He  would  have  more  exactly  fulfilled  that 
obligation  if  he  had  endeavored  faithfully  to  comprehend 
and  adopt  as  his  own  all  the  plans  proposed  by  his 
chosen  and  trusted  general-in-chief,  guarding  the  latter 
against  all  possible  interference,  theretofore  so  perni 
cious,  from  the  War  Department  or  any  other  source. 
By  such  means  the  President  could  have  actually  exer 
cised  the  chief  command  imposed  upon  him  by  the  Con 
stitution,  sharing  in  due  measure  with  his  chief  military 
officer  the  responsibilities  imposed  by  their  high  offices. 


410  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

In  no  other  way,  it  is  believed,  can  the  duties  imposed 
upon  a  constitutional  commander-in-chief  who  is  not  pos 
sessed  of  military  education  and  experience  be  fully  and 
conscientiously  performed.  Indeed,  such  is  the  method 
pursued  by  great  military  sovereigns  all  over  the  world, 
except  in  the  few  instances  where  the  monarch  believes 
himself,  either  truly  or  falsely,  superior  in  military  ability 
to  his  chief  of  staff.  It  is  only  in  this  country,  where  the 
chief  of  state  has  generally  no  military  training,  and  his 
war  minister  the  same,  that  a  chief  of  staff  of  the  army  is 
supposed  to  be  unnecessary.  While  it  is  easy  to  under 
stand  the  reasons  which  led  to  the  action  of  the  govern 
ment  in  the  spring  of  1864,  it  is  much  less  easy  to 
understand  why  some  reasonable  approximation  to  that 
course,  as  above  suggested,  and  in  accord  with  the  prac 
tice  of  all  military  nations,  has  never  been  adopted  as  a 
permanent  system  in  this  country.  Perhaps  it  may  be 
like  the  case  of  that  citizen  of  Arkansas  who  did  not 
mend  the  roof  of  his  house  when  it  was  not  raining 
because  it  did  not  then  need  mending.  But  it  would 
seem  the  part  of  wisdom  to  perfect  the  military  system 
so  far  as  practicable  in  time  of  peace  rather  than  con 
tinue  a  fruitless  controversy  over  the  exact  location  of 
an  undefined  and  undefinable  line  supposed  to  separate 
the  military  administration  from  the  command  in  the 
army,  or  the  functions  of  the  Secretary  of  War  from 
those  of  the  commanding  general.  The  experience  of 
many  years  had  shown  that  the  Secretary  was  sure  to 
get  on  both  sides  of  that  line,  no  matter  where  it  was 
drawn.  But  it  is  encouraging  to  note  that  some  exper 
iments  made  in  more  recent  years,  in  the  direction  of 
the  generally  recognized  sound  military  system,  have  not 
proved  by  any  means  unsatisfactory. 

This  chronic  controversy  between  the  military  admin 
istration  and  the  command  once  gave  rise  to  one  of  the 
most  dangerous  crises  iri  American  history.  The  facts 


GENERAL  GRANT'S  SPECIAL  POWERS  4H 

in  respect  to  the  origin  of  that  crisis  soon  became  ob 
scured  by  other  events,  and  have  never  been  correctly 
published. 

The  assassination  of  President  Lincoln  occurred  a 
very  short  time  before  the  end  of  the  Civil  War.  It 
appears  that  his  successor  in  the  Presidential  office  did 
not  withdraw  any  part  of  the  supreme  authority  which 
had  been  conferred  upon  G-eneral  Grant  by  President 
Lincoln  a  year  before.  Nevertheless,  Secretary  Stanton, 
who  had  very  reluctantly  yielded  to  President  Lincoln's 
order,  began,  soon  after  the  end  of  hostile  operations,  to 
resume  the  exercise  of  those  functions  which  had  for 
merly  been  claimed  as  belonging  to  the  War  Department, 
and  which  had  been  suspended  by  President  Lincoln. 
Stanton  "  boldly  took  command  of  the  armies." l  By  this 
G-eneral  Grant  was  deeply  offended,  and  finally  declared 
that  the  action  of  the  Secretary  of  War  was  intolerable ; 
although  he  refers  to  it  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  as  "  another 
little  spat."  The  authority  which  Stanton  assumed  was 
the  constitutional  authority  of  the  commander-in-ehief 
of  the  army,  a  large  part  of  which  authority  had  been 
delegated  by  the  President  to  General  Grant,  not  to 
Secretary  Stanton.  Hence  the  Secretary's  assumption 
was  offensive  alike  to  the  general  and  to  the  President. 
General  Grant  acted  with  great  forbearance,  and  endea 
vored  to  obtain  from  Secretary  Stanton  due  recognition  of 
his  rightful  authority  as  general  commanding  the  army, 
but  with  no  permanent  effect.2 

General  Grant  opposed  the  removal  of  Mr.  Stanton  by 
the  exercise  of  the  President's  prerogative  alone,  for  the 
reason,  with  others,  that  such  action  would  be  in  viola 
tion  of  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act.3  He  also  objected  at 

1  Grant's  " Memoirs,"  Vol.  II,  p.  105.         3  See    General    Grant's    letter    to 

2  Grant's  "  Memoirs,"  Vol.  II,  pp.  President  Andrew  Johnson.  August 
104, 105;  Sherman's  "Memoirs,"  sec-  1,  1867,  in  McPherson's  " History  of 
ond  edition,  Vol.  II,  pp.  446-450.  Reconstruction,"  p.  307. 


412         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

first  to  either  removal  or  suspension,  mainly  for  fear  that 
an  objectionable  appointment  might  be  made  in  Stan- 
ton's  place.1  But  those  two  objections  being  removed 
by  Johnson's  tender  of  the  appointment  to  Grant  him 
self,  vice  Stanton  suspended  instead  of  removed,  General 
Grant  gave  his  full  countenance  and  support  to  President 
Johnson  in  the  suspension  of  Mr.  Stanton,  with  a  view 
on  the  part  of  the  President  to  his  ultimate  removal, 
either  with  the  concurrence  of  the  Senate  or  through  a 
judicial  decision  that  the  Tenure-of-Office  Act  was,  as 
Johnson  claimed,  unconstitutional.2 

On  August  12,  1867,  Grant  himself  accepted  the  ap 
pointment  of  Secretary  of  War  ad  interim,  and  informed 
Stanton  that  he  had  done  so.  Stanton  denied  the  right 
of  the  President  to  suspend  him  without  the  consent  of 
the  Senate,  but  wrote  to  the  President,  and  to  the  same 
effect  to  General  Grant :  "  But  inasmuch  as  the  general 
commanding  the  armies  of  the  United  States  has  been 
appointed  ad  interim,  and  has  notified  me  that  he  has 
accepted  the  appointment,  I  have  no  alternative  but  to 
submit,  under  protest,  to  superior  force." 3 

In  1866,  1867,  and  1868  General  Grant  talked  to  me 
freely  several  times  of  his  differences  with  Secretary 
Stanton.  His  most  emphatic  declaration  on  that  sub 
ject,  and  of  his  own  intended  action  in  consequence,  ap 
pears  from  the  records  to  have  been  made  after  Stanton's 
return  to  the  War  Office  in  January,  1868,  when  his  con 
duct  was  even  more  offensive  to  Grant  than  it  had  been 
before  Stanton's  suspension  in  August,  1867,  and  when 
Grant  and  Sherman  were  trying  to  get  Stanton  out  of 
the  War  Office.4  At  the  time  of  General  Grant's  visit 

1  See    General    Grant's    letter    to     son's   "  History  of  Reconstruction," 
President  Andrew  Johnson,  Febru-     pp.  282-293. 

ary  3,  1868,  in  McPherson's  " History  3  McPherson's  "History  of  Recon- 

of  Reconstruction,"  p.  286.  struction,"  pp.  261,  262. 

2  Sherman's     "Memoirs,"     second  4  Sherman's     "Memoirs,"    second 
edition,  Vol.  II,  p.  241 ;  and  McPher-  edition,  Vol.  II,  pp.  422-424. 


GRANT  AS  SECRETARY  OF  WAR  AD  INTERIM 

to  Richmond,  Va.,  as  one  of  the  Peabody  trustees,  he 
said  to  me  that  the  conduct  of  Mr.  Stanton  had  become 
intolerable  to  him,  and,  after  asking  nay  opinion,  declared 
in  emphatic  terms  his  intention  to  demand  either  the  re 
moval  of  Stanton  or  the  acceptance  of  his  own  resigna 
tion.  But  the  bitter  personal  controversy  which  imme 
diately  followed  between  Grant  and  Johnson,  the  second 
attempt  to  remove  Stanton  in  February,  1868,  and  the 
consequent  impeachment  of  the  President,  totally  eclipsed 
the  more  distant  and  lesser  controversy  between  Grant 
and  Stanton,  and,  doubtless,  prevented  Grant  from  taking 
the  action  in  respect  to  Stanton's  removal  which  he  in 
formed  me  in  Richmond  he  intended  to  take.1 

Of  the  impeachment  and  trial  of  President  Johnson  it 
is  not  my  province  to  write.  My  special  knowledge  re 
lates  only  to  its  first  cause,  above  referred  to,  and  its  ter 
mination,  both  intimately  connected  with  the  history  of 
the  War  Department,  the  necessities  of  which  department, 
real  or  supposed,  constituted  the  only  vital  issue  involved 
in  the  impeachment  trial.  The  following  memorandum, 
made  by  me  at  the  time,  and  now  published  with  the 
consent  of  Mr.  Evarts,  explains  the  circumstances  under 
which  I  became  Secretary  of  War  in  1868,  and  the  con 
nection  of  that  event  with  the  termination  of  the  impeach 
ment  trial : 


MEMORANDUM 

May,  1868. 

In  compliance  with  a  written  request  from  Mr.  W.  M.  Evarts, 
dated  Tuesday,  April  21,  1868,  2  p.  M.,  I  called  upon  that  gentle 
man  in  his  room  at  Willard's  Hotel,  Washington,  a  few  minutes 
before  three  o'clock  p.  M.  of  the  same  day. 

Mr.  Evarts  introduced  conversation  by  saying  something  about 
the  approaching  trial  of  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  but  quickty  said 
that  was  not  what  he  wished  to  see  me  about.  The  business 

l  The  records  of  the  Peabody  trustees  show  that  their  meeting  in  Rich 
mond,  when  General  Grant  was  present,  occurred  January  21  and  22,  1868. 


414  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

upon  which  he  wished  to  see  me  was  of  vastly  greater  importance, 
involving  the  safety  of  the  country  and  the  maintenance  of  the 
Constitution.  Mr.  Evarts  then  asked  my  consent  that  the  Pres 
ident  might  at  any  time  before  the  close  of  the  impeachment 
trial  send  my' nomination  to  the  Senate  as  Secretary  of  War  in 
place  of  Mr.  Stanton.  I  asked  upon  what  ground,  and  for  what 
reasons,  the  proposition  was  made,  which  question  was  then 
answered  in  part,  and  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day  more 
fully,  as  hereafter  related.  It  having  been  announced  that 
General  Grant  was  waiting  at  the  door  for  me,  this  first  inter 
view  was  cut  short  with  an  agreement  to  renew  it  about  eight 
o'clock  the  same  evening.  Before  separating  I  asked  Mr.  Evarts 
whether  I  was  at  liberty  to  mention  the  subject  to  any  other 
person.  Mr.  Evarts  replied :  "  I  suppose  you  mean  General 
Grant."  I  said:  "Yes;  my  relations  with  General  Grant,  and 
his  with  the  President,  are  such  that  I  do  not  wish  to  act  in 
such  a  matter  without  consulting  him."  Mr.  Evarts  said  he 
could  not  give  consent  that  any  person  should  be  informed  that 
such  a  proposition  had  been  made  on  behalf  of  the  President, 
and  suggested  some  objections  to  consulting  General  Grant  on 
the  subject,  for  the  reason  of  his  being  a  candidate  for  the  Pres 
idency,  but  finally  intimated  that  it  might  be  well  to  talk  to 
General  Grant  about  it  incidentally,  and  thus  learn  his  views. 

While  walking  with  General  Grant  after  dinner  the  same  day, 
I  said  to  him,  in  effect,  that  I  had  reason  to  believe  that  a  propo 
sition  like  the  one  referred  to  above  would  probably  be  made  to 
me,  and  that  upon  the  theory,  as  I  understood,  that  the  Presi 
dent  would  not  be  convicted  by  the  Senate,  and  I  asked  General 
Grant's  opinion  in  regard  to  it.  General  Grant  replied  that  he 
had  supposed  there  was  no  reasonable  doubt  of  the  President's 
removal,  but  if  that  was  not  the  case,  or  if  it  were,  he  (General 
Grant)  would  be  glad  to  have  me  as  Secretary  of  War  during 
the  remainder  of  the  term;  that  Mr.  Wade  would  have  some 
difficulty  in  making  up  a  cabinet  for  so  short  a  portion  of  a  term. 

About  eight  o'clock  p.  M.  of  the  same  day  (April  21)  I  again 
called  upon  Mr.  Evarts  at  the  hotel,  when  a  long  conversation 
took  place  upon  the  subject  referred  to  in  the  morning.  The 
substance  of  what  Mr.  Evarts  said  was  as  follows :  He  was  fully 
satisfied  that  the  President  could  not  be  convicted  upon  the  evi 
dence  ;  if  he  was  removed,  it  would  be  done  wholly  from  sup 
posed  party  necessity ;  that  this  was  the  opinion  and  feeling  of 


INTERVIEWS  WITH  EVARTS  AND  GRANT  415 

a  considerable  number  of  the  ablest  lawyers  and  statesmen  among 
the  Republican  senators  ;  that  it  was  his  and  their  opinion  that 
if  the  President  was  removed,  it  would  be  not  really  from  any 
thing  he  had  done,  but  for  fear  of  what  he  might  do ;  that  he 
(Mr.  Evarts)  did  not  believe  the  President  could  possibly  be  con 
victed  in  any  event,  but  that  senators  were  at  a  loss  how  to  remove 
the  apprehensions  of  the  Republican  party  as  to  what  the  Presi 
dent  would  do  in  case  of  acquittal,  unless  the  War  Department 
was  placed  in  a  satisfactory  condition  in  advance.  He  said :  "A 
majority  of  Republicans  in  both  houses  of  Congress  and  through 
out  the  country  now  regret  the  commencement  of  the  impeach 
ment  proceedings,  since  they  find  how  slight  is  the  evidence  of 
guilty  intent.  But  now  the  serious  question  is,  how  to  get  out 
of  the  scrape?  A  judgment  of  guilty  and  removal  of  the  Presi 
dent  would  be  ruinous  to  the  party,  and  cause  the  political  death 
of  every  senator  who  voted  for  it  as  soon  as  the  country  has  time 
to  reflect  upon  the  facts  and  appreciate  the  frivolous  character 
of  the  charges  upon  which  the  removal  must  be  based.  The 
precedent  of  the  impeachment  and  removal  of  the  President  for 
political  reasons  would  be  exceedingly  dangerous  to  the  govern 
ment  and  the  Constitution  j  in  short,  the  emergency  is  one  of 
great  national  peril."  He  added  that  this  was  the  view  of  the 
case  entertained  by  several  among  the  most  prominent  Repub 
lican  senators,  and  that  from  such  senators  came  the  suggestion 
that  my  nomination  as  Secretary  of  War  be  sent  to  the  Senate, 
in  order  that  the  Senate  might  vote  upon  the  President's  case  in 
the  light  of  that  nomination.  Mr.  Evarts  believed  that  I  was  so 
named  because  my  appointment  would  be  satisfactory  to  Gen 
eral  Grant,  and  would  give  the  Republican  party  a  sense  of  se 
curity  as  to  the  President's  future  action  in  reference  to  the  War 
Department  and  the  military  districts  of  the  South ;  that  it  was 
not  with  anybody  a  question  of  friendship  or  hostility  toward 
the  President  personally,  for  he  really  had  no  friends.  That 
while  the  Democrats  in  the  Senate  would  of  course  vote  for  his 
acquittal,  and  do  their  whole  duty  in  the  case,  just  so  soon  as  he 
was  removed  they  would  rejoice  that  it  was  done,  feeling  confi 
dent  that  it  would  cause  the  overthrow  of  the  Republican  party 
and  the  defeat  of  General  Grant.  Mr.  Evarts  was  not  at  liberty 
to  mention  names  of  senators  holding  these  views  and  originat 
ing  the  proposition  of  my  nomination. 
I  suggested  a  number  of  objections,  some  personal  as  to  my- 


416  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

self,  and  others  of  a  public  character,  to  giving  my  assent  to  the 
proposed  nomination,  in  reply  to  which  objections  many  of  the 
above  statements  by  Mr.  Evarts  were  made.  I  then  said  I 
would  again  talk  with  General  Grant  upon  the  subject,  and  give 
a  definite  reply  the  next  morning.  About  eleven  o'clock  the 
same  night  (April  21)  I  informed  General  Grant  at  his  house 
that  the  proposition  above  named  had  been  (or  it  would  be)  made 
to  me  5  that  it  originated  with  Republican  senators  j  and  I  gave 
in  substance  the  reasons  above  stated  as  what  I  understood  to  be 
the  grounds  upon  which  the  proposition  was  made.  I  did  not 
give  any  names  of  senators,  nor  the  channel  through  which  my 
information  or  the  proposition  came.  My  remarks  to  General 
Grant  were  prefaced  by  the  statement  that  while  I  would  be  glad 
of  General  Grant's  advice  if  he  felt  at  liberty  to  give  it,  I  did 
not  wish  to  ask  General  Grant  to  commit  himself  in  so  delicate 
a  matter  unless  he  desired  to  do  so ;  but  that  the  matter  was  one 
of  so  great  importance  that  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  tell  him  all 
about  it,  and  what  I  believed  I  ought  to  do,  and  leave  General 
Grant  to  advise  or  not,  as  he  thought  best.  I  said  that  although 
the  statement  of  the  views  and  wishes  of  senators  above  referred 
to  came  to  me  indirectly,  they  came  in  such  a  way  as  not  to  per 
mit  me  to  doubt  their  correctness,  and  I  believed  it  my  duty  to 
yield  to  the  request.  General  Grant  at  once  replied  that  under 
those  circumstances  he  did  not  see  how  I  could  do  otherwise. 
General  Grant  said  he  did  not  believe  in  any  compromise  of  the 
impeachment  question.  The  President  ought  to  be  convicted  or 
acquitted  fairly  and  squarely  on  the  facts  proved.  That  if  he 
was  acquitted,  as  soon  as  Congress  adjourned  he  would  trample 
the  laws  under  foot  and  do  whatever  he  pleased ;  that  Congress 
would  have  to  remain  in  session  all  summer  to  protect  the  coun 
try  from  the  lawless  acts  of  the  President  j  that  the  only  limit  to 
his  violation  of  law  had  been,  and  would  be,  his  courage,  which 
had  been  very  slight  heretofore,  but  would  be  vastly  increased 
by  his  escape  from  punishment.  General  Grant  said  he  would 
not  believe  any  pledge  or  promise  Mr.  Johnson  might  make  in  re 
gard  to  his  future  conduct.  In  his  opinion,  the  only  safe  course, 
and  the  most  popular  one,  would  be  to  remove  the  President. 
He  could  understand  the  grounds  of  apprehension  in  the 
minds  of  some  leading  Republicans,  but  he  did  not  agree  with 
them.  He  believed  the  safest  and  wisest  course  was  the  bold 
and  direct  one.  In  this  General  Grant  was  very  emphatic  5  he 


INTERVIEWS  WITH  EVARTS  AND  GRANT  41J 

said  he  would  not  advise  me  to  eiiter  into  any  project  to  com 
promise  the  impeachment  question,  but  if  the  facts  were  as  rep 
resented  that  I  could  not  well  do  otherwise  than  to  acquiesce  in 
the  nomination. 

The  next  morning  (April  22),  about  ten  o'clock,  I  called  upon 
Mr.  Evarts  at  Willard's  Hotel,  and  informed  him  that  I  had  con 
sidered  the  matter  as  carefully  as  I  was  able  to  do,  and  that 
there  was  then  only  one  difficulty  in  my  mind.  That  was  as  to 
what  would  be  the  policy  of  the  President  during  the  remainder 
of  his  term,  in  the  event  of  his  being  acquitted.  I  mentioned 
some  of  the  President's  recent  acts,  such  as  the  creation  of  the 
Military  Division  of  the  Atlantic,  disregard  of  military  usage  in 
sending  orders  to  army  officers  out  of  the  regular  channels,  etc., 
—  acts  for  which  no  good  reason  could  be  given,  and  which  at 
least  tended  to  create  discord  and  trouble.  Mr.  Evarts  replied 
that  he  could  not  tell  anything  about  those  matters,  but  pre 
sumed  that  such  annoying  irregularities  would  disappear  with 
the  removal  of  their  cause,  namely,  hostility  between  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  Mr.  Evarts  said  he  did  not  see 
how  I  could  satisfy  myself  on  that  subject  without  a  personal 
interview  with  the  President,  which  would  not  be  advisable  in 
the  circumstances.  I  then  said  I  did  not  expect  any  pledge  from 
the  President,  and  did  not  expect  to  receive  any  communication 
from  him  on  the  subject,  either  directly  or  indirectly;  and  that 
I  was  not  willing  to  converse  with  the  President,  nor  with  any 
other  person  except  Mr.  Evarts,  on  the  subject;  but  that  I 
wished  the  President  to  understand  distinctly  the  conditions 
upon  which  I  was  willing  to  accept  the  appointment,  and  desired 
Mr.  Evarts  to  inform  the  President  of  these  conditions.  If  the 
nomination  was  then  made,  I  would  take  it  for  granted  that  the 
conditions  were  satisfactory.  I  then  said  I  had  always  been 
treated  kindly  by  the  President,  and  felt  kindly  toward  him ; 
that  I  had  always  advised  him,  whenever  any  excuse  had  been 
given  for  offering  advice,  to  avoid  all  causes  of  irritation  with 
Congress,  and  try  to  act  in  harmony  with  the  legislative  de 
partment;  that  I  regarded  the  removal  of  Mr.  Stanton,  in  the 
way  it  was  done,  as  wrong  and  unwise ;  that  I  understood  this 
proposition  as  coming  originally  from  the  Republican  side  of  the 
Senate,  and  as  being  accepted  by  the  President  in  the  interest 
of  peace,  and  for  the  purpose  of  securing  harmony  between  the 
legislative  and  executive  departments  of  the  government,  and 


418  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

a  just  and  faithful  administration  of  the  laws,  including  the 
reconstruction  acts.  I  added:  u  And  the  President  knows  from 
General  Schofield's  acts  what  he  means  by  this,  —  if,  after  these 
conditions  have  been  fully  stated  to  the  President,  he  sends  nay 
name  to  the  Senate,  I  will  deem  it  my  duty  to  say  nothing  on 
the  subject  of  accepting  or  declining  the  appointment  until 
the  Senate  has  acted  upon  it." 

Mr.  Evarts  intimated  that  the  above  was  satisfactory,  and 
the  interview  then  ended. 

I  returned  to  Kichmond  on  Thursday,  April  23,  being 
then  in  command  in  Virginia,  executing  the  reconstruc 
tion  acts.  On  the  24th  the  President  sent  to  the  Senate 
my  nomination  as  Secretary  of  War.  On  the  morning 
of  the  26th  I  received  from  General  Grant  a  confidential 
letter,  dated  April  25,  advising  me  under  the  circum 
stances  to  decline  the  secretaryship  in  advance.1 

To  the  above  letter  I  sent  the  following  letters  in  reply  : 

(Confidential.) 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  April  26,  1868. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  regret  exceedingly  that  your  advice  came 
too  late.  I  have  already  promised  not  to  decline  the  nomination 
in  advance  of  any  action  of  the  Senate. 

Yours  very  truly,  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen. 

GEN'L  GRANT,  Washington,  D.  C. 

RICHMOND,  VA.,  April  26,  1868. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  see  from  the  papers  that  the  President  has 
nominated  me  to  the  Senate  as  Secretary  of  War.  You  are 
aware  that  I  do  not  want  that  office  ;  yet  under  existing  circum 
stances,  if  the  Senate  should  wish  me  to  serve  I  could  not  de 
cline.  I  presume  my  nomination  will  not  be  confirmed,  but 
have  no  right  to  act  upon  such  presumption. 

Yours  very  truly,  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Bvt.  Maj.-Gen. 

GEN'L  GRANT,  Washington,  D.  C. 

1  From  all  the  circumstances  it  is  opinion  as  to  the  effect  the  nomina- 
fair  to  assume  that  General  Grant's  tion  would  have  on  the  impeachment 
change  of  attitude  was  owing  to  his  proceedings. 


FAILURE  OF  THE  IMPEACHMENT   TRIAL 

I  have  no  means  of  knowing  to  what  extent,  if  any, 
the  Senate  was  influenced  by  this  nomination,  but  anxi 
ety  about  the  ultimate  result  seemed  to  be  soon  allayed. 
About  a  month  later  a  vote  was  taken  in  the  Senate,  and 
the  impeachment  failed;  my  nomination  was  then  con 
firmed,  as  stated  at  the  time,  by  a  nearly  unanimous  vote 
of  the  Senate. 

I  entered  upon  the  duties  of  the  office  as  Secretary  of 
War  on  the  first  day  of  June,  and  continued  to  discharge 
them  until  a  few  days  after  General  Grant's  inauguration 
in  March.  I  was  greeted  very  cordially  by  the  President, 
by  all  the  members  of  his  cabinet,  by  General  Grant,  and 
by  a  large  number  of  senators  who  called  upon  me  at'  the 
War  Department. 

The  duties  devolved  upon  me  were  often  of  a  very 
delicate  character,  and  it  required  at  times  no  little  tact 
to  avoid  serious  trouble.  President  Johnson's  views 
were  sometimes  in  direct  conflict  with  those  which  I 
felt  compelled  to  maintain  under  the  acts  of  Congress 
affecting  the  States  lately  in  rebellion ;  but  it  is  due  to 
the  memory  of  President  Johnson  to  say  that  he  did 
not  at  any  time  require  me  to  do  anything  contrary 
to  my  interpretation  of  the  acts  of  Congress,  and  that 
he  in  general  acquiesced  without  objection  in  all  the 
measures  I  deemed  necessary  to  preserve  the  peace  and 
secure  a  fair  vote  of  the  newly  enfranchised  citizens  of 
the  Southern  States  in  the  Presidential  election.  The 
cordial  assistance  of  Mr.  Evarts  as  Attorney-General  was 
a  great  help  to  me  in  such  matters.  When  he  was  present 
I  had  little  difficulty  in  respect  to  the  law  involved  in 
any  question ;  but  when  he  happened  to  be  absent,  and 
I  was  compelled  to  stand  alone  against  all  the  cabinet,  or 
all  who  chose  to  take  any  interest  in  the  question,  it  was 
hard  work.  But  I  always  carried  the  day — at  least,  in 
act  if  not  in  argument.  The  President  never  decided 
against  me.  He  thus  fulfilled  to  the  letter  the  implied 


420  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

promise  made  when  he  submitted  my  nomination  to  the 
Senate. 

If  there  ever  had  been  any  real  ground  for  the  wide 
spread  apprehension  of  criminal  purpose  on  the  part  of 
President  Johnson,  certainly  all  indication  of  any  such 
purpose  disappeared  with  the  failure  of  his  impeach 
ment  and  the  settlement  of  the  long-standing  contro 
versy  respecting  the  War  Department.  The  so-called 
reconstruction  laws,  which  the  President  so  emphati 
cally  condemned  as  being  unconstitutional,  were  carried 
out  without  further  objection  from  him;  the  Presiden 
tial  election  in  the  Southern  States  was  conducted  with 
perfect  good  order ;  a  free  ballot  and  a  full  count  were 
secured  under  the  supervision  and  protection  of  the 
army — a  thing  supposed  to  be  so  dangerous  to  the  lib 
erties  of  a  free  people.  This  and  many  other  examples 
in  the  history  of  this  country,  from  the  time  when 
"Washington  surrendered  his  commission  to  the  Conti 
nental  Congress  down  to  the  present  time,  show  that  a 
"free  people"  have  nothing  to  fear  from  their  army, 
whether  regular,  volunteer,  or  militia ;  the  soldiers  are, 
in  fact,  among  the  most  devoted  and  loyal  citizens  of 
the  republic,  and  thoroughly  imbued  with  the  funda 
mental  principle  of  subordination  of  the  military  to  the 
civil  power. 

With  Greneral  Grant  my  relations  while  in  the  War 
Department  were  of  the  most  satisfactory  character. 
As  a  candidate  for  the  Presidency,  and  as  President 
elect,  he  naturally  desired  to  be  as  free  as  possible  from 
the  current  duties  of  his  office  as  general  of  the  army, 
and  he  was  absent  from  Washington  much  of  the  time, 
his  chief  of  staff,  Greneral  Eawlins,  remaining  there  to 
promulgate  orders  in  his  name.  Thus  it  devolved  upon 
me  to  exercise  all  the  functions  of  u  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army" — functions  which  it  is  usually  attempted 
to  divide  among  three, — the  President,  the  Secretary  of 


HARMONY  IN  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  421 

War,  and  the  general-in-chief, — without  any  legal  defi 
nition  of  the  part  which  belongs  to  each.  Of  course 
"the  machine"  ran  very  smoothly  in  the  one  case, 
though  there  had  been  much  friction  in  the  other. 

In  compliance  with  the  wish  of  General  Grant,  I  re 
mained  in  office  under  him  for  a  few  days,  for  the  pur 
pose  of  inaugurating  the  system  which  he  hoped  would 
end  the  long-standing  controversy  between  the  War  De 
partment  and  the  headquarters  of  the  army.  The  order 
which  was  issued  assigning  General  Sherman  to  com 
mand  the  entire  army,  staff  as  well  as  line,  was  prepared 
by  me  under  General  Grant's  instructions,  and  the  draft 
of  the  order  was  approved  by  him  as  expressing  the 
views  he  had  maintained  when  he  was  general-in-chief. 
As  President  he  very  soon  yielded  to  the  opposite  views, 
and  caused  the  order  to  be  amended  accordingly. 

That  General  Sherman  then  entertained  views  of  his 
authority  which  were  too  broad,  as  General  Grant  had 
also  done,  is  no  doubt  true;  but  it  ought  not  to  have 
been  very  difficult  to  correct  such  errors.  It  was  easier 
to  take  away  all  administrative  authority  and  all  com 
mand  over  the  general  staff  of  the  army,  and  the  latter 
course  was  adopted.  The  ancient  controversy  was  up  to 
1888  no  nearer  settlement  than  it  was  in  186{j\  though  in 
General  Sheridan's  time  some  progress  had  been  made 
in  the  persistent  efforts  to  deprive  the  general-in-chief  of 
the  little  authority  which  had  been  left  to  General  Sher 
man.  General  Sheridan  had,  with  his  usual  gallantry 
and  confidence,  renewed  the  contest,  but  had  been  worsted 
in  his  first  encounter  with  the  Secretary,  and  then  gave 
up  the  struggle. 

Upon  my  assignment  to  the  "  command  of  the  army  " 
in  1888,  I  determined  to  profit  so  far  as  possible  by  the 
unsatisfactory  experience  of  Generals  Scott,  Grant,  Sher 
man,  and  Sheridan  —  at  least  so  far  as  to  avoid  further 
attempts  to  accomplish  the  impossible,  which  attempts 


422  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

have  usually  the  result  of  accomplishing  little  or  nothing. 
In  fact,  long  study  of  the  subject,  at  the  instance  of  Gen 
erals  Grant  and  Sherman,  earnest  efforts  to  champion 
their  views,  and  knowledge  of  the  causes  of  their  failure, 
had  led  me  to  the  conclusion  heretofore  suggested,  namely, 
that  under  the  government  of  the  United  States  an  actual 
military  commander  of  the  army  is  not  possible,  unless 
in  an  extreme  emergency  like  that  which  led  to  the  as 
signment  of  Lieutenant-General  Grant  in  1864 ;  and  that 
the  general-in-chief,  or  nominal  commanding  general, 
can  at  most  be  only  a  "  chief  of  staff," —  that  or  nothing, 
—  whatever  may  be  the  mere  title  under  which  he  may 
be  assigned  to  duty  by  the  President. 

As  the  first  step  in  the  experimental  course  decided 
upon,  I  sent  an  order  in  writing  to  the  adjutant-general, 
directing  him  never,  under  any  circumstances,  to  issue 
an  order  dictated  by  me,  or  in  my  name,  without  first 
laying  it  before  the  Secretary  of  War;  and  I  made  it 
known  to  all  the  staff  that  I  disclaimed  the  right  to  issue 
any  order  to  the  army  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
President  or  the  Secretary.  I  also  forbade  the  issuing 
of  any  order  in  my  name  without  my  knowledge.  The 
first  rule  was  easy,  the  latter  very  difficult,  to  enforce. 
I  found,  with  no  little  surprise,  that  the  office  of  the 
"  commanding  general "  usually  learned  for  the  first  time 
of  routine  orders  issued  in  his  name  by  seeing  them  pub 
lished  in  the  New  York  papers  the  next  day ;  and  it  was 
quite  difficult  at  first  to  make  it  distinctly  understood 
that  such  a  practice  could  not  be  tolerated.  In  fact,  it 
became  necessary  to  call  attention  to  the  question  of  vera 
city  involved  in  such  a  use  of  the  general's  name.  Such 
was  the  condition  the  War  Department  had  reached. 
The  adjutant-general  had  acquired  the  habit  of  issuing 
nearly  all  orders  to  the  army  without  the  knowledge  of 
any  one  of  his  superiors  —  the  President,  the  Secretary 
of  War,  or  the  general-in-chief.  In  fact,  the  adjutant- 


A  NEW  POLICY  AT  ARMY  HEADQUARTERS  423 

general  had  in  practice  corne  very  near  being  "com 
mander -in-chief." 

Some  time  and  much  patience  were  required  to  bring 
about  the  necessary  change,  but  ere  long  the  result  be 
came  very  apparent.  Perfect  harmony  was  established 
between  the  War  Department  and  the  headquarters  of 
the  army,  and  this  continued,  under  the  administrations 
of  Secretaries  Proctor,  Elkins,  and  Lamont,  up  to  the 
time  of  my  retirement  from  active  service.  During  all 
this  period, —  namely,  from  1889  to  1895,  under  the  ad 
ministrations  of  Presidents  Harrison  and  Cleveland, —  the 
method  I  have  indicated  was  exactly  followed  by  the 
President  in  all  cases  of  such  importance  as  to  demand 
his  personal  action,  and  some  such  cases  occurred  under 
both  administrations.  The  orders  issued  were  actually 
the  President's  orders.  No  matter  by  whom  suggested 
or  by  whom  formulated,  they  were  in  their  final  form  un- 
derstandingly  dictated  by  the  President,  and  sent  to  the 
army  in  his  name  by  the  commanding  general,  thus  leav 
ing  no  possible  ground  for  question  as  to  the  constitu 
tional  authority  under  which  they  were  issued,  nor  of  the 
regularity  of  the  method,  in  conformity  with  army  regu 
lations,  by  which  they  were  communicated  to  the  army. 

It  is,  I  think,  to  be  hoped  that  the  system  thus  begun 
may  be  fully  developed  and  become  permanent,  as  being 
the  best  practicable  solution  of  a  long-standing  and 
dangerous  controversy,  and  as  most  in  accord  with  the 
fundamental  principles  of  our  constitutional  government, 
under  which  the  President,  whether  a  soldier  or  a  civil 
ian,  is  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  army  and  navy. 


CHAPTER  XXHI 

ASSIGNMENT  TO  THE  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI  —  A 
CORDIAL  RECEPTION  FROM  FORMER  OPPONENTS  IN  ST. 
LOUIS  —  ORIGIN  OF  THE  MILITARY  SCHOOL  AT  FORT 
RILEY  —  FUNERAL  OF  GENERAL  GEORGE  H.  THOMAS  — 
DEATH  OF  GENERAL  GEORGE  G.  MEADE  —  ASSIGNED  TO 
THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  PACIFIC  —  A  VISIT  TO  HAWAII  — 
MILITARY  MEN  IN  THE  EXERCISE  OF  POLITICAL  POWER 
—  TROUBLE  WITH  THE  MODOC  INDIANS  —  THE  CANBY 
MASSACRE. 

WHEN  I  went  into  the  War  Office  in  1868,  the  cor 
dial  greeting  extended  from  all  quarters  was  ex 
ceedingly  gratifying  to  me,  and,  I  thought,  highly  honor 
able  to  those  gentlemen,  especially  in  the  Senate,  who 
had  so  long  opposed  me,  only  one  of  whom,  I  believe, 
failed  to  call  at  the  office  and  express  a  kindly  welcome ; 
and  that  one  was  so  great  a  man,  in  his  own  estimation, 
I  flattered  myself  that  was  the  only  reason  he  had  not 
called  to  greet  me.  So  when  I  returned  to  St.  Louis  in 
March,  1869,  the  good  citizens  of  that  place  gave  me  a 
banquet  and  a  most  cordial  welcome,  in  which  all  par 
ticipated,  save  one,  of  those  who  had  seemed  to  be  my 
most  bitter  enemies  in  1862  and  1863.  It  was  espe 
cially  noteworthy  that  the  Hon.  Charles  D.  Drake,  who 
had  been  chairman  of  the  large  delegation  which  went 
to  Washington,  and  one  of  the  recognized  leaders  in  the 
movement,  to  obtain  my  removal  from  the  command  in 
Missouri,  was  among  the  most  cordial  in  his  expressions 
of  esteem  and  regard  from  March,  1869,  up  to  the  time 

424 


ASSIGNMENT  TO  THE   DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI      425 

of  his  death,  at  which  time  I  was  in  command  of  the 
army.  But  his  principal  associate,  the  Hon.  Henry  T. 
Blow,  could  not  forgive  me,  for  what  thing  especially  I 
do  not  know,  unless  for  my  offense  in  arresting  a  "  loyal " 
editor,  for  which  he  denounced  me  in  a  telegram  to  the 
President.  That  was,  no  doubt,  a  very  grave  offense, 
but  a  natural  one  for  a  young  soldier.  Indeed,  old  as  I 
am  now,  and  much  sad  experience  as  I  have  had  with 
the  press,  I  would  probably  do  the  same  thing  again. 
That  "  loyal "  editor,  professing  the  greatest  zeal  for  the 
Union  cause  and  devotion  to  the  National  Government, 
had  published,  in  a  city  under  martial  law,  a  confidential 
letter  from  the  President,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army,  to  the  commanding  general  of  that  department. 
The  ever  kind  and  indulgent  President  was  only  too 
willing  to  overlook  such  an  offense  on  the  part  of  one 
who  professed  to  be  a  friend  of  the  Union.  But  a  sol 
dier  could  not  overlook  such  an  outrage  as  that  upon  his 
commander-in-chief,  and  upon  the  cause  he  was  sworn 
to  defend.  Though  his  respect  for  a  free  press  be  pro 
found,  there  are  some  kinds  of  freedom  which  must,  in 
time  of  war,  be  crushed,  even  though  the  soldier  him 
self  may  also  be  crushed.  A  soldier  who  is  not  ready  to 
meet  his  fate  in  that  way,  as  well  as  in  battle,  is  not  fit 
to  command. 

In  President  Grant's  order  of  March,  1869,  assigning 
the  general  officers  to  commands,  the  Department  of  the 
Missouri  again  fell  to  my  lot.  I  relieved  Lieutenant- 
General  Sheridan,  who  took  command  of  the  Division 
of  the  Missouri,  and  removed  his  headquarters  from  St. 
Louis  to  Chicago,  which  then  became  for  the  first  time 
the  principal  military  center  of  all  the  Western  country. 
These  arrangements  were  intended  to  be  as  nearly  per 
manent  as  practicable,  so  that  all  might  have  a  period 
of  comparative  rest  after  the  eight  years  of  war  and 
strife.  I  then  reverted,  for  the  first  time  in  those  eight 


426  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

years,  to  the  thoughts  and  ambitions  of  my  youth  and 
young  manhood,  for  I  had  grown  much  older  in  that 
time.  First  was  the  ambition,  inherited  from  my  grand 
father  McAllister,  to  acquire  a  farm  big  enough  to  keep 
all  the  neighbors  at  a  respectful  distance.  In  company 
with  my  brother  and  another  officer,  I  bought  in  Col 
orado  a  ranch  about  ten  miles  square,  and  projected 
some  farming  and  stock-raising  on  a  large  scale.  My 
dream  was  to  prepare  a  place  where  I  could,  ere  long, 
retire  from  public  life  and  pass  the  remainder  of  my 
days  in  peace  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  all  those  out-of- 
door  sports  which  were  always  so  congenial  to  me.  But 
events  "  over  which  I  had  no  control "  soon  defeated  that 
scheme.  That,  like  all  the  other  plans  of  my  own  inven 
tion,  came  to  naught.  The  ranch  was  sold,  and  I  got 
out  of  it,  as  I  always  tried  to  do,  about  as  much  as  I  had 
put  in. 

Upon  a  suggestion  from  General  Henry  J.  Hunt,  the 
famous  chief  of  artillery,  when  I  was  in  the  War  De 
partment,  I  ordered  a  light-artillery  school  to  be  estab 
lished  at  Fort  Riley,  Kansas.  Also,  upon  his  suggestion, 
I  directed  that  the  four  batteries  which  were  to  compose 
that  school  should  be  supplied  with  carbines,  so  that  they 
might  serve  as  cavalry  when  necessary  to  protect  the 
neighboring  settlements  against  Indian  raids,  and  thus 
overcome  any  objection  which  might  be  urged  on  the 
ground  that  the  barracks  at  Fort  Riley  were  needed  for 
cavalry.  The  school  was  organized,  under  Colonel  John 
Hamilton ;  the  batteries  did  good  service  as  cavalry  in  the 
summers  of  1869  and  1870;  and  all  was  working,  as  I 
thought,  in  a  highly  satisfactory  manner  so  long  as  I  re 
mained  in  command  of  that  department.  But  after  I 
went  to  California,  for  some  inscrutable  reason  the  school 
was  broken  up  and  the  batteries  again  scattered  to  sepa 
rate  posts. 

When  that  department  again  came  under  my  com- 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  MILITARY  SCHOOL  AT  FORT  RILEY      427 

mand,  as  part  of  the  Division  of  the  Missouri,  and  General 
Sheridan  was  in  command  of  the  army,  a  move  was 
made  by  somebody  to  get  possession  of  that  splendid 
military  reservation  of  Fort  Riley  for  some  other  purpose. 
Hence  it  became  necessary  to  manifest  in  some  more 
striking  way  the  importance  of  that  place  for  military 
uses.  The  occasion  had  again  come  for  carrying  out  that 
scheme  which  Hunt  and  I  had  devised  for  doing  what  was 
so  much  needed  for  the  artillery.  Fortunately,  General 
Sheridan  wanted  also  to  do  something  beneficial  for  the 
cavalry,  in  which  he  felt  much  the  same  special  interest 
that  I  did  in  the  artillery.  So  a  sort  of  alliance,  offen 
sive  and  defensive,  was  formed,  which  included  as  its 
most  active  and  influential  member  Senator  Plumb  of 
Kansas,  to  obtain  the  necessary  funds  and  build  a  suit 
able  post  and  establish  at  Fort  Riley  a  school  of  cavalry 
and  light  artillery.  The  result  finally  attained,  when  I 
was  in  command  of  the  army,  is  well  known,  and  is 
an  honor  to  the  country. 

The  department  headquarters  were  removed  to  St. 
Louis  during  the  winter  of  1869-70  to  make  room  at  Fort 
Leavenworth  for  the  cavalry  who  had  been  on  the  plains 
during  the  summer.  I  then  had  the  pleasure  of  renewing 
the  intimate  friendships  which  had  been  formed  between 
1860  and  1863  in  that  most  hospitable  city.  Even  those 
ties  which  had  been  so  rudely  severed  by  war  in  the  spring 
of  1861  were  restored  and  became  as  strong  as  ever.  I 
found  that  the  memory  of  a  little  humanity  displayed  in 
mitigating  somewhat  the  horrors  of  war  had  sufficed  to 
obliterate  in  those  few  years  the  recollection  of  a  bitter 
sectional  enmity ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  a  record  of 
some  faithful  service  far  enough  from  their  eyes  to  en 
able  them  to  see  it  without  the  aid  of  a  microscope,  and 
the  cooler  judgment  of  a  few  years  of  peace,  had  so  far 
obscured  the  partizan  contests  of  a  period  of  war  that 
none  were  more  cordial  friends  in  1869  than  those  who 


428  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

had  seemed  bitterest  enemies  six  years  before.  Human 
nature  is  not  half  so  bad  as  it  sometimes  pretends  to  be. 
As  a  rule,  it  would  be  pretty  good  all  the  time  if  men 
could  only  keep  cool.  Among  all  the  enjoyments  of  that 
season  in  St.  Louis,  that  which  left  the  deepest  impression 
on  my  memory,  as  has  always  been  the  case  with  me, 
was  the  sport  at  Hat  Island,  under  the  management  of 
that  most  genial  of  companions,  Ben  Stickney.  We 
hunted  with  hounds  before  breakfast  every  morning,  and 
shot  water-fowl  from  breakfast  till  supper.  What  was 
done  after  supper  has  never  been  told.  What  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  "reversionary"  tendency  in  civilized 
man  to  a  humbler  state !  He  never  feels  so  happy  as 
when  he  throws  off  a  large  part  of  his  civilization  and 
reverts  to  the  life  of  a  semi-savage.  The  only  thing  that 
saves  him  from  total  relapse  is  the  fact  that  he  takes 
with  him  those  little  comforts,  both  liquid  and  solid, 
which  cannot  be  found  in  the  woods.  He  thus  keeps  up 
the  taste  that  finally  draws  him  back  again  to  a  civilized, 
or,  more  accurately,  semi-civilized  life.  If  any  sportsman 
knows  any  better  reason  than  that  for  not  living  like  a 
savage  when  in  his  hunting-camp,  I  would  like  him  to 
give  that  reason  to  me ! 

We  returned  to  Fort  Leavenworth  in  the  spring,  and 
expected  to  make  that  our  permanent  home.  Some  ne 
cessary  improvements  had  been  made  in  the  quarters 
during  the  winter,  and  no  one  could  have  desired  a  more 
comfortable  residence,  more  congenial  companionship,  or 
more  agreeable  occupation  than  that  of  guarding  and 
protecting  the  infant  settlements  of  industrious  but  un 
armed  and  confiding  people  rapidly  spreading  far  out 
upon  the  plains.  With  my  cavalry  and  carbined  artillery 
encamped  in  front,  I  wanted  no  other  occupation  in  life 
than  to  ward  off  the  savage  and  kill  off  his  food  until 
there  should  no  Jxmger  be  an  Indian  frontier  in  our 
beautiful  country.  ? 


FUNERAL  OF  GENERAL  GEORGE  H.   THOMAS  429 

But  soon  after  my  pickets  were  put  out  on  the  plains, 
there  came  the  sad  news  of  the  sudden  death,  in  San 
Francisco,  of  my  old  commander,  General  George  H. 
Thomas.  His  body  was  brought  east  to  Troy,  New  York, 
for  interment.  All  his  old  companions,  including  Presi 
dent  Grant,  assembled  to  pay  the  last  tribute  of  respect 
and  honor  to  that  noble  old  soldier,  whose  untimely 
death  was  deeply  mourned  by  all.  It  was  a  most  im 
pressive  scene.  All  the  high  commanders  of  the  vast 
army  which  had  been  disbanded  five  years  before  as 
sembled  around  the  grave  of  one  of  their  number.  The 
hero  was  buried,  as  he  had  lived,  honored  by  all  who 
knew  him,  and  mourned  by  the  nation  he  had  so  faith 
fully  served. 

Immediately  after  the  funeral  of  General  Thomas 
there  was,  if  I  recollect  rightly,  a  large  assembly,  in  Phil 
adelphia,  of  the  Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
General  Grant  and  General  Sherman  were  there,  and  we 
met  at  an  early  dinner  at  the  house  of  General  Meade, 
who  had  been  designated  by  General  Sherman  to  suc 
ceed  General  Thomas  in  command  of  the  Division  of  the 
Pacific.  After  dinner  General  Meade  took  me  to  drive 
through  Fairmount  Park,  in  which  he  was  greatly  inter 
ested  as  president  of  the  commission  having  it  in  charge. 
He  explained  to  me  the  great  sacrifice  he  would  make  in 
giving  up  command  of  the  Division  of  the  Atlantic,  and 
his  congenial  occupation  and  pleasant  home  in  Philadel 
phia,  where  he  was  best  known  and  most  highly  respected^ 
and  where,  as  I  could  see  in  driving  along,  almost  every 
body  recognized  and  saluted  him.  I  thought  he  had  in 
deed  better  reason  to  feel  satisfied  with  his  home  than 
any  other  man  I  had  ever  known.  But  he,  too,  great  and 
brave  soldier,  was  given  but  little  longer  to  enjoy  the 
high  honors  he  had  so  nobly  won  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  When  I  had  so  far  recovered  from  a  se 
vere  attack  of  pneumonia  as  to  be  permitted  to  look  for 


430  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  first  time  at  a  morning  paper,  one  of  the  first  things 
that  attracted  my  attention  was  the  death  of  General 
Meade,  from  the  same  disease,  the  day  before. 

Of  course  the  President  did  not  hesitate  to  accede  to 
G-eneral  Meade's  desire,  for  he  had  given  him,  only  a  year 
before,  the  division  of  his  choice.  As  is  well  known,  the 
relations  between  G-eueral  Grant  and  General  Hancock 
were  not  at  that  time  quite  satisfactory.  As  I  knew  the 
exact  truth  at  the  time,  I  think  it  my  duty  to  state  that 
General  Grant  believed  that  General  Hancock  had  not 
at  one  time  shown  that  degree  of  subordination  which  a 
soldier  ought  always  to  feel.  But  to  the  honor  of  both 
be  it  said  that  their  difference  was  ere  long  removed, 
and  General  Hancock  was  assigned  to  command  the 
Division  of  the  Atlantic,  according  to  his  rank.  In  the 
meantime,  it  fell  to  my  lot  to  take  the  Division  of  the 
Pacific,  which  I  had  a  year  before  gladly  relinquished  in 
favor  of  General  Thomas. 

Soon  after  my  arrival  in  San  Francisco,  General  Sher 
man  met  me  there,  and  we  went  together,  by  sea,  to 
Oregon,  where  we  met  General  Canby,  then  commanding 
the  Department  of  the  Columbia.  We  ascended  the  Co 
lumbia  River  to  Umatilla,  and  rode  by  stage  from  that 
place  to  Kelton,  on  the  Central  Pacific  Railroad,  seven 
hundred  and  fifty  miles.  After  a  visit  to  Salt  Lake  City, 
we  returned  to  St.  Louis,  where  I  had  some  work  to  com 
plete  as  president  of  a  board  on  tactics  and  small  arms, 
upon  the  completion  of  which  I  returned  to  San  Francisco. 

In  the  summer  of  1871,  after  the  great  earthquake  of 
that  year,  I  made  a  trip  across  the  Sierra  to  Camp  Inde 
pendence,  which  had  been  destroyed,  to  consider  the  ques 
tion  of  rebuilding  that  post.  Of  the  buildings,  brick  or 
adobe,  not  one  remained  in  condition  to  be  occupied. 
Very  fortunately,  all  in  the  garrison  had  received  timely 
warning  from  the  first  shock,  so  that  none  were  injured 
by  the  second  and  third  shocks,  which  tumbled  everything 


ASSIGNED  TO  THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  PACIFIC          43} 

to  the  ground.  Some  thirty  people  living  in  small  adobe 
houses  in  Owens  River  valley  were  killed.  Sounds  like 
heavy  artillery  in  the  distance  were  still  heard  at  intervals 
after  our  arrival.  For  many  miles  along  the  length  of 
the  valley  a  great  crevasse  had  been  formed  by  the  up 
heaval,  which  must  have  been  many  feet  in  height.  In 
the  subsidence  one  side  had  fallen  several  feet  lower  than 
the  other,  and  at  a  place  where  the  crack  crossed  the 
wagon-tracks  a  horizontal  motion  of  several  feet  had 
taken  place,  the  road  marking  its  permanent  effect. 

We  ascended  Owens  Eiver  valley  to  the  source  of  that 
stream,  recrossed  the  mountains  by  the  "bloody"  canon, 
and  descended  through  the  great  Yosemite  valley,  which 
from  the  higher  altitude  looked  like  a  little  "  hole  in  the 
ground."  That  was  the  least  interesting  of  all  my  four 
visits  to  that  wonderful  work  of  nature.  Our  round  trip 
occupied  about  seven  weeks. 

At  our  last  camp,  in  Tuolumne  meadows,  some  time  in 
August,  after  the  temperature  had  been  above  eighty 
degrees  in  the  daytime,  it  fell  below  thirty  at  night.  I 
contracted  a  cold  which  developed  into  pneumonia,  from 
which  I  did  not  recover  for  many  months.  It  was  during 
my  convalescence  that  I  went  with  Colonel  B.  S.  Alex 
ander  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  under  an  arrangement 
previously  made  with  the  War  Department. 

It  was  the  year  1872  when  I  and  Colonel  Alexander, 
the  senior  engineer  officer  on  the  Pacific  coast,  who  had 
applied  to  the  War  Department  and  obtained  an  order  to 
visit  the  Hawaiian  Islands  for  the  purpose  of  reporting 
to  the  War  Department,  confidentially,  the  value  of  those 
islands  to  the  United  States  for  military  and  naval 
purposes,  went  to  Hawaii  with  Rear- Admiral  Pennock 
on  the  flag-ship  California,  and  returned,  three  months 
later,  on  the  war-steamer  Benicia.  During  our  stay  we 
visited  the  largest  island  of  the  group, — Hawaii, — and  its 
principal  seaport, — Hilo, — and  the  great  crater  of  Kilauea. 


432  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

We  made  a  careful  examination  of  the  famous  harbor 
of  Pearl  River,  in  the  island  of  Oahu,  a  few  miles  from 
Honolulu,  including  a  survey  of  the  entrance  to  that 
harbor  and  an  estimate  of  the  cost  of  cutting  a  deep 
ship-channel  through  the  coral  reef  at  the  extremity  of 
that  entrance  toward  the  sea. 

At  that  time  the  young  king  Lunalilo  had  just  ascended 
the  throne  made  vacant  by  the  death  of  the  last  of  the 
ancient  reigning  house  of  Hawaii.  The  policy  of  the  pre 
ceding  king  had  been  annexation  to  the  United  States; 
but  the  new  sovereign  and  his  advisers  were  opposed  to 
that  policy,  although  very  friendly  to  Americans,  and 
largely  controlled  by  their  influence  in  governmental  af 
fairs.  It  was  manifest  that  the  question  of  annexation 
ought  not  to  be  discussed  at  that  time,  but  that  action 
ought  to  be  taken  at  once  to  secure  to  the  United  States 
the  exclusive  right  to  the  use  of  Pearl  River  harbor  for 
naval  purposes,  and  to  prepare  the  way  to  make  annexa 
tion  to  the  United  States  sure  in  due  time.  This  could 
readily  be  done  by  making  such  concessions  in  favor  of 
the  products  of  Hawaiian  industries  as  would  develop 
the  resources  of  the  islands  and  increase  their  wealth,  all 
of  which  would  be  to  the  ultimate  benefit  of  the  United 
States  when  the  islands  should  become  a  part  of  this 
country. 

The  continuous  and  rapid  decay  of  all  the  ancient  fam 
ilies  of  chiefs,  from  which  alone  would  the  people  ever 
think  of  electing  a  king  or  a  queen,  and  the  notorious 
corruption  in  blood  and  character  of  the  few  remaining 
half-castes  nominally  belonging  to  those  ancient  fam 
ilies,  made  it  plain  to  all  that  the  monarchical  gov 
ernment  must  soon  die  a  natural  death,  or  become  so 
intolerably  corrupt  as  to  make  its  overthrow  inevitable. 
Americans  by  birth  or  descent  were  then,  and  had  been 
for  a  long  time,  the  controlling  element  in  the  govern 
ment.  While  perfectly  faithful  to  that  government,  they 


A  VISIT  TO  HAWAII  433 

had  lost  none  of  their  love  for  their  native  country,  and 
looked  forward  with  confidence  to  the  time  when  the 
islands,  like  ripe  fruit,  should  fall  into  the  lap  of  their 
beloved  mother.  These  American  Hawaiians  were  men 
of  very  high  character,  and  much  above  the  average  of 
intelligence  even  in  this  country.  They  had  no  desire 
to  force  the  ripening  of  the  fruit,  but  were  perfectly  con 
tent  to  bide  the  course  of  nature,  which  must  of  necessity 
produce  the  result  in  no  long  time. 

It  seems  to  me  a  very  narrow  view  of  the  intelligence 
of  the  people  of  this  country  which  suggests  any  serious 
difficulty  in  the  government  of  outlying  possessions 
which  are  essential  military  and  naval  outposts  simply 
because  their  heterogeneous  populations  are  not  yet  capa 
ble  of  self-government,  or  fit  for  admission  to  the  Union 
as  a  State.  If  the  Territorial  system  to  which  the  coun 
try  is  accustomed  is  not  appropriate  in  any  special  case, 
and  the  prejudice  against  a  military  government  is  re 
garded  as  insurmountable,  we  have  an  example  in  the 
present  government  of  the  District  of  Columbia, —  one  of 
the  best  and  most  economical  in  the  world, — which  would 
require  very  slight  modification  to  make  it  perfectly 
applicable  to  any  of  the  islands  of  the  Atlantic,  the  Pa 
cific,  or  the  gulf  which  may  be  acquired  by  this  country. 
I  do  not  believe  any  man  worthy  of  the  title  of  states 
man  will  admit  for  a  moment  that  the  United  States 
cannot  govern,  and  govern  well,  any  national  outposts 
or  other  possessions  which  the  interests  of  the  country 
may  require  it  to  hold.  In  fact,  it  seems  an  almost  self- 
evident  proposition  that  a  government,  under  exclusive 
national  authority,  exercised  over  comparatively  small 
districts  of  country  and  small  population,  under  the  con 
stant  observation  of  the  people  and  public  press  of  the 
entire  country,  is  more  likely  to  be  just  and  pure  than 
any  other.  Responsibility  to  a  local  constituency  un 
doubtedly  has  great  advantages,  but  responsibility  to 


434  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  government  and  entire  people  of  the  United  States 
has  vastly  greater. 

When  it  was  proposed  to  me  in  Virginia,  in  1867,  that 
I  become  a  candidate  for  the  United  States  Senate  under 
the  State  government  which  I  was  trying  to  "recon 
struct,"  I  replied  that  in  my  opinion  the  highest  quali 
fication  I  possessed  for  the  difficult  duty  I  was  then 
required  to  perform  resided  in  the  fact  that  there  was 
"  nothing  in  the  gift  of  Virginia  which  I  could  afford  to 
accept."  I  believe  now  that  the  highest  external  incen 
tive  to  honorable  conduct  anywhere  in  the  world  is  that 
of  responsibility  to  the  government  and  the  whole  peo 
ple  of  the  United  States.  There  need  be  no  apprehen 
sion  that  any  American  who  has  a  national  reputation  at 
stake  will  be  guilty  of  any  of  the  crimes  which  are  said 
to  stain  the  administration  of  viceroys  in  some  parts  of 
the  world.  The  prejudice  which  still  exists  in  this  coun 
try  in  respect  to  military  government  is  due  solely  to 
the  fact  that  the  people  do  not  yet  appreciate  the  legiti 
mate  influence  which  they  themselves  exercise  over  their 
public  servants,  military  no  less  than  civil.  Indeed, 
there  is  perhaps  no  other  class  of  citizens  so  sensitive  to 
public  criticism  as  those  in  the  military  service,  certainly 
none  who  value  more  highly  their  reputation  for  faithful 
and  honorable  conduct  in  the  public  service.  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  give  it  as  my  deliberate  judgment,  based  upon 
the  experience  of  half  a  century,  that  the  best  and  most 
satisfactory  government  any  island  of  the  West  Indies 
can  have  in  the  next  hundred  years  will  be  a  military 
government  under  an  officer  of  the  United  States  army. 

It  is  only  an  incident  of  despotic  governments,  past 
or  present,  that  soldiers  have  been  employed  to  execute 
despotic  orders.  The  common  inference  that  military 
government  is  essentially  despotic  is  absolutely  false. 
On  the  contrary,  military  men  are,  as  a  rule,  the  most 
humane.  This  has  been  most  notably  so  in  the  history 


TROUBLE  WITH  THE  MODOC  INDIANS  435 

of  this  country.  Almost  without  exception,  the  soldiers 
of  all  grades  in  the  Union  army  desired  to  treat  the  con 
quered  South  with  all  possible  kindness  and  humanity, 
while  the  men  who  inflicted  upon  the  Southern  people 
the  worst  form  of  cruelty  were  men  who  had  never  fought 
a  battle.  There  have  been  some  cruel  soldiers  in  the 
world,  many  more  cruel  men  who  were  not  soldiers  ex 
cept  perhaps  in  name.  Men  of  that  character  generally 
avoid  danger.  What  mankind  has  most  to  dread  is  the 
placing  of  military  power  in  the  hands  of  men  who  are 
not  real  soldiers.  They  are  quite  sure  to  abuse  it  in  one 
way  or  the  other,  by  cruelty  to  their  own  men,  or  else  to 
others.  The  same  disregard  for  human  life  which  induces 
an  ignorant  man  to  take  command  of  troops  and  send  them 
to  useless  slaughter  may  well  manifest  itself  in  barbarity 
toward  prisoners  of  war  or  non-combatants;  but  a  real 
soldier  is  never  guilty  of  either  of  those  crimes,  which 
seem  to  me  alike  among  the  greatest  in  military  experience. 
The  Modoc  Indians  were  a  brave  people,  and  had  al 
ways  been  friends  of  the  whites;  but  their  old  home  in 
southern  Oregon  was  rich  grazing-land,  and  was  much 
coveted  by  the  ranchmen  of  that  region.  Hence  the  Mo- 
docs  were  induced  in  some  way  to  leave  their  homes  and 
go  upon  the  Klamath  reservation.  There  they  were 
starved  and  generally  abused  until  they  could  stand  it 
no  longer.  They  went  back  to  their  old  place,  and  de 
clared  they  would  die  rather  than  go  to  live  with  the 
Klamaths  again.  Repeated  requests  were  made  by  the 
Indian  Bureau  to  the  War  Department  to  force  the  Mo- 
docs  to  go  back  to  the  Klamaths;  but  this  was  firmly 
opposed  by  General  Canby,  commanding  the  department; 
by  me,  who  then  commanded  the  Division  of  the  Pacific; 
and  by  General  Sherman,  commanding  the  army.  No 
such  order  could  be  obtained  in  the  regular  way.  Eesort 
was  had  to  an  innocent  old  army  regulation  which  di 
rected  department  commanders  to  render  such  military 


436  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

assistance  as  might  be  necessary  to  enable  the  Indian 
superintendents  to  carry  out  their  orders  from  Wash 
ington.  Without  the  knowledge  of  the  President,  or  the 
Secretary  of  War,  or  the  general  of  the  army,  an  order 
was  sent  from  the  Indian  Bureau  in  Washington  to  send 
the  Modocs  back  to  the  Klamath  reservation,  and  to  call 
on  the  department  commander  for  troops  to  enforce  the 
order.  General  Canby,  honorable  and  simple-hearted 
man  that  he  was,  never  imagined  that  such  an  order 
could  come  from  Washington,  after  all  that  had  been 
said  about  it,  unless  with  the  sanction  of  the  highest  au 
thority  and  the  knowledge  of  the  War  Department.  He 
did  not  even  think  it  necessary  to  report  to  the  division 
commander  the  requisition  which  had  been  made  upon 
him  for  troops,  but  loyally  obeyed  the  old  regulation. 
The  first  information  that  came  to  me  was  that  the  troops 
had  been  beaten  with  heavy  loss,  and  that  many  of  the 
surrounding  settlers  had  been  killed  by  the  Indians.  A 
long  and  bloody  war  ensued,  with  some  results  which 
were  deplorable  in  the  extreme.  General  Canby's  confid 
ing  nature  had  led  him  into  a  terrible  mistake.  He  had 
executed  an  unwise  regulation  which  placed  military 
power  in  unworthy  hands,  without  waiting  to  inquire 
whether  that  power  was  not,  in  fact,  about  to  be  unlaw 
fully  abused,  and  thus  had  become  a  party  to  the  sacri 
fice  of  many  innocent  lives.  The  brave  and  noble- 
hearted  Canby  strove  in  every  possible  way  to  make 
peace  with  the  Modocs  without  further  shedding  of 
innocent  blood.  But  the  savage  red  man,  who  had 
never  been  guilty  of  breaking  faith  with  a  civilized 
white  man,  would  no  longer  trust  any  one  of  the 
"  treacherous  race."  He  paid  them  back  "  in  their  own 
coin,"  according  to  his  traditional  method.  Though 
warned  of  the  danger,  Canby  went  calmly  into  the  trap 
they  had  laid  for  him,  in  the  hope  that  his  confidence 
might  inspire  their  respect ;  but  he  was  the  very  man 


THE  CANBY  MASSACRE  437 

whose  troops  had  been  ordered  to  drive  them  out  from 
their  happy  homes,  and  they  treacherously  killed  him. 
And  I  doubt  not,  if  more  blood  must  be  shed,  he  pre 
ferred  to  be  the  first  to  die.  This  is  the  true  history  of 
the  "  Canby  massacre." 

After  a  long  contest,  costing  many  lives,  the  Modocs 
were  subdued  and  made  prisoners.  Those  Indians  who 
had  been  engaged  in  the  massacre  were  tried  and  justly 
executed  according  to  the  laws  of  civilized  war,  while 
those  white  men  who,  in  no  less  flagrant  disregard  of  the 
laws  of  civilization,  brought  on  the  war  were  not  called 
to  any  account  for  their  crime.  But  President  Grant, 
when  I  called  his  attention  to  the  abuse  of  that  old  regu 
lation,  promptly  abolished  it.  Since  that  time,  as  I  un 
derstand  it,  no  man  but  the  head  of  the  nation  can  order 
the  army  to  kill  unless  necessary  in  defense,  nor  deter 
mine  for  what  purposes  the  army  may  be  employed. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  are  advancing,  though 
slowly,  in  civilization.  Their  fundamental  law  has  very 
wisely  always  provided  that  Congress  alone  should  have 
power  to  "declare  war";  but  for  many  years  any  Indian 
agent,  or  any  bloodthirsty  white  man  on  the  frontier, 
who  chose  to  kill  an  Indian  in  cold  blood,  could  inau 
gurate  a  war  without  waiting  for  anybody  to  declare 
it,  and  that  without  the  slightest  danger  of  punishment. 
A  little  military  justice,  in  the  absence  of  any  possible 
civil  government,  in  what  was  so  long  called  the  "  Indian 
country"  would  have  saved  many  hundreds  of  millions 
of  dollars  and  many  thousands  of  lives.  But  the  inher 
ited  prejudice  against  "  military  despotism  "  has  hardly 
yet  been  eradicated  from  the  minds  of  the  millions  of 
freemen  who  inhabit  this  country — as  if  seventy  or  fifty, 
or  even  thirty,  millions  of  people  could  not  defend  their 
liberties  against  a  little  standing  army !  A  white  mur 
derer  was  long  regarded  as  so  much  better  than  an  hon 
est  Indian  that  the  murderer  must  go  free  because  there 


438  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN   THE  ARMY 

was  no  judge  or  jury  to  try  him,  while  the  Indian  must 
be  shot  by  the  soldiers,  without  trial,  for  trying  to  protect 
himself  from  murder.  If  the  innocent  could  be  sepa 
rated  from  the  guilty,  u  plague,  pestilence,  and  famine  " 
would  not  be  an  unjust  punishment  for  the  crimes  com 
mitted  in  this  country  against  the  original  occupants  of 
the  soil.  And  it  should  be  remembered  that  when  retri 
bution  comes,  though  we  may  not  understand  why,  the  in 
nocent  often  share  the  fate  of  the  guilty.  The  law  under 
which  nations  suffer  for  their  crimes  does  not  seem  to 
differ  much  from  the  law  of  retribution  which  governs 
the  savage  Indian. 

No  possible  plea  of  the  demands  of  civilization,  or  of 
the  interests  of  a  superior  race,  can  be  held  to  justify 
such  a  policy  as  that  long  pursued  by  the  people  of  this 
country.  The  natural  law  of  the  "survival  of  the  fittest" 
may  doubtless  be  pleaded  in  explanation  of  all  that  has 
happened ;  but  that  is  not  a  law  of  Christianity,  nor  of 
civilization,  nor  of  wisdom.  It  is  the  law  of  greed  and 
cruelty,  which  generally  works  in  the  end  the  destruc 
tion  of  its  devotees.  In  their  greedy  and  blind  pursuit 
of  their  own  prey,  they  lose  sight  of  the  shark  that  is 
waiting  to  devour  them.  It  is  still  the  "  fittest "  that 
survives.  It  were  wiser  to  remember  that  the  shark  is 
always  well  armed,  and  if  you  would  survive  him  you 
must  be  fitter  than  he.  If  the  benign  law  of  civilization 
could  be  relied  upon  always  to  govern,  then  all  would 
be  well.  But  so  long  as  the  sharks  still  live,  the  cruel 
law  of  nature  cannot  be  ignored.  The  highest  principles 
and  the  highest  wisdom,  combined,  would  seem  to  sug 
gest  the  higher  law  as  the  rule  of  action  toward  the 
weaker,  and  the  natural  law  as  the  rule  for  defense 
against  the  stronger.  This  country  has,  happily,  already 
made  some  progress  in  both  directions.  If  that  is  con 
tinued  a  few  more  years,  then  all,  strong  as  well  as  weak, 
will  be  glad  to  "  arbitrate  "  if  we  ask  them  to. 


CHAPTER  XXIV 

SUPEKINTENDENT  AT  WEST  POINT  —  GENEKAL  SHERMAN'S 
ULTERIOR  REASONS  FOR  THE  APPOINTMENT  —  ORIGIN 
OF  THE  "DEPARTMENT  OF  WEST  POINT"  —  CASE  OF 

THE  COLORED  CADET  WHITTAKER  —  A  PROPOSED  RE 
MOVAL  FOR  POLITICAL  EFFECT  —  GENERAL  TERRY'S 
FRIENDLY  ATTITUDE  —  A  MUDDLE  OF  NEW  COMMANDS 
—  WAITING  ORDERS,  AND  A  VISIT  TO  EUROPE — AGAIN 
IN  COMMAND  IN  THE  WEST — THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF 
FORT  SHERIDAN  AT  CHICAGO. 

IN  the  centennial  year,  1876,  I  committed  the  mistake 
of  my  life  by  consenting,  in  deference  to  the  opinions 
and  wishes  of  my  superiors  and  in  opposition  to  my  own 
judgment  and  interests,  to  give  up  the  command  of  a 
military  division  appropriate  to  my  rank  of  major- 
general,  and  accept  a  position  which  by  law  and  custom 
was  appropriate  to  the  rank  of  colonel.  The  following 
extracts  from  correspondence  will  sufficiently  explain 
the  reasons  for  this  extraordinary  action,  and  the  assur 
ances  which  induced  it : 

(Telegram.) 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  March  28,  1876. 
GENERAL  JOHN  M.  SCHOFIELD,  San  Francisco,  California : 

Will  you  accept  the  superintendency  of  the  military  academy 
at  West  Point  ?  I  advise  it.  Your  rank  and  history  will  ele 
vate  it  and  solve  all  trouble.  Admiral  Porter's  example  at 
Annapolis  is  suggested  as  precedent.  The  President,  Secretary 
Taft,  and  I  are  unanimous  on  the  wisdom  and  propriety  of  it. 


440  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

Advise  me  of  your  decision  as  early  as  you  can  —  certainly  this 
week.  You  will  be  subject  to  no  supervision  except  by  the 
usual  board  of  visitors  and  the  general  commanding  the  army. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  General. 


(Telegram.) 

SAN  FRANCISCO,  CAL.,  March  29, 1876. 
GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

I  appreciate  the  importance  of  the  superin tendency  of  the 
academy,  and  the  compliment  paid  me  by  the  President,  Secre 
tary  of  War,  and  yourself  in  desiring  me  to  accept  it.  Under 
the  circumstances  I  cannot  decline.  .  .  . 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major- General. 

(Telegram.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  March  30, 1876. 

GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  San  Francisco,  California  : 

Despatch  received,  and  am  much  pleased ;  think  you  can  add 
new  luster  to  the  old  academy.  It  has  always  needed  a  head 
with  rank  and  experience,  and  now  I  am  sure  that  the  whole 
country  will  be  satisfied.  ...  I  am  not  yet  resolved  on  my  own 
course  of  action,  but  will  be  governed  by  events  to  occur  in  this 
week. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  General. 


HEADQUARTERS  MIL.  Div.  OF  THE  PACIFIC, 

SAN  FRANCISCO,  CAL.,  March  30,  1876. 

GENERAL  SHERMAN,  etc.,  Washington,  D.  C. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  was  not  taken  entirely  by  surprise  by 
your  despatch  relative  to  the  West  Point  superintendency. 
General  Grant  mentioned  the  subject  to  me  soon  after  the  war, 
and  army  officers  since  that  time  have  spoken  of  it  often 
enough  to  keep  me  in  mind  of  the  fact  that  I  might  some  time 
be  called  upon  to  assume  that  responsibility.  Yet  it  is  with  a 
strong  feeling  of  reluctance  that  I  have  brought  myself  to  re- 


SUPERINTENDENT  AT  WEST  POINT  441 

gard  it  as  a  thing  to  be  done.  This  feeling  results  from  several 
causes,  which  I  desire  to  explain  to  you,  while  I  know  you  will 
give  me  credit  for  a  desire  to  do  what  appears  best  for  the  pub 
lic  service,  and  satisfactory  to  all  concerned,  without  too  much 
concern  for  my  own  personal  preferences. 

In  the  first  place,  I  have  no  little  doubt  of  the  possession  of 
any  special  fitness  for  that  position,  and  have  pretty  strong  ap 
preciation  of  its  difficulties  and  importance.  I  do  not  feel  at  all 
confident  that  the  flattering  expectations  of  my  friends  will  be 
realized  from  my  management  of  the  academy. 

I  have  been  there  enough  to  know  pretty  well  how  difficult  a 
post  that  of  superintendent  is,  and  how  varied  the  good  quali 
ties  a  man  ought  to  possess  to  fit  him  in  all  respects  for  it. 

Eank  and  reputation  will  of  course  be  of  some  assistance,  but 
their  good  effect  will  be  greatly  impaired  without  the  dignity  of 
command  belonging  to  them.  To  transfer  an  officer  of  rank 
from  a  high  command  and  post  of  great  responsibility  and  trust 
to  one  heretofore  regarded  as  appropriate  to  an  inferior  grade, 
may  be  regarded  as  elevating  the  dignity  of  the  new  command, 
but  looks  much  more  like  degrading  the  officer,  and  to  that  ex 
tent  impairs  the  good  effect  desired  to  be  produced.  Besides,  it 
is  impossible  for  any  officer  not  to  feel  that  in  taking  such  in 
ferior  command,  although  it  is  even  for  the  avowed  purpose  of 
raising  its  dignity,  that  he  is  stooping  to  do  so.  Especially 
must  both  these  effects  be  produced  when  the  assignment  is  only 
an  executive  act.  If  it  was  done  in  pursuance  of  law,  the  case 
would  be  materially  different.  .  .  . 

We  were  all  delighted  at  the  news  of  your  return  to  Wash 
ington  and  the  prospect  of  your  restoration  to  the  proper  duties 
and  authority  of  general  of  the  army;  and  I  sincerely  hope  the 
events  to  occur  this  week,  alluded  to  in  your  telegram  to-day, 
may  be  such  as  to  justify  you  in  taking  the  course  universally 
desired  by  the  army.  We  want  our  general  where  he  can  best 
look  after  all  the  interests  of  the  military  service,  with  power 
to  command  the  army  in  fact  as  well  as  in  name. 

I  have  read  with  the  greatest  pleasure  your  capital  speech  to 
the  Knights  of  St.  Patrick. 

Please  present  my  respectful  compliments  to  the  Secretary  of 
War,  and  my  kindest  regards  to  the  President. 

I  am,  dear  General,  as  ever,  truly  yours, 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 


442  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

During  the  Civil  War  the  demand  for  the  services  in 
the  field  of  the  most  capable  officers  had,  as  was  gen 
erally  understood,  been  prejudicial  to  the  interests  of 
the  military  academy;  and  this  continued  some  time 
after  the  close  of  the  war,  in  consequence  of  the  unusual 
increase  of  rank  of  those  officers  who  were  known  to  be 
fitted  in  all  respects  for  the  head  of  that  institution. 
This  difficulty  was  increased  by  the  very  unreasonable 
notion  that  because  the  law  had  opened  the  academy 
to  the  line  of  the  army,  the  superintendent  must  neces 
sarily  be  taken  from  the  line,  and  not  from  the  corps  of 
engineers,  although  the  latter  contained  many  officers  of 
appropriate  rank  who  had  then  added  to  their  high  sci 
entific  ability  and  attainments  distinguished  services  in 
the  field.  Even  in  the  line,  officers  were  not  wanting  of 
appropriate  rank,  character,  ability,  education,  and  ex 
perience  to  qualify  them  for  the  duties  of  superintendent. 
For  example,  my  immediate  predecessor,  Major-General 
Thomas  H.  Ruger,  then  a  colonel  of  infantry,  was  in 
all  respects  highly  qualified  for  that  office ;  and  when  I 
relieved  him  I  found  the  academy  in  about  the  same 
state  of  efficiency  which  had  characterized  it  before  the 
war.  There  was,  in  fact,  at  that  time  little,  if  any,  foun 
dation  for  the  assumption  that  the  interests  of  the  mili 
tary  academy  required  the  assignment  of  any  officer  of 
higher  rank  than  colonel  to  duty  as  superintendent  of 
the  academy.  Of  course  I  did  not  know  this  before  I 
went  there,  and  it  was  a  matter  for  the  judgment  of  my 
superiors,  whose  duty,  and  not  mine,  it  was  to  know  the 
facts. 

But  General  Sherman  had  other  reasons,  some  of  them 
very  cogent  in  his  own  estimation  at  least,  for  desiring 
my  presence  somewhere  in  the  Eastern  States ;  and  the 
West  Point  "detail"  was  the  only  way  in  which  that 
could  readily  be  brought  about.  He  had  just  been  re 
stored,  or  was  about  to  be,  to  the  actual  command  of  the 


ULTERIOR  REASONS  FOR  THE   APPOINTMENT  443 

army,  after  having  been  practically  suspended  from  com 
mand  a  long  time  because  of  his  differences  with  the 
Secretary  of  War.  He  desired  especially  to  bring  the 
military  academy  under  his  command,  and  appears  to 
have  been  assured  of  President  Grant's  support  in  that 
regard.  General  Sherman  also  wished  me  to  revise  the 
army  regulations,  so  as  to  incorporate  the  theory  of 
relation  between  the  administration  and  the  command 
which  he  and  General  Grant  had  maintained  as  the  true 
one,  but  which  had  generally,  if  not  always,  been  op 
posed  by  the  Secretaries  of  War  and  by  the  chiefs  of 
staff  departments.  These  were  doubtless  the  principal 
reasons  for  General  Sherman's  anxiety  to  have  me  accept 
the  assignment  to  West  Point.  But  very  soon  after  my 
arrival  in  the  East  I  found  that  I  was  also  expected  to 
preside  over  a  board  of  review  in  the  case  of  General 
Fitz-John  Porter  and  in  that  of  Surgeon-General  William 
A.  Hammond;  and  that  my  junior  in  rank,  Major-Gen 
eral  Irvin  McDowell,  could  not  be  given  a  command  ap 
propriate  to  his  rank  unless  it  was  the  division  which 
I  had  consented  to  vacate.  Of  course  I  could  not  but 
feel  complimented  by  this  indication  that  my  superiors 
thought  me  capable  of  doing  well  so  many  things  at 
once,  nor  yet  could  I  fail  to  see  that,  after  all,  my  care  of 
West  Point  had  not  been  considered  of  so  vital  impor 
tance,  since  it  would  not  interfere  with  the  all-important 
revision  of  the  army  regulations,  and  the  retrial  of  Porter 
and  Hammond. 

But  I  had  given  my  consent,  though  under  erroneous 
impressions  as  to  the  reasons  and  necessity,  to  what 
my  superiors  desired,  and  hence  determined  to  keep  my 
thoughts  to  myself  so  long  as  the  promises  made  by 
General  Sherman  were  fulfilled.  But  I  had  hardly  got 
settled  in  the  academic  chair  before  I  received  a  great 
affront  from  the  Secretary  of  War,  through  the  adjutant- 
general  of  the  army,  in  direct  violation  of  General  Sher- 


444  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

man's  promise  that  I  should  "  be  subject  to  no  super 
vision  except  by  the  usual  board  of  visitors  and  the 
general  commanding  the  army."  This  offensive  action 
arose  not  simply  from  ignorance  of  General  Sherman's 
promise,  of  which  the  adjutant-general  and  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  had  evidently  not  been  informed,  but  from 
culpable  ignorance  of  the  academic  regulations  on  the 
part  of  the  adjutant-general,  and  still  more  culpable  dis 
regard  of  the  invariable  rule  of  courtesy  enjoined  by 
military  law  among  military  men.  With  no  little  diffi 
culty  I  restrained  my  indignation  so  far  as  to  write  a 
calm  and  respectful  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War, 
inclosing  a  copy  of  my  correspondence  with  General 
Sherman  respecting  my  command  at  West  Point,  and 
pointing  out  the  regulation  which  he  or  the  adjutant- 
general  had  ignored,  and  requesting  him  to  submit  the 
whole  matter  to  the  President.  It  is  due  to  the  Honor 
able  Secretary,  and  is  a  pleasure  to  me,  to  say  that  he  did 
not  wait  the  slow  course  of  the  mail,  but  telegraphed  me 
at  once  that  it  was  all  a  mistake,  and  that  he  made  all 
the  amend  that  a  gentleman  could  make  under  the  cir 
cumstances.  He  as  well  as  I  had  been  made  the  victim 
of  the  ignorance  and  discourtesy  of  a  staff  officer,  in  a 
matter  about  which  the  Secretary  of  War  could  of  ne 
cessity  know  nothing  unless  the  staff  officer  informed 
him.  But  I  was  determined  to  guard  against  any  such 
outrage  in  future,  and  hence  insisted  that  West  Point 
be  erected  into  a  military  department.  By  this  means 
I  would  become  entitled  to  the  effective  intervention 
and  protection  of  the  general  of  the  army.  This  is 
the  origin  of  that  anomaly  which  must  have  puzzled 
many  military  men,  namely,  the  "  Department  of  West 
Point." 

But  I  discovered  in  time  that  even  this  safeguard  was 
by  no  means  sufficient.  I  had  some  apprehension  on 
this  subject  at  the  start,  and  telegraphed  General  Sher- 


CASE  OF  THE  COLORED  CADET  WHITTAKEE     445 

man  about  it ;  but  his  answer  of  May  25  was  accepted  as 
sufficiently  reassuring.  Indeed  it  could  hardly  have  been 
imagined  that  a  President  of  the  United  States  would 
disregard  an  honorable  obligation  incurred  by  his  prede 
cessor;  but  before  I  got  through  with  that  matter  I 
was  enlightened  on  that  point. 

In  the  spring  of  1880  there  arose  great  public  excite 
ment  over  the  case  of  the  one  colored  cadet  then  at  West 
Point.  This  cadet,  whose  name  was  Whittaker,  had 
twice  been  found  deficient  in  studies,  and  recommended 
by  the  academic  board  for  dismissal;  but  had  been  saved 
therefrom  by  me,  in  my  perhaps  too  strong  desire  to  give 
the  young  colored  man  all  possible  chance  of  ultimate 
success,  however  unwise  his  appointment  to  the  military 
academy  might  have  been.  As  was  stated  by  me  at  the 
time,  in  my  report  of  the  case  to  the  War  Department, 
that  second  and  unusual  indulgence  was  based  upon  the 
fact  that  he  was  the  only  representative  of  his  race  then 
at  the  academy.  Being  again,  for  the  third  time,  in  dan 
ger  of  dismissal,  that  colored  cadet,  either  by  his  own 
hands,  or  by  others  with  his  consent  (of  which  he  was 
finally  convicted  by  a  general  court-martial),  was  bound 
hand  and  foot  and  mutilated  in  such  manner  as,  while 
doing  him  no  material  injury,  to  create  a  suspicion  of 
foul  play  on  the  part  of  other  cadets.  An  official  inves 
tigation  by  the  commandant,  Colonel  Henry  M.  Lazelle, 
led  him  to  the  conclusion  that  the  other  cadets  had 
no  knowledge  whatever  of  the  outrage,  and  that  the 
colored  cadet  himself  was  guilty.  Not  being  fully  sat 
isfied  with  that  conclusion,  I  appointed  a  court  of 
inquiry  to  investigate  the  matter  more  thoroughly.  The 
result  of  that  investigation  fully  sustained  the  finding  of 
Colonel  Lazelle,  that  the  colored  cadet  himself  was  the 
guilty  person. 

But  those  judicial  conclusions  did  not  suffice  to  allay 
the  public  clamor  for  protection  to  the  recently  emanci- 


446  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

pated  negroes  in  the  enjoyment  of  privileges  in  the 
national  institutions  for  which  they  had  not  become 
either  mentally  or  morally  fitted.  A  presidential  election 
was  pending,  and  the  colored  vote  and  that  in  sympathy 
with  it  demanded  assurance  of  the  hearty  and  effective 
support  of  the  national  administration.  Nothing  less 
than  a  radical  change  at  West  Point  would  satisfy  that 
demand,  and  who  could  be  a  more  appropriate  victim  to 
offer  as  a  sacrifice  to  that  Moloch  than  one  who  had 
already  gone  beyond  the  limits  of  duty,  of  justice,  and 
of  wisdom  in  his  kind  treatment  of  the  colored  cadet? 
It  was  decided  in  Washington  that  he,  the  over-kind 
superintendent  himself,  should  be  sacrificed  to  that  par- 
tizan  clamor  before  the  coming  election.  Some  rumor 
of  this  purpose  had  reached  me,  though  it  had  been 
concealed  from  General  Sherman,  who  assured  me  that 
no  such  purpose  existed. 

In  General  Sherman's  absence,  General  Alfred  H.  Terry 
was  chosen  to  succeed  me.  He  came  to  West  Point, 
August  14,  for  the  purpose  of  learning  from  me  in  person 
the  truth  as  to  the  assertion  made  to  him  that  the  propo 
sition  to  relieve  me  from  duty  at  West  Point  was  in 
accord  with  my  own  wishes.  When  informed,  as  he  had 
suspected,  that  I  could  not  possibly  have  expressed  any 
such  wish  under  the  circumstances  then  existing,  he 
positively  refused,  like  the  honorable  man  that  he  was, 
to  be  made  a  party  to  any  such  act  of  wrong.  There 
was  not  the  slightest  foundation  in  fact  for  the  assump 
tion  that  my  relief  from  command  could  be  based  upon 
my  own  request,  and  no  such  reason  could  have  been 
given  in  an  order  relieving  me.  That  assumption  could 
have  had  no  other  apparent  motive  than  to  induce  my 
warm  friend  General  Terry  to  accept  the  appointment. 
As  soon  as  he  learned  the  truth  from  me,  General  Terry 
went  to  Washington  and  exposed  the  falsehood  of  which 
he  and  I  together  were  the  intended  victims.  This 


GENERAL  TERRY'S  FRIENDLY  ATTITUDE      447 

action  of  a  true  friend,  and  the  correspondence  which 
had  passed  between  General  Sherman  and  me,  sufficed 
to  prevent  the  consummation  of  the  wrong  which  had 
been  contemplated. 

After  the  presidential  election  was  over,  and  partizan 
passion  had  subsided,  I  made  a  formal  application,  No 
vember  12,  1880,  to  be  relieved  from  duty  at  West  Point 
on  or  before  the  first  of  May  following,  and  to  be  per 
mitted  to  await  orders  until  an  appropriate  command  be 
came  vacant.  I  repeatedly  expressed  my  desire  that 
none  of  my  brother  officers  should  be  disturbed  in  their 
commands  on  my  account,  and  that  no  new  command 
should  be  created  for  me.  I  was  entirely  content  to 
await  the  ordinary  course  of  events,  in  view  of  pending 
legislation  relative  to  retirements  for  age,  and  of  retire 
ments  which  might  be  made  under  the  laws  then  existing. 

My  relief  from  West  Point  was  effected  earlier  than 
General  Sherman  or  I  had  anticipated.  Before  the  end 
of  1880  the  following  correspondence  passed  between 
me  and  the  general  of  the  army: 

(Confidential.) 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  December  13,  1880. 

GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  West  Point,  New  York. 

DEAR  GENERAL  :  General  Drum  has  just  shown  me  the  memo 
randum  for  orders.  The  President  has  worked  out  this  scheme 
himself,  without  asking  my  help,  and  I  am  glad  of  it,  for  I  would 
not  like  to  burden  my  conscience  with  such  a  bungle. 

He  creates  a  new  department  out  of  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and 
the  Indian  Territory,  to  be  commanded  by  the  senior  officer 
present.  .  .  . 

You  are  to  command  the  Department  of  Texas  and  this  new 
department,  called  a  division,  of  what  name  I  don't  know. 

Howard  is  to  replace  you  at  West  Point.  I  suppose  the  order 
will  issue  at  once.  Yours  truly, 

W.  T.  SHERMAN, 


448  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

WEST  POINT,  N.  Y.,  December  14, 1880. 
GENERAL  SHERMAN,  Washington,  D.  C. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  have  received  your  confidential  letter 
of  yesterday,  informing  me  of  the  bungling  scheme  which  has 
been  worked  out  without  your  help.  I  presume  it  would  be 
fruitless  to  attempt  any  opposition  to  the  species  of  mania 
which  manifests  itself  in  such  action.  It  may  be  best  to  let  it 
run  its  course  during  the  short  time  which  must  yet  elapse  un 
til  a  reign  of  reason  is  again  inaugurated  with  the  incoming 
administration.  But  it  occurs  to  me  that  you  may  be  able  to 
save  the  useless  expense  to  the  government  and  the  great  in 
convenience  and  expense  to  staff  officers  which  would  neces 
sarily  result  from  the  organization  of  a  division  which  could 
only  last  for  a  few  months.  To  me  personally  it  is  a  matter  of 
little  moment;  but  not  so  with  the  staif  officers  and  the  mili 
tary  appropriations.  I  am  not  willing  to  have  such  a  thing 
done,  even  apparently,  on  my  account.  Please  advise  what 
official  action,  if  any,  should  be  taken  by  me  in  this  matter. 
Personally  I  am  perfectly  ready  to  obey  the  President's  order, 
without  a  word  of  protest ;  but  I  am  not  willing  to  be  the  occa 
sion  of  manifest  injury  to  the  public  service,  and  of  useless  in 
convenience  and  expense  to  the  officers  of  the  general  staff  who 
must  be  assigned  to  the  headquarters  of  the  new  division. 

Very  truly  yours,  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD. 

But  the  public  interests,  and  my  desire  to  make  my  own 
entirely  subservient  thereto,  were  alike  disregarded.  A 
new  division  was  carved  out  of  the  three  old  ones,  in  vio 
lation  of  the  plainest  dictates  of  military  principles.  The 
government  was  subjected  to  a  worse  than  useless  ex 
pense  of  many  thousands  of  dollars,  and  a  number  of 
staif  officers  to  like  useless  expense  and  trouble.  For  all 
this  there  was  no  other  apparent  motive  but  to  make  it 
appear  that  there  were  appropriate  commands  for  all  the 
major-generals  then  in  active  service,  and  hence  no  reason 
for  placing  any  one  of  them  on  the  retired  list.  As  a  part 
of  that  scheme,  one  of  the  most  active  brigadier-generals, 
younger  than  one  of  the  major-generals,  was  selected  in- 


A  MUDDLE  OF  NEW  COMMANDS  449 

stead  of  the  latter  to  make  way  for  an  aspirant  having 
greater  "influence."  The  correspondence  of  that  period 
shows  the  indignation  felt  in  the  army  at  such  disregard 
of  the  just  claims  of  officers  and  of  the  interests  of  the 
military  service.  Neither  General  Sherman  nor  any  of 
the  several  higher  officers  at  that  time  could  hope  to 
derive  any  advantage  from  the  passage  of  the  act  of  Con 
gress,  then  pending,  to  retire  all  officers  at  a  fixed  age. 
On  the  contrary,  such  a  law  would  most  probably  cut 
them  off  when  in  the  full  prime  of  activity  and  useful 
ness.  But  all  were  more  than  willing  to  accept  that 
rather  than  still  be  in  a  position  to  be  arbitrarily  cut  off 
to  make  place  for  some  over-ambitious  aspirant  possessed 
of  greater  influence,  of  whatever  kind.  I  know  perfectly 
well  that  General  Sherman  was  governed  by  a  generous 
desire  to  give  General  Sheridan  command  of  the  army 
for  a  number  of  years,  while  the  latter  was  still  in  the 
prime  of  life.  But  that  he  could  have  done,  and  had 
announced  his  intention  to  do,  by  requesting  to  be  re 
lieved  from  the  command  and  permitted  to  await  the 
President's  orders,  performing  such  duties,  from  time 
to  time,  as  the  President  might  desire  of  him.  Such  a 
status  of  high  officers  of  great  experience,  whose  in 
spections,  observations,  and  advice  might  be  of  great 
value  to  the  President  and  to  the  War  Department,  would 
manifestly  have  been  far  better  for  the  country  than  that 
of  total  retirement,  which  deprives  the  President  of  any 
right  to  call  upon  them  for  any  service  whatever,  even  in 
an  emergency.  This  was  one  of  the  subjects  of  corre 
spondence  between  General  Sherman  and  me  while  I  was 
in  Europe  in  1881-2.  But  it  was  finally  agreed  by  all 
concerned  that  it  would  be  best  to  favor  the  uniform  ap 
plication  of  the  rule  of  retirement  for  age,  so  that  all 
might  be  assured,  as  far  as  possible,  of  a  time,  to  which 
they  might  look  forward  with  certainty,  when  they  would 
be  relieved  from  further  apprehension  of  treatment  which 


450  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

no  soldier  can  justly  characterize  without  apparent  dis 
respect  to  his  official  superior. 

Such  treatment  is  indeed  uncommon.  The  conduct  of 
the  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  toward  his  subor 
dinates  has  been  generally  kind  and  considerate  in  this 
country.  But  the  few  opposite  examples  have  been  quite 
enough  to  cloud  the  life  of  every  officer  of  high  rank  with 
the  constant  apprehension  of  an  insult  which  he  could 
neither  submit  to  nor  resent. 

Soon  after  the  inauguration  of  President  G-arfield,  the 
"Division  of  the  Gulf"  was  broken  up,  and  I  was  per 
mitted  to  visit  Europe,  as  I  had  requested  in  the  preced 
ing  November,  until  the  President  should  be  pleased  to 
assign  me  to  a  command  according  to  my  rank. 

(Telegram.) 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  3, 1881. 
GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Commanding  Division,  New  Orleans,  La.: 

In  case  the  President  will  repeal  the  orders  creating  the  new 

division  and  department,  and  agree  to  give  you  the  Division  of 

the  Pacific  in  a  year,  will  you  be  willing  to  take  your  leave  to 

go  abroad  meantime  ?    Telegraph  me  fully  and  frankly  for  use. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  General. 

(Telegram  — 9:30  P.  M.) 

HEADQRS.  MIL.  Div.  GULF, 

NEW  ORLEANS,  LA.,  May  3, 1881. 

GENERAL  W.  T.  SHERMAN,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Your  telegram  of  this  date  just  received.  I  am  debarred,  by 
a  promise  made  to  General  McDowell  about  two  years  and  a 
half  ago,  from  making  any  condition  affecting  his  command  of 
the  Division  of  the  Pacific.  If  I  am  to  displace  him,  it  must  be 
without  regard  to  any  wish  of  mine.  If  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
President  to  assign  me  to  that  command  in  a  year,  I  would  like 
to  go  abroad  in  the  meantime,  as  it  would  not  be  convenient  to 
go  afterward,  though  I  would  prefer  to  go  next  year  rather  than 


WAITING  ORDERS,  AND  A  VISIT  TO  EUROPE  451 

this.  But  I  cannot  afford  to  go  on  leave  with  reduced  pay.  If  it 
is  not  found  practicable  to  give  me  a  command  according  to  my 
rank,  and  so  organized  as  to  benefit  rather  than  injure  the  mili 
tary  service,  I  am  willing  to  await  orders  for  a  year  without  re 
duction  of  pay. 

This  is  substantially  the  proposition  I  made  in  my  application 
to  be  relieved  from  duty  at  West  Point ;  and  I  am  still  willing 
to  abide  by  it,  although  my  wishes  were  then  disregarded,  if  it 
will  relieve  the  present  administration  from  embarrassment. 
But  I  would  much  prefer  to  have  a  proper  command.  .  .  . 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Maj.-Gen. 

(Telegram.) 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  5,  1881. 
GENERAL  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Commanding  Division,  New  Orleans,  La. : 
Your  despatch  of  the  third  was  duly  received,  and  a  copy  thereof 
laid  before  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  has  received  the  orders 
of  the  President  to  repeal  all  parts  of  General  Orders,  No. 
84,  of  December  18, 1880,  which  refer  to  the  Division  of  the  Gulf 
and  Department  of  Arkansas,  restoring  the  status  quo  before 
that  order  was  made.  You  will  be  placed  on  waiting  orders,  with 
full  pay,  till  further  orders  of  the  President.  You  may  take  ac 
tion  accordingly. 

W.  T.  SHERMAN,  General. 

My  stay  in  Europe — from  May,  1881,  to  May,  1882 — 
was  marked  by  only  one  incident  of  special  military  inter 
est.  Under  orders  of  the  War  Department,  upon  invi 
tation  from  the  government  of  France,  I  witnessed  the 
autumn  manoeuvers  of  the  Twelfth  Corps  of  the  French 
army  at  and  about  Limoges.  A  few  other  officers  of  our 
army,  and  many  from  other  countries,  enjoyed  the  same 
privilege.  The  operations,  which  were  interesting  and  in 
structive,  culminated  in  an  assault  upon  and  the  capture 
of  Limoges.  The  next  day  the  corps  was  reviewed  in  the 
streets  of  the  city.  The  general-in-chief  and  his  staff 
and  suite  rode  along  the  line  at  full  speed.  The  head  of 


452  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  cavalcade,  consisting  of  the  French  and  American 
generals,  and  a  few  other  officers  of  high  rank,  came  out 
in  good  order.  The  others  were  much  disordered,  and  so 
covered  with  dust  that  the  uniforms  of  all  nations  looked 
very  much  alike.  The  ceremony  was  terminated  at  the 
public  square,  where  the  cavalry  was  formed  along  one 
side,  and  the  opposite  was  occupied  by  high  officials  and 
prominent  citizens  of  the  town.  The  charge  of  the 
squadrons  across  the  square,  halting  at  command  within 
a  few  feet  of  the  reviewing  general,  was  a  fine  exhibition 
of  discipline  and  perfect  control. 

After  the  review  the  general-in-chief  made  a  long  ad 
dress  to  his  assembled  officers,  explaining  in  much  detail 
the  important  lessons  taught  by  the  manceuvers.  He 
closed  with  a  feeling  allusion  to  his  own  mental  and 
physical  strength  and  vigor,  which  had  been  so  fully 
displayed  in  the  last  few  days,  and  which  were  still  at 
the  service  of  his  beloved  France.  But  the  gallant  old 
soldier  was  retired,  all  the  same,  at  the  end  of  the  year. 
Republics  seem  to  have  much  the  same  way  of  doing 
things  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean ! 

A  pleasing  incident  occurred  at  one  time  during  the 
manoeuvers.  At  the  hour  of  halt  for  the  midday  rest  a 
delicious  repast  was  served  at  the  beautiful  home  of  the 
prefect  of  the  department,  between  the  two  opposing  lines. 
The  tables  were  spread  in  lovely  arbors  loaded  with 
grapes.  When  the  dejeuner  was  ended,  speeches  were 
made  by  the  distinguished  prefect  and  the  gallant  gen 
eral-in-chief,  to  which,  as  senior  of  the  visiting  officers 
from  foreign  countries,  I  was  called  upon  to  respond. 
Thus  suddenly  summoned  to  an  unwonted  task,  I  was 
much  too  prudent  to  address  the  guests  in  a  language 
which  they  all  understood.  But  by  a  free  use  of  those 
words  and  phrases  which  are  so  common  in  the  mili 
tary  language  of  France  and  of  this  country,  linked  to 
gether  by  as  little  Anglo-Saxon  as  possible,  I  made  a 


AGAIN  IN  COMMAND  IN  THE  WEST  453 

speech  which  was  warmly  received,  and  which,  after 
careful  revision  with  the  aid  of  a  highly  accomplished 
French  officer  who  had  been  educated  in  England  as 
well  as  in  France,  was  made  to  appear  pretty  well  when 
printed  in  both  languages. 

The  charming  hospitality  of  the  general-in-chief  of  the 
Twelfth  Army  Corps  and  of  the  prefect  of  Limoges,  with 
all  the  other  incidents  of  the  autumn  manoeuvers  of  1881, 
are  an  ever  fresh  and  pleasant  memory,  with  the  many 
other  recollections  of  beautiful  France  under  the  empire 
and  under  the  republic. 

According  to  the  understanding  expressed  in  my  cor 
respondence  with  General  Sherman  of  May  3,  1881,  I  re 
turned  from  Europe  at  the  end  of  a  year,  and  reported 
for  duty.  But  in  the  meantime  President  Garfield  had 
been  assassinated,  and  the  bill  then  pending  in  Congress 
providing  for  the  retirement  of  all  officers  at  a  fixed  age 
was  amended  so  as  to  make  that  age  sixty-four  years 
instead  of  sixty-two.  Hence  I  continued  to  wait  without 
protest  until  the  retirement  of  my  junior  in  rank,  the 
next  autumn,  for  the  fulfilment  of  General  Sherman's 
assurance  conveyed  in  his  despatch  of  May  25,  1876 :  "If 
any  hitch  occurs  at  any  future  time,  you  can  resume  your 
present  or  some  command  due  your  rank."  Although 
this  long  suspension  from  command  was  very  annoying, 
I  had  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  none  of  my 
brother  officers  had  been  disturbed  on  my  account. 

In  the  fall  of  1882,  I  was  again  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Division  of  the  Pacific,  awaiting  the  time 
of  General  Sherman's  retirement  under  the  law  and 
the  succession  of  General  Sheridan  to  the  command  of 
the  army.  Nothing  of  special  interest  occurred  in  that 
interval.  In  1883  I  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the 
Division  of  the  Missouri,  with  headquarters  at  Chicago. 
One  of  the  first  and  most  important  subjects  which  im 
pressed  themselves  upon  my  attention  after  the  generous 


454  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

reception  and  banquet  given  by  the  citizens  of  that  hos 
pitable  city,  was  the  necessity  for  a  military  post  near 
that  place.  The  location  of  Chicago  makes  it  the  most 
important  strategical  center  of  the  entire  northern  fron 
tier.  It  is  also  the  most  important  center  of  interstate 
commerce  and  transportation  anywhere  in  the  country. 
Yet  in  1883  there  were  no  troops  nearer  than  St.  Paul, 
Omaha,  and  Leavenworth.  At  the  time  of  the  railroad 
strikes  in  1877,  troops  had  been  brought  there  in  time 
to  render  the  necessary  service,  but  no  thought  appears 
to  have  been  given  to  the  necessity  of  better  provision 
for  the  future. 

There  had  been  in  early  times  a  military  reservation 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Chicago  River,  on  which  old  Fort 
Dearborn  was  located.  But  that  had  become  far  too 
valuable  to  be  retained  for  military  use,  and  no  longer 
suitable  for  a  military  post,  being  in  the  heart  of  a  great 
city.  Hence  it  had  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  gov 
ernment.  Upon  consultation  with  Senator  Logan  and  a 
few  others,  it  was  not  thought  possible  to  obtain  from 
Congress  the  large  sum  of  money  necessary  to  buy 
ground  for  a  post  near  Chicago;  but  that  if  the  United 
States  owned  the  ground,  the  appropriations  to  build  a 
post  could  readily  be  obtained.  Hence  the  subject  was 
mentioned  to  a  few  prominent  citizens,  with  the  sugges 
tion  that  a  site  be  purchased  by  subscription  and  pre 
sented  to  the  United  States.  I  was  soon  invited  to  meet 
the  Commercial  Club  at  one  of  their  monthly  dinners, 
where  the  matter  was  fully  discussed.  At  another  meet 
ing,  some  time  later,  it  was  made  the  special  subject  for 
consideration,  and  this  resulted  in  the  organization  of 
the  plan  to  raise  the  money  and  purchase  the  ground. 
All  the  eligible  sites  were  examined,  the  prices  obtained, 
and  the  purchase-money  pledged.  Then  the  proposition 
was  submitted  to  the  War  Department  and  approved. 
G-eneral  Sheridan  was  sent  out  to  select  the  best  of  the 


THE  ESTABLISHMENT   OF  FOKT  SHERIDAN  AT   CHICAGO    455 

sites  offered,  and  his  choice  fell  on  that  which  all,  I  be 
lieve,  had  esteemed  the  best,  though  the  most  expensive  — 
a  beautiful  tract  of  land  of  about  six  hundred  acres,  situ 
ated  on  the  shore  of  Lake  Michigan  twenty-five  miles 
north  of  Chicago.  The  cost  was  nothing  to  the  broad- 
minded  and  far-sighted  men  of  that  city.  The  munifi 
cent  gift  was  accepted  by  Congress,  and  appropriations 
were  made  for  the  finest  military  post  in  the  country. 
It  was  appropriately  named  Fort  Sheridan,  not  only  in 
recognition  of  the  great  services  the  general  had  ren 
dered  to  the  country,  but  as  a  special  and  graceful  recog 
nition  of  the  services  he  had  rendered  Chicago  in  the 
time  of  her  sorest  need. 

During  my  brief  service  —  two  years  and  some 
months — in  the  Division  of  the  Missouri,  I  traveled 
many  thousands  of  miles,  and  visited  nearly  all  parts 
of  that  vast  territory,  from  the  Canadian  line  to  the 
G-ulf  of  Mexico,  some  of  which  was  then  new  to  me, 
attending  to  the  ordinary  routine  duties  of  a  time  of 
comparative  peace.  Nothing  else  occurred  at  all  com 
parable  in  importance,  in  my  judgment,  to  the  estab 
lishment  of  the  post  of  Fort  Sheridan. 


CHAPTER  XXV 

THE  DEATH  OF  GENERAL  HANCOCK  —  ASSIGNED  TO  THE 
DIVISION  OF  THE  ATLANTIC  —  MEASURES  FOB  IMPROV 
ING  THE  SEA-COAST  DEFENSE  —  GENERAL  FITZ-JOHN 
PORTER'S  RESTORATION  TO  THE  ARMY  —  PRESIDENT  OF 
THE  BOARD  APPOINTED  TO  REVIEW  THE  ACTION  OF  THE 
COURT-MARTIAL  —  GENERAL  GRANT'S  OPINION  —  SENA 
TOR  LOGAN'S  EXPLANATION  OF  HIS  HOSTILE  ATTITUDE 

TOWARD   GENERAL   PORTER. 

IN  the  spring  of  1886  we  were  again  called  to  meet 
around  the  grave  of  one  of  the  bravest  and  best  of 
our  companions.  The  almost  incomparably  gallant  Han 
cock,  the  idol  of  his  soldiers  and  of  a  very  large  part  of 
the  people,  so  perfectly  stainless  in  life  and  character  that 
even  political  contest  could  not  fan  the  breath  of  slander, 
had  suddenly  passed  away.  We  buried  him  with  all 
honor  at  his  home  in  Pennsylvania.  Again  it  fell  to  my 
lot  —  the  lot  so  common  to  the  soldier  —  to  step  into  the 
place  in  the  ranks  where  my  comrade  had  suddenly  fallen. 
The  Division  of  the  Missouri  was  then  larger  in  terri 
tory  and  much  larger  in  number  of  troops  than  that  of 
the  Atlantic,  and  had  been  far  more  important.  But 
Indian  wars  were,  as  we  hoped,  approaching  an  end, 
while  we  also  hoped  that  the  country  might  soon  be 
aroused  to  the  necessities  of  the  national  defense.  The 
Division  of  the  Atlantic,  including  also  the  greater  part 
of  the  Gulf  States  and  those  of  the  northeastern  fron 
tier,  would  then  resume  its  rightful  place  as  by  far  the 
most  important  of  the  grand  military  divisions  of  the 

456 


ASSIGNED  TO  THE  DIVISION  OF  THE  ATLANTIC        457 

country.  Hence  I  accepted  without  hesitation  the  com 
mand  of  that  division.  My  natural  tastes  and  favorite 
studies  had  led  me  largely  in  the  direction  of  those 
modern  sciences  which  have  in  a  few  years  imparted 
such  enormous  strides  to  the  development  of  the  me 
chanical  means  of  attack  and  defense,  changing  in  a  cor 
responding  degree  the  great  problems  of  war.  The  valor 
of  great  masses  of  men,  and  even  the  genius  of  great 
commanders  in  the  field,  have  been  compelled  to  yield  the 
first  place  in  importance  to  the  scientific  skill  and  wisdom 
in  finance  which  are  able  and  willing  to  prepare  in  ad 
vance  the  most  powerful  engines  of  war.  Nations,  espe 
cially  those  so  happily  situated  as  the  United  States,  may 
now  surely  defend  their  own  territory  against  invasion 
or  damage,  and  the  national  honor  and  the  rights  of 
their  citizens  throughout  the  world,  by  the  wise  scientific 
use  of  surplus  revenue,  derived  from  high  import  duties 
if  the  people  so  please,  instead  of  by  the  former  uncivil 
ized  method  of  sacrificing  the  lives  of  hundreds  of  thou 
sands  of  brave  men.  Far  more,  such  sacrifice  of  the  brave 
can  no  longer  avail.  As  weU  might  it  be  attempted  to 
return  to  hand-  or  ox-power,  freight- wagons  and  country 
roads,  in  place  of  the  present  steam-locomotives,  trains 
of  cars,  and  steel  tracks,  for  the  enormous  transportation 
of  the  present  day,  as  to  rely  upon  the  bravery  of  troops 
for  the  defense  of  a  city. 

Science  has  wrought  no  greater  revolution  in  any  of 
the  arts  of  peace  than  it  has  in  the  art  of  war.  Indeed, 
the  vast  national  interests  involved  all  over  the  world 
have  employed  the  greatest  efforts  of  genius  in  develop 
ing  the  most  powerful  means  of  attack  and  defense. 

Such  were  the  thoughts  with  which  I  entered  upon  my 
duties  in  the  Division  of  the  Atlantic,  and  such  guided 
my  action  there  and  in  the  subsequent  command  of  the 
army.  That  not  very  much  was  accomplished  is  too 
painfully  true.  Yet  a  beginning  was  at  once  made,  and 


458  FORTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

progress,  though  slow,  continued  until  the  hope  now 
seems  justified  that  our  country  may  be  ready  before  it 
is  too  late  to  "  command  the  peace  "  in  a  voice  which  all 
must  heed. 

I  was  ably  and  zealously  assisted  in  all  this  work  by 
Major  Joseph  P.  Sanger,  one  of  my  aides  until  his 
well-merited  promotion  to  inspector-general.  Then  Cap 
tain  Tasker  H.  Bliss  took  Major  Sanger's  place,  and 
helped  me  to  carry  forward  the  work  with  his  well-known 
ability,  devotion,  and  industry.  The  army  owes  much 
to  those  faithful  officers,  without  whose  help  little  could 
have  been  done  by  me.  I  quote  here  from  a  memoran 
dum,  prepared  at  my  request  by  Major  Sanger,  showing 
in  detail  the  measures  taken  to  perfect,  so  far  as  possible 
in  advance,  the  instruction  of  the  artillery  of  the  army  in 
the  service  of  the  modern  high-power  armament,  so  that 
every  new  gun  and  mortar  should  have,  the  moment  it 
was  finished  and  placed  in  position,  thoroughly  qualified 
officers  and  men  to  use  it : 

Major-General  J.  M.  Schofield  assumed  command  of  the  Di 
vision  of  the  Atlantic  and  Department  of  the  East  April  13, 1886; 
and  during  the  remaining  months  of  that  year,  as  opportunity 
afforded,  gave  much  attention  to  the  condition  of  the  sea-coast 
forts  and  their  garrisons  from  the  Canadian  line  to  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico. 

There  were  at  this  time  sixty-six  posts  in  the  division,  of 
which  twenty-seven  were  garrisoned  and  thirty-nine  ungarri- 
soned;  of  the  total  number,  fifty-one  were  sea-coast  forts  and 
the  balance  barracks,  properly  speaking.  Of  the  garrisoned  forts, 
fifteen  had  no  armaments,  and  the  armaments  of  all  the  others 
were  the  old  muzzle-loading  types  of  low  power.  The  efficiency 
of  the  artillery  personnel  was  far  from  satisfactory,  from  lack 
of  proper  instruction,  due  in  turn  to  lack  of  facilities.  Artillery 
target  practice,  except  at  Forts  Monroe,  Hamilton,  and  Wads- 
worth,  had  practically  ceased  in  the  division  ;  and  of  the  forty- 
five  companies  of  artillery,  comprising  seventy-five  per  cent,  of 
the  entire  artillery  troops  of  the  army,  only  two  batteries  con- 


MEASURES  FOE  IMPROVING  THE  SEA-COAST  DEFENSE    459 

tinnally  at  Fort  Monroe  had  had  annual  artillery  target  practice 
during  the  preceding  ten  years,  and  some  of  the  batteries  had 
not  fired  a  shot. 

To  remedy  these  defects,  and  at  the  same  time  provide  a  sys 
tem  of  fire  control  applicable  to  the  defense  of  all  our  harbors, 
orders  were  issued  in  1887  for  mapping  the  harbors,  establishing 
base  lines,  and  arranging  the  extremities  for  the  use  of  angle- 
measuring  instruments,  and  graduating  traverse  circles  in  azi 
muth.  Systematic  artillery  instruction  and  target  practice  were 
ordered,  and  a  system  of  reports  suited  to  the  preservation  and 
utilization  of  all  data  resulting  from  the  firing. 

Thus,  for  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  country,  an  effort 
was  made  to  establish  and  develop  a  system  of  artillery  fire  con 
trol  adapted  to  our  fortifications  and  armament.  In  1888  Gen 
eral  Schofield  succeeded  General  Sheridan  in  command  of  the 
army,  and  in  December  issued  "  General  Orders,  No.  108"  from  the 
headquarters  of  the  army.  This  order  extended  to  all  the  artil 
lery  troops  of  the  army  the  system  of  artillery  instruction  and 
target  practice  which  had  been  established  in  the  Division  of  the 
Atlantic.  As  it  had  not  been  found  practicable  to  equip  all  the 
artillery  posts  with  the  necessary  appliances  for  carrying  out  the 
provisions  of  the  order,  the  eleven  principal  posts  on  the  Eastern, 
Western,  and  Southern  coasts  were  designated  as  artillery  posts 
of  instruction,  and  provided  with  all  the  guns,  implements,  and 
instruments  necessary  for  the  instruction  and  target  practice  of 
such  of  the  neighboring  garrisons  as  were  unprovided  with 
proper  facilities. 

To  insure  the  proper  execution  of  the  order,  there  was  appro 
priated  March  2,  1889,  twenty  thousand  dollars  to  be  expended 
under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  Board  of  Ordnance  and 
Fortifications,  which  had  been  created  by  the  Fortification  Ap 
propriation  Act  of  September  22,  1888,  and  of  which  General 
Schofield  was  the  president.  The  Army  Regulations  of  1889 
were  published  on  February  9,  and  paragraph  382  authorized 
the  commanding  general  of  each  geographical  division  within 
which  were  the  headquarters  of  one  or  more  artillery  regiments 
to  designate,  with  the  approval  of  the  general  commanding  the 
army,  a  division  inspector  of  artillery  target  practice,  whose  duty 
it  was  to  make  inspections  with  a  view  to  insuring  uniform, 
thorough,  and  systematic  artillery  instruction. 

On  June  11,  1889,  "  General  Orders,  No.  49  "  was  issued  from 


460  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  headquarters  of  the  army,  in  anticipation  of  the  more  com 
plete  equipment  of  the  artillery  posts  with  the  apparatus  neces 
sary  for  the  proper  conduct  of  artillery  instruction  and  target 
practice.  The  course  of  instruction  covered  the  use  of  plane 
tables,  telescopic  and  other  sights,  electrical  firing-machines, 
chronographs,  velocimeters,  anemometers,  and  other  meteorologi 
cal  instruments,  stop-watches,  signaling,  telegraphy,  vessel  track 
ing,  judging  distances,  and,  in  short,  everything  essential  to  the 
scientific  use  of  the  guns.  By  "  General  Orders,  No.  62,  Head 
quarters  of  the  Army,'7  July  2, 1889,  Lieutenant  T.  H.  Bliss,  First 
Artillery,  Aide-de-Camp  to  General  Schofield  commanding,  was 
announced  as  inspector  of  small  arms  and  artillery  practice.  As 
an  inducement  to  greater  application  on  the  part  of  the  student 
officers  of  the  Artillery  School  and  of  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry 
School,  the  distinction  of  "  honor  graduate n  was  conferred  on 
all  officers  who  had  graduated,  or  should  graduate,  either  first 
or  second  from  the  Artillery  School,  or  first,  second,  or  third 
from  the  Infantry  and  Cavalry  School:  the  same  to  appear  with 
their  names  in  the  Army  Register  as  long  as  such  graduates 
should  continue  on  the  active  or  retired  list  of  the  army.  .  .  . 


In  August,  1886,  after  the  passage  of  a  bill  by  Congress, 
General  Fitz-John  Porter  was  restored  to  the  army,  as 
colonel,  by  President  Cleveland.  When  I  was  in  the  War 
Department  in  1868,  General  Porter  had  come  to  me 
with  a  request  that  I  would  present  his  case  to  the  Presi 
dent,  and  recommend  that  he  be  given  a  rehearing.  I 
declined  to  do  so,  on  the  ground  that,  in  my  opinion,  an 
impartial  investigation  and  disposition  of  his  case,  what 
ever  were  its  merits,  could  not  be  made  until  the  passions 
and  prejudices  begotten  by  the  war  had  subsided  much 
further  than  they  had  done  at  that  time.  In  the  course 
of  conversation  I  told  him  that  while  I  never  permitted 
myself  to  form  an  opinion  of  any  case  without  much 
more  knowledge  of  it  than  I  then  had  of  his,  I  presumed, 
from  the  finding  of  the  court-martial,  that  he  had  at  least 
been  guilty  of  acting  upon  what  he  supposed  to  be  his 
own  better  judgment  under  the  circumstances  he  found 


FITZ-JOHN  PORTER'S  RESTORATION  TO  THE  ARMY 

to  exist,  instead  of  in  strict  obedience  to  General  Pope's 
orders.  He  said  that  that  was  not  the  case ;  that  he  had 
not  even  literally  disobeyed  orders ;  that  in  so  far  as  he 
had  acted  upon  his  own  judgment,  he  had  loyally  done 
all  that  could  be  done  to  carry  out  General  Pope's  wishes; 
and  that  all  he  wanted  was  an  opportunity  to  prove  such 
to  be  the  facts.  I  replied  that  if  he  could  prove  what  he 
stated  beyond  question,  he  would  of  course  have  a  case 
worthy  of  consideration — not  otherwise.  Nothing  was 
said  in  respect  to  the  facts  or  the  evidence  in  contraven 
tion  of  the  judgment  of  the  court-martial  which  tried  him. 
Hence,  beyond  that  above  stated,  I  had  no  knowledge 
of  his  case  when  the  board  of  review,  of  which  I  was  pres 
ident,  met  in  1878  to  hear  the  new  evidence ;  and  I  believe 
neither  of  the  other  members  of  the  board — Generals  A. 
H.  Terry  and  George  W.  Getty — was  any  better  informed. 

The  duty  of  the  board  was  very  different  from  that  of 
a  court-martial  appointed  to  try  an  original  case.  The 
accused  had  already  been  tried  and  convicted.  He  was 
not  to  have  a  new  trial.  He  could  not  have  any  benefit 
whatever  of  any  doubt  that  might  exist  after  all  the  evi 
dence,  old  and  new,  had  been  duly  considered.  He  must 
prove  his  innocence  positively,  by  absolutely  convincing 
evidence,  or  else  the  original  judgment  of  the  court-mar 
tial  must  stand.  This  view  of  the  issue  was  fully  ac 
cepted  by  General  Porter  and  his  counsel.  This  caused 
a  new  and  peculiar  duty  to  devolve  upon  the  board — at 
least  it  was  so  to  me ;  that  is,  to  find,  if  possible,  some 
view  of  all  the  evidence,  or  of  all  the  facts  established  by 
the  evidence,  that  could  be  regarded  as  consistent  with 
the  theory  or  supposition  that  Porter  was  guilty. 

When  the  evidence  was  all  in,  the  members  of  the 
board  separated  for  several  weeks  to  let  each  examine  all 
the  evidence  and  reach  his  own  conclusion,  to  be  pre 
sented  in  form  at  the  next  meeting  of  the  board.  I  be 
lieve  I  devoted  more  earnest  work  to  the  examination 


462  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN   THE  ARMY 

and  analysis  than  I  had  ever  done  to  any  one  thing  be 
fore  in  my  life.  I  tried  in  succession  every  possible  com 
bination  of  the  established  facts,  in  the  effort  to  find 
some  one  consistent  with  the  theory  that  Porter  had 
been  guilty  of  disobedience,  as  charged,  or  of  any  other 
military  offense.  But  I  could  not  find  one,  except  the 
very  patent  one  that  he  had  sent  despatches  to  Burnside 
which  were  by  no  means  respectful  to  Pope;  and  the 
board  expressed  an  opinion  in  condemnation  of  that, 
which  Porter's  counsel  very  frankly  admitted  to  be  just. 

In  the  course  of  that  long  and  earnest  effort  to  find 
Porter  guilty, — for  that  is  what  the  effort  was  in  effect, — 
the  whole  story  of  his  conduct  and  of  the  operations  of 
the  two  opposing  armies  and  the  actions  of  other  promi 
nent  officers  became  so  clear,  and  his  honorable  and  sol 
dierly  conduct  so  absolutely  demonstrated,  that  it  was 
exceedingly  difficult,  in  view  of  all  the  wrong  he  had 
suffered,  to  write  a  cold  judicial  statement  of  the  facts. 
The  first  draft  was  toned  down  in  many  particulars  in 
the  effort  to  bring  it  within  the  strictest  rules  of  judicial 
decisions.  I  have  sometimes  thought  since  that  if  the 
report  of  the  board  could  have  been  much  colder,  it 
might  have  been  better  at  first  for  Porter,  though  less 
just.  But  I  do  not  think  he  or  any  of  his  companions 
and  friends  will  ever  feel  like  finding  fault  because  the 
board  could  not  entirely  suppress  the  feelings  produced 
by  their  discovery  of  the  magnitude  of  the  wrong  that 
had  been  done  to  a  gallant  fellow-soldier. 

The  first  time  I  met  General  Grant  after  the  decision 
of  the  board  was  published  was  very  soon  after  he  had 
published  in  1882  the  result  of  his  own  investigation  of 
the  case.  He  at  once  introduced  the  subject,  and  talked 
about  it  for  a  long  time  in  the  most  earnest  manner  that 
I  ever  heard  him  speak  on  any  subject.  He  would  not 
permit  me  to  utter  a  single  sentence  until  he  had  gone 
all  over  the  case  and  showed  me  that  he  understood  all 


GENERAL  GRANT'S  OPINION  4(53 

its  essential  features  as  thoroughly  as  I  did,  and  that  his 
judgment  was  precisely  the  same  as  that  which  the  board 
had  reached.  He  intimated  very  decidedly  that  no  im 
partial  and  intelligent  military  man  could,  in  his  opinion, 
possibly  reach  any  other  conclusion.  The  general  evi 
dently  desired  to  make  it  perfectly  clear  that  he  had  not 
adopted  the  opinion  of  the  board  of  which  I  was  a  mem 
ber,  nor  that  of  any  one  else;  but  that  he  had  thoroughly 
mastered  the  case  for  himself,  and  formed  his  own  judg 
ment  in  regard  to  it.  I  take  pleasure  in  recording  the 
fact  that  he  unquestionably  had  done  it,  and  I  never 
knew  a  man  who  could  form  more  positive  opinions,  or 
one  who  could  express  them  more  convincingly,  than 
General  Grant. 

The  board  was  not  called  upon  to  express  any  opinion 
respecting  the  action  of  the  court-martial  upon  the  evi 
dence  before  it,  and  it  would  have  been  manifestly  im 
proper  to  do  so.  Speaking  for  myself,  and  not  for  any 
other  member  of  the  board,  I  do  not  now  hesitate  to  say 
that  the  finding  and  sentence  of  the  general  court-mar 
tial  which  tried  General  Fitz-John  Porter  were  not  justi 
fied  by  the  evidence  before  that  court.  In  my  judgment, 
formed  from  long  observation  and  much  experience,  the 
passions  of  war  often  render  the  administration  of  justice 
impossible.  A  suggestion  once  made  to  me  by  a  man  in 
very  high  military  authority,  that  a  finding  and  sentence 
of  court-martial  rendered  in  time  of  war  should  be  re 
garded  as  res  adjudicata,  produced  in  my  mind  the  pain 
ful  impression  that  a  very  great  man  did  not  find  the 
word  "justice"  anywhere  in  his  vocabulary;  and  I  watched 
for  many  years  the  conversation  and  writings  and  public 
speeches  of  that  man  without  finding  that  he  ever  made 
use  of  that  word,  or  ever  gave  as  a  reason  for  doing  or 
not  doing  anything  that  it  would  be  just  or  unjust.  In 
his  mind,  whatever  might  have  happened  to  any  person 
was  simply  a  matter  of  good  or  bad  fortune  which  did 


464  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

not  concern  him.  He  refused  even  to  consider  the 
question  whether  injustice  had  or  had  not  been  done, 
or  whether  the  operation  of  a  law  was  not  relatively 
unjust  to  some  as  compared  to  others.  When  to  such 
natural  character  and  habits  of  thought  are  added  the 
stern  necessities  of  war  as  viewed  by  a  commander  and 
many  other  officers,  what  possible  chance  of  justice  can 
be  left  to  an  unfortunate  man  ? 

It  is  true  that  even  if  the  life  of  an  innocent  man  may 
have  been  sacrificed  under  the  stern  necessities  of  dis 
cipline,  that  is  no  more  than  thousands  of  his  fellow- 
soldiers  have  suffered  because  of  the  crimes  and  follies 
of  politicians  who  brought  on  the  war.  But  that  is  no 
reason  why  his  memory  as  well  as  those  of  his  comrades 
should  not  be  finally  honored,  if  it  can  be  proved  that, 
after  all,  he  also  was  innocent  and  brave. 

In  my  opinion,  no  government  can  be  regarded  as  just 
to  its  army  unless  it  provides,  under  appropriate  condi 
tions,  for  the  rehearing  of  cases  that  may  be  tried  by 
court-martial  in  time  of  war.  Perhaps  it  may  most 
wisely  be  left  for  the  President  and  Congress  to  institute 
appropriate  action  in  each  individual  case.  That  is  a 
matter  for  mature  consideration.  My  only  desire  is  to 
suggest  the  necessity  for  some  such  action,  whenever 
reasonable  grounds  for  it  may  be  presented.  I  have  no 
respect  for  the  suggestions  sometimes  urged  that  labor 
and  expense  are  sufficient  grounds  for  failure  to  secure 
justice  to  every  citizen  or  soldier  of  the  republic,  whether 
at  home  or  abroad. 

Soon  after  General  Logan's  last  election  to  the  Senate, 
I  had  a  very  interesting  and  unreserved  conversation 
with  him,  at  his  house  in  Chicago,  in  respect  to  his  action 
in  the  Porter  case.  He  spoke  of  it  with  evident  candor, 
acknowledged  that  his  view  of  the  case  was  probably 
wrong,  and  as  if  to  excuse  his  mistake,  volunteered  an 
explanation  as  to  how  he  came  to  take  that  view  of  it. 


SENATOE  LOGAN'S  EXPLANATION         455 

He  told  me  that  when  he  found  that  the  case  might 
probably  come  before  Congress,  he  wanted  to  prepare 
himself  in  advance  as  far  as  possible  to  deal  with  it 
justly,  and  to  defend  the  right  effectively.  Hence  he 
went  to  General  Grant  to  obtain  the  best  possible  view 
of  the  military  questions  involved.  General  Grant  gave 
him  the  theory  of  the  military  situation  and  of  the 
operations  of  the  opposing  armies,  as  well  as  that  of 
Porter's  own  conduct,  which  had  been  presented  to,  and 
evidently  accepted  by,  the  court-martial,  as  presenting 
the  true  merits  of  the  case.  General  Logan  accepted 
that  theory  as  unquestionably  correct,  and  bent  all  his 
energies  to  the  construction  of  unanswerable  arguments 
in  support  of  Porter's  condemnation. 

At  that  time  neither  General  Grant  nor  General  Logan 
knew  anything  of  the  new  evidence  which  was  afterward 
submitted  to  the  board  of  review.  Logan's  powerful 
arguments  in  the  Senate  were  based  upon  his  precon 
ceived  opinion  of  the  case,  supported  by  such  part  of  the 
new  evidence,  as  well  as  of  the  old,  as  could  be  made  to 
support  that  view.  In  reply  to  my  statement  that  he  had 
unquestionably  been  led  astray,  he  said  that  that  was 
quite  probable,  but  that  Grant  was  responsible,  and  it 
was  then  too  late  to  change.  I  do  not  think  that  any 
body  will  now  hesitate  to  say  that  General  Grant's  view 
of  his  duty  in  respect  to  this  last  point  was  the  more  to 
be  commended.  But  the  fact  I  wish  to  record  is  that  of 
Logan's  sincerity  in  the  great  efforts  he  had  made  to 
convict  Porter  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  and  his  ex 
planation  of  the  way  in  which  he  had  been  led  into 
the  greatest  possible  error.  It  suggests  the  reflection 
that  even  a  senator  of  the  United  States  might  better 
form  his  own  opinions  rather  than  adopt  those  even 
of  the  highest  authority,  when  the  only  question  in 
volved  is  one  of  justice,  and  not  one  of  public  policy, 
in  which  latter  case  differences  of  opinion  must  of  ne- 


80 


466  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

cessity  be  reconciled  for  the  purpose  of  securing  unity 
of  action. 

As  an  illustration  of  the  necessity  for  an  absolutely 
impartial  review  of  cases  which  have  involved  the  pas 
sions  of  war,  reference  must  be  made  to  the  action  of 
one  member  of  the  Porter  court-martial  who  made  it 
generally  understood  that  his  individual  opinion  sup 
ported  the  rinding  of  that  court.  He  went  so  far  as  to 
make  inquiries  whether  precedents  could  be  found  in 
American  or  English  history  to  sustain  a  member  of  a 
court-martial  in  publicly  defending  the  finding  of  that 
court,  notwithstanding  the  oath  of  secrecy  imposed  by 
law  upon  every  member.  And  this  same  member  of  the 
court  was  furnished  by  a  very  able  lawyer  with  an  argu 
ment  in  support  of  the  findings  of  the  court,  based  upon 
a  review  of  the  evidence  submitted  to  the  subsequent 
board,  as  if  that  member  of  the  court  might  make  public 
use  of  that  argument  as  his  own. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

THE  DEATH  OF  GENERAL  SHERIDAN —  HIS  SUCCESSOR  IN 
COMMAND  OF  THE  ARMY  —  DEPLORABLE  CONDITION  OF 
THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  AT  THE  TIME  —  A  BETTER 
UNDERSTANDING  BETWEEN  THE  DEPARTMENT  AND  THE 
ARMY  COMMANDER  —  GENERAL  SHERIDAN'S  HUMILIATING 
EXPERIENCE —  THE  GRANTING  OF  MEDALS  —  THE  SEC 
RETARY'S  CALL-BELL  —  THE  RELATIONS  OF  SECRETARY 
AND  GENERAL  —  VIEWS  SUBMITTED  TO  PRESIDENT 
CLEVELAND  —  THE  LAW  FIXING  RETIREMENT  FOR  AGE 
— AN  ANECDOTE  OF  GENERAL  GRANT. 

A  GAIN,  in  1888,  only  two  years  after  Hancock's  death, 
-XJL  another  of  our  most  gallant  companions,  the  match 
less  Sheridan,  was  suddenly  stricken  down,  and  soon 
passed  away,  before  the  expiration  of  half  the  term 
allotted  for  his  command  of  the  army.  As  next  in  rank, 
upon  the  request  of  the  general's  family  and  upon  the 
order  of  the  Secretary  of  War  it  became  my  duty  to  ar 
range  and  conduct  the  military  ceremonies  at  the  funeral. 

We  buried  our  companion  in  beautiful  Arlington,  the 
choicest  spot  in  America  for  the  last  resting-place  of  a 
soldier.  It  was  a  bright  summer's  day,  and  the  funeral 
ceremonies,  both  religious  and  military,  were  the  most 
impressive  I  have  ever  seen.  As  a  special  tribute  of 
respect  to  my  brother  soldier,  a  staff  officer  in  uniform 
was  sent  to  meet  and  escort  the  archbishop  who  came 
to  celebrate  the  funeral  mass. 

The  death  of  General  Sheridan  placed  me  in  a  position 
which  I  had  never  anticipated  —  that  of  senior  officer  on 


467 


468         FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

the  active  list  of  the  army.  The  President  had  known 
little  of  ine  either  officially  or  personally,  and  I  had  had 
some  grave  differences  with  the  Secretary  of  War  upon 
subjects  of  great  importance  in  my  estimation,  though 
doubtless  less  in  his.  I  had  defended  as  well  as  I  could, 
and  with  some  persistence,  what  I  then  believed  and 
now  know  was  the  right,  but  had  been  worsted,  as  a 
matter  of  course.  It  is  due  to  the  Honorable  Secretary 
to  say  that  he  disclaimed,  many  months  later,  ever  hav 
ing  knowingly  given  his  sanction  to  the  document  an 
nouncing  one  of  the  military  doctrines  which  I  had  so 
persistently  but  ineffectually  combated.  But  I  did  not 
know  that  in  August,  1888,  and  he  did  not  then  know 
that  he  had  been  thus  betrayed.  Hence  I  thought  it 
quite  improbable  that  a  general  holding  opinions  so  radi 
cally  opposed  to  those  of  the  Secretary  of  War  would 
be  called  to  the  command  of  the  army.  But  I  quietly 
waited  in  Washington  for  the  President's  orders,  neither 
seeking  nor  receiving  any  opportunity  for  explanation  of 
the  supposed  irreconcilable  difference  with  the  Secretary 
of  War.  What  occurred  in  that  secret  council-chamber 
of  the  commander-in-chief,  where  the  fate  of  so  many 
anxious  soldiers  has  been  sealed,  I  have  never  known  or 
inquired;  but  in  no  great  length  of  time  came  the  Presi 
dent's  order  assigning  me  to  the  command  of  the  army, — 
six  or  seven  hours,  as  I  afterward  learned,  after  it  was 
received  in  the  War  Department  and  given  to  the  press. 
It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  condition  of  the 
War  Department  at  that  time  was  deplorable.  It  was 
the  culmination  of  the  controversy  respecting  the  rela 
tions  between  the  administration  and  the  command  which 
had  lasted,  with  slight  intermissions,  for  forty  years. 
It  is  not  my  purpose  to  go  into  the  history  of  that  long 
controversy,  but  only  to  state  briefly  its  final  result,  part 
of  which  was  perhaps  due  to  General  Sheridan's  extreme 
illness  for  some  time  before  his  death,  and  his  retention 


DEPLORABLE  CONDITION  OF  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT  459 

in  nominal  command  and  in  the  nominal  administration 
of  military  justice  long  after  it  had  become  impossible 
for  him  to  discharge  such  duties  intelligently.  But  that 
result  had  been  practically  reached  a  long  time  before 
General  Sheridan  became  seriously  ill.  He  had  long 
ceased,  as  General  Sherman  and  General  Scott  had  be 
fore  him,  not  only  to  command,  but  to  exercise  any  ap 
preciable  influence  in  respect  to  either  the  command  or 
the  administration.  The  only  difference  was  that  Gen 
eral  Scott  went  to  New  York  and  General  Sherman  to 
St.  Louis,  while  General  Sheridan  stayed  in  Washington. 
I  have  always  understood,  but  do  not  know  the  fact, 
that  in  former  times  the  Secretary  of  War  had  exercised 
some  intelligent  control  over  military  affairs,  so  that 
there  was  at  least  unity  in  the  exercise  of  military  au 
thority.  But  in  1888  even  that  had  ceased,  and  it  had 
been  boldly  announced  some  time  before  that  each  de 
partmental  chief  of  staff,  in  his  own  sphere,  was  clothed 
with  all  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  All  that 
a  major-general  as  well  as  an  officer  of  lower  grade  had 
to  do  was  to  execute  such  orders  as  he  might  receive 
from  the  brigadiers  at  the  head  of  the  several  bureaus 
in  Washington.  It  was  not  even  necessary  for  those 
mighty  chiefs  to  say  that  their  mandates  had  the  sanction 
of  any  higher  authority.  Their  own  fiat  was  all-suffi 
cient  for  a  mere  soldier  of  the  line  or  for  his  command 
ing  general,  of  whatever  grade  of  rank  or  of  command. 
It  is  not  strange  that  the  Secretary  was  finally  unable 
to  admit  that  he,  great  lawyer  as  he  was,  could  pos 
sibly  have  given  his  sanction  to  such  an  interpretation 
of  the  law  as  that;  but  the  decision  was  given  by  his 
order,  and  it  governed  the  army  for  a  long  time.  Of 
course  the  adjutant-general  became  by  far  the  chiefest 
of  those  many  chiefs;  for  it  is  his  function  to  issue  to 
the  army  all  the  orders  of  both  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  commanding  general.  Be  it  said  to  his  credit 


470  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

that  he  did  not  assume  to  issue  any  orders  in  his  own 
name,  after  the  manner  of  the  other  chiefs.  Like  a 
sensible  man,  he  was  content  with  the  actual  exercise  of 
power,  without  caring  to  let  the  army  know  that  he  did 
it.  He  had  only  to  use  the  name  of  the  Secretary  or 
the  general,  as  he  pleased;  either  would  answer  with 
the  army.  Of  course  I  knew  something  of  this  before  I 
went  to  Washington,  for  the  evidence  of  it  was  some 
times  too  plain  to  be  ignored.  Yet  it  did  seem  to  me 
passing  strange  to  sit  in  my  office  about  noon,  where  I 
had  been  all  the  day  before,  and  learn  from  the  New 
York  papers  what  orders  I  had  issued  on  that  previous 
day!  Upon  inquiry  I  was  told  that  that  was  only  a  mat 
ter  of  routine,  and  a  rule  of  long  standing.  But  I  mildly 
indicated  that  such  a  practice  did  not  meet  my  ap 
proval,  and  that  I  wished  it  changed,  which  was  finally 
done,  as  explained  in  a  previous  chapter.  But  even  then 
I  had  no  means  of  knowing  whether  an  order  sent  to 
me  in  the  name  of  the  Secretary  of  War  had  ever  been 
seen  by  him,  or  whether  it  was  the  work  of  the  adjutant- 
general,  or  the  product  of  some  joint  operation  of  two  or 
more  of  the  several  chiefs,  each  of  whom  had  the  Sec 
retary's  authority  to  do  such  things.  At  length  the  Sec 
retary,  though  with  evidently  serious  misgivings  respect 
ing  some  deep  ulterior  purpose  of  mine,  consented  that  I 
might  have  an  officer  of  the  adjutant-general's  depart 
ment,  whom  I  knew,  in  my  own  office,  to  keep  me  in 
formed  of  what  I  was  to  do,  and,  if  possible,  what  orders 
I  might  actually  receive  from  the  Secretary  himself,  and 
what  from  the  several  other  heads  of  that  hydra  called 
the  War  Department. 

After  that  change  things  went  on  much  better;  but 
it  was  at  best  only  an  armed  truce,  with  everybody  on 
guard,  until  the  end  of  that  administration,  and  then  it 
came  very  near  culminating  in  a  pitched  battle  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  next.  By  what  seemed  at  the  time 


A  BETTER  UNDERSTANDING  471 

a  very  sharp  trick,  but  which  may  possibly  have  been 
only  the  natural  working  of  the  vicious  system,  I  was 
made  to  appear  to  the  new  Secretary  of  War  as  having 
failed  promptly  to  give  effect  to  an  order  authorized  by 
his  predecessor,  but  on  which  no  authentic  marks  of  his 
authority  appeared,  only  such  as  might  indicate  that  it 
came  from  another  source.  But  if  it  was  a  trick,  it  sig 
nally  failed.  A  few  candid  words  from  one  soldier  to 
another,  even  if  that  other  had  not  been  a  soldier  all  his 
life,  were  quite  sufficient  to  dissipate  that  little  cloud 
which  at  first  had  threatened  a  storm.  Then  sunlight 
began  to  appear ;  and  when,  in  due  time,  by  the  opera 
tion  of  some  natural  laws,  and  some  others  happily 
enacted  by  Congress,  certain  necessary  changes  came 
about,  the  sky  over  the  War  Department  became  al 
most  cloudless,  and  I  trust  it  may  never  again  be  dark 
ened  as  it  had  been  nearly  all  the  time  for  forty  years. 

General  Sheridan  had  entered  upon  his  duties  with  all 
the  soldierly  courage  and  confidence  of  his  nature,  de 
claring  his  purpose  to  regain  the  ground  lost  by  General 
Sherman  when,  to  use  Sheridan's  own  expressive  words, 
"  Sherman  threw  up  the  sponge."  He  announced  his  in 
terpretation  of  the  President's  order  assigning  him  to 
the  "command  of  the  army"  as  necessarily  including 
all  the  army,  not  excepting  the  chiefs  of  the  staff  de 
partments;  and  he  soon  gave  evidence  of  his  faith  by 
ordering  one  of  those  chiefs  on  an  inspecting  tour,  or 
something  of  that  kind,  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
Secretary  of  War.  Thus  the  Secretary  found  the  chief 
of  one  of  the  bureaus  of  his  department  gone  without 
his  authority,  he  knew  not  where.  It  was  not  difficult 
for  the  Secretary  to  point  out  to  the  general,  as  he  did 
in  writing,  in  a  firm,  though  kind  and  confidential  way, 
that  such  could  not  possibly  be  the  true  meaning  of  the 
President's  order.  No  attempt  appears  to  have  been 
made  to  discuss  the  subject  further,  or  to  find  any 


472  FOETY-SIX  YEAKS  IN  THE  AEMY 

ground  broad  enough  for  both  Secretary  and  general  to 
stand  upon.  Nothing  further  appears  to  have  been  said 
or  done  on  that  subject  during  that  administration.  But 
upon  the  inauguration  of  the  next,  the  Secretary  of  War 
sent  out  to  all  the  commanding  generals  of  the  army 
copies  of  that  letter  of  his  predecessor,  in  which  the 
general-in-chief  had  been  so  mildly  and  respectfully,  yet 
so  thoroughly,  beaten.  The  army  was  thus  given  to  un 
derstand  that  on  that  occasion  their  senior  in  command 
had  not  even  been  given  a  chance  to  "throw  up  the 
sponge,"  as  his  predecessor  had  done,  but  had  been 
"knocked  out"  by  the  first  blow. 

As  if  that  was  not  humiliation  enough  for  a  great  sol 
dier  to  bear,  whenever  the  Secretary  went  away  one  of 
the  same  chiefs  of  bureaus  that  the  general  thought  he 
had  a  right  to  command  acted  as  Secretary  of  War,  to 
dominate  over  him !  But  the  loyal,  subordinate  soldier 
who  had  commanded  great  armies  and  achieved  magnifi 
cent  victories  in  the  field  while  those  bureau  chiefs  were 
purveying  powder  and  balls,  or  pork  and  beans,  sub 
mitted  even  to  that  without  a  murmur,  for  a  great  lawyer 
had  told  him  such  was  the  law,  and  how  could  he  know 
any  better?  It  was  only  when  the  adjutant-general, 
his  own  staff-officer,  so  made  by  the  regulations  which 
the  general  knew,  was  thus  appointed  over  him,  that  his 
soldierly  spirit  rebelled.  The  humblest  soldier  of  a  re 
public  could  not  endure  that.  All  this  was  based  upon 
the  theory  that  the  general  of  the  army  was  not  an  offi 
cer  of  the  War  Department,  and  hence  could  not  be 
appointed  acting  Secretary  of  War.  What  other  great 
department  of  the  government  could  recognize  the  stand 
ing  army  as  belonging  to  it,  if  not  the  Department  of 
War  ?  Surely  the  little  army  had  a  hard  time  while  it 
was  thus  turned  out  into  the  cold,  not  even  its  chief 
recognized  as  belonging  to  any  department  of  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  country  which  they  were  all  sworn  to 


UNIVERSITY 

OF 


SHERIDAN'S  HUMILIATING  EXPERIENCE      473 


serve,  but  subject  to  the  orders  of  smy  bureau  officer  who 
happened  to  be  the  senior  in  Washington  in  hot  summer 
weather,  when  nearly  all  had  gone  to  the  mountains  or 
the  sea  ! 

That  same  great  lawyer  announced  in  my  hearing, 
very  soon  after  his  accession  to  power,  in  response  to  a 
suggestion  that  war  service  was  entitled  to  weight  in  ap 
pointments  and  promotions,  that  in  his  judgment  "that 
book  was  closed."  Could  any  one  of  the  million  of  soldiers 
still  living,  and  the  many  more  millions  of  patriots  who 
are  always  alive  in  our  country,  be  expected  to  support 
such  a  policy  as  that  ?  In  my  opinion,  that  one  short 
speech  cost  the  national  administration  more  than  a  mil 
lion  of  votes.  Soldiers  don't  say  much  through  the  press, 
but  they  quietly  talk  things  over  around  their  camp- 
fires.  And  I  hope  many  generations  will  pass  away  be 
fore  they  and  their  sons  will  cease  thus  to  keep  alive  the 
fires  of  patriotism  kindled  by  the  great  struggle  for 
American  Union. 

Thank  God,  that  "  law  "  did  not  last  many  years.  There 
was  great  rejoicing  throughout  the  little  army  when  it 
was  again  recognized  as  belonging  to  the  Department  of 
"War.  But  that  cause  of  rejoicing  was  soon  beclouded. 
By  another  of  those  inscrutable  dispensations  of  Provi 
dence,  another  superior,  under  the  title  of  Assistant  Sec 
retary  of  War,  was  interposed  between  the  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  army  and  the  general  appointed  to  assist 
him  in  the  command.  It  had  been  thought,  and  so  stated 
in  writing,  that  the  major-general  commanding,  and  the 
ten  heads  of  staff  departments  and  bureaus,  with  their 
many  assistants,  all  educated  men  of  long  experience  in 
the  several  departments  of  military  affairs,  and  some  of 
them  tried  in  war,  might  give  the  Secretary  all  the  assist 
ance  he  needed,  if  they  were  permitted  to  do  it.  But  no; 
it  appears  to  have  been  thought  that  some  other,  who  had 
had  no  education  or  experience  in  the  affairs  of  the  War 


474  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Department,  could  better  assist  a  Secretary  who  to  simi 
lar  acquired  qualifications  for  his  office  added  far  greater 
natural  endowments  and  the  just  confidence  of  his  coun 
try.  Thus  the  major-general  was  treated  as  much  worse 
than  the  lieutenant-general  had  been,  as  he  was  inferior 
to  him  in  rank.  But  I  also  submitted  without  a  word,  be 
cause  it  was  this  time  unquestionably  the  law  as  well  as 
the  will  of  my  lawful  superiors  in  office.  I  waited  as  pa 
tiently  as  I  could,  as  the  lieutenant-general  had  done, 
the  time  when  by  operation  of  law,  human  or  divine,  wel 
come  relief  from  a  burdensome  duty  would  come,  upon 
the  official  declaration  that  I  had  done,  as  best  I  could, 
all  the  duty  that  God  and  my  country  required  of  me. 

One  illustration  will  suffice  to  show  the  working  of  this 
new  invention  by  which  the  general-in-chief  was  still 
further  removed  from  the  commander-in-chief,  whose 
chief  military  adviser  he  was  supposed  to  be.  An  act  of 
Congress  authorized  the  President  to  confer  medals  of 
honor  upon  soldiers  of  all  grades  who  might  be  most  dis 
tinguished  for  bravery  in  action.  It  is  the  most  highly 
prized  of  all  military  rewards  because  given  to  the  soldier, 
without  regard  to  rank,  for  that  service  which  every  true 
soldier  regards  as  of  the  greatest  merit.  The  standard 
of  merit  deserving  that  reward  is  essentially  the  same  in 
all  the  armies  of  the  civilized  world,  and  the  medal  is  made 
of  iron  or  bronze,  instead  of  anything  more  glittering  or 
precious,  to  indicate  the  character  of  the  deed  it  com 
memorates.  That  standard  of  merit  is  the  most  heroic 
devotion  in  the  discharge  of  soldierly  duty  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy,  that  conduct  which  brings  victory,  honor,  and 
glory  to  the  country  for  which  a  brave  man  has  devoted 
his  life  in  obedience  to  the  orders  which  have  come  down 
to  him  from  the  head  of  the  nation,  which  spirit  of  obe 
dience  and  devotion  creates  armies  and  saves  nations 
from  defeat,  disaster,  or  domestic  convulsion.  These 
highest  tokens  of  a  nation's  honor  had  for  many  years 


THE  GRANTING  OF  MEDALS  475 

been  given  with  the  greatest  care,  after  most  rigid  scru 
tiny  of  the  official  records  and  all  other  evidence  pre 
sented,  laboriously  reviewed  by  the  general-in-chief  in 
person,  recommended  by  him  under  the  universal  rule  of 
civilized  nations,  and  approved  by  the  Secretary  of  War, 
whose  approval  is  considered  equivalent  to  the  order  of 
the  President,  by  which  alone,  under  the  law,  a  medal  of 
honor  can  be  granted.  But  at  length  these  carefully  con 
sidered  recommendations  were  disapproved  by  the  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  War,  on  the  ground  that  the  soldier 
had  only  done  his  duty !  He  had  only  done,  or  heroically 
tried  to  do  until  stricken  down  by  the  enemy's  fire,  what 
his  commander  had  ordered !  Some  other  standard  of 
soldierly  honor  was  set  up,  not  involving  obedience  to 
orders  nor  discharge  of  duty,  but  instead  of  that  some 
act  of  each  soldier's  own  volition,  as  if  what  a  nation 
most  highly  honored  was  independent  action  of  each  one 
of  its  million  of  soldiers,  without  any  special  regard  to 
the  orders  of  the  commander-in-chief  or  any  of  his  sub 
ordinate  commanders!  Thus  the  most  dearly  bought 
honor  of  a  citizen  of  this  great  republic,  intrusted  by 
Congress  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  arrny,  to  be 
duly  awarded  to  his  subordinates,  passed  into  the  hands 
of  an  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  to  be  awarded  by  him 
under  his  own  newly  invented  theory  of  soldierly  merit! 
After  a  laborious  but  vain  attempt  to  obtain  recognition 
of  the  time-honored  standard  of  soldierly  honor  and 
merit,  the  general-in-chief  was  forced  to  admit  that  the 
new  standard  sefc  up  by  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  War 
did  not  afford  him  any  intelligible  guide  by  which  he 
could  be  governed  in  making  his  recommendations,  and 
hence  he  requested  to  be  relieved  ly  the  Secretary  of  War 
from  consideration  of  such  cases  in  future,  presuming 
that  the  vital  question  would  thus,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
receive  the  personal  consideration  of  the  Secretary.  The 
formal  action  of  the  "  Secretary  of  War,"  relieving  the 


476  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

general  from  that  important  duty  involving  the  honor 
of  those  under  his  command,  was  very  promptly  made 
known  to  him.  But  now  there  is  very  good  reason  for 
the  belief  that  the  honorable  and  very  worthy  Secretary 
knew  nothing  at  all  of  the  whole  transaction ! 

It  was  my  good  fortune  to  have  had,  by  close  personal 
association,  exact  knowledge  of  the  difficulties  which  my 
predecessors  had  encountered,  as  well  as,  perhaps,  a  more 
modest  ambition,  and  hence  to  avoid  some  of  those  diffi 
culties.  Yet  in  view  of  the  past  experience  of  all  com 
manders  of  the  army,  from  that  of  George  Washington 
with  the  Continental  Congress  down  to  the  present  time, 
I  advise  all  my  young  brother  soldiers  to  limit  their  am 
bition  to  the  command  of  the  Division  of  the  Atlantic  or 
Department  of  the  East.  But  since  some  of  them  must 
in  all  probability  be  required  to  discharge  the  duties  of 
the  higher  position,  I  trust  the  varied  experiences  of  their 
predecessors  may  serve  as  some  help  to  them  in  the  dis 
charge  of  those  duties,  which  are  vastly  more  difficult 
and  far  less  agreeable  than  any  other  duties  of  an  Ameri 
can  soldier.  They  are  the  duties  which  most  closely 
concern  the  subordinate  relation  of  the  military  to  the 
civil  power  in  a  republic.  In  that  relation  I  had  the 
great  good  fortune  to  enjoy  most  cordial  and  consid 
erate  personal  treatment  on  the  part  of  my  distinguished 
associates  representing  the  civil  power.  Hence  my  ad 
vice  to  my  young  military  friends  may  be  fairly  regarded 
as  based  upon  the  most  favorable  view  of  what  any  of 
them  may  reasonably  expect.  It  is  the  one  position  of 
all  in  the  army  which  most  severely  tries  the  spirit 
of  subordination  which  is  so  indispensable  in  a  soldier  of 
a  republic.  I  have  not  thought  it  surprising  that  none 
of  my  great  predecessors  were  quite  able  to  endure  the 
trial. 

It  is  there  where  the  polished  surfaces  of  military  eti 
quette  and  military  methods  come  in  contact  with  the 


THE  SECRETARY'S  CALL-BELL  477 

rough  cast-iron  of  those  which  often  prevail  in  civil  ad 
ministration,  and  the  former  get  badly  scratched.  Mili 
tary  rules  are  invariable,  with  rare  exceptions  understood 
and  observed  by  all,  while  civil  practice  varies  according 
to  the  character  and  habits  of  the  chief  in  authority, 
from  those  of  the  illustrious  Stanton,  now  well  known  in 
history,1  to  the  opposite  extreme  of  refined  courtesy. 
Long  observation  and  experience  have  led  to  the  belief 
that  such  rasping  of  feelings,  too  sensitive  perhaps,  even 
more  than  substantial  difference,  has  often  been  the  cause 
of  discord.  A  single  example  may  suffice  to  illustrate 
what  is  meant.  In  the  arrangements  of  the  room  es 
pecially  designed  for  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
in  the  splendid  new  State,  War,  and  Navy  Departments 
building,  was  a  great  table-desk  on  which  was  a  complete 
system  of  electric  buttons  connected  with  wires  leading 
to  bells  in  all  the  principal  offices  in  the  department,  the 
buttons  bearing  the  titles  of  the  officers  at  the  head  of 
the  several  bureaus,  etc.,  so  that  the  Secretary  could 
"ring  up"  any  colonel,  brigadier-general,  or  major-gen 
eral  whom  he  wanted  to  see,  just  as  a  gentleman  in  pri 
vate  life  does  his  coachman,  butler,  or  valet.  To  an 
army  officer  who  had  for  many  years,  in  lower  grades, 
been  accustomed  to  the  invariable  formula,  delivered  by 
a  well-dressed  soldier  standing  at  "attention"  and  re 
spectfully  saluting,  "The  commanding  officer  sends  his 
compliments  to  Captain  B ,  and  wishes  to  see  the  cap 
tain  at  headquarters,"  the  tinkling  of  that  soft  little  bell 
must  have  sounded  harsh  indeed  after  he  had  attained  the 
rank  of  brigadier-general.  Twice  only,  I  believe,  my  own 
old  soldier  messenger  who  attended  in  the  room  where  the 
telephone  and  bells  were  located,  came  to  my  room,  with 
an  indescribable  expression  on  his  face,  and  said,  "The  bell 
from  the  Secretary's  office  is  ringing ! "  I  replied,  "  Indeed? 
Go  up  and  inquire  what  it  means."  Presently  the  Secre- 

1  Sherman's  "Memoirs,"  second  edition,  Vol.  II,  p.  422. 


478  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

tary's  own  messenger  appeared,  and  delivered  a  message 
in  courteous  terms — whether  the  same  the  Secretary  had 
given  to  him  I  did  not  know,  but  had  reason  to  doubt, 
for  I  had  seen  and  heard  the  Secretary  violently  ring  a 
certain  bell  several  times,  and  then  say  with  great  em 
phasis  to  his  messenger,  "Go  and  tell  M- —  to  come  here," 

not  even  using  the  high  military  title  by  which  "M "  was 

habitually  addressed  in  the  "War  Department.  But  those 
uncivil  methods  of  an  imperfect  civilization  are  gradually 
passing  away,  and  the  more  refined  courtesies,  taught,  I 
believe,  in  all  our  great  schools  as  well  as  in  the  military 
and  naval  service,  are  taking  their  place.  It  is  now  a 
long  time  since  that  reform  was  practically  complete  in 
the  "War  Department. 

Thus  it  appeared,  when  I  went  into  the  office  in  1888, 
that  of  my  predecessors  in  command  of  the  army,  Scott 
and  Sherman  had  given  up  the  contest,  Sheridan  had 
been  quickly  put  hors  de  combat,  while  Grant  alone  had 
won  the  fight,  and  that  after  a  long  contest,  involving 
several  issues,  in  which  a  Secretary  of  War  was  finally 
removed  from  office  with  the  consent  of  his  own  personal 
and  political  friends,  a  President  was  impeached  and  es 
caped  removal  from  office  by  only  one  vote,  and  the  coun 
try  was  brought  to  the  verge  of  another  civil  war.  As  I 
had  helped  Evarts,  Seward,  and  some  others  whose  names 
I  never  knew,  to  "pour  oil  on  the  troubled  waters"  in  the 
time  of  Grant  and  Stanton,  and  to  get  everybody  into  the 
humor  to  respond  heartily  to  that  great  aspiration,  "Let 
us  have  peace,"  I  thought  perhaps  I  might  do  something 
in  the  same  direction  in  later  years.  Be  that  as  it  might, 
I  had  no  desire  to  try  again  what  so  many  others  had 
failed  to  accomplish,  but  thought  it  better  to  make  an 
experiment  with  a  less  ambitious  plan  of  my  own,  which 
I  had  worked  out  while  trying  to  champion  the  ideas 
entertained  by  all  my  predecessors.  At  the  request  of 
General  Grant  and  General  Sherman,  when  the  one  was 


THE  RELATIONS  OF  SECRETARY  AND  GENERAL        479 

President  and  the  other  general  of  the  army,  I  studied 
the  subject  as  thoroughly  as  I  was  capable  of  doing,  and 
formulated  a  regulation  intended  to  define  the  relations 
between  the  Secretary  of  War,  the  general  of  the  army, 
and  the  staff  departments.  I  still  think  that  plan  of 
my  great  superiors,  only  formulated  by  me,  would  have 
worked  quite  satisfactorily  if  it  could  have  had  general 
and  cordial  support.  Yet  I  do  not  think  it  was  based 
upon  the  soundest  view  of  the  constitutional  obligations 
of  the  President  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  army, 
nor  at  all  consistent  with  the  practice  in  this  country  of 
giving  the  command  of  the  army  to  the  officer  happening 
to  be  senior  in  rank,  without  regard  to  the  "  special  trust 
and  confidence  "  reposed  in  him  by  the  President  for  the 
time  being.  It  was  based  too  much  upon  the  special  con 
ditions  then  existing,  wherein  the  general  of  the  army, 
no  less  than  the  Secretary  of  War,  enjoyed  the  confidence 
of  the  President  in  the  highest  degree.  The  plan  pro 
posed  to  give  far  too  great  authority  to  the  general,  if  he 
did  not,  for  whatever  reason,  enjoy  the  full  confidence  of 
the  President.  It  also  trusted  too  much  to  the  ability 
and  disinterested  fidelity  of  the  several  chiefs  of  the  staff 
departments.  In  short,  it  was  based  upon  a  supposed 
higher  degree  of  administrative  virtue  than  always  exists 
even  in  this  country. 

However  all  this  may  be,  the  proposed  regulation  did 
not  meet  with  cordial  support,  so  far  as  I  know,  from  any 
but  General  Grant,  General  Sherman,  and  General  M.  0. 
Meigs,  then  quartermaster-general.  The  other  bureau 
chiefs  earnestly  opposed  it.  It  was  near  the  end  of 
General  Grant's  second  term,  and  no  effort  was  made,  so 
far  as  I  know,  to  adopt  any  regulation  on  the  subject  in 
the  next  or  any  succeeding  administration.  The  personal 
controversy  between  General  Scott  and  the  Secretary 
of  War  many  years  before  had  resulted  in  the  repeal, 
through  revision,  of  the  old  and  quite  satisfactory  regu- 


480  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

lation  on  the  subject,  and  no  other  worthy  of  the  name 
has  ever  been  adopted  in  its  place. 

Soon  after  I  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  army 
I  submitted,  in  writing,  to  President  Cleveland  my  own 
mature  views  on  the  subject.  They  received  some  favor 
able  consideration,  but  no  formal  action,  in  view  of  the 
near  approach  of  the  end  of  his  first  term.  From  that 
time  till  near  the  present  the  paper  was  in  the  personal 
custody  of  the  Secretary  of  War.  What  consideration, 
if  any,  it  ever  received,  I  was  never  informed.  But  it 
was  the  guide  of  my  own  action,  at  least,  while  I  was  in 
command  of  the  army.  It  is  now  on  file  in  the  War  De 
partment.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  some  future  military 
and  administrative  geniuses,  superior  to  any  of  the  last 
hundred  years,  may  be  able  to  solve  that  difficult  prob 
lem.  I  can  only  say  that  my  own  plan  worked  well 
enough  so  long  as  I  helped  to  work  it.  How  it  may  be 
with  anybody  else,  either  under  my  plan  or  some  other, 
only  the  future  can  determine.  I  so  far  succeeded  that 
the  most  intelligent  staff  officers  used  to  say,  "For  the 
first  time  the  general  actually  does  command  the  army." 
They  saw  only  the  results,  without  exactly  perceiving  the 
nature  of  the  motive-power. 

The  way  to  success  in  rendering  efficient  public  service 
does  not  lie  through  any  assumption  of  the  authority 
which  the  nation  may  have  given  to  another,  even  if  not 
most  wisely,  but  rather  in  zealous,  faithful,  and  subordi 
nate  efforts  to  assist  that  other  in  doing  what  the  country 
has  imposed  upon  him. 

A  soldier  may  honorably  crave,  as  the  dearest  object 
of  his  life,  recognition  of  his  past  services  by  promotion 
to  a  higher  grade.  That  is  his  one  reward  for  all  he  may 
have  done.  But  the  desire  for  higher  command,  greater 
power,  and  more  unrestrained  authority  exhibits  ambi 
tion  inconsistent  with  due  military  subordination  and 
good  citizenship.  It  is  a  dangerous  ambition  in  a  re- 


THE  LAW  FIXING  EETIEEMENT  FOE  AGE 

public.  The  highest  examples  of  patriotism  ever  shown 
in  this  country  have  been  in  the  voluntary  surrender  of 
power  into  the  hands  of  the  people  or  of  their  chosen 
representatives,  not  in  efforts  to  increase  or  prolong  that 
power.  Following  those  highest  examples,  in  the  year 
1882  all  the  senior  officers  of  the  army,  including  Sher 
man,  Sheridan,  and  Hancock,  united  in  advocating  the 
measure  then  pending  in  Congress,  to  fix  a  limit  of  age 
when  every  officer  should  relinquish  command  and  return 
to  the  ranks  of  private  citizenship.  In  doing  so,  nearly 
all  of  those  seniors,  especially  Hancock,  relinquished  for 
ever  all  hope  of  rising  to  the  command  of  the  army. 
My  case  was  not  so  strong  as  that  of  Hancock,  because  I 
was  younger.  But  Sheridan  was  only  six  months  older 
than  I,  and  his  "  expectation  of  life  "  was  far  beyond  the 
time  when  I  should  become  sixty-four  years  old.  Hence 
I  cheerfully  relinquished  in  1882  any  reasonable  ambi 
tion  I  may  ever  have  had  to  command  the  army.  My 
ultimate  succession  to  that  command  in  1888  was,  like  all 
other  important  events  in  my  personal  career,  unsought 
and  unexpected.  Hence  whatever  I  did  from  1888  to  1895 
was  only  a  little  "  extra  duty,"  and  I  have  had  no  reason 
to  find  fault  on  account  of  the  "  extra-duty  pay  "  which  I 
received,  though  none  of  it  was  in  money.  I  am  inclined 
to  think  it  a  pretty  good  rule  for  a  soldier  to  wait  until 
he  is  "detailed,"  and  not  to  try  to  put  himself  "on  guard." 
I  do  not  know  any  case  in  American  history  where  the 
opposite  course  has  not  resulted  in  irretrievable  injury 
to  him  who  adopted  it.  Temporary  success  in  gaining 
high  position,  before  education  and  experience  have  given 
the  necessary  qualifications,  necessarily  results  finally  in 
failure ;  while  slower  advancement,  giving  full  opportuni 
ties  for  education  and  experience  in  the  duties  of  each 
grade,  insures  full  qualification  for  the  next  higher. 
American  history  is  full  of  such  examples,  as  it  is — alas ! 
too  truly  —  of  those  cases  where  the  highest  qualifica- 


31 


482  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

tions  and  most  becoming  modesty  have  not  met  with 
any  appropriate  advancement  or  other  recognition. 

In  the  official  intercourse  of  a  soldier  with  the  great 
departments  of  government,  he  often  finds  useful  those 
maxims  which  have  served  him  as  commander  of  an 
army  in  the  field.  The  most  important  of  these  is,  not 
to  enter  a  combat  where  he  is  sure  to  be  beaten,  as,  for  in 
stance,  where  his  opponent  is  the  judge  who  is  to  decide 
the  issue.  As  in  war,  so  in  administration,  battle  once 
joined,  questions  of  right  become  obscured.  The  most 
powerful  guns  and  battalions  are  sure  to  win.  It  is  much 
wiser  to  seek  an  ally  who  carries  a  heavier  armament. 
Some  subordinates  of  mine  —  clerks  and  messengers,  I 
believe — were  once  required  to  refund  some  money  which 
had  been  paid  them  on  my  interpretation  of  the  law  and 
regulations.  My  careful  explanation  of  the  ground  of 
my  action  was  promptly  disapproved.  I  then  requested 
that  the  money  be  charged  to  me  and  the  whole  matter 
referred  to  Congress,  in  reply  to  which  request  I  was  in 
formed  that  the  accounts  had  been  settled.  In  another 
case  I  requested  that  my  appeal  from  adverse  action  be 
submitted  to  President  Grant,  who  had  had  occasion  to 
know  something  about  me.  I  was  requested  by  tele 
graph,  in  cipher,  to  withdraw  that  appeal,  as  it  was  liable 
to  cause  trouble.  Being  a  lover  of  peace  rather  than  war, 
I  complied.  In  that  perhaps  I  made  a  mistake.  If  I  had 
adhered  to  my  appeal,  it  might  have  saved  a  public  im 
peachment.  Again,  I  was  called  upon  by  one  of  the 
Treasury  bureaus  to  refund  some  money  which  had  been 
paid  me  for  mileage  by  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  on 
the  alleged  ground  that  the  Secretary  could  not  lawfully 
give  me  such  an  order.  I  referred  the  matter  to  the  Sec 
retary,  as  one  that  did  not  concern  me  personally,  but 
which  involved  the  dignity  of  the  head  of  the  War  De 
partment  as  compared  with  that  of  a  subordinate  bureau 
of  another  department.  The  Treasury  official  soon  noti- 


AN  ANECDOTE  OF  GENERAL  GRANT        433 

fied  me  that  the  account  had  been  allowed.  To  illustrate 
the  application  of  the  same  principle  under  opposite  con 
ditions,  I  must  relate  the  story  told  of  President  Grant. 
When  informed  by  a  Treasury  officer  that  he  could  not 
find  any  law  to  justify  what  the  President  had  desired  to 
be  done,  he  replied,  "  Then  I  will  see  if  I  can  find  a 
Treasury  officer  who  can  find  that  law."  Of  course  no 
change  in  the  incumbent  of  that  office  proved  to  be  neces 
sary.  I  have  thought  in  several  cases  in  later  years 
that  Grant's  military  method  might  have  been  tried  to 
advantage. 

"  Be  ye  wise  as  a  serpent  and  harmless  as  a  dove "  is 
the  only  rule  of  action  I  have  ever  heard  of  that  can  steer 
a  soldier  clear  of  trouble  with  the  civil  powers  of  this 
great  republic.  Yet  he  must  sometimes,  when  his  honor 
or  the  rights  of  his  subordinates  are  involved,  make  the 
fight,  though  he  knows  he  must  be  beaten.  A  soldier 
must  then  stand  by  his  guns  as  long  as  he  can,  and  it  has 
happened  that  such  a  fight,  apparently  hopeless  at  the 
time,  has  given  victory  to  a  future  generation. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

PRESIDENT  OF  THE  NEW  BOARD  OF  ORDNANCE  AND  FORTI 
FICATION —  USEFULNESS  OF  THE  BOARD  —  TROUBLES 
WITH  THE  SIOUX  INDIANS  IN  1890-91  —  SUCCESS  OF 
THE  PLAN  TO  EMPLOY  INDIANS  AS  SOLDIERS  —  MAR 
RIAGE  TO  MISS  KILBOURNE  —  THE  DIFFICULTY  WITH 
CHILE  IN  1892. 

EVEN  as  late  as  the  year  1882,  very  high  military  au 
thority  in  this  country  advocated  with  great  earnest 
ness  the  proposition  that  our  old  brick  and  stone  forts, with 
their  smooth-bore  guns,  could  make  a  successful  defense 
against  a  modern  iron-clad  fleet !  At  the  same  time,  and 
even  much  later,  high  naval  authority  maintained  that  the 
United  States  navy  should  be  relied  upon  for  the  defense 
of  our  many  thousands  of  miles  of  sea-coast !  In  view  of 
such  counsel,  it  does  not  seem  strange  that  Congress,  af 
ter  the  old  ships  had  nearly  all  rotted  away,  began  to 
give  some  attention  to  a  new  navy,  but  thought  little  or 
nothing  of  land  defenses.  The  old  brick  and  stone  para 
pets  and  the  cast-iron  guns  were  still  there ;  none  of  them 
had  become  rotten,  though  the  wooden  carriages  had  gone 
to  decay,  and  the  guns  were  lying  on  the  ground !  Yet, 
after  a  long  dream  of  security,  the  Great  National  Council 
announced  the  decision  that  something  ought  probably  to 
be  done  for  sea-coast  defense.  Provision  was  made  by 
law  for  a  very  high  board,  with  the  Secretary  of  War 
presiding,  to  report  to  Congress  what  was  required  —  a 
thing  which,  if  Congress  had  only  known  it,  the  Engineer 
Bureau  of  the  War  Department  could  have  reported  just 


484 


BOARD  OF  ORDNANCE  AND  FORTIFICATION  435 

as  well  in  far  less  time.  But  at  length  a  very  able  report 
was  submitted,  which  inspired  the  confidence  of  Congress. 

In  the  meantime  there  had  arisen  a  condition  which 
can  best  be  expressed  as  "want  of  confidence"  in  the 
chief  of  the  Ordnance  Department  of  the  army  on  the 
part  of  committees  of  Congress.  From  this  it  resulted 
that  no  appropriations  were  made  for  several  years  for 
any  new  armament,  and  hence  none  for  fortifications. 
Thus  by  a  trifle  were  the  wheels  of  a  great  government 
blocked  for  a  long  time !  Yet  that  government  still  sur 
vives  !  Finally,  in  the  year  1888  an  act  was  passed  cre 
ating  a  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  of  which 
the  commanding  general  of  the  army  should  be  presi 
dent,  and  appropriating  quite  a  large  sum  of  money  to  be 
expended,  under  the  direct  supervision  of  that  board,  to 
commence  the  work  of  fortification  and  armament  of  the 
sea-coast.  After  very  careful  examination  and  full  con 
sideration  and  discussion,  the  board  adopted  the  plans 
prepared  by  the  Bureaus  of  Engineering  and  Ordnance, 
and  the  work  was  begun  and  carried  forward  substan 
tially  the  same  as  if  the  expenditure  of  the  appropriation 
had  been  intrusted  to  the  two  bureaus  concerned  and  the 
Secretary  of  War. 

The  board  did  perform,  and  still  continues  to  perform, 
a  very  important  and  essential  duty,  and  one  which  cannot 
be  satisfactorily  intrusted  to  any  one  man,  namely,  that 
of  deciding  the  delicate  and  difficult  questions  constantly 
arising  in  respect  to  the  practical  utility  and  economy  of 
new  inventions  having  reference  to  works  of  defense  or 
of  attack.  But  these  questions  had  no  immediate  bearing 
whatever  upon  the  all-important  problem  of  the  day — to 
place  the  sea-coasts  of  the  United  States  in  a  satisfactory 
state  of  defense  according  to  the  best  scientific  methods 
then  known  to  the  world.  And  that  problem  had  already 
been  solved,  in  all  respects  save  one,  namely,  how  to  get 
out  of  Congress  the  necessary  money  to  do  the  work! 


486  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Grenius  will  never  cease  to  invent  something  better.  If 
we  wait  for  the  best,  the  next  war  will  be  over  long  be 
fore  we  shall  begin  to  prepare  for  it.  All  great  military 
nations  had  been  engaged  for  many  years  in  elaborate 
and  costly  experiments,  to  develop  the  best  possible 
means  of  attack  and  defense,  and  our  Engineer  and 
Ordnance  departments  had  not  failed  to  profit  thereby 
to  the  fullest  extent.  They  were  ready,  without  any 
such  costly  experiments,  to  make  our  defenses  as  good 
as  any  in  the  world.  Yet  that  work  of  so  vital  im 
portance  must  be  delayed  until  American  genius  could 
also  be  assured  of  a  chance,  at  government  expense,  of 
developing  something  better  than  anybody  else  in  the 
world  had  done!  An  end  was  finally,  in  1888,  put  to 
that  dangerous  delay  by  the  device,  so  happily  invented 
by  somebody  in  Congress,  of  a  Board  of  Ordnance  and 
Fortification. 

The  board  has  also  served,  and  will  doubtless  continue 
to  serve,  another  very  important  purpose.  It  brings  to 
gether,  in  close  consideration  and  discussion  of  all  details 
of  the  system  of  national  defense,  representative  officers 
of  the  engineers,  the  ordnance,  and  the  artillery,  to 
gether  with  a  representative  civilian  who  has  become,  by 
service  in  Congress,  far  better  able  than  any  other  mem 
ber  to  insure  that  perfect  understanding  between  the 
board  and  the  committees  of  Congress  which  is  essential 
to  harmonious  action.  Above  all,  it  has  given  to  the 
commanding  general  an  opportunity  to  become  perfectly 
familiar  with  all  the  details  of  the  coast  defenses,  and  to 
exert  a  legitimate  influence  in  making  preparations  for 
war,  which  must  be  of  vital  importance  to  him  and  to 
the  country  when  he  has  to  bear  the  great  responsibility 
of  command.  I  used  to  say  that  it  would  not  be  just  to 
me  to  deprive  me  of  such  opportunities  for  education, 
and  I  doubt  not  all  my  successors  will  share  that  feeling. 
Thus,  what  may  prove  to  be  of  the  greatest  benefit  to 


USEFULNESS  OF  THE  BOARD  487 

the  military  service  has  finally  come  out  of  that  evil  of 
"  want  of  confidence  "  in  an  ordnance  chief. 

When  in  command  of  the  Division  of  the  Atlantic, 
in  1886-7,  I  made  a  careful  estimate  of  the  aggregate 
strength  of  the  war  garrisons  required  for  the  fortifi 
cations  and  armament  recommended  by  the  Endicott 
board,  and  of  the  peace  garrisons  which  would  be  abso 
lutely  required  for  the  care  of  the  new  works  and  for  the 
instruction  of  the  militia  artillery  reserves.  It  was  found 
that  the  addition  of  two  regiments  to  the  present  artil 
lery  strength  of  the  army  would  provide  the  requisite 
force.  Hence  a  measure  was  formulated  and  submitted 
to  Congress  to  convert  the  present  five  regiments  into 
seven,  with  some  proportionate  reduction  in  the  number 
of  officers,  intended  to  promote  efficiency  and  economy. 
That  measure  has  appeared  to  meet  with  the  approval  of 
nearly  aU  concerned,  but  is  still  pending  in  Congress.  It 
is  probably  the  most  important  military  measure  now 
awaiting  favorable  action.  The  measure  which  accom 
panies  it  for  the  reorganization  of  the  infantry,  though 
not  of  so  pressing  necessity,  is  based  upon  sound  mili 
tary  principles,  and  is  worthy  of  prompt  and  favorable 
action. 

The  first  introduction  of  the  policy  of  confining  the 
warlike  tribes  of  Indians  upon  very  restricted  reser 
vations  necessarily  caused  great  discontent,  especially 
among  the  young  men,  who  were  thus  cut  off  from  the 
sports  of  the  chase  and  the  still  greater  sport  of  occa 
sional  forays  into  frontier  settlements,  which  were  the 
only  means  known  in  Indian  custom  by  which  a  young 
warrior  could  gain  a  name  and  a  position  of  honor  in  his 
tribe.  Either  through  too  limited  appropriations  or  bad 
management,  or  both,  the  provisions  furnished  for  the 
support  of  the  Indians,  in  lieu  of  those  to  which  they 
had  been  accustomed,  proved  inadequate.  This  caused 
the  spirit  of  discontent  to  increase  and  to  become  general 


488         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

among  all  ages.  The  natural  result  was  such  a  threat  of 
war  from  the  great  Sioux  nation  in  the  winter  of  1890-91 
as  to  necessitate  the  concentration  of  quite  a  large  army 
to  meet  the  danger  of  a  general  outbreak.  In  the  course 
of  military  operations,  accidents  rather  than  design  on 
either  side  occasioned  some  serious  collisions  between 
the  troops  and  the  Indians,  especially  at  Wounded  Knee, 
resulting  in  desperate  conflict  and  in  riiuch  loss  of  life. 
But  by  very  careful  management  on  the  part  of  the 
commanding  general  in  the  field,  Major-General  Miles,  a 
general  conflict  was  averted,  and  the  Sioux  made  their 
submission.  They  had  had  no  general  intention  to  go  to 
war,  if  they  could  avoid  it  without  starvation.  After  a 
large  sum  of  money  had  been  expended  by  the  War 
Department  in  this  way,  the  deficiencies  in  food  were 
supplied  at  about  the  same  cost  as  would,  if  made  in 
advance,  have  removed  the  cause  of  war.  The  Indians 
gained  their  point  of  getting  as  much  food  as  they 
needed,  and  the  War  Department  paid  the  extra  bills, 
but  out  of  the  same  public  treasury  which  has  so  often 
been  bled  in  that  way. 

It  was  quite  beyond  the  power  of  the  War  Department 
to  guard  against  a  recurrence  of  that  greatest  danger  of 
Indian  wars  —  starvation  of  the  Indians.  But  long  ex 
perience  and  accurate  knowledge  of  Indian  character 
had  suggested  a  method  by  which  the  other  cause  of 
discontent  among  the  young  Indian  warriors  might 
be,  at  least  in  a  great  measure,  removed.  That  was 
by  providing  a  legitimate  method  by  which  their  ir 
repressible  love  of  military  life  and  exploits  might  be 
largely  gratified,  and,  at  the  same  time,  those  ambitious 
young  men  transferred  from  the  ranks  of  more  or  less 
probable  savage  enemies  to  the  ranks  of  friends  and 
practically  civilized  allies.  Fortunately,  the  strongest 
trait  of  the  Indian  character,  namely,  fidelity  to  the 
war  chief,  lent  itself  to  this  project.  Long  experience 


TROUBLES  WITH  THE  SIOUX  INDIANS  IN  1890-91        439 

had  shown  the  existence  of  this  Indian  trait.  In  only 
one  solitary  instance  had  the  Indian  scouts  so  long  em 
ployed  by  the  army  ever  proved  unfaithful,  though 
often  employed  in  hostilities  against  their  own  tribes. 
Hence,  if  the  ardent  young  warriors  could  be  induced 
to  enlist  for  three  years  in  the  army,  they  would,  at  least 
for  that  time,  be  converted  from  enemies  into  allies,  even 
against  such  of  their  own  tribes  as  might  refuse  to  en 
list.  Of  course  the  army  must  suffer  somewhat,  in  its 
effective  strength  for  all  purposes,  during  this  experi 
ment  ;  for  it  is  evident  that  a  company  or  troop  of  In 
dians  would  not  be  quite  as  valuable  for  general  service 
as  the  same  number  of  white  men.  Yet  the  transfer  of  a 
few  hundred  of  the  best  Sioux  warriors  from  the  Sioux 
side  to  our  side  would  much  more  than  compensate  for 
the  loss  of  the  same  number  of  white  troops.  The  result 
of  that  experiment  seemed  to  be  entirely  satisfactory. 
At  all  events,  there  has  been  no  great  Indian  war,  nor 
any  threat  of  one,  since  that  experiment  was  begun.  It 
has  served  to  tide  over  the  time  during  which  the  young 
men,  who  had  from  earliest  childhood  listened  to  stories 
of  the  Ouster  massacre  and  other  great  Indian  achieve 
ments,  were  undergoing  transformation  from  the  life 
and  character  of  savage  warriors  to  those  of  civilized 
husbandmen,  under  the  system  of  allotments  in  sever- 
alty.  When  the  short  warlike  part  of  the  life  of  one 
generation  is  past,  the  danger  will  no  longer  exist. 

In  June,  1891,  at  Keokuk,  Iowa,  I  married  Miss  Geor 
gia  Kilbourne,  daughter  of  Mrs.  George  E.  Kilbourne  of 
that  city.  Then  a  host  of  old  soldiers  of  the  Union 
army  reassembled  to  greet  their  comrade. 

In  1892  this  country  seemed  on  the  verge  of  war  with 
the  little  republic  of  Chile.  So  confident  were  some  offi 
cials  of  the  administration  that  war  was  inevitable,  that 
I  was  asked  to  make  an  estimate  of  the  military  force 
which  would  be  necessary  to  occupy  and  hold  a  vital 


490  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

point  in  Chilean  territory  until  the  demands  of  the 
United  States  were  complied  with.  It  was  assumed,  of 
course,  that  the  navy  could  easily  do  all  the  rest.  Pend 
ing  the  consideration  of  this  subject,  so  disagreeable  to 
me,  I  had  a  dream  which  I  repeated  at  the  time  to  a  few 
intimate  friends.  I  saw  in  the  public  street  a  man  hold 
ing  a  mangy-looking  dog  by  the  neck,  and  beating 
him  with  a  great  club,  while  a  crowd  of  people  assem 
bled  to  witness  the  "sport."  Some  one  asked  the  man 
why  he  was  beating  the  poor  dog.  He  replied:  "Oh, 
just  to  make  him  yelp."  But  the  dog  did  not  "yelp." 
He  bore  his  cruel  punishment  without  a  whine.  Then 
he,  was  transformed  into  a  splendid  animal,  one  of  the 
noblest  of  his  species,  and  the  entire  crowd  of  bystanders, 
with  one  accord,  rushed  in  and  compelled  the  man  to 
desist  from  beating  him. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII 

SERVICES    OF    THE    ARMY    DURING    THE    LABOR    STRIKES    OF 
1894  —  MILITARY    CONTROL    OF   THE    PACIFIC    RAILWAYS 

—  UNITED   STATES   TROOPS   IN   THE   CITY  OF   CHICAGO  — 
ORDERS    SENT    TO    GENERAL    MILES,    AND    HIS    REPORTS 

—  THE    PROCLAMATION    OF    THE    PRESIDENT  —  INSTRUC 
TIONS    TO    GOVERN    THE    TROOPS    IN    DEALING    WITH    A 
MOB  —  THE    DUTIES    OF   THE   MILITARY  MISUNDERSTOOD 

—  ORDERS     OF     THE     PRESIDENT     IN     REGARD     TO     THE 
PACIFIC  RAILWAYS. 

IN  1894  the  vast  development  of  railroad  communica 
tion  between  the  Mississippi  valley  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean,  and  the  similar  building  of  new  cities  and  found 
ing  of  industrial  enterprises  in  the  region  between  the 
Rocky  Mountains  and  the  Pacific,  both  in  anticipation  of 
the  future  development  of  the  country  rather  than  in  re 
sponse  to  any  demand  then  existing,  having  been  sub 
stantially  completed,  or  suspended  for  an  indefinite  time, 
a  large  amount  of  capital  so  invested  was  found  for  the 
time  unproductive,  and  a  great  number  of  laborers  were 
left  in  the  Pacific  States  without  any  possible  employ 
ment.  The  great  majority  of  these  laborers  were,  as 
usual,  without  any  accumulated  means  to  pay  their 
transportation  to  any  other  part  of  the  country,  and 
hence  were  left  to  drift  as  they  might  toward  the  East, 
subsisting  by  whatever  means  they  could  find  during 
their  long  tramp  of  many  hundreds  of  miles.  Similar 
and  other  causes  had  produced  at  the  same  time  in 
dustrial  depression  throughout  the  country,  so  that  the 

491 


492  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

unfortunate  laborers  drifting  eastward  were  only  an  ad 
ditional  burden  upon  communities  already  overloaded 
with  unemployed  labor.  Thus  the  borrowing  of  foreign 
capital  to  put  into  unprofitable  investments,  and  the 
employment  of  great  numbers  of  laborers  in  making  pre 
mature  developments,  met  with  the  consequences  which 
are  sure  to  follow  disregard  of  natural  laws.  The  man 
agement  of  the  Pacific  railroads  did  not  appear  to  appre 
ciate  the  wisdom  of  mitigating,  so  far  as  was  in  their 
power,  the  evil  which  had  resulted  from  their  own  policy, 
by  giving  free  transportation  to  the  laborers  who  had 
been  stranded  on  the  Pacific  coast.  Hence  all  the  trans 
continental  roads  were  soon  blocked  by  lawless  seizures 
of  trains,  and  suffered  losses  far  greater  than  they  saved 
in  transportation.  Indeed,  the  requisite  transportation 
of  destitute  laborers  eastward  would  have  cost  the  roads 
practically  nothing,  while  their  losses  resulting  from  not 
providing  it  were  very  great.  Every  possible  effort  was 
made  for  a  long  time  to  deal  effectively  with  this  evil  by 
the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings;  but  such 
methods  proved  entirely  inadequate.  The  government 
was  finally  compelled,  in  consequence  of  the  almost 
total  interruption  of  interstate  commerce  and  of  the 
transportation  of  the  United  States  mails  and  troops, 
to  assume  military  control  along  the  lines  of  all  the 
Pacific  roads,  and  direct  the  department  commanders 
to  restore  and  maintain,  by  military  force,  traffic  and 
transportation  over  those  roads. 

For  some  time  these  lawless  acts  did  not  seem  to  re 
sult  from  any  general  organization.  But  they  gradually 
developed  into  the  formidable  character  of  a  wide-spread 
conspiracy  and  combination,  with  recognized  general 
leaders,  to  obstruct  and  prevent  the  due  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States  respecting  transportation  and 
interstate  commerce.  The  principal  center  of  this  con 
spiracy,  and  by  far  the  most  formidable  combination, 


MILITARY  CONTROL  OF  THE  PACIFIC  RAILWAYS       493 

was  in  Chicago,  where  the  greatest  material  interests, 
both  public  and  private,  were  at  stake,  though  many 
other  important  railroad  centers  and  many  thousand 
miles  of  road  were  involved.  There  the  insurrection 
was  so  great  in  numbers  and  so  violent  in  its  acts  as 
to  require  the  most  prompt  and  energetic  action  of  a 
very  large  force  to  suppress  disorder,  protect  property, 
and  execute  the  laws.  The  city  police  were  utterly  pow 
erless  in  such  an  emergency,  and  deputy  United  States 
marshals,  though  employed  without  limit  as  to  numbers, 
were  no  more  effective.  The  State  militia  were  not  called 
out  in  time  to  meet  the  emergency.  Hence  nothing  re 
mained  but  for  the  National  Government  to  exercise  the 
military  power  conferred  upon  it  by  the  Constitution  and 
laws,  so  far  as  the  same  were  applicable.1  Fortunately,  the 
acts  of  Congress  passed  in  pursuance  of  the  Constitu 
tion,  although  never  before  made  effective  in  a  similar 
case,  were  found  to  give  ample  authority  for  the  action 
then  required.  Fortunately,  also,  the  wise  foresight  of 
the  government  in  establishing  a  large  military  post  at 
Fort  Sheridan,  near  Chicago,  made  a  regiment  of  infan 
try,  a  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  a  battery  of  artillery  im 
mediately  available  for  service  in  that  city.  But,  unfor 
tunately,  the  commanding  general  of  that  department 
was  absent  from  his  command,  where  superior  military 
capacity  was  so  much  needed  at  that  time.  Although 
the  troops  west  of  the  Mississippi  had  been  engaged  for 
a  long  time,  under  the  President's  orders,  in  overcoming 
the  unlawful  obstruction  of  railroad  traffic  above  re 
ferred  to,  the  general  appears  not  to  have  anticipated 
any  emergency  which  would  in  his  judgment  require  or 
justify  such  use  of  the  troops  in  his  own  department, 
and  hence  remained  in  the  Eastern  States,  where  he  had 
gone  some  time  before.  From  this  it  resulted  that  when 
the  troops  at  Fort  Sheridan  were  ordered  into  Chicago, 

l  See  the  report  of  Attorney-General  Olney,  December  1,  1894,  p.  31. 


494  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

the  execution  of  the  order  devolved  on  subordinate  offi 
cers,  and  the  troops  were  so  dispersed  as  to  be  unable  to 
act  with  the  necessary  effect. 

It  having  become  apparent  that  the  services  of  troops 
would  probably  be  required  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  and 
in  anticipation  of  orders  from  the  President,  instructions 
were  telegraphed  on  July  2  to  the  commanding  general 
of  the  Department  of  the  Missouri  to  make  preparations 
to  move  the  garrison  of  Fort  Sheridan  to  the  Lake  Front 
Park  in  the  city.  The  reply  of  his  staff-officer,  Colonel 
Martin,  showed  that  the  department  commander,  Major- 
General  Miles,  was  not  in  Chicago,  and  the  adjutant- 
general  of  the  army  did  not  know  where  he  was,  but, 
after  several  inquiries  by  telegraph,  learned  that  the  gen 
eral  had  started  that  afternoon  from  Long  Island  for 
"Washington  instead  of  for  Chicago.  The  next  day  (July 
3),  in  the  President's  room  at  the  Executive  Mansion,  in 
reply  to  my  suggestion  that  his  presence  was  needed 
with  his  command,  General  Miles  said  he  was  subject  to 
orders,  but  that  in  his  opinion  the  United  States  troops 
ought  not  to  be  employed  in  the  city  of  Chicago  at  that 
time.  No  reply  was  made  by  the  President  or  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  who  was  also  present,  to  that  expression  of 
opinion,  but  the  President  approved  my  further  sugges 
tion  that  General  Miles  should  return  at  once  to  his  com 
mand.  The  general  started  by  the  first  train,  but  could 
not  reach  Chicago  in  time  to  meet  the  emergency.  It 
became  necessary  in  the  judgment  of  the  President  to 
order  the  Fort  Sheridan  garrison  into  the  city  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  same  day  (July  3). 

The  instructions  given  the  day  before  about  moving 
the  troops  to  Lake  Front  Park  were  not  complied  with. 
From  that  point  they  could  most  readily  have  protected 
the  sub-treasury,  custom-house,  post-office,  and  other 
United  States  property,  and  also  have  acted  in  a  for 
midable  body  at  any  other  point  where  their  services 


UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  IN  THE  CITY  OF  CHICAGO    495 

might  properly  have  been  required.  But  instead  of  that, 
the  troops  were  so  dispersed  that  they  could  not  act  with 
much  effect  anywhere,  and  could  give  no  protection 
whatever  to  the  vast  amount  of  United  States  property 
exposed  to  destruction.  This  error  appears  to  have  re 
sulted  in  some  measure  from  the  too  great  deference 
paid  by  commanding  officers  to  the  advice  or  wishes  of 
civil  officers  to  whom  they  were  referred  for  information, 
and  much  more  from  lack  of  knowledge  of  the  lawful 
relations  existing  between  the  national  troops  and  the 
civil  authorities  in  this  country,  although  those  relations 
had  been  plainly  defined  in  an  order  dated  May  25, 
quoted  below.  Like  ignorance  in  respect  to  the  proper 
tactical  methods  of  dealing  with  insurrection  against  the 
authority  of  the  United  States  caused  halting  and  in 
effective  action  of  the  troops.  To  correct  this  error  and 
make  known  to  all  the  rules  which  must  govern  United 
States  troops  in  all  like  emergencies,  the  subjoined  order, 
dated  July  9,  was  issued.  The  extracts  from  correspon 
dence  quoted  below  indicate  the  nature  of  the  errors 
above  referred  to,  and  their  correction  some  time  after 
the  arrival  of  General  Miles  in  Chicago. 

The  garrison  of  Fort  Sheridan  proved  sufficient,  not 
withstanding  the  first  faulty  disposition  and  action  of  the 
troops,  to  hold  the  mob  in  check  until  reinforcements  ar 
rived  from  distant  stations  and  the  State  troops  were 
brought  into  effective  action.  Finally,  the  proclamation 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  quoted  below,  which 
was  issued  at  the  moment  when  ample  military  forces  had 
been  placed  in  position  to  enforce  his  constitutional  man 
dates,  very  quickly  terminated  all  forcible  resistance  to 
the  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  The  same 
result,  though  perhaps  with  greater  destruction  of  life 
and  far  less  destruction  of  property,  would  probably  have 
been  accomplished  in  a  single  day  by  the  Fort  Sheridan 
garrison  alone,  acting  in  one  compact  body,  according  to 


496  FOKTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

the  tactics  prescribed  for  such  service.  If  a  like  occasion 
ever  again  occurs,  the  action  of  the  troops  will  doubtless 
be  governed  by  such  tactics.  Delay  is  too  dangerous  in 
such  cases. 

(Telegram.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  2,  1894. 

To  the  Commanding  General,   Department  of   the  Missouri, 

Chicago,  Illinois. 

You  will  please  make  all  necessary  arrangements,  confiden 
tially,  for  the  transportation  of  the  entire  garrison  of  Fort  Sher 
idan —  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  —  to  the  Lake  Front 
Park  in  the  city  of  Chicago.  To  avoid  possible  interrup 
tion  of  the  movement  by  rail  and  by  marching  through  a  part 
of  the  city,  it  may  be  advisable  to  bring  them  by  steamboat. 
Please  consider  this  matter,  and  have  the  arrangements  per 
fected  without  delay.  You  may  expect  orders  at  any  time  for 
the  movement.  Acknowledge  receipt,  and  report  in  what  man 
ner  the  movement  is  to  be  made. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General  Commanding. 

(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS,  July  2,  1894. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Confidential  despatch  this  date  received  at  three-thirty  P.M. 
Arrangements  can  be  made  to  bring  troops  from  Sheridan  to 
Lake  Front  Park  by  steamer,  but  there  would  be  difficulty  in  dis 
embarking  them  there,  as  the  Van  Buren  street  viaduct  has  been 
torn  down ;  and,  besides,  transportation  from  barracks  to  pier 
at  Sheridan  would  necessarily  be  slow.  They  can  be  brought 
from  Sheridan  to  Lake  Front  direct  by  rail,  and  disembark  on 
grounds,  thus  avoiding  marching  through  city.  Suggest  the 
latter  plan  as  best,  especially  as  rail  transportation  is  now  at  the 
post  sufficient  to  bring  the  whole  command — infantry,  artillery, 
and  cavalry— as  soon  as  they  can  be  loaded  on  cars  at  that  point. 

MARTIN,  Asst.  Adjt.-Genl. 
(in  absence  of  Major-Genl.  Comdg.). 


UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  IN  THE  CITY  OF  CHICAGO    497 
(Telegram.) 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  3, 1894,  four  o'clock  p.  M. 

To  MARTIN,  Adjutant-General,  Hdqrs.  Dept.  of  the  Missouri, 

Chicago,  Ills. 

It  having  become  impracticable,  in  the  judgment  of  the  Presi 
dent,  to  enforce,  by  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  you  will  direct  Colonel  Crof ton  to  move 
his  entire  command  at  once  to  the  city  of  Chicago,  leaving  the 
necessary  guard  at  Fort  Sheridan,  there  to  execute  the  orders  and 
processes  of  the  United  States  Court,  to  prevent  the  obstruction 
of  the  United  States  mails,  and  generally  to  enforce  the  faithful 
execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States.  He  will  confer  with 
the  United  States  marshal,  the  United  States  district  attorney, 
and  Edwin  Walker,  special  counsel.  Acknowledge  receipt,  and 
report  action  promptly. 

By  order  of  the  President : 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 


(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  4,  1894. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

At  ten-fifteen  this  morning  Colonel  Crofton  reports  his  com 
mand  in  the  city;  located,  infantry  at  Blue  Island  and  Grand 
Crossing,  cavalry  and  artillery  at  stock-yards ;  cannot  learn  that 
anything  definite  has  been  accomplished,  but  there  has  been  no 
active  trouble.  People  appear  to  feel  easier  since  arrival  of 
troops.  General  Miles  is  expected  to  arrive  in  city  within  an 
hour  or  at  twelve. 

MARTIN,  Asst.  Adjt.-Genl. 


(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  4,  1894. 
Adjt.  Genl.  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 
Returned  at  eleven-thirty  this  morning. 

MILES,  Maj.-Genl.  Commanding. 


498  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  4,  1894. 
AdjutaDt-G-eneral  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Cavalry  and  artillery  moving  to  the  stock-yards  were  delayed 
by  obstructions  placed  upon  the  track,  also  cars  being  over 
turned  on  track  and  the  threatening  mob  in  the  vicinity.  A 
report  is  received  that  a  mob  of  about  two  thousand  men  has 
gathered  near  Blue  Island  and  threatened  to  take  that  place  at 
four  o'clock  this  afternoon.  It  is  occupied  by  four  companies 
of  infantry.  At  the  request  of  U.  S.  Marshal  Arnold,  troops 
had  been  located  at  Blue  Island,  the  stock-yards,  and  the  cross 
ing  at  Forty-seventh  street  of  the  Lake  Shore  and  Rock  Island 
railroads  before  my  arrival,  and  others  are  desired  at  South 
Chicago.  I  have  directed  all  commanding  officers  not  to  allow 
crowds  or  mobs  to  congregate  about  the  commands  in  a  mena 
cing  or  threatening  manner,  and  to  keep  out  pickets  and  guards  j 
and,  after  due  warning,  if  the  mobs  approach  the  commands  in 
a  threatening  manner,  they  must  be  dispersed,  even  if  firearms 
have  to  be  used.  A  large  number  of  men  in  the  city  are  wear 
ing  white  ribbon,  the  color  ordered  by  Debs  to  indicate  their 
allegiance  to  his  orders.  Owing  to  the  feeling  of  feverish  ex 
citement  in  the  city,  and  the  large  number  of  unoccupied,  the 
condition  to-day  is  more  critical  than  at  any  other  time.  Most 
of  the  roads  are  moving  mail  and  passenger  trains.  All  of  the 
roads  will  attempt  to  move  their  trains  to-morrow  morning. 
Sufficient  number  of  men  are  available  and  anxious  to  work  to 
take  the  place  of  all  the  strikers,  provided  proper  protection  can 
be  given  them.  Seven  roads  have  moved  a  few  cars  of  perish 
able  freight.  All  the  troops  from  Sheridan  are  occupied,  and  I 
renew  my  recommendation  that  that  garrison  be  very  largely 
increased  at  once  to  meet  any  emergency  that  may  arise.  The 
effect  of  moving  troops  through  the  country,  especially  from 
Kansas  to  Chicago,  at  this  time  would  be  desirable. 

NELSON  A.  MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 

Additional  troops  were  concentrated  in  Chicago  as 
rapidly  as  they  could  be  transported,  until  the  force 
there  aggregated  about  two  thousand  men.  More  were 
in  readiness  to  move  if  necessary. 


ORDERS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  MILES,  AND  HIS  REPORTS     499 
(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  5,  1894. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

Owing  to  the  excellent  discipline  and  great  forbearance  of 
officers  and  men,  serious  hostilities  were  avoided  yesterday; 
several  small  fights  and  affrays  occurred.  Matters  look  more 
favorable  to-day,  although  interference  exists  on  five  roads. 
All  railroads  are  endeavoring  to  move  freight  and  mail  trains. 

MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 

(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  5,  1894. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

The  mob  of  several  thousand  are  moving  east  along  Rock 
Island  nearer  center  of  city,  overturning  cars,  burning  station- 
houses,  and  destroying  property.  There  is  a  report  that  the  mob 
intend  sacking  some  of  the  principal  buildings  near  Rookery 
Building  to-night.  The  riot  will  soon  embrace  all  the  criminals 
of  the  city  and  vicinity.  Unless  very  positive  measures  are 
taken,  the  riot  will  be  beyond  the  control  of  any  small  force. 
Has  the  government  any  additional  instructions? 

NELSON  A.  MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 

(Telegram  —  Confidential.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  5,  1894. 
Adjutant-General  U.  S.  Army,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

While  most  of  the  roads  are  moving  passenger  and  mail  trains, 
nearly  all  the  freight-trains  are  interfered  with,  and  but  very 
few  are  moving.  This  morning  a  mob  of  over  two  thousand 
men  gathered  at  the  stock-yards,  crowded  among  the  troops, 
obstructed  the  movement  of  trains,  knocked  down  a  railroad 
official,  and  overturned  some  twenty  freight-cars  on  the  track, 
which  obstructs  all  freight  and  passenger  traffic  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  stock-yards,  and  thereby  the  transit  of  meat-trains  to 
different  parts  of  the  country,  as  well  as  the  passenger  traffic 
of  the  Rock  Island  Railroad.  The  mob  also  derailed  a  passenger- 
train  coming  into  the  city  on  the  Pittsburg,  Fort  Wayne,  and 


500  FORTY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

Chicago  Railroad,  and  burned  switches,  which  destroys  track. 
The  injunction  of  the  United  States  Court  is  openly  defied,  and 
unless  the  mobs  are  dispersed  by  the  action  of  the  police,  or  they 
are  fired  upon  by  United  States  troops,  more  serious  trouble 
may  be  expected,  as  the  mob  is  increasing  and  becoming  more 
defiant.  Shall  I  give  the  order  for  troops  to  fire  on  mob  ob 
structing  trains? 

MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 

The  following  extracts  from  correspondence  and  or 
ders,  and  the  proclamation  of  the  President,  with  the 
foregoing  explanation,  sufficiently  indicate  the  methods 
by  which  the  unlawful  combination  in  Chicago  was 
pressed : 

(Telegram.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  5,  1894, 10 : 15  P.  M. 

To  MAJOR-GENERAL  MILES,  Headquarters  Department  of  the 
Missouri,  United  States  Army,  Chicago,  Illinois. 
In  view  of  the  situation  in  Chicago,  as  reported  in  your  de 
spatches  to  the  adjutant-general  this  evening,  it  is  your  duty 
to  concentrate  your  troops  so  as  to  enable  them  to  act  effec 
tively  either  in  execution  of  the  orders  heretofore  given,  or  in 
protecting  the  property  of  the  United  States,  as  in  your  judg 
ment  may  be  necessary.  In  any  event,  the  troops  should  not 
be  scattered  or  divided  into  small  detachments,  nor  should  they 
attempt  to  do  service  in  several  places  at  the  same  time,  which 
their  numbers  will  not  enable  them  to  do  effectively. 

The  mere  preservation  of  peace  and  good  order  in  the  city  is, 
of  course,  the  province  of  the  city  and  State  authorities. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General  Commanding. 

(Telegram.) 

CHICAGO,  ILLS.,  July  6,  1894. 
Adjutant-General,  U.  S.  A.,  Washington,  D.  C. : 

In  accordance  with  the  orders  of  the  War  Department,  the 
troops  were  sent  to  Blue  Island,  stock-yards,  Grand  Crossing, 


ORDERS  SENT  TO  GENERAL  MILES,  AND  HIS  REPORTS     5Q1 

and  Forty-ninth  street,  at  the  request  of  the  U.  S.  marshal. 
This  disposition  was  made  before  my  arrival  yesterday.  The 
roads  were  obstructed  in  several  places  by  mobs;  the  largest 
and  most  violent  gathered  near  the  stock-yards  at  noon,  and 
gradually  moved  east  along  the  line  of  the  Rock  Island  road, 
overturning  cars,  burning  station-house,  roundhouse,  and  other 
property.  The  mob  was  estimated  at  ten  thousand  men,  three 
miles  long  and  a  half  a  mile  wide ;  it  moved  steadily  north  un 
til  after  dark,  destroying  property  and  setting  fires,  and  the  cry 
of  the  mob  was  "  To  hell  with  the  government ! n  It  reached 
Eighteenth  street  after  dark,  and  then  dispersed.  While  this 
threatening  movement  was  in  action  I  withdrew  some  of  the 
troops  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city,  and  in  the  evening  the  bat 
tery  and  one  troop  of  cavalry,  to  the  Lake  Front  Park,  for  the 
purpose  of  attacking  the  mob  should  it  reach  the  vicinity  of  the 
government  building  between  Adams  and  Jackson  sts.  Dur 
ing  the  afternoon,  night,  and  this  morning  I  have  concentrated 
nine  (9)  companies  infantry,  troop  cavalry,  and  the  battery  of 
artillery  on  the  Lake  Front  Park.  This  includes  troops  from 
Leaven  worth  and  Brady.  During  last  night  a  proclamation 
was  issued  by  the  mayor  directing  the  police  to  disperse  mobs 
and  prevent  the  lawless  from  interfering  with  railroads.  If  this 
order  is  executed  there  will  be  no  further  trouble.  One  engi 
neer  has  been  stoned  to  death.  During  the  night  a  dozen  fires 
were  started  in  different  places,  but  destroying  very  little  prop 
erty,  except  the  principal  buildings  of  the  World's  Fair  and 
more  than  a  hundred  cars;  this  morning  a  mob  has  gathered 
near  the  stock-yards  in  as  large  numbers  as  yesterday  at  this 
time;  they  threatened  to  hang  U.  S.  marshals  and  policemen. 
The  law-breakers  constitute  a  very  small  percentage  of  the  peo 
ple.  The  mass  of  the  people  desire  the  maintenance  of  law  and 
order.  The  action  of  the  Chief  Executive  has  given  universal 
satisfaction. 

MILES,  Major-General  Commanding. 


BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 
A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas,  by  reason  of  unlawful  obstructions,  combinations, 
and  assemblages  of  persons,  it  has  become  impracticable,  in  the 


502  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

judgment  of  the  President,  to  enforce,  by  the  ordinary  course  of 
judicial  proceedings,  the  laws  of  the  United  States  within  the 
State  of  Illinois,  and  especially  in  the  city  of  Chicago,  within 
said  State : 

And  whereas,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  faithful  execu 
tion  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  protecting  its  prop 
erty,  and  removing  obstructions  to  the  United  States  mails,  in 
the  State  and  city  aforesaid,  the  President  has  employed  a  part 
of  the  military  forces  of  the  United  States : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  G-rover  Cleveland,  President  of  the  United 
States,  do  hereby  admonish  all  good  citizens  and  all  persons  who 
may  be,  or  may  come,  within  the  city  and  State  aforesaid,  against 
aiding,  countenancing,  encouraging,  or  taking  any  part  in  such 
unlawful  obstructions,  combinations,  and  assemblages;  and  I 
hereby  warn  all  persons  engaged  in,  or  in  any  way  connected 
with,  such  unlawful  obstructions,  combinations,  and  assemblages, 
to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their  respective  abodes  on  or 
before  twelve  o'clock  noon  on  the  ninth  day  of  July  instant. 

Those  who  disregard  this  warning  and  persist  in  taking  part 
with  a  riotous  mob  in  forcibly  resisting  and  obstructing  the 
execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  or  interfering  with 
the  functions  of  the  government,  or  destroying  or  attempting 
to  destroy  the  property  belonging  to  the  United  States  or  un 
der  its  protection,  cannot  be  regarded  otherwise  than  as  public 
enemies. 

Troops  employed  against  such  a  riotous  mob  will  act  with 
all  the  moderation  and  forbearance  consistent  with  the  accom 
plishment  of  the  desired  end  j  but  the  stern  necessities  that  con 
front  them  will  not  with  certainty  permit  discrimination  be 
tween  guilty  participants  and  those  who  are  mingled  with  them 
from  curiosity  and  without  criminal  intent.  The  only  safe 
course,  therefore,  for  those  not  actually  unlawfully  participating 
is  to  abide  at  their  homes,  or  at  least  not  to  be  found  in  the 
neighborhood  of  riotous  assemblages. 

While  there  will  be  no  hesitation  or  vacillation  in  the  decisive 
treatment  of  the  guilty,  this  warning  is  especially  intended  to 
protect  and  save  the  innocent. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  hereto  affixed. 
Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  eighth  day  of  July,  in  the 

year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 


THE  PROCLAMATION  OF  THE  PRESIDENT  5Q3 

four,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one 
hundred  and  nineteenth. 

GROVER  CLEVELAND. 
By  the  President : 

W.  Q.  GRESHAM,  Secretary  of  State. 


(General  Orders,  No.  6.) 

HEADQUARTERS  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSOURI, 

CHICAGO,  ILLINOIS,  July  9,  1894. 

To  all  United  States  troops  serving  in  the  Department  of  the 

Missouri. 

The  acts  of  violence  committed  during  the  past  few  days  in 
obstructing  the  mail-trains  and  post-roads  j  the  blocking  of 
the  interstate  commerce  j  the  open  defiance  and  violation  of  the 
injunction  of  the  United  States  Court ;  the  assaults  upon  the 
Federal  forces  in  the  lawful  discharge  of  their  duties  ;  the  de 
struction,  pillage,  and  looting  of  the  inland  commerce  property 
belonging  to  citizens  of  the  different  States,  and  other  acts  of  re 
bellion  and  lawlessness,  have  been  of  such  a  serious  character  that 
the  duties  of  the  military  authorities  are  now  clearly  denned. 

The  proclamation  of  the  President,  the  commander-in-chief 
of  the  land  and  navy  forces  and  the  State  militia  when  called 
into  service,  is  understood  by  the  military  to  be  in  the  interests 
of  humanity  and  to  avoid  the  useless  waste  of  life,  if  possible. 
It  is  an  executive  order  for  all  law-abiding  citizens  to  separate 
themselves  from  the  law-breakers  and  those  in  actual  hostility  to 
the  action  of  the  United  States  Court  and  the  laws  of  the  National 
Government.  He  has  defined  the  attitude  of  these  law-breakers 
to  be  that  of  enemies  of  the  government,  and  hence  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  military  forces  to  aid  the  United  States  marshals  to 
disperse,  capture,  or  destroy  all  bodies  of  men  obstructing  the 
mail-routes  and  in  actual  hostility  to  the  injunction  of  the  United 
States  Court  and  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

This  does  not  change  the  relations  of  the  Federal  officials  with 
those  of  the  local  authority,  as  it  is  expected  that  the  State  and 
municipal  governments  will  maintain  peace  and  good  order 
within  the  territory  of  their  jurisdiction.  Should  they  fail  or 
be  overpowered,  the  military  forces  will  assist  them,  but  not 


504  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

to  the  extent  of  leaving  unprotected  property  belonging  to  or 
under  the  protection  of  the  United  States. 

The  officer  in  the  immediate  command  of  troops  must  be  the 
judge  as  to  what  use  to  make  of  the  forces  of  his  command  in 
executing  his  orders,  and  in  case  serious  action  be  required  and 
there  be  time,  he  will  communicate  with  his  next  superior  for 
his  instructions. 

The  earnest  efforts  of  the  law-abiding  citizens  have  done 
much  to  improve  the  condition  of  affairs  during  the  last  few 
days,  and  I  earnestly  request  all  law-abiding  citizens  to  do 
whatever  is  possible  to  assist  in  maintaining  the  civil  govern 
ment  and  the  authority  of  the  municipal,  State,  and  Federal 
governments  in  preserving  peace  and  good  order. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Miles : 

J.  P.  MARTIN,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

(General  Orders,  No.  23.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
AD  JUT  ANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  July  9, 1894. 

The  following  instructions  are  published  for  the  government 
of  the  army : 

A  mob  forcibly  resisting  or  obstructing  the  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  or  attempting  to  destroy  property 
belonging  to  or  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States,  is  a 
public  enemy. 

Troops  called  into  action  against  such  a  mob  are  governed  by 
the  general  regulations  of  the  army  and  military  tactics  in  re 
spect  to  the  manner  in  which  they  shall  act  to  accomplish  the 
desired  end.  It  is  purely  a  tactical  question  in  what  manner 
they  shall  use  the  weapons  with  which  they  are  armed  —  whether 
by  the  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery,  or  by  use  of  the  bayonet 
and  saber,  or  by  both,  and  at  what  stage  of  the  operations  each 
or  either  mode  of  attack  shall  be  employed. 

This  tactical  question  must  necessarily  be  decided  by  the  im 
mediate  commander  of  the  troops,  according  to  his  best  judg 
ment  of  the  situation  and  the  authorized  drill  regulations. 

In  the  first  stage  of  an  insurrection  lawless  mobs  are  fre 
quently  commingled  with  great  crowds  of  comparatively  in- 


INSTRUCTIONS  IN  DEALING  WITH  A  MOB  5Q5 

nocent  people  drawn  there  by  curiosity  and  excitement,  and 
ignorant  of  the  great  danger  to  which  they  are  exposed.  Under 
such  circumstances  the  commanding  officer  should  withhold  the 
fire  of  his  troops,  if  possible,  until  timely  warning  has  been 
given  to  the  innocent  to  separate  themselves  from  the  guilty. 

Under  no  circumstances  are  the  troops  to  fire  into  a  crowd 
without  the  order  of  the  commanding  officer,  except  that  single 
sharp-shooters,  selected  by  the  commanding  officer,  may  shoot 
down  individual  rioters  who  have  fired  upon  or  thrown  missiles 
at  the  troops. 

As  a  general  rule,  the  bayonet  alone  should  be  used  against 
mixed  crowds  in  the  first  stages  of  a  revolt.  But  as  soon  as 
sufficient  warning  has  been  given  to  enable  the  innocent  to  sepa 
rate  themselves  from  the  guilty,  the  action  of  the  troops  should 
be  governed  solely  by  the  tactical  considerations  involved  in 
the  duty  they  are  ordered  to  perform.  They  are  not  called  upon 
to  consider  how  great  may  be  the  losses  inflicted  upon  the  pub 
lic  enemy,  except  to  make  their  blows  so  effective  as  to  promptly 
suppress  all  resistance  to  lawful  authority,  and  to  stop  the  de 
struction  of  life  the  moment  lawless  resistance  has  ceased. 
Punishment  belongs  not  to  the  troops,  but  to  the  courts  of 
justice. 

By  command  of  Major-General  Schofield : 

GEO.  D.  EUGGLES,  Adjutant-General. 


(General  Orders,  No.  15.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE, 
WASHINGTON,  May  25, 1894. 

The  following  instructions  are  issued  for  the  government  of 
department  commanders : 

Whenever  the  troops  may  be  lawfully  employed,  under  the 
orders  of  the  President,  to  suppress  "  insurrection  in  any  State 
against  the  government  thereof/'  as  provided  in  section  5297  of 
the  Revised  Statutes ;  or  to  "  enforce  the  execution  of  the  laws 
of  the  United  States"  when  "by  reason  of  unlawful  obstruc 
tions,  combinations,  or  assemblages  of  persons  "  it  has  "  become 
impracticable,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President,  to  enforce,  by 
the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  the  laws  of  the 


506  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

United  States/'  as  provided  in  section  5298  of  the  Revised 
Statutes,  the  troops  are  employed  as  a  part  of  the  military  power 
of  the  United  States,  and  act  under  the  orders  of  the  President, 
as  commander-in-chief,  and  his  military  subordinates.  They 
cannot  be  directed  to  act  under  the  orders  of  any  civil  officer. 
The  commanding  officers  of  the  troops  so  employed  are  directly 
responsible  to  their  military  superiors.  Any  unlawful  or  un 
authorized  act  on  their  part  would  not  be  excusable  on  the 
ground  of  any  order  or  request  received  by  them  from  a  mar 
shal  or  any  other  civil  officer. 
By  command  of  Major-General  Schofield : 

GEO.  D.  RUGGLES,  Adjutant-General. 


It  appears  to  have  been  thought  in  Chicago  that "  the  re 
quest  of  the  United  States  marshal,"  with  whom  the  com 
manding  officer  of  the  troops  had  been  directed  to  "  con 
fer,"  was  equivalent  to  "  orders  of  the  "War  Department," 
notwithstanding  the  order  of  May  25,  above  quoted, 
strictly  prohibiting  any  such  use  of  troops.  Hence  the 
faulty  disposition  of  the  troops  which  was  corrected  when 
the  mob  was  approaching  the  heart  of  the  city.  Then 
"  some  of  the  troops  on  the  outskirts  of  the  city "  were 
withdrawn,  and  "in  the  evening  the  battery  and  one 
troop  of  cavalry  "  were  moved  "  to  the  Lake  Front  Park, 
for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  mob  should  it  reach  the 
vicinity  of  the  government  building  between  Adams  and 
Jackson  sts."  And  during  the  afternoon  and  night  of  the 
5th  and  morning  of  the  6th  an  effective  force  was  con 
centrated  on  the  Lake  Front  Park,  forty-eight  hours  after 
the  time  when  the  orders  from  Washington  indicated 
that  the  Fort  Sheridan  garrison  should  be  at  that  place. 

On  July  9,  the  day  after  the  President  had  issued  his 
proclamation,  it  appeared  in  Chicago  that  "  the  duties  of 
the  military  authorities  are  now  clearly  defined."  The 
President's  proclamation  was  "understood  by  the  mili 
tary  to  be  in  the  interests  of  humanity,"  and  to  concern, 
in  some  way,  "the  State  militia,"  as  if  they  had  been 


THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  MILITARY  MISUNDERSTOOD       5Q7 

"  called  into  service  w  of  the  United  States.  It  was  "  the 
duty  of  the  military  forces  to  aid  the  United  States  mar 
shals."  Again,  "  it  is  expected  the  State  and  municipal 
governments  will  maintain  peace  and  good  order.  .  .  . 
Should  they  fail  or  be  overpowered,  the  military  forces 
will  assist  them  .  .  .  " —  and  this  notwithstanding  the 
well-known  law  on  that  subject  to  which  allusion  was 
made  in  the  despatch  of  July  5  from  the  headquarters  of 
the  army. 

The  President's  proclamation  was  strictly  limited  to 
"  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  faithful  execution  of  the 
laws  of  the  United  States,  and  protecting  its  property,  and 
removing  obstructions  to  the  United  States  mails,"  for 
which  purpose  the  proclamation  stated  "the  President 
has  employed  a  part  of  the  military  forces  of  the  United 
States  "  —  not  is  about  to  employ,  but  has  employed,  under 
specific  orders,  which  were  telegraphed  to  Colonel  Martin 
on  July  3,  to  do  certain  things  which  were  precisely  the 
things  specified  in  the  proclamation  of  July  8,  and  not 
"  to  aid  the  United  States  marshals  "  in  doing  those  things 
or  any  others.  Yet  it  was  not  until  July  9,  six  days  after 
the  order  to  Colonel  Martin,  that  those  duties  became 
"  clearly  defined,"  and  then  they  were  misunderstood  in 
the  very  essential  particulars  above  specified. 

The  lawless  interruptions  of  traffic  on  the  Pacific  roads 
had  continued  from  the  latter  part  of  April  till  early  in 
July, —  two  months  and  a  half, — in  spite  of  all  the  efforts 
to  enforce  the  laws,  in  each  special  case,  by  the  ordinary 
course  of  judicial  proceedings.  Yet  as  soon  as  full  dis 
cretionary  authority  was  given  to  the  several  depart 
ment  commanders  to  act  promptly  as  each  emergency 
might  require,  all  obstruction  to  the  operations  of  the 
Pacific  railroads  rapidly  disappeared. 

The  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings  is  generally 
far  too  slow  to  produce  satisfactory  results  when  military 
force  is  required.  Fortunately  the  Constitution  and  laws 


508  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

of  the  United  States  do  not  require  such  ineffective  mix 
ture  of  civil  and  military  methods.  When  the  civil  power 
ceases  to  be  effective  and  the  President  is  required  to 
exercise  his  authority  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army,  his  acts  become  purely  military,  untramineled  by 
any  civil  authority  whatever.  This  is  perhaps  one  of  the 
strongest  and  most  valuable  provisions  of  the  Constitu 
tion  and  laws  —  one  which,  if  generally  known,  is  most 
likely  to  deter  the  lawless  from  any  attempt  to  act  in 
defiance  of  the  judicial  authority  of  the  United  States. 
The  General  Order  No.  15,  issued  at  the  time  herein  re 
ferred  to  (May  25,  1894),  was  based  upon  the  foregoing 
interpretation  of  the  Constitution  and  laws. 

Under  the  Constitution  and  existing  statutes  of  the 
United  States  it  is  not  proper  to  use  the  troops,  either  in 
large  or  small  numbers,  to  "  aid  the  United  States  mar 
shals."  When  the  civil  officers,  with  their  civil  posse,  are 
no  longer  able  to  enforce  the  laws,  they  stand  aside,  and 
the  military  power,  under  the  orders  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  steps  in  and  overcomes  the  lawless  resistance  to 
authority.  Then  the  civil  officers  resume  their  functions, 
to  make  arrests  of  individuals,  hold  them  in  custody,  and 
deliver  them  to  the  courts  for  trial.  It  is  not  the  duty  of 
the  troops  in  such  cases  to  guard  prisoners  who  are  in  the 
custody  of  civil  officers ;  but  it  is  the  duty  of  the  troops,  if 
necessary,  to  repel  by  force  of  arms  any  unlawful  attempt 
to  rescue  such  prisoners.  This  distinction  should  be 
clearly  understood  by  all  army  officers,  and  it  is  of  uni 
versal  application.  The  duty  of  the  army  is,  when  so  or 
dered  by  the  President,  to  overcome  and  suppress  law 
less  resistance  to  civil  authority.  There  military  duty 
ends,  and  the  civil  officers  resume  their  functions. 

The  distinction  between  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  and  that  of  the  several  States  is  so  clearly  defined 
that  there  can  be  no  possible  excuse  for  ignorance  on 
that  subject  on  the  part  of  any  officer  of  the  army.  But 


THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  MILITARY  MISUNDERSTOOD       5Q9 

the  relation  between  the  civil  and  the  military  authorities 
of  the  United  States  had  not  been  clearly  defined,  after 
the  passage  of  the  "Posse  Comitatus  Act,"  until  the 
order  of  May  25,  1894,  was  issued.  But  that  can  hardly 
excuse  continued  ignorance  of  the  law  a  month  or  more 
after  that  order  was  issued ;  and  it  is  worthy  of  note  that 
at  least  one  department  commander  showed  himself  famil 
iar  with  the  law  before  the  order  was  issued,  by  correct 
ing  the  mistake  of  a  subordinate,  which  called  attention 
to  the  necessity  of  issuing  some  such  order. 

Of  course  that  order  had  the  sanction  of  the  President, 
after  consideration  and  approval  by  the  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  before  it  was  issued. 

The  acts  of  Congress  creating  the  Pacific  railroads  and 
making  them  military  roads  justify  and  require  that  the 
government  give  them  military  protection  whenever,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  President,  such  protection  is  needed. 
It  is  not  incumbent  on  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  of  the  United  States  to  call  on  civil  courts  and 
marshals  to  protect  the  military  roads  over  which  he 
proposes  to  move  his  troops,  whether  on  foot  or  on  horse 
back  or  in  cars.  It  appears  to  have  been  almost  forgot 
ten  that  the  transcontinental  railroads  were  built,  at  great  . 
expense  to  the  national  treasury,  mainly  as  a  military 
land  between  the  Atlantic  States  and  the  Pacific  States, 
and  that  this  is  by  far  their  most  important  service,  and 
this  explains  the  meaning  of  the  language  employed  in 
the  acts  of  Congress  creating  them. 

At  the  time  of  the  massacre  of  Chinese  laborers  at 
Rock  Springs,  Wyoming,  during  President  Cleveland's 
first  administration,  I  was  ordered  by  the  President  to  go 
to  that  place  from  Chicago  and  suppress  that  violation  of 
the  treaty  obligations  between  this  country  and  China. 
On  my  arrival  at  Omaha,  I  was  informed  by  press  report 
ers  that  a  grand  conclave  at  Denver  that  night  was  to 
consider  a  proposition  to  order  out  all  the  train-men  on 


510  FORTY-SIX  TEARS  EN*   THE  AROT 

the  Union  Pacific  Railroad  the  next  morning,  for  the  pur 
pose,  as  I  understood,  of  preventing  the  passage  of  my 
train.  I  told  the  reporters  they  might  telegraph  those 
people  in  Denver,  but  not  for  publication,  that  I  was 
traveling  over  a  military  road,  on  military  duty,  under 
orders  from  the  comniander-in-chief  of  the  army;  that 
interference  with  that  journey  would  be  regarded  by  me 
as  an  act  of  war,  and  would  be  so  treated.  I  heard  no 
more  on  that  subject.  That  interpretation  of  the  Pacific 
Railroad  acts  was  suggested  several  times,  but  never  of 
ficially  accepted  until  1894. 

The  following  are  in  substance  the  orders  sent  on  July 
6  and  7,  by  the  President's  direction,  to  all  the  department 
commanders  in  the  countiy  traversed  by  the  Pacific 
railroads,  and  the  President's  proclamation  which  fol 
lowed  two  days  later,  under  the  operation  of  which  traffic 
was  resumed  throughout  all  that  vast  region  of  country 
as  rapidly  as  trains  conveying  troops  could  be  moved. 
No  serious  opposition  or  resistance  was  offered  any 
where. 

(Telegram.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  July  7, 1894. 

BRIGADIER-GEXERAL  OTIS.  Commanding  Department  of  the 
Columbia,  Vancouver  Barracks,  Washington : 
In  view  of  the  fact,  as  substantiated  by  communications  re 
ceived  from  the  Department  of  Justice,  from  military  official  re 
ports,  and  from  other  reliable  sources,  that  by  reason  of  unlawful 
obstructions,  and  combinations  or  assemblages  of  persons,  it  has 
become  impracticable,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President,  to  en 
force,  by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceedings,  the  laws  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  prevent  obstructions  of  the  United 
States  mails,  and  interruptions  to  commerce  between  the  States, 
on  the  line  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  and  to  secure  to 
the  United  States  the  right  guaranteed  by  section  11  of  the 
a<5t  approved  July  2.  IS 04.  constituting  the  Northern  Pacific 
Railroad  **a  post  route  and  military  road  subject  to  the  use  of 


ORDERS  OF   THE  PRESIDENT  511 

the  United  States  for  postal,  military,  naval,  and  all  other  gov 
ernment  service/'  you  are  directed  by  the  President  to  employ 
the  military  force  under  your  command  to  remove  obstructions 
to  the  mails,  and  to  execute  any  orders  of  the  United  States 
courts  for  the  protection  of  property  in  the  hands  of  receivers 
appointed  by  such  courts,  and  for  preventing  interruption  of  in 
terstate  commerce,  and  to  give  such  protection  to  said  railroad 
as  will  prevent  any  unlawful  and  forcible  obstruction  to  the 
regular  and  orderly  operation  of  said  road  "  for  postal,  military, 
naval,  and  all  other  government  service." 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General  Commanding. 


(Telegram.) 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY, 

WASHINGTON,  July  7,  1894. 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL  OTIS,  Commanding  Department  of  the  Co 
lumbia,  Vancouver  Barracks,  Washington : 
The  order  of  the  President  sent  you  this  morning  by  telegraph 
is  the  same  in  substance  as  one  sent  last  night  to  General  Mer- 
ritt,  the  purpose  being  to  extend  military  protection  over  the 
entire  line  of  the  Northern  Pacific  Railroad  from  St.  Paul  to 
Puget  Sound.  In  the  movement  of  the  troop-trains  along  the 
line  of  the  road  in  the  execution  of  this  order,  the  Department 
of  Justice  will  furnish  a  sufficient  force  of  marshals  to  make 
arrests  and  hold  prisoners  subject  to  the  orders  of  the  United 
States  courts.  You  will  please  concert  with  General  Merritt  by 
direct  correspondence  the  necessary  exchanges  of  guards  upon 
moving  trains  at  the  military  posts  in  your  department  and  in 
his,  nearest  to  each  other,  so  that  the  troops  may  return  to  their 
proper  stations  without  unnecessary  delay. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General  Commanding. 


BY  THE  PRESIDENT  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 
A  PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas t  by  reason  of  unlawful  obstructions,  combinations, 
and  assemblages  of  persons,  it  has  become  impracticable,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  President,  to  enforce,  by  the  ordinary  course  of 


512  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

judicial  proceedings,  the  laws  of  the  United  States  at  certain 
points  and  places  within  the  States  of  North  Dakota,  Montana, 
Idaho,  Washington,  Wyoming,  Colorado,  and  California,  and 
the  Territories  of  Utah  and  New  Mexico,  and  especially  along 
the  lines  of  such  railways  traversing  said  States  and  Territories 
as  are  military  roads  and  post  routes,  and  are  engaged  in  inter 
state  commerce  and  in  carrying  United  States  mails ; 

And  ivhereas,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  faithful  execu 
tion  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  and  protecting  property 
belonging  to  the  United  States  or  under  its  protection,  and  of 
preventing  obstructions  of  the  United  States  mails  and  of  com 
merce  between  the  States  and  Territories,  and  of  securing  to  the 
United  States  the  right  guaranteed  by  law  to  the  use  of  such 
roads  for  postal,  military,  naval,  and  other  government  service, 
the  President  has  employed  a  part  of  the  military  forces  of  the 
United  States : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Grover  Cleveland,  President  of  the  United 
States,  do  hereby  command  all  persons  engaged  in,  or  in  any 
way  connected  with,  such  unlawful  obstructions,  combinations, 
and  assemblages,  to  disperse  and  retire  peaceably  to  their  re 
spective  abodes  on  or  before  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  on 
the  tenth  day  of  July  instant. 

In  witness  ^vhereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused 
the  seal  of  the  United  States  to  be  hereto  affixed. 
Done  at  the  city  of  Washington,  this  ninth  day  of  July,  in  the 
year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  ninety- 
four,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  one 
hundred  and  nineteenth. 

GROVER  CLEVELAND. 
By  the  President : 

W.  Q.  GRESHAM,  Secretary  of  State. 


CHAPTER  XXIX 

LESSONS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR —  WEAKNESS  OF  THE  MILITARY 
POLICY  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OF  THE  REBELLION  —  A 
POOR  USE  OF  THE  EDUCATED  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY 

—  MILITARY  WISDOM   SHOWN  BY  THE  CONFEDERATE  AU 
THORITIES —  TERRITORIAL    STRATEGY  —  GENERAL    MILI 
TARY  EDUCATION    INDISPENSABLE   TO  GOOD    CITIZENSHIP 

—  ORGANIZATION   OF   THE  NATIONAL    GUARD  —  GENERAL 
GRANT   WITHOUT    MILITARY    BOOKS  —  MEASURES    NECES 
SARY  TO   THE  NATIONAL  DEFENSE. 

IN  my  opinion,  the  most  important  of  all  the  lessons 
taught  by  the  Civil  War  is  the  necessity  of  using  in 
the  most  effective  manner  the  means  at  the  disposal  of 
the  government  when  war  breaks  out.  The  necessity 
for  adequate  preparation  is  a  different  question,  which 
has  been  much  discussed,  and  in  regard  to  which  some 
progress  has  been  made  toward  a  satisfactory  solution. 
Whatever  the  outcome  may  be  in  respect  to  preparation 
for  war,  certainly  the  government  and  the  people  ought 
to  adopt  such  a  policy  as  will  lead  to  the  best  practicable 
use  of  the  preparations  which  have  actually  been  made. 

In  this  respect  the  policy  adopted  by  the  National  G-ov- 
ernment  in  1861  was  about  as  weak  as  possible,  while  that 
of  the  Confederates  was  comparatively  strong.  It  is  said 
that  this  weak  policy  was  due  largely  to  General  Scott, 
and  grew  out  of  his  distrust  of  volunteer  troops;  he 
having  thought  it  necessary  to  have  a  considerable  body 
of  regular  troops  to  give  steadiness  and  confidence  to  the 
volunteers  or  militia.  This  is  a  very  good  theory,  no 

33  513 


514  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

doubt,  provided  the  regulars  could  be  provided  in  ad 
vance  in  such  numbers  as  to  produce  the  desired  effect. 
But  if  that  theory  had  been  relied  upon  in  1861,  the  "  Con 
federate  States"  would  have  established  their  indepen 
dence  long  before  the  regular  army  could  be  organized  and 
made  effective.  What  was  demanded  by  the  necessities 
of  the  country  in  1861  was  the  best  large  army  that  could 
be  made  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  not  a  better  small 
army  to  be  made  in  a  much  longer  time. 

The  United  States  government  actually  had  at  hand 
the  means  of  creating  in  a  very  short  time  a  far  larger 
efficient  army  than  the  South  could  possibly  have  raised  in 
the  same  time.  This  means  had  been  provided,  with  great 
care  and  at  great  expense,  through  a  long  term  of  years, 
by  the  education  of  young  men  at  the  Military  Academy, 
and  their  practical  training  in  the  small  regular  army  in 
all  kinds  of  actual  service,  including  one  foreign  war  and 
almost  constant  campaigns  against  the  Indians.  Nowhere 
in  the  world  could  have  been  found  a  better  corps  of 
officers  to  organize,  instruct,  and  discipline  new  troops. 
Yet  those  officers  were  hardly  employed  at  all  in  that 
service  at  first,  when  it  was  of  supreme  importance. 
Some  time  later,  when  the  necessity  was  not  so  great,  a 
few  officers  of  the  army  were  permitted  to  accept  com 
mands  in  the  volunteers.  Even  then  it  often  required 
great  "  influence  "  to  secure  such  "  indulgences."  Scores 
of  young  officers,  qualified  in  every  way  to  do  such  ser 
vice  in  the  first  six  months  of  the  war,  sought  in  vain  for 
opportunities  to  render  the  valuable  services  for  which 
the  government  had  educated  them,  and  were  compelled 
to  drag  along  four  years  in  the  discharge  of  duties  sev 
eral  grades  below  their  qualifications. 

In  the  regular  army  in  1861  there  were,  exclusive  of 
those  who  went  South,  at  least  600  officers  who,  after 
graduating  at  West  Point,  had  served  several  years  with 
their  regiments,  and  were  well  qualified  to  drill  a  regi- 


WEAKNESS  OF  THE  MILITARY  POLICY  515 

ment  and  to  command  it  in  battle.  A  large  proportion  of 
them  were  fitted  to  command  brigades,  and  some  of  them 
divisions,  and  even  army  corps.  The  three  years'  volun 
teers  first  called  out  could  have  been  fully  supplied  with 
brigade,  division,  and  corps  commanders  from  graduates 
of  West  Point  who  were  thoroughly  qualified  by  theoret 
ical  education  and  established  character,  and  many  of 
them  by  practical  experience  in  the  Mexican  war  and  In 
dian  campaigns,  for  the  instruction,  discipline,  and  com 
mand  of  troops,  still  leaving  a  sufficient  number  with  the 
regulars  for  efficient  service.  The  old  sergeants  of  the  army 
in  1861  were  relatively  competent  company  commanders. 
One  commissioned  officer  to  four  companies  of  those  vet 
eran  Indian-fighters  made  as  reliable  a  battalion  as  any 
general  could  wish  for  in  the  conditions  then  existing. 

Experience  demonstrated  that  a  volunteer  regiment 
could  in  a  very  few  weeks  be  converted  into  an  efficient 
and  thoroughly  reliable  force  in  battle  by  a  single  young 
officer  of  the  regular  army.  In  other  words,  by  a  judicious 
use  of  the  small  body  of  officers  whom  the  country  had 
educated  at  so  great  expense,  a  fine  army  of  500,000  men, 
or  more,  could  have  been  called  into  service,  organized, 
disciplined,  and  put  into  the  field  by  August  1,  1861 ;  and 
that  without  interfering  in  any  way  with  the  three 
months'  militia  called  out  to  meet  the  first  emergency, 
which  militia  ought,  of  course,  to  have  acted  strictly  on 
the  defensive  until  the  more  permanent  force  could  take 
the  field.  In  a  few  months  more,  certainly  by  the  spring 
of  1862,  the  instruction,  discipline,  and  field  experience 
of  the  first  levy  would  have  given  good  officers  enough 
to  organize  and  command  a  million  more  men.  It  re 
quired,  in  short,  only  a  wise  use  of  the  national  resources 
to  overwhelm  the  South  before  the  spring  of  1863. 

The  supply  of  arms,  it  is  true,  was  deplorably  deficient 
in  1861.  But  the  South  was  only  a  little  better  off  than 
the  North  in  that  regard.  Besides,  the  National  Govern- 


516  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

ment  had  command  of  all  the  markets  of  the  world,  and 
of  the  means  of  ocean  transportation.  It  could  have 
bought  at  once  all  the  available  arms  everywhere,  and 
thus  fully  equipped  its  own  troops,  while  preventing  the 
South  from  doing  the  same.  Hence  the  excuse  given  at 
the  time — namely,  want  of  muskets — was  no  excuse  what 
ever  for  delay  in  the  organization  of  armies. 

The  rebellion  made  some  progress  at  first,  and  offered 
effective  resistance  for  a  long  time,  simply  because  the 
Southern  authorities  manifested  greater  military  wisdom 
than  the  Northern.  The  difference  in  preparation  and  in 
military  training  in  advance  was  quite  insignificant.  The 
North  had  many  more  educated  and  competent  military 
men  than  the  South.  The  difference  was  that  the  South 
used  the  few  they  had  to  the  best  advantage,  while  the 
North  so  used  only  a  very  few  of  their  many. 

The  lesson  next  in  importance  taught  by  our  experi 
ence  is  the  necessity  of  general  military  education  in  a 
country  having  a  popular  government.  No  man  can  be 
fully  qualified  for  the  duties  of  a  statesman  until  he  has 
made  a  thorough  study  of  the  science  of  war  in  its  broad 
est  sense.  He  need  not  go  to  a  military  school,  much  less 
serve  in  the  army  or  in  the  militia.  But  unless  he  makes 
himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  methods  and 
conditions  requisite  to  success  in  war,  he  is  liable  to  do 
almost  infinite  damage  to  his  country.  For  example,  the 
very  first  success  of  the  Union  armies  —  the  capture  of 
Fort  Donelson  —  was  quickly  followed  by  a  proclamation 
of  thanksgiving  and  an  order  to  stop  recruiting.  That 
one  act  of  "  statesmanship  "  cost  the  country  untold  mil 
lions  of  dollars  and  many  thousands  of  lives.  It  was  ne 
cessary  only  to  take  the  ordinary  military  advantage  of 
the  popular  enthusiasm  throughout  the  country  after 
Grant's  first  victory  to  have  made  the  Union  armies 
absolutely  irresistible  by  any  force  the  South  could  raise 
and  arm  at  that  time. 


A  POOR  USE  OF  THE  EDUCATED  SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY    517 

There  has  been  much  irrelevant  discussion  about  the 
ability  or  inability  of  commanders  in  the  North  and  South. 
The  fact  is  that  political  instead  of  military  ideas  con 
trolled  in  very  large  degree  the  selection  of  commanders 
in  the  Union  armies;  while  for  three  whole  years  the  au 
thorities  in  Washington  could  not  see  the  necessity  of 
unity  of  action  in  all  the  armies  under  one  military  leader. 
It  required  three  years  of  costly  experience  to  teach  the 
government  that  simple  lesson,  taught  in  the  military 
text-books!  As  experience  finally  proved,  there  was  no 
lack  of  men  capable  of  leading  even  large  armies  to  vic 
tory;  but,  with  few  exceptions,  they  were  not  put  in 
command  until  many  others  had  been  tried.  Information 
as  to  military  fitness  was  not  sought  from  military  sources. 
If  a  lawyer  is  wanted  for  the  supreme  bench,  or  an  en 
gineer  to  construct  a  great  bridge,  information  is  sought 
from  the  best  men  of  the  profession  concerned;  but  the 
opinions  of  politicians  were  thought  sufficient  in  deter 
mining  the  selection  of  major-generals ! 

Again,  the  policy  of  the  government  required  the  cap 
ture  and  occupation  of  all  the  important  seaports  and 
other  places  in  the  South,  and  the  permanent  occupation 
and  protection  of  all  the  territory  gained  in  military  op 
erations.  Until  near  the  close  of  the  war,  neither  the 
public  nor  the  government  seemed  to  have  the  remotest 
conception  of  the  fundamental  fact  that  Confederate 
armies,  wherever  they  might  go,  instead  of  places  and 
States,  were  the  only  real  objectives.  Even  some  of  the 
best  Union  generals  were  constrained  to  act  upon  this 
popular  heresy,  contrary  to  their  own  sound  military 
judgment  and  education.  Yet  while  this  erroneous  "  ter 
ritorial"  strategy  was  insisted  on,  no  adequate  concep 
tion  was  formed  of  the  vastly  greater  force  required  to 
hold  all  the  territory  gained,  and  to  push  aggressive 
operations  still  further  into  the  heart  of  the  South.  Very 
rarely  indeed  were  the  Union  armies  large  enough,  until 


518         FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

near  the  end  of  the  war,  to  assure  success.  The  end 
finally  came  through  a  long  succession  of  desperate  bat 
tles  between  forces  so  nearly  equal  that  decisive  victory 
was  impossible  until  the  weaker  side  finally  became  ex 
hausted.  Thus  the  aggregate  loss  in  men  as  well  as  in 
money  was  vastly  greater  than  it  would  have  been  if  the 
Union  had  put  forth  its  full  strength  and  ended  the 
rebellion  in  two  years  instead  of  four. 

It  is  true  that  some  of  the  worst  of  these  "  blind  guides  " 
were  men  supposed  to  have  a  very  high  military  education. 
But  if  sound  military  education  had  been  at  all  general  in 
the  country,  statesmen  would  have  known  by  what  stan 
dard  to  judge  of  any  one  man's  fitness  for  high  command. 

It  is  true  that  no  amount  of  military  education  can  sup 
ply  the  place  of  military  genius  or  create  a  great  com 
mander.  It  may  possibly  happen  at  any  time  that  there 
may  not  be  among  all  the  living  graduates  of  West  Point 
one  Grant  or  Sherman  or  Sheridan,  or  one  Lee  or  John 
ston  or  Jackson.  So  much  greater  the  need  of  a  well- 
educated  staff  and  a  well-disciplined  army.  Nobody  is 
wise  enough  to  predict  who  will  prove  best  able  to  com 
mand  a  great  army.  But  it  is  the  easiest  thing  in  the 
world  to  tell  who  can  best  create  such  an  army  and  com 
mand  its  subdivisions,  and  this  is  the  work  to  be  done 
instantly  upon  the  outbreak  of  war.  The  selection  of 
commanders  for  the  several  armies,  and,  above  all,  of  a 
general-in-chief,  must  of  course  be  the  most  difficult; 
for  it  is  not  probable  that  any  man  young  enough  will 
have  had  any  experience  in  such  commands  in  this 
country.  But  even  this  difficulty  will  disappear  in  a 
very  great  measure  if  statesmen  will  make  the  study  of 
the  art  and  science  of  war,  instead  of  far  less  important 
subjects,  a  part  of  their  pastime.  They  will  thus  acquire 
the  ability  to  judge,  from  personal  acquaintance  with 
military  men  and  conversation  with  others  best  informed, 
of  the  relative  fitness  of  officers  for  the  highest  commands. 


GENERAL  MILITARY  EDUCATION  INDISPENSABLE       519 

There  is  no  possible  remedy  for  such  evils  as  this  coun 
try  has  suffered  except  general  military  education.  In 
my  opinion,  no  man  is  fit  for  a  seat  in  Congress  unless 
he  has  such  an  education.  The  first  thing  he  ought  to 
learn  is  the  old  and  trite  military  maxim  that  the  only 
way  to  carry  on  war  economically  is  to  make  it  "  short, 
sharp,  and  decisive."  To  dole  out  military  appropriations 
in  driblets  is  to  invite  disaster  and  ultimate  bankruptcy. 
So  it  is  in  respect  to  the  necessary  preparations  for  war 
in  time  of  peace.  No  man  is  wise  enough  to  tell  when 
war  will  come.  Preparations  are  made  upon  the  theory 
that  it  may  come  at  any  time.  If  a  hundred  millions  are 
necessary  for  adequate  preparation  for  defense,  and  you 
have  spent  only  fifty  when  war  comes,  you  might  as  well 
have  thrown  your  fifty  millions  into  the  sea.  There  is  no 
such  thing  as  partial  defense  in  modern  war.  If  there  are 
weak  points  in  your  defenses,  your  enemy  is  sure  to  find 
them.  Indeed,  he  knows  about  them  all  the  time,  and  will 
strike  them  at  once.  Then  your  whole  costly  system 
will  be  worthless. 

What  would  be  thought  of  the  business  capacity  of  a 
man  who  would  not  insure  his  house  or  his  store  or  his 
stock  of  goods  against  fire  because  he  did  not  happen  to 
have  money  enough  in  bank  to  pay  the  premium,  but 
would  have  to  borrow  it  at  three  per  cent.  ?  Or  of  a  man 
who  would  wait  until  he  had  realized  the  expected  profit 
on  a  commercial  venture  before  insuring  the  goods  ?  If 
preparation  for  defense  is  the  policy  of  a  country,  it  would 
be  little  short  of  blindness  to  delay  it  on  account  of  a 
temporary  deficiency  in  the  current  revenues. 

All  now  admit  that  universal  education  is  an  indispensa 
ble  requisite  to  fitness  for  universal  suffrage.  The  most 
serious  questions  upon  which  a  free  people  can  be  called  to 
vote  are:  a  question  of  war,  a  question  of  preparation  for 
war,  and  a  question  of  approval  and  support,  or  disap 
proval  and  condemnation,  of  an  administration  on  ac- 


520  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

count  of  the  mode  in  which  war  has  been  conducted. 
Can  this  highest  duty  of  the  citizen  be  intelligently  per 
formed  without  military  education  ?  A  sovereign  indi 
vidual  regards  this  as  demanding  the  highest  education 
and  the  ablest  counsel  he  can  possibly  obtain.  Can  sov 
ereign  millions  do  it  wisely  without  any  education  what 
ever  1  I  believe  no  proposition  could  possibly  be  plainer 
than  that  general  military  education  is  indispensable  to 
good  citizenship  in  this  country,  and  especially  to  all  who 
may  be  intrusted  with  high  responsibilities  in  the  legisla 
tive  and  executive  departments  of  the  National  Govern 
ment.  What  would  be  thought  of  a  general  of  the  army 
who  tried  to  shield  himself  from  censure  or  punishment 
behind  his  ignorance  of  the  law  1  Can  a  legislator  be  ex 
cused  because  he  knows  nothing  of  the  art  and  science  of 
war?  If  there  is  any  one  offense  in  this  country  which 
ought  never,  under  any  circumstances,  to  be  pardoned,  it 
is  ignorance  in  those  who  are  trusted  by  the  people  to  man 
age  the  affairs  of  their  government.  As  in  the  military, 
so  in  the  civil  departments  of  government,  there  are  few 
greater  crimes  than  that  of  seeking  and  assuming  the 
responsibilities  of  an  office  for  which  the  man  himself 
knows  he  is  not  fit.  It  is  nearly  as  great  as  that  committed 
by  the  appointing  power  under  similar  circumstances. 

A  system  of  general  military  education  should  of  course 
include  elementary  training  in  all  the  schools,  public 
and  private,  so  that  every  boy,  before  he  is  sixteen  years 
old,  would  know  how  to  use  the  rifled  musket  in  ranks, 
and  be  familiar  with  the  simple  evolutions  of  a  company 
and  battalion.  Young  men  never  forget  such  training- 
received  when  they  are  boys.  The  country  would  have 
in  a  few  years  several  millions  of  fairly  well-trained  young 
soldiers,  requiring  only  competent  officers  and  a  few  days' 
drill  in  regimental  tactics  to  make  a  reliable  army  for 
any  service  this  country  will  probably  ever  require  of  her 
volunteer  soldiery.  If  it  were  a  question  of  the  invasion 


GENERAL  MILITARY  EDUCATION  INDISPENSABLE       521 

of  a  foreign  country  against  a  modern  veteran  army,  the 
case  would  be  different.  But  for  defense  against  any  pos 
sible  landing  of  a  hostile  army  on  our  shores,  our  available 
force  ought  to  be  so  overwhelming  in  numbers  as  to  far 
more  than  compensate  for  lack  of  experience.  Yet  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  some  training  is  indispensable. 
No  possible  advantage  in  numbers  can  overcome  the  dis 
advantage  resulting  from  total  ignorance  of  tactics  and 
of  the  use  of  the  modern  long-range  rifle.  Grood  parents 
who  apprehend  evil  effects  from  giving  their  boys  military 
training  ought  to  reflect  that  the  boys  will  go,  all  the 
same,  whether  trained  or  not,  when  the  country  is  threat 
ened  with  invasion.  Then,  if  ignorant,  they  will  simply 
be  doomed  to  fall  the  victims  of  skilled  marksmen  to 
whose  shots  they  know  not  how  to  reply.  Possibly  the 
most  cruel  fate  which  American  parents  could  prepare 
for  their  sons  would  be  to  keep  them  in  ignorance  of  the 
highest  duty  their  country  may  call  upon  them  to  per 
form,  so  that,  unable  to  offer  any  effective  resistance  to 
invasion,  they  could  only  die  in  a  hopeless  effort  to  do 
their  duty  as  citizen  soldiers  and  patriots — or,  worse,  live 
only  to  be  driven  in  disgrace  from  a  field  which  a  little 
education  would  have  enabled  them  gloriously  to  win. 

There  should  be,  under  State  authority,  a  general  en 
rolment  and  organization  of  all  the  young  men  who  have 
received  military  training,  and  places  of  rendezvous  fixed 
at  convenient  centers  at  or  near  railway-stations.  Officers 
of  all  grades  up  to  that  of  colonel  should  be  appointed  in 
advance,  and  occasional  musters  held  under  State  laws, 
even  if  military  exercises  were  not  attempted. 

Our  colleges  and  high  schools,  besides  the  military 
academies  of  the  country,  are  even  now  educating  a  fair 
percentage  of  young  men  to  be  officers  of  such  an  organ 
ization  of  enrolled  regiments  as  that  here  suggested. 
This  percentage  could  easily  be  increased  in  accordance 
with  the  demand.  Besides,  the  retired  men  of  the  regi- 


522  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

ments  of  the  National  Guard  in  the  several  States  might 
furnish  some  officers  for  the  enrolled  militia.  But  those 
well-trained  and  fully  equipped  regiments  would  be  re 
quired  to  move  with  full  ranks  at  once  to  the  place  of 
danger.  Hence  their  active  members  would  not  be  avail 
able  in  the  great  expansion  of  the  army  in  the  first  period 
of  war.  The  organization  of  the  first  reserve  must,  for  this 
reason,  be  entirely  independent  of  the  National  Guard. 

A  great  and  very  important  advance  has  already  been 
made  in  bringing  the  regular  army  into  close  relations 
with  the  National  Guard  of  the  several  States,  and  in  the 
employment  of  regular  officers  in  disseminating  military 
education,  both  theoretical  and  practical,  throughout  the 
country.  These  are  among  the  most  valuable  services 
the  regular  army  can  render  in  time  of  peace,  and  they 
should  be  extended,  if  practicable,  still  further.  Espe 
cially  in  the  State  artillery,  which  must  soon  be  organized 
for  war  service  in  the  new  fortifications,  instruction  by 
regular  officers  will  be  indispensable,  and  this  can  best  be 
given  in  conjunction  with  the  regular  garrisons,  the  same 
as  in  war  service.  It  would  also  be  well  to  perfect  an  ar 
rangement  by  which  the  new  infantry  regiments,  when 
first  taking  the  field  upon  the  breaking  out  of  war,  might 
be  accompanied  by  small  bodies  of  regulars,  to  lead  the 
way  and  indicate  by  example  what  is  to  be  done.  Ex 
perience  has  shown  that  under  such  example  the  rawest 
volunteers  will  be  almost  as  stanch  in  battle  as  the  regu 
lars  themselves.  The  beneficial  effect  upon  new  troops 
of  the  example  of  men  who  have  before  been  in  battle  is 
very  great.  Hence  it  is  that  old  regiments  should  always 
be  kept  full  by  the  addition  of  recruits,  rather  than  that 
the  casualties  of  service  be  replaced  by  new  regiments. 

What  constitutes  valuable  education,  military  no  less 
than  civil,  is  often  greatly  misunderstood.  Elementary 
education  and  practical  training  are  indispensable  to 
everybody,  while  higher  education  may  be  rather  injuri- 


ORGANIZATION  OF   THE  NATIONAL  GUARD  523 

cms  than  beneficial,  unless  it  is  so  regulated  as  to  culti 
vate  the  reasoning  faculties  and  independence  of  thought, 
rather  than  mere  acquisition  of-  knowledge.  Some  nota 
ble  examples  of  this  have  appeared  in  the  military  annals 
of  this  country,  and  no  doubt  in  the  civil  also.  Men  who 
had  become  famous  military  scholars  were  total  failures 
in  war,  not  only  as  commanders  in  the  field,  for  which  no 
amount  of  theoretical  education  alone  can  qualify  a  man, 
but  also  as  military  advisers.  This  was  apparently  be 
cause  their  elaborate  studies  had  made  them  mere  imi 
tators  or  copyists.  Whatever  originality  of  thought  or 
power  of  invention  they  ever  possessed  had  ceased  to 
exist  from  disuse.  They  could  plan  and  direct  a  cam 
paign  with  absolute  accuracy,  according  to  the  teachings 
of  the  great  masters,  for  the  well-defined  purpose  upon 
which  those  teachings  had  been  based.  But  when  a 
wholly  new  problem  was  presented  to  them,  they  had  no 
conception  of  the  right  mode  of  solving  it.  The  plan  of 
one  great  campaign  was  based  absolutely  upon  the  best- 
approved  method  of  capturing  a  certain  place,  without 
any  reference  to  what  damage  might  or  might  not  be 
done  to  the  opposing  army  in  that  operation.  The  plan 
of  another  great  campaign  had  for  its  sole  object  the  con 
quest  and  permanent  occupation  of  a  great  territory,  and 
was  so  conducted  as  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  seriously 
hurting  the  enemy  in  that  operation.  Yet  the  theory  upon 
which  this  last  plan  was  based,  as  well  as  the  first,  gov 
erned  the  policy  of  the  government  more  than  two  years. 
It  was  not  until  Grant  took  command  of  "all  the  ar 
mies"  that  the  true  strategic  principle  governed  the  gen 
eral  military  policy.  In  this  connection,  the  story  told  by 
Grant  himself  about  his  military  studies  is  very  instruc 
tive.  When  asked  by  the  representative  of  some  friends 
who  wished  to  present  him  a  library  for  his  new  house  in 
Washington,  what  military  books  he  then  had,  so  that 
they  might  not  duplicate  them,  he  replied  that  he  did  not 


524  FORTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

have  any  military  books,  and  never  had  any,  except  the 
"West  Point  text-books.  No  doubt  Grant  might  have 
profited  by  some  additional  study,  but  none  at  all  was 
far  better  than  so  much  as  to  have  dwarfed  his  mind  into 
that  of  an  imitator  of  former  commanders. 

The  development  of  great  military  ability  in  Grant, 
as  the  result  of  his  own  experience  and  independent 
thought,  —  that  is,  the  independent  development  of  his 
own  native  military  genius,  —  is  by  far  the  most  interest 
ing  part  of  his  history. 

In  short,  the  great  lesson  taught  by  our  own  experience 
is  that  elementary  military  training  should  be  universal, 
because  every  young  man  may  be  called  upon  to  perform 
the  duties  of  a  soldier ;  that  general  military  reading,  and 
habits  of  independent  thought  upon  all  great  military 
subjects,  should  be  cultivated  by  all  who  aspire  to  any 
high  place  in  life,  because  they  may  be  called  upon  to 
discharge  the  highest  possible  duties  of  good  citizens  in 
peace  or  in  war,  namely,  those  connected  with  the  na 
tional  defense;  that  due  preparation  for  defense  ought 
to  be  made  without  delay,  and  the  requisite  means  kept 
always  ready;  and,  above  all,  that  the  best  method  of 
making  the  quickest  possible  effective  use  of  those  means 
ought  to  be  fully  matured  and  understood  by  all  who  may 
be  called  upon  to  execute  the  orders  of  the  government. 

It  now  seems  to  me  amazing  that  the  affairs  of  an  en 
lightened  nation  could  have  been  so  badly  managed  as  to 
leave  the  secession  issue  in  doubt  almost  to  the  last  mo 
ment  of  a  four  years'  contest,  as  it  is  now  well  known  it 
was.  Probably  the  one  saving  fact  in  all  those  years 
was  that  the  young  soldiers  of  the  republic  —  and  they 
were  nearly  all  young  then  —  knew  little  and  cared  less 
about  the  wrangling  of  self-seeking  politicians  and  vision 
ary  doctrinaires  in  the  rear,  but  fought  steadily  on  to  the 
end,  never  doubting  for  a  moment  the  final  triumph.  I 
have  never  been  able  to  recah1  a  single  instance  of  doubt 


GENERAL  GRANT  WITHOUT  MILITARY  BOOKS  525 

manifested  by  any  soldier  in  the  field,  though  I  did  know 
a  very  few  cases  of  officers  of  considerable  rank,  who 
thought  they  ought  to  have  had  more  rank,  who  went  to 
the  rear  and  said  something  about  failure  in  the  field. 

I  believe  now  that  it  required  only  some  real  emergency, 
such,  for  instance,  as  the  capture  of  Washington  in  July, 
1863,  to  call  forth  the  power  of  the  North  and  crush  the 
rebellion  in  six  months.  If  any  man  thinks  a  great  dis 
aster  would  have  disheartened  the  North,  he  knows  no 
thing  of  the  people  of  our  country.  It  was  the  slow 
waste  of  enormous  resources  and  of  latent  military 
strength  that  at  length  made  many  even  of  the  stoutest 
hearts  begin  to  feel  despondent.  I  do  not  believe  there  was 
any  time  when  the  people  would  not  have  responded  with 
unanimity  and  enthusiasm  to  an  appeal  to  put  forth  all 
their  strength  and  end  the  rebellion  at  a  single  blow. 

The  one  lesson  of  reason  and  experience  that  I  would 
impress  upon  my  countrymen  in  every  possible  way  is, 
when  war  or  insurrection  comes  or  is  threatened,  do 
not  trifle  with  it.  Do  not  invoke  judicial  proceedings, 
or  call  for  75,000  men;  but  call  for  men,  and  let  them 
come  as  many  as  will!  If  some  of  them  do  not  get 
there  in  time,  before  it  is  all  over,  it  will  not  cost  much 
to  send  them  home  again !  The  services  of  the  Pennsyl 
vania  reserve,  though  ready  for  the  field,  were  actually, 
positively  refused  until  after  the  disaster  of  Bull  Run! 
The  greatest  wonder  in  the  history  of  this  wonderful 
republic  is  that  the  government  actually  survived  such 
a  military  policy  as  that ! 

In  this  connection,  it  ought  to  be  distinctly  understood 
that  the  great  object  of  education  at  West  Point  and 
other  military  schools  is  not  to  make  high  commanders, 
but  to  make  thorough  soldiers,  men  capable  of  creating 
effective  armies  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  and  of  com 
manding  comparatively  small  bodies  of  men.  If  great 
commanders  are  ever  again  required  in  this  country,  they 


526  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

will  come  to  the  front  in  due  time.  They  cannot  be  se 
lected  in  advance  of  actual  trial  in  war.  Even  West 
Point,  though  one  of  the  best  schools  in  the  world,  can 
at  the  most  only  lay  the  foundation  of  a  military  educa 
tion.  Each  individual  must  build  for  himself  upon  that 
foundation  the  superstructure  which  is  to  mark  his  place 
in  the  world.  If  he  does  not  build,  his  monument  will 
hardly  appear  above  the  surface  of  the  ground,  and  will 
soon  be  covered  out  of  sight. 

It  is  of  vital  importance  that  the  necessity  of  provid 
ing  for  calling  into  active  service  a  very  large  army  in 
the  shortest  possible  time  be  fully  understood.  It  is  as 
sumed  that  every  important  seaport  will  in  time  be  so 
fortified  as  to  be  safe  against  any  unsupported  naval  at 
tack.  Modern  science  has  rendered  this  easy  and  certain. 
Hence  a  naval  attack  must  necessarily  be  supported  by 
the  landing  of  a  military  force  upon  the  open  coast,  to  at 
tack  the  land  defenses  in  reverse ;  and  such  defenses  are 
now  far  more  vulnerable  to  attack  in  rear  than  those  of 
former  times. 

The  sea-coasts  of  the  United  States  are  many  thousand 
miles  in  extent,  and  an  attack  may  be  made  at  any  one 
or  several  of  the  many  important  seaports  in  these  long 
lines  of  coast.  No  one  can  anticipate  where  the  blow  or 
blows  may  fall.  Hence  it  is  necessary  to  be  prepared  to 
resist  an  attempt  to  land  at  any  one  of  those  many  points 
which  are  of  such  importance  as  to  tempt  an  enemy  to 
attack  them.  The  railroad  facilities  of  the  country  are 
such  that  the  necessary  armies  can  be  moved  to  all  ex 
posed  points  in  time  to  meet  any  emergency.  But  the 
armies  must  be  ready  to  move  almost  at  a  moment's  no 
tice.  There  will  be  no  time  to  organize,  much  less  to  drill, 
new  troops.  Before  that  could  be  done,  any  one  or  two 
or  three  of  our  largest  seaport  cities  could  be  captured 
and  destroyed,  and  the  invading  forces  get  back  again  on 
their  transports,  and  under  the  protection  of  the  guns  of 


MEASURES  NECESSARY  TO  THE  NATIONAL  DEFENSE       527 

their  own  fleet.  And  even  if  we  had  a  navy  more  power 
ful  than  that  of  our  enemy,  it  alone  could  give  us  no  ade 
quate  protection ;  for  the  enemy  would  be  sure  to  select  a 
point  of  attack  where  our  navy  was  not  at  the  time,  and 
which  it  could  not  reach  until  too  late.  Indispensable  as 
a  navy  is  to  this  country,  it  cannot  act  any  very  impor 
tant  part  in  the  defense  of  so  extended  a  sea-coast  un 
less  it  is  many  times  more  powerful  than  any  fleet  which 
an  enemy  may  send  to  attack  us.  The  enemy  being  free 
to  choose  his  point  of  attack,  we  would  require  at  or  near 
every  one  of  the  exposed  points  a  fleet  at  least  as  large  as 
his,  or  in  the  aggregate  at  least  five  times  as  large.  No 
one,  it  is  presumed,  contemplates  the  creation  of  any  such 
navy  as  that  in  this  country. 

Indeed,  it  would  be  the  height  of  folly  to  require  the 
navy  to  take  part  in  the  defense.  In  a  country  having 
the  situation  of  the  United  States,  the  navy  is  the  aggres 
sive  arm  of  the  national  military  power.  Its  function  is 
to  punish  an  enemy  until  he  is  willing  to  submit  to  the 
national  demands.  For  this  purpose  entire  freedom  of 
action  is  essential;  also  secure  depots  whence  supplies 
may  be  drawn  and  where  necessary  repairs  may  be  made, 
and  harbors  where  cruisers  or  other  vessels  may  seek 
safety  if  temporarily  overpowered.  Hence  arises  one 
of  the  most  important  functions  of  the  land  defense :  to 
give  the  aggressive  arm  secure  bases  of  operation  at  all 
the  great  seaports  where  navy-yards  or  depots  are  located. 
It  may  be  that  in  special  cases  military  forces  may  be 
needed  to  act  in  support  of  naval  operations,  or  to  hold 
for  a  time  important  points  in  a  foreign  country;  but 
such  service  must  be  only  auxiliary,  not  a  primary  object. 
Foreign  conquest  and  permanent  occupation  are  not  a 
part  of  the  policy  of  this  country.  There  is  no  division 
of  opinion  among  standard  naval  and  military  authorities 
on  this  great  subject;  such  standard  authors  as  Rear- 
Admiral  Walker  and  Captain  Mahan  have  clearly  set 


528  FOETY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

forth  the  relative  functions  of  the  army  and  the  navy  in 
enforcing  the  military  policy  of  the  United  States.  The 
military  problem  which  this  country  must  solve  is  to  pro 
vide  such  means  of  aggressive  and  defensive  action  as  to 
be  able  to  enforce  a  due  observance  of  American  public 
law  on  this  continent,  and,  while  doing  this,  to  defend 
itself  against  insult  and  spoliation.  The  land  defenses, 
including  torpedoes  and  in  a  few  cases  floating  batteries, 
should  be  entirely  independent  of  the  active  navy,  so 
that  the  latter  may  be  free  to  act  in  one  compact  mass 
against  any  enemy  which  may  anywhere  oppose  it. 

There  will  be  another  important  necessity  for  very 
large  forces  of  infantry  and  light  artillery, — that  is,  large 
in  the  aggregate, — in  the  event  of  war  with  even  a  second- 
or  third-class  naval  power:  to  protect  our  long  lines  of 
open  coast  and  small  unfortified  harbors  from  destruction 
by  the  guns  and  landing-parties  of  the  enemy's  light-draft 
cruisers.  This  would  require  a  "  picket-line  "  with  con 
siderable  "reserves,"  several  thousand  miles  in  length. 
The  national  pride,  if  not  the  material  interests  involved, 
would  not  permit  the  government  to  submit  to  such  de 
struction  or  spoliation  without  making  every  possible 
effort  to  prevent  it.  In  short,  unless  the  government  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  are  willing  to  prepare  in 
advance  for  putting  into  the  field  at  a  moment's  notice  a 
very  large  and  effective  army,  as  well  as  to  fortify  all  im 
portant  seaports,  they  may  as  well  make  up  their  minds 
to  submit,  at  least  for  a  time,  to  whatever  indignity  any 
considerable  naval  power  may  see  fit  to  inflict  upon  them. 
No  half-way  measures  will  do  any  good.  Fortifications 
without  an  army  would  be  worth  no  more,  against  any 
country  having  a  considerable  army  and  navy,  than  an 
army  without  fortifications. 


CHAPTER  XXX 

THE  FINANCIAL  LESSON  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  —  APPROACHING 
BANKRUPTCY  OF  THE  GOVERNMENT  NEAR  THE  CLOSE  OF 
THE  WAR — THE  LEGAL-TENDER  NOTES  AN  INJURY  TO 
THE  PUBLIC  CREDIT  —  A  VICIOUS  CLAUSE  IN  THE  CON 
STITUTION —  NO  PREJUDICE  IN  THE  ARMY  AGAINST 
OFFICERS  NOT  EDUCATED  AT  WEST  POINT — THE  NEED 
OF  A  LAW  REFORMING  THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE 
PRESIDENT  AND  THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  ARMY  —  DE 
VOTION  TO  THE  CHOSEN  LEADER  IN  TIMES  OF  PUBLIC 
PERIL. 

A  NOTHER  great  lesson  taught  by  our  Civil  War,  per- 
JT\-  haps  even  more  important  than  any  other,  is  the 
financial  lesson.  An  established  government  which  has  a 
place  to  maintain  among  the  commercial  nations  of  the 
world  must  maintain  its  credit.  It  must  purchase  its  sup 
plies  and  munitions  of  war  and  pay  its  troops  in  money. 
In  a  great  and  prolonged  war  it  is  not  possible  for  the 
people  to  contribute  all  the  means  required  at  the  time. 
The  amount  of  taxation  would  be  greater  than  any  people 
could  bear.  Hence  the  government  must  borrow  the 
necessary  money.  This  cannot  be  done  without  national 
credit.  If  credit  declines,  rates  of  interest  and  discount 
on  securities  increase  until  the  national  debt  reaches  its 
limit  and  no  more  money  can  be  borrowed.  In  short,  the 
nation  becomes  bankrupt.  This  was  the  condition  of 
the  United  States  before  the  close  of  the  late  Civil  War. 
With  a  million  of  men  on  the  muster-  and  pay-rolls,  in 
cluding  several  great  armies  of  veteran  troops  in  the  field, 

34  529 


530  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

while  the  Confederate  army  was  reduced  to  a  very  small 
fraction  of  that  number,  the  Union  cause  was  on  the  very 
verge  of  failure,  because  the  government  could  no  longer 
raise  money  to  pay  its  troops,  purchase  supplies,  or  make 
any  further  use  of  its  magnificent  armies.  This  astound 
ing  fact  was  confided  to  the  generals  of  the  army  in  the 
winter  of  1864-5  by  the  Secretary  of  War,  who  then  said 
the  rebellion  must  be  suppressed  in  the  coming  spring 
campaign,  or  the  effort  abandoned,  because  the  resources 
of  the  treasury  were  exhausted.  In  corroboration  of  my 
recollection  on  this  subject,  I  now  find  the  following  in  a 
private  letter  written  by  me  at  that  time : 

WASHINGTON,  February  3,  1865. 

There  is  much  excitement  here  over  the  peace  rumors,  and  it 
would  seem  there  must  be  good  foundation  for  it.  The  Presi 
dent  has  actually  gone  to  Fort  Monroe  to  meet  the  rebel  com 
missioners.  I  do  not,  however,  indulge  much  faith  in  the  result 
of  these  negotiations.  We  will  probably  have  to  beat  Lee's  army 
before  we  can  have  peace.  There  is  much  commotion  among 
politicians,  and  there  will  he  a  storm  of  some  kind  on  the  politi 
cal  sea  if  peace  is  made  now.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  war  con 
tinues  long,  the  treasury  will  most  likely  become  bankrupt.  It 
has  got  far  behind  already.  There  is  no  money  to  pay  the  army, 
and  no  one  can  tell  where  it  is  to  come  from.  I  have  succeeded 
in  getting  enough  to  pay  my  troops,  which  was  obtained  by  spe 
cial  arrangement  with  the  treasury,  and  as  a  special  reward  for 
their  distinguished  services.  No  other  troops  in  the  country  have 
been  paid  for  five  months,  and  there  is  no  money  to  pay  them. 

The  reasons  for  this  deplorable  condition  of  the  United 
States  treasury  are  understood  by  all  financiers.  Yet  a 
very  large  proportion  of  the  voting  population  do  not  ap 
pear  to  understand  it,  or  do  not  know  the  fact.  People 
engaged  in  an  effort  to  throw  off  their  dependency  or  po 
litical  connection,  and  establish  their  own  independence, 
or  a  country  defending  itself  against  a  powerful  adversary, 
may  be  compelled  to  resort  to  forced  loans,  in  the  absence 


THE  FINANCIAL  LESSON  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAK  531 

of  national  credit,  to  carry  on  the  war.  But  in  a  great 
country  with  unlimited  resources,  like  the  United  States, 
resort  to  forced  loans  would  seem  to  be  entirely  unneces 
sary.  However  this  may  be,  and  whatever  may  be  the 
necessity  in  any  case,  a  forced  loan,  without  interest,  is 
simple  robbery  to  the  extent  of  unpaid  interest,  even  if 
the  principal  is  paid.  And  a  robber  cannot  expect  to 
have  much  credit  left  after  his  character  becomes  known 
to  the  world. 

The  issue  of  legal-tender  notes  during  the  Civil  War 
was  of  this  character.  The  country  received  a  deadly 
blow  to  its  financial  credit  when  that  policy  was  adopted. 
Nations  or  peoples  cannot,  any  more  than  individuals, 
violate  the  established  rules  of  honest  dealing  without 
suffering  the  just  penalty.  If  money  is  needed  beyond 
current  revenues,  there  is  no  other  honest  way.  to  get  it 
but  by  borrowing  it  at  such  rate  of  interest  and  upon 
such  security  as  can  be  agreed  upon.  Besides,  to  leave 
any  room  for  doubt  or  cavil  about  the  conditions  of  a 
loan,  or  about  the  standard  of  money  in  which  principal 
and  interest  are  to  be  paid,  necessarily  arouses  suspicion 
of  bad  faith,  and  hence  destroys  or  seriously  injures  na 
tional  credit.  It  is  now  perfectly  well  known  to  all  who 
have  taken  the  pains  to  study  the  subject  that  this  false 
and  practically  dishonest  policy,  however  innocently  it 
may  have  been  conceived,  cost  the  United  States  many 
hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars,  and  came  very  near  bring 
ing  disaster  upon  the  Union  cause.  One  of  the  most 
astounding  spectacles  ever  presented  in  the  history  of 
the  world  was  that  presented  by  this  country.  It  went 
into  the  war  practically  free  from  debt,  and  came  out  of 
it  with  a  debt  which  seemed  very  large,  to  be  sure,  and 
was  in  fact  nearly  twice  as  large  as  it  ought  to  have  been, 
yet  so  small  in  comparison  with  the  country's  resources 
that  it  could  be  paid  off  in  a  few  years.  It  went  into  the 
war  practically  without  an  army,  and  came  out  of  the  war 


532  FORTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  AEMY 

with  its  military  strength  not  even  yet  fully  developed. 
It  had  more  than  a  million  of  men,  nearly  all  veterans,  in 
the  ranks,  and  could  have  raised  a  million  more,  if  neces 
sary,  without  seriously  interfering  with  the  industries  of 
the  country.  Yet  in  four  short  years  a  false  financial 
policy  destroyed  the  national  credit,  brought  its  trea 
sury  to  bankruptcy,  and  thus  reduced  a  great  people  to 
a  condition  in  which  they  could  no  longer  make  any 
use  of  their  enormous  military  strength !  This  lesson 
ought  to  be  taught  in  every  school-house  in  the  United 
States,  until  every  child  is  made  to  understand  that  there 
is  no  such  thing  in  the  world  as  paper  money ;  that  the 
only  real  money  in  the  world  is  standard  gold  and  silver; 
that  paper  can  be  used  in  the  place  of  money  only  when 
it  represents  the  real  gold  or  silver  in  which  it  can  at  any 
time  be  redeemed ;  that  even  gold  and  silver  can  be  used 
together  as  standard  money  only  under  their  real  intrinsic 
values  as  recognized  by  all  the  world ;  that  any  attempt 
to  force  either  gold  or  silver  into  unlimited  circulation, 
under  any  arbitrary  ratio  different  from  their  real  ratio, 
is  not  honest ;  and  that  dishonesty  is  the  worst  of  all  finan 
cial  policies,  as  well  as  the  most  unworthy  of  a  civilized 
people. 

The  laws  of  finance,  like  the  laws  of  military  strategy, 
were  never  invented  by  anybody,  any  more  than  the  law 
of  gravitation  or  the  law  of  electrical  attraction  and  re 
pulsion.  They  have  all  been  learned  by  the  experience 
and  study  of  mankind  since  the  dawn  of  civilization. 
All  alike  are  parts  of  the  great  laws  of  nature.  They 
should  be  carefully  and  diligently  studied  and  taught  in  all 
the  schools,  until  the  rising  generation  understand  that 
all  the  affairs  of  mankind  are  governed  by  the  uniform 
laws  established  by  the  great  Creator  and  Euler  of  the 
universe;  and  that  self-appointed  "leaders  of  the  people" 
who  would  entice  them  to  follow  their  own  inventions 
cannot  save  them  from  the  penalties  which  naturally 


A  VICIOUS  CLAUSE  IN  THE  CONSTITUTION  533 

follow  the  violation  of  any  of  the  laws  of  the  universe. 
In  short,  education, — wisely  directed  education, — both  in 
science  and  in  morals,  is  the  one  indispensable  foundation 
of  good  popular  government.  The  relative  importance 
to  be  attached  to  the  many  branches  of  popular  education 
demands  the  careful  consideration  of  all  educators,  and 
still  more  the  purity  of  the  doctrines  taught  in  all  the 
schools.  There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  this  last 
duty  has  been  much  neglected,  especially  in  respect  to 
financial  theories. 

In  this  connection,  it  is  worthy  of  serious  consideration 
whether  one  of  the  teachings  of  a  corrupt  age  has  not 
found  its  way  into  that  almost  sacred  writing,  the  Con 
stitution  of  the  United  States.  What  right  has  Congress, 
or  any  other  department  of  government,  or  any  govern 
ment  on  earth,  to  "regulate  the  value"  of  money,  any 
more  than  that  of  wheat  or  corn  1  Is  not  the  real  value 
of  money,  like  that  of  everything  else,  regulated  by  the 
general  law  of  supply  and  demand  throughout  the  world? 
Ought  not  the  value  of  money,  and  what  shall  constitute 
money,  be  left,  without  governmental  interference,  to  be 
determined  by  the  common  consent  of  mankind  ?  Must 
not  commercial  intercourse  among  all  the  countries  of 
the  world  necessarily  regulate  all  this,  in  spite  of  the  de 
crees  of  government ?  Ought  not  the  function  of  govern 
ment  in  this  regard  to  be  limited  to  the  coining  of  money 
and  stamping  on  its  face  its  real  value — that  is,  in  effect, 
the  amount  of  gold  or  silver  it  actually  contains?  In 
short,  is  not  the  attempt  of  government  to  make  a  certain 
weight  of  one  thing  equal  to  a  certain  weight  of  another 
thing  a  plain  violation  of  a  natural  law,  and  hence  neces 
sarily  vicious  ?  Is  not  all  our  serious  monetary  contro 
versy  in  this  country  the  result  of  vicious  teaching  to  be 
found  in  our  own  Constitution,  inherited  from  a  corrupt 
age,  when  the  fiat  of  a  prince  was  thought  sufficient  to 
make  a  coin  worth  more  than  it  was  in  fact?  "Where  did 


534  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

so  many  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  learn  the 
heretical  doctrine  of  fiat  money  ?  Is  it  not  taught  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States!  It  so  seems  to  me, 
and  hence  it  seems  to  me  that  the  people  should  at  once 
strike  at  the  very  root  of  the  evil,  and  eradicate  from 
their  fundamental  law  the  theory  that  the  value  of  any 
thing  can  be  regulated  by  arbitrary  fiat,  in  violation  of 
natural  law.  Let  the  people  restore  to  themselves  their 
inalienable  right  to  liberty  of  trade,  so  that  they  can  deal 
with  each  other  in  gold,  or  in  silver,  or  in  cotton,  or  in 
corn,  as  they  please,  and  pay  in  what  they  have  agreed 
to  pay  in,  without  impertinent  interference  from  legis 
lators  or  anybody  else.  Then,  and  only  then,  can  the 
monetary  system  of  this  country  be  placed  on  a  sound 
foundation,  and  all  the  gold  and  silver  of  our  mines,  as 
well  as  all  other  products  of  human  industry,  and  the 
people  who  produce  or  own  them,  become  truly  free. 

Another  important  lesson  taught  by  our  experience 
since  the  Civil  War,  no  less  than  at  the  commencement 
of  that  period,  is  that  prompt  and  vigorous  action,  in 
accordance  with  established  military  methods,  whenever 
military  force  must  be  employed,  necessarily  presupposes 
such  knowledge  of  the  laws  on  the  part  of  department 
and  army  commanders  as  will  justify  the  President  in 
intrusting  them  with  discretionary  authority  to  act  with 
out  specific  orders  in  each  case.  Such  emergencies  as 
that  of  1894,  for  example,  give  striking  proof  of  the 
necessity  for  the  higher  education  to  fit  men  for  high 
command  in  the  army.  It  is  not  mainly  a  question  of 
military  education.  Early  deficiencies  in  that  respect 
may  soon  be  overcome  by  the  constant  practice  afforded 
by  active  service.  The  indispensable  necessity  is  for 
education  in  general,  and  especially  in  those  things  which 
army  officers  are  not  habitually  required  to  know,  but 
which  are  of  vital  importance  to  those  who  must,  in  great 
emergencies,  be  intrusted  with  great  responsibilities  and 


OFFICERS  NOT  EDUCATED  AT  WEST  POINT  535 

with  discretionary  authority.  That  very  emergency  of 
1894  gave  examples  of  officers,  not  educated  at  West 
Point  nor  at  any  other  military  school,  distinguished  for 
gallant  and  efficient  military  service  in  the  field,  who 
proved  to  be  perfectly  familiar  with  the  principles  of 
constitutional  and  military  law  which  ought  to  govern 
the  action  of  troops  under  circumstances  like  those  of 
1894;  while  others,  distinguished  as  commanders  in  the 
field,  seemed  strangely  ignorant  of  both  constitutional 
and  military  laws.  It  is  also  worthy  of  remark  that  such 
necessary  legal  education  did  not  appear  to  be  uni 
versal  among  the  West  Point  graduates  at  that  time. 
Some  men  who  are  not  graduates  of  West  Point  are  much 
better  qualified  for  high  command  than  some  who  are. 

Much  has  been  said  about  a  supposed  prejudice  in  the 
army  against  officers  who  have  not  enjoyed  the  advan 
tages  of  education  at  the  military  academy.  I  aver,  em 
phatically,  that  I  have  never  seen  any  evidence  of  any 
such  feeling,  and  I  do  not  believe  it  has  ever  existed  to 
any  appreciable  extent.  On  the  contrary,  the  general 
feeling  has  been  that  of  just  and  generous  consideration 
for  officers  who  were  at  first  laboring  under  that  disad 
vantage.  Some  of  the  most  popular  men  in  the  army 
have  been  among  those  appointed  from  civil  life  or  from 
the  volunteers.  General  Alfred  H.  Terry  was  a  fair  ex 
ample  of  this.  He  was  a  ripe  scholar,  a  thorough  lawyer, 
a  very  laborious  student  of  the  art  and  science  of  war, — 
more  so  than  most  West  Point  graduates, — and  so  modest 
that  he  hesitated  to  accept  the  appointment  of  brigadier- 
general  in  the  regular  army,  although  it  had  been  given 
for  so  distinguished  a  service  as  the  capture  of  Fort 
Fisher,  on  the  ground  that  older  officers  who  had  devoted 
their  whole  lives  to  the  military  service  were  better  en 
titled  to  it. 

The  general  feeling  in  the  army  has  no  special  refer 
ence  to  West  Point.  It  is  a  feeling,  and  a  very  strong 


536  FOETY-SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

one,  in  favor  of  education,  of  qualification  in  all  respects 
for  the  service  which  may  be  required,  of  that  dignified 
self-respect  and  becoming  modesty  which  prevent  an 
officer  from  desiring  a  position  for  which  he  is  not  fully 
qualified,  and,  above  all,  that  manly  delicacy  which  makes 
it  impossible  for  an  officer  to  seek  a  position  which  ought 
to  be  left  to  seek  Mm.  As  well  might  a  maiden  ask  a 
man  to  marry  her,  or  get  some  one  else  to  do  it  for  her, 
as  a  soldier  to  seek  in  the  same  way  a  position  on  the 
staff  of  a  general  or  of  the  President. 

This  is  especially  true  in  respect  to  the  position  of  the 
"  commanding  general,"  or  general-in-chief ,  of  the  army. 
The  President  being,  by  the  Constitution,  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  army  and  navy,  no  law  of  Congress,  even 
with  his  own  consent,  could  relieve  him  from  that  respon 
sibility.  There  is  no  law,  and  there  could  not  constitu 
tionally  be  any  law  passed,  establishing  any  such  office  as 
that  of  commanding  general  of  the  army,  and  defining 
the  duties  and  authority  attached  to  it.  Such  a  law 
would  be  a  clear  encroachment  upon  the  constitutional 
prerogatives  of  the  President.  The  only  constitutional 
relation  in  which  the  so-called  "  commanding  general,"  or 
"  general-in-chief,"  of  the  army  can  occupy  is  that  usually 
called  "chief  of  the  staff"  —  the  chief  military  adviser 
and  executive  officer  of  the  commander-in-chief.  He  can 
not  exercise  any  command  whatever  independently  of  the 
President,  and  the  latter  must  of  necessity  define  and 
limit  his  duties.  No  other  authority  can  possibly  do  it. 
In  this  regard  the  President's  power  and  discretion  are 
limited  only  by  his  constitutional  obligation  to  exercise 
the  chief  command  himself.  He  can  give  his  general-in- 
chief  as  much  authority  as  he  pleases  consistently  with 
that  obligation.  Hence  it  is  entirely  in  the  discretion  of 
the  President  to  define  and  fix  the  relations  which  should 
exist  between  the  general  and  the  Secretary  of  "War — a 
very  difficult  thing  to  do,  no  doubt, — at  least  one  which 


THE  PRESIDENT   AND  THE  COMMANDER   OF   THE  ARMY    537 

seems  never  to  have  been  satisfactorily  done  by  any 
President.  The  Secretary  and  the  general  appear  to 
have  been  left  to  arrange  that  as  best  they  could,  or  to 
leave  it  unarranged.  However  this  may  be,  the  relations 
of  the  general  to  the  President  are,  or  ought  to  be,  of  the 
most  confidential  character,  no  less  so  than  those  of  any 
member  of  the  cabinet.  And  the  necessity  of  that  confi 
dential  relation  is  far  more  important  than  in  the  case  of 
any  cabinet  officer,  for  the  reason  that  it  is  brought  into 
prominence  in  times  of  great  emergency,  when  questions 
of  peace  and  war  are  involved,  and  when  the  President  is 
required  to  act  upon  momentous  military  questions  about 
which  he  cannot,  in  general,  have  much  knowledge,  and 
hence  must  trust  to  the  ability,  judgment,  discretion,  and 
scientific  military  knowledge  of  the  general-in-chief.  In 
such  cases  the  general  becomes,  as  it  were,  the  "  keeper 
of  the  President's  conscience  "  in  respect  to  the  most  mo 
mentous  questions  he  can  ever  have  to  decide. 

It  is  necessarily  extremely  embarrassing  to  the  Presi 
dent  to  be  compelled  to  place  or  retain  in  that  close,  con 
fidential,  and  important  relation  to  himself  an  officer  in 
whom  he  has  not  entire  confidence  in  all  respects;  or  else, 
as  the  only  alternative,  by  selecting  another,  to  cast  a  re 
flection  upon  the  senior  in  rank,  whose  soldierly  character 
and  services  may  have  entitled  him  to  the  highest  dis 
tinction.  The  situation  is  no  less  embarrassing,  under 
the  existing  law  and  custom,  to  the  officer  who  may  at 
any  time  happen  to  be  the  senior  in  commission.  He 
may  be  compelled  to  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  being 
superseded  by  some  junior  in  rank,  or  else  to  occupy  a 
confidential  position  of  great  importance  in  the  absence 
of  that  confidence  which  is  necessary  to  make  such  a 
position  even  tolerable  to  himself  or  to  the  army,  which 
must  inevitably  be  deprived  of  his  legitimate  influence 
for  good  if  he  does  not  enjoy  the  confidence  of  the  Presi 
dent  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  There  can  be  no  relief 


538  FORTY-SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

from  this  dilemma,  so  embarrassing  to  both  the  President 
and  the  general,  except  by  appropriate  legislation. 

The  most  important  military  reform  now  required  in 
this  country  is  a  law  authorizing  the  President,  "  by  and 
with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,"  to  appoint, 
not  a  commander  of  the  army,  but  a  "  general-in-chief ," 
or  "  chief  of  staff,"  to  aid  him  (the  commander-in-chief)  in 
the  discharge  of  his  military  duties.  The  President  ought 
to  have  the  power  to  retire  such  officer  at  any  time,  with 
due  regard  for  his  rank  and  services,  and  to  appoint 
another  in  the  same  manner.  The  title  "commanding 
general  of  the  army"  is  inappropriate  and  misleading. 
There  never  has  been  any  such  office  in  this  country,  ex 
cept  that  created  especially  for  General  Grant  in  1864. 
The  old  title  of  "general-in-chief,"  given  to  the  officer 
at  the  head  of  the  army  before  the  Civil  War,  is  the  ap 
propriate  title  in  this  country.  That  officer  is,  in  fact, 
the  chief  general,  but  does  not  command  the  army. 

If  it  be  considered  the  best  policy  to  reserve  the  two 
highest  military  grades, — those  of  general  and  lieutenant- 
general, — to  be  conferred  only  by  special  act  of  Congress 
for  distinguished  services,  appropriate  distinction  may 
be  given  to  the  officer  at  the  head  of  the  army  at  any 
time  by  the  title  of  general-in-chief,  with  such  additional 
compensation  as  is  necessary  to  defray  his  living  ex 
penses  in  Washington.  Neither  the  rank  nor  the  pay 
of  an  officer  in  a  subordinate  position  can  possibly  be  re 
garded  as  appropriate  to  one  in  a  higher  grade  of  duty. 
Every  grade  of  public  service  should  have  an  officer  of  ap 
propriate  rank  and  compensation,  certainly  the  highest  in 
any  department  even  more  than  any  other.  The  govern 
ment  of  this  country  has  not  been  duly  regardful  even  of 
its  own  dignity  and  self-respect,  in  denying  to  its  chief 
military  officer  appropriate  rank,  and  in  requiring  him 
to  expend  all  the  savings  of  a  lifetime  to  maintain  his 
official  position  for  a  few  years  at  the  seat  of  government. 


THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  COMMANDER  OF  THE  ARMY     539 

Not  by  any  means  the  least  benefit  to  be  expected 
from  a  law  authorizing  each  President  to  select  his  chief 
general,  would  be  the  education  thus  given  to  officers  of 
the  army  in  respect  to  the  relation  in  which  they  stand 
to  the  commander-in-chief,  and  in  respect  to  the  reason 
able  limits  of  military  ambition  in  a  republic  where  the 
President  is  and  must  be  commander-in-chief,  whether  he 
is  a  man  of  military  education  and  experience  or  not. 

So  strongly  were  these  views  impressed  upon  my  mind 
by  my  studies  of  the  subject,  made  at  the  request  of 
General  Grant  and  General  Sherman  many  years  ago, 
that  when  I  became  the  senior  officer  of  the  army  I  re 
frained  scrupulously  from  suggesting  to  the  President  or 
the  Secretary  of  War  or  anybody  else  that  I  had  any  ex 
pectation  of  being  assigned  to  the  command,  or  regarded 
myself  as  having  any  claim  to  it.  It  seemed  to  me  solely 
a  question  for  the  President  himself  to  decide  whether  or 
not  he  wanted  me  as  his  chief  military  adviser  and  assist 
ant,  and  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  me  to  consent 
that  anybody  should  try  to  influence  his  decision  in  my 
favor. 

The  duties  of  patriotic  citizenship  in  time  of  war  have 
not  always  been  duly  appreciated,  even  by  those  most 
zealous  in  their  loyalty  to  the  government.  I  would  not 
detract  one  iota  from  the  honor  and  fame  of  the  wise, 
brave,  and  patriotic  statesmen  who  upheld  the  hands  of 
the  great  Lincoln  in  his  struggle  against  the  avowed  foes 
of  the  Union,  and  his  still  harder  struggle  with  professed 
patriots  who  wielded  national  influence  only  for  evil, 
though  under  the  guise  of  friends  of  the  Union.  But 
if  many  thousands  of  those  zealous  and  "truly  loyal 
Union  men,"  many  of  whom  I  knew,  could  have  managed 
in  some  way  to  get  into  the  ranks  and  get  killed  in  battle 
the  first  year,  I  firmly  believe  the  Union  would  have 
been  restored  much  sooner  than  it  was. 

When  the  people  have  chosen  their  chief  to  lead  them 


540          FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

through,  the  fierce  storms  of  civil  war,  he  alone  must 
guide  the  ship,  or  else  all  must  perish.  After  the  storm 
has  burst  upon  them  it  is  too  late  to  select  another  pilot. 
Then  partizan  opposition,  impairing  the  popular  strength 
and  confidence  of  the  leader  and  embarrassing  his  mili 
tary  operations  or  public  policy,  becomes  treason,  and  a 
far  more  dangerous  treason  than  any  which  the  open 
sympathizers  with  the  public  enemy  could  possibly  com 
mit.  Those  powerful  leaders  of  public  opinion  who 
hounded  Lincoln  on  to  measures  which  his  far  greater 
wisdom  and  his  supreme  sense  of  responsibility  told  him 
were  unwise,  deserved  to  be  hanged,  or  at  least  to  be 
imprisoned  until  the  war  was  over.  That  some  of  them 
died  in  shame  and  disgrace  upon  the  failure  of  their  own 
selfish  schemes  for  personal  or  political  aggrandizement, 
was  only  a  mild  measure  of  righteous  retribution. 

In  the  calm  atmosphere  of  these  later  years  I  still  think 
that  the  course  of  the  young  soldier  who  had  not  learned 
any  of  the  arts  or  of  the  ambitions  of  partizan  leaders, 
but  whose  only  motto  was  "  the  President's  policy  is  my 
policy ;  his  orders  my  rule  of  action,"  was  much  more  in 
accord  with  the  plain  duty  of  every  citizen  of  the  republic. 
I  can  find  in  my  mind  or  heart  only  contempt  for  that 
theory  of  patriotic  duty  which  sends  one  citizen  to  the 
front,  freely  to  give  his  life,  without  question,  to  enforce 
the  orders  of  the  chosen  leader  of  the  nation,  and  permits 
another  to  stay  at  home  and  bend  all  his  efforts  toward 
forcing  the  substitution  of  his  own  egotistical  views  upon 
the  country,  in  lieu  of  those  which  the  great  leader  has 
decided  to  be  most  wise. 

Let  the  names  of  the  great  war  governors,  and  of  the 
statesmen  in  Congress  and  cabinet  who  gave  all  of  their 
strength  to  the  support  of  the  measures  of  Lincoln,  stand 
by  the  side  of  the  foremost  commanders  of  armies  on 
the  roll  of  national  honor.  Let  the  others  be  covered  by 
the  mantle  of  charity,  and  quietly  pass  into  oblivion. 


CHAPTER  XXXI 

GENERAL    SHERMAN'S    FRIENDSHIP  —  HIS    DEATH  —  GENERAL 

GRANT'S  RECOGNITION  OF  SERVICES  —  HIS  GREAT  TRAIT, 
MORAL  AND  INTELLECTUAL  HONESTY  —  HIS  CONFIDENCE 
IN  HIMSELF  —  GRANT,  LIKE  LINCOLN,  A  TYPICAL  AMERICAN 

—  ON   THE  RETIRED   LIST    OF   THE   ARMY  —  CONCLUSION. 


ENERAL  SHERMAN  never  failed  to  manifest  his 
vJT  generous  appreciation  of  my  services  as  one  of  his 
trusted  lieutenants,  from  the  time  we  met  in  the  field 
until  he  retired  from  command  of  the  army.  Our  long 
standing  friendship  increased  till  the  time  of  his  death. 
"While  I  was  in  command  of  the  army,  General  Sherman 
never  came  to  Washington  without  coming  very  promptly 
to  see  me  at  headquarters,  not  waiting  for  a  first  visit 
from  his  junior  in  rank.  Of  course  this  great  and  cordial 
courtesy  was  very  promptly  returned.  Upon  the  occa 
sions  of  these  visits  at  the  office,  the  general  would  sit  a 
long  time,  talking  in  his  inimitably  charming  manner 
with  me  and  the  staff  officers  who  came  in  with  their 
morning  business.  Then  he  would  insist  upon  my  going 
with  him  to  call  upon  the  President,  a  formality  which 
was  demanded  by  his  high  sense  of  the  respect  due  from 
him  and  me  together,  as  past  and  present  commanding 
generals,  to  the  commander-in-chief.  This  high  regard 
for  military  courtesy  which  was  a  characteristic  of  Gen 
eral  Sherman,  though  he  seemed  comparatively  indif 
ferent  to  any  lack  of  it  toward  himself,  well  merits  the 
imitation  of  all  military  men. 

The  last  of  those  visits  occurred  a  very  short  time  be- 


542  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  ARMY 

fore  the  general's  death.  He  was  then  well  aware  of  the 
weakness  which  so  soon  proved  fatal  to  him,  and  sub 
mitted  like  a  child  while  I  wrapped  him  up  before  going 
over  to  the  White  House.  Upon  my  suggestion  of  the 
necessity  of  caution,  he  said,  "Yes,"  and  gripping  his 
hand  near  his  chest,  added,  "  It  will  catch  me  like  that 
some  time,  and  I  will  be  gone."  Yet  General  Sherman 
preferred  the  life  in  New  York  which  was  so  congenial 
to  him,  rather  than  seek  to  prolong  his  days  in  a  milder 
climate. 

We  laid  him  by  the  side  of  his  wife,  that  highest  type 
of  the  Christian  woman,  wife,  and  mother.  Who  can 
ever  forget  that  touching  scene  by  the  grave  in  St. 
Louis?  The  brave  young  priest,  the  very  image  in 
character,  even  more  than  in  face,  of  his  great  father, 
standing  alone,  without  another  of  all  the  priests  of  his 
church,  and  daring,  without  ecclesiastical  sanction  or 
support,  to  perform  the  service  for  the  dead  prescribed 
by  his  church  for  those  who  "  die  in  the  Lord."  "  Wor 
thy  son  of  a  noble  sire!"  What  man  dares  to  pass 
judgment  upon  him  who  so  mightily  helped  to  save  his 
country  from  ruin,  and  to  strike  the  shackles  from  mil 
lions  of  slaves,  or  to  say  that  he  was  not  worthy  to  be 
numbered  among  those  to  whom  the  Divine  Master  has 
said,  "Inasmuch  as  ye  have  done  it  unto  one  of  the 
least  of  these  my  brethren,  ye  have  done  it  unto  me "  ! 

The  subject  of  this  volume  being  limited  to  events  of 
which  I  have  had  personal  knowledge,  and  it  never  having 
been  my  good  fortune  to  serve  in  the  field  with  General 
Grant,  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  make  herein  any 
general  comments  upon  his  military  operations.  But  I 
cannot  close  this  account  of  events  so  closely  connected 
with  my  own  official  life  without  making  acknowledgment 
of  my  obligations  to  that  great-hearted  man  for  the  jus 
tice,  kindness,  and  generosity  which  he  invariably  mani 
fested  toward  me  whenever  occasion  offered. 


GENERAL  GRANT'S  RECOGNITION  OF   SERVICES         543 

It  was  General  Grant  whose  voluntary  application,  in 
the  winter  of  1863-4,  relieved  me  from  the  disagreeable 
controversy  with  partizan  politicians  in  Missouri,  and 
gave  me  command  of  an  army  in  the  field.  It  was  upon 
his  recommendation  that  my  services  in  that  command 
were  recognized  by  promotion  from  the  grade  of  captain 
to  that  of  brigadier-general  in  the  regular  army  and 
brevet  major-general  for  services  in  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin.  It  was  Grant  who,  upon  my  suggestion,  ordered  me, 
with  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  from  Tennessee  to  North 
Carolina,  to  take  part  in  the  closing  operations  of  the 
war,  instead  of  leaving  me  where  nothing  important  re 
mained  to  be  done.  It  was  he  who  paid  me  the  high 
compliment  of  selecting  me  to  conduct  the  operations 
which  might  be  necessary  to  enforce  the  Monroe  doctrine 
against  the  French  army  which  had  invaded  Mexico.  It 
was  he  who  firmly  sustained  me  in  saving  the  people  of 
Virginia  from  the  worst  effects  of  the  congressional  re 
construction  laws.  It  was  he  who  greeted  me  most  cor 
dially  as  Secretary  of  War  in  1868,  and  expressed  a  desire 
that  I  might  hold  that  office  under  his  own  administra 
tion.  And,  finally,  it  was  he  who  promoted  me  to  the 
rank  of  major-general  in  the  regular  army,  the  next  day 
after  his  inauguration  as  President. 

It  was  a  great  disappointment  to  me  to  find  only  casual 
mention  of  my  name  in  General  Grant's  "  Memoirs."  But 
I  was  not  only  consoled,  but  moved  to  deep  emotion  when 
told  by  his  worthy  son,  Colonel  Frederick  Dent  Grant, 
that  his  father  had  not  ceased  up  to  the  last  day  of  his 
life  to  cherish  the  same  kind  feeling  he  had  always  mani 
fested  toward  me,  and  that  one  of  his  last  fruitless  efforts, 
when  he  could  no  longer  speak,  was  to  put  on  paper  some 
legible  words  mentioning  my  name. 

General  Sherman  wrote  that  he  could  not  understand 
Grant,  and  doubted  if  Grant  understood  himself.  A  very 
distinguished  statesman,  whose  name  I  need  not  mention, 


544  FORTY- SIX  YEARS  IN  THE  AEMY 

said  to  me  that,  in  his  opinion,  there  was  nothing  special 
in  Grant  to  understand.  Others  have  varied  widely  in 
their  estimates  of  that  extraordinary  character.  Yet  I  be 
lieve  its  most  extraordinary  quality  was  its  extreme  sim 
plicity  —  so  extreme  that  many  have  entirely  overlooked 
it  in  their  search  for  some  deeply  hidden  secret  to  account 
for  so  great  a  character,  unmindful  of  the  general  fact 
that  simplicity  is  one  of  the  most  prominent  attributes 
of  greatness. 

The  greatest  of  all  the  traits  of  Grant's  character  was 
that  which  lay  always  on  the  surface,  visible  to  all  who 
had  eyes  to  see  it.  That  was  his  moral  and  intellectual 
integrity,  sincerity,  veracity,  and  justice.  He  was  incapa 
ble  of  any  attempt  to  deceive  anybody,  except  for  a  legit 
imate  purpose,  as  in  military  strategy ;  and,  above  all,  he 
was  incapable  of  deceiving  himself.  He  possessed  that 
rarest  of  all  human  faculties,  the  power  of  a  perfectly 
accurate  estimate  of  himself,  uninfluenced  by  pride,  am 
bition,  flattery,  or  self-interest.  Grant  was  very  far  from 
being  a  modest  man,  as  the  word  modest  is  generally  un 
derstood.  His  just  self-esteem  was  as  far  above  modesty 
as  it  was  above  flattery.  The  highest  encomiums  were 
accepted  for  what  he  believed  them  to  be  worth.  They 
did  not  disturb  his  equilibrium  in  the  slightest  degree. 

"While  Grant  knew  his  own  merits  as  well  as  anybody 
did,  he  also  knew  his  own  imperfections,  and  estimated 
them  at  their  real  value.  For  example,  his  inability  to 
speak  in  public,  which  produced  the  impression  of  ex 
treme  modesty  or  diffidence,  he  accepted  simply  as  a  fact 
in  his  nature  which  was  of  little  or  no  consequence,  and 
which  he  did  not  even  care  to  conceal.  He  would  not  for 
many  years  even  take  the  trouble  to  jot  down  a  few 
words  in  advance,  so  as  to  be  able  to  say  something  when 
called  upon.  Indeed,  I  believe  he  would  have  regarded  it 
as  an  unworthy  attempt  to  appear  in  a  false  light  if  he 
had  made  preparations  in  advance  for  an  "  extempora- 


GRANT'S  CONFIDENCE  IN  HIMSELF  545 

neous"  speech.  Even  when  he  did  in  later  years  write 
some  notes  on  the  back  of  a  dinner-card,  he  would  take 
care  to  let  everybody  see  that  he  had  done  so  by  holding 
the  card  in  plain  view  while  he  read  his  little  speech. 
After  telling  a  story  in  which  the  facts  had  been  modi 
fied  somewhat  to  give  the  greater  effect,  which  no  one 
could  enjoy  more  than  he  did,  Grant  would  take  care  to 
explain  exactly  in  what  respects  he  had  altered  the  facts 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  the  interest  in  his  story,  so 
that  he  might  not  leave  any  wrong  impression. 

When  Grant's  attention  was  called  to  any  mistake  he 
had  committed,  he  would  see  and  admit  it  as  quickly  and 
unreservedly  as  if  it  had  been  made  by  anybody  else,  and 
with  a  smile  which  expressed  the  exact  opposite  of  that 
feeling  which  most  men  are  apt  to  show  under  like  cir 
cumstances.  His  love  of  truth  and  justice  was  so  far 
above  all  personal  considerations  that  he  showed  unmis 
takable  evidence  of  gratification  when  any  error  into 
which  he  might  have  fallen  was  corrected.  The  fact  that 
he  had  made  a  mistake  and  that  it  was  plainly  pointed 
out  to  him  did  not  produce  the  slightest  unpleasant  im 
pression,  while  the  further  fact  that  no  harm  had  resulted 
from  his  mistake  gave  him  real  pleasure.  In  Grant's 
judgment,  no  case  in  which  any  wrong  had  been  done 
could  possibly  be  regarded  as  finally  settled  until  that 
wrong  was  righted ;  and  if  he  himself  had  been,  in  any 
sense,  a  party  to  that  wrong,  he  was  the  more  earnest 
in  his  desire  to  see  justice  done.  While  he  thus  showed 
a  total  absence  of  any  false  pride  of  opinion  or  of 
knowledge,  no  man  could  be  firmer  than  he  in  adherence 
to  his  mature  judgment,  or  more  earnest  in  his  determi 
nation,  on  proper  occasions,  to  make  it  understood  that 
his  opinion  was  his  own,  and  not  borrowed  from  anybody 
else.  His  pride  in  his  own  mature  opinion  was  very 
great;  in  that  he  was  as  far  as  possible  from  being  a 
modest  man.  This  absolute  confidence  in  his  own  judg- 

35 


546  FORTY- SIX  YEAES  IN  THE  ARMY 

ment  upon  any  subject  which  he  had  mastered,  and  the 
moral  courage  to  take  upon  himself  alone  the  highest  re 
sponsibility,  and  to  demand  full  authority  and  freedom 
to  act  according  to  his  own  judgment,  without  interfer 
ence  from  anybody,  added  to  his  accurate  estimate  of  his 
own  ability  and  his  clear  perception  of  the  necessity  for 
undivided  authority  and  responsibility  in  the  conduct  of 
military  operations,  and  in  all  that  concerns  the  efficiency 
of  armies  in  time  of  war,  constituted  the  foundation  of 
that  very  great  character. 

When  summoned  to  Washington  to  take  command  of  all 
the  armies,  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-general,  he  deter 
mined,  before  he  reached  the  capital,  that  he  would  not  ac 
cept  the  command  under  any  other  conditions  than  those 
above  stated.  His  sense  of  honor  and  of  loyalty  to  the 
country  would  not  permit  him  to  consent  to  be  placed  in  a 
false  position, — one  in  which  he  could  not  perform  the 
service  which  the  country  had  been  led  to  expect  from  him, 
— and  he  had  the  courage  to  say  so  in  unqualified  terms. 

These  are  the  traits  of  character  which  made  Grant 
a  very  great  man — the  only  man  of  our  time,  so  far  as 
can  be  known,  who  possessed  both  the  character  and  the 
military  ability  which  were,  under  the  circumstances,  in 
dispensable  in  the  commander  of  the  armies  which  were 
to  suppress  the  great  rebellion. 

It  has  been  said  that  Grant,  like  Lincoln,  was  a  typical 
American,  and  for  that  reason  was  most  beloved  and  re 
spected  by  the  people.  That  is  true  of  the  statesman  and 
of  the  soldier,  as  well  as  of  the  people,  if  it  is  meant  that 
they  were  the  highest  type,  that  ideal  which  commands 
the  respect  and  admiration  of  the  highest  and  best  in  a 
man's  nature,  however  far  he  may  know  it  to  be  above 
himself.  The  soldiers  and  the  people  saw  in  Grant  or  in 
Lincoln,  not  one  of  themselves,  not  a  plain  man  of  the 
people,  nor  yet  some  superior  being  whom  they  could  not 
understand,  but  the  personification  of  their  highest  ideal 
of  a  citizen,  soldier,  or  statesman,  a  man  whose  great- 


CONCLUSION  547 

ness  they  could  see  and  understand  as  plainly  as  they 
could  anything  else  under  the  sun.  And  there  was  no 
more  mystery  about  it  all  in  fact  than  there  was  in  the 
popular  mind. 

Matchless  courage  and  composure  in  the  midst  of  the 
most  trying  events  of  battle,  magnanimity  in  the  hour  of 
victory,  and  moral  courage  to  compel  all  others  to  respect 
his  plighted  faith  toward  those  who  had  surrendered  to 
him,  were  the  crowning  glories  of  Grant's  great  and  no 
ble  character. 

On  September  29,  1895,  came  the  hour  when  I  had 
done,  however  imperfectly,  all  the  duty  my  country  re 
quired  of  me,  and  I  was  placed  on  the  retired  list  of  the 
army.  Having  been,  at  appropriate  periods  in  my  offi 
cial  career,  by  the  unsolicited  action  of  my  official  supe 
riors,  justly  and  generously  rewarded  for  all  my  public 
services,  and  having  been  at  the  head  of  the  army  several 
years,  near  the  close  of  the  period  fixed  by  law  for  active 
military  service  I  was  made  the  grateful  recipient  of 
the  highest  honor  which  the  government  of  my  country 
can  confer  upon  a  soldier,  namely,  that  of  appointment 
to  a  higher  grade  under  a  special  act  of  Congress.  My 
public  life  was,  in  the  main,  a  stormy  one,  as  this  vol 
ume  has,  perhaps  too  fully,  shown.  Many  times  I  felt 
keenly  the  injustice  of  those  who  did  not  appreciate  the 
sincerity  of  my  purpose  to  do,  to  the  best  of  my  ability, 
what  the  government  desired  of  me,  with  little  or  no 
regard  for  my  own  personal  opinions  or  ambitions.  But 
I  can  now  concede  to  nearly  all  those  who  so  bitterly  op 
posed  me  the  same  patriotic  motives  which  I  know  in 
spired  my  own  conduct ;  and  I  would  be  unworthy  of 
my  birthright  as  an  American  citizen  if  I  did  not  feel 
grateful  to  my  countrymen  and  to  our  government  for 
all  the  kindness  they  have  shown  me. 

THE   END. 


INDEX 


"Abolitionist,"  distinguished  from  "  anti- 
slavery  man,"  74 

Accident  in  war,  234 

Acworth,  Ga.,  military  movements  near, 
130,  316 

Adams,  Charles  F.,  U.  S.  Minister  at  Lon 
don,  385,  392 

Adjutant-general,  tlie  office  of  the,  422, 
423,  469,  470 

"Advance  and  Retreat  "  (Hood's),  172 

Alabama,  Hood's  proposed  movement 
toward,  163;  Thomas  proposes  a  cam 
paign  in,  253,  255,  256,  305;  abundance 
of  supplies  in,  288;  Thomas  to  have 
command  over,  317 

Alexander,  Col.  Barton  S.,  trip  to  Hawaii 
with  S.,  431 

Alexandria,  Va.,  provisional  government 
of  Virginia  at,  394 

Allatoona,  Ga.,  military  operations  near, 
143,  163 

American  Association  for  the  Advance 
ment  of  Science,  28 

Americans,  patriotism  and  courage 
among,  183 

American  soldier,  the,  business  methods 
in  his  movements,  145 ;  has  a  mind  of 
his  own,  155;  manhood  and  valor  of, 
365,  366 

Amnesty,  the  oath  of,  375,  376 

Anarchy,  one  of  the  causes  of,  75 

Annapolis,  Md.,  Adm.  Porter  becomes 
superintendent  of  Naval  Academy  at, 
439 

Anthony,  Mayor  (of  Leaven  worth),  in 
the  Kansas-Missouri  troubles,  79,  80,  84 

"Anti-slavery  man,"  distinguished  from 
"  abolitionist,"  74 

Appalachicola  River,  the,  Sherman's  pro 
posed  movement  on,  317 

Arkansas,  Fremont's  plan  of  campaign 
in,  49;  importance  of  combining  with 
Missouri  and  Tennessee  in  a  depart 
ment,  60,  61;  Confederate  movements 
in,  61;  the  emancipation  proclamation 
in,  75 ;  reinforcements  for  Steele  in,  85 ; 
S.  reclaims  all  of,  90;  raids  into  Mis 
souri  from,  101 ;  Steele  commanding  in, 
112 ;  included  in  Division  of  the  Gulf, 
447 

Arkansas  River,  the,  Fremont's  plan  of 
campaign  on,  49;  Confederate  move 
ments  on,  61;  Union  raid  on,  63;  pro 
posed  movements  on,  70;  its  control 
secured, 70 

Arlington,  Va.,  burial  of  Sheridan  at,  467 

Army.    See  UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 

Army  of  the  Cumberland,  the,  its  un 
wieldy  size,  122,  139;  in  the  Atlanta 
campaign,  123, 129, 130;  love  for  Thorn  as, 


Army  of  the  Cumberland  —  continued 
123,  239,  242 ;  operations  and  dispositions 
in  Tennessee,  166 ;  Logan  ordered  to  as 
sume  command,  239,  240 ;  Thomas  com 
manding,  275;  dedicates  the  fields  of 
Chickainauga  and  Chattanooga,  297 ;  no 
opposition  to  S.Js  promotion  from,  297 

Army  of  the  Frontier,  the,  S.  command 
ing,  61,  64,  65  ;  Herron  commanding,  64 

Army  of  the  Ohio,  the,  Gen.  Foster  re 
lieved  by  5.  in  command  of,  109,  110; 
condition  at  time  of  S.'s  assuming  com 
mand,  114 ;  strength  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign  compared  with  other  armies,  122 ; 
question  of  command,  239,  240 

Army  of  the  Potomac,  the  Ninth  Corps  or 
dered  to  join  the,  116.  See  also  SOCIETY 
OF  THE  ARMY,  ETC. 

Army  of  the  Tennessee,  the,  proposed 
succession  of  McPherson  to  command 
of,  109;  strength  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign  compared  with  other  armies,  122 ; 
movement  on  the  Sandtown  Road,  136 ; 
a  night  visit  to  the  camp  of,  139 ;  battle 
of  Atlanta,  146-148;  battle  of  Peach- 
tree  Creek,  232 ;  its  lighting  days  over, 
343 

Army  of  the  West,  the,  disbanded,  40,  48  ; 
Frdmont's  plans  for,  49 

Army  regulations,  abuse  of,  435,  436 

Arnold  (U.  S.  Marshal),  in  labor  riots  at 
Chicago,  498,  501 

Articles  of  War,  the  122d  article,  151 

Artillery,  plan  to  increase  the,  487 

Artillery  School,  the,  459,  460 

Astronomy,  fascination  of  its  study,  28, 
29 

Athens,  Tenn.,  Stanley  at,  319 

Atlanta,  Ga.,  incident  in  siege  of,  142 ;  ad 
vance  on,  movements  before,  siege  and 
capture  of,  143,  144,  146,  152  et  seii.,  163, 
231,  247,  299,  303,  304,  310,  326,  341,  342; 
question  of  "making  a  lodgment  in," 
147, 148;  S.'s  opinions  on  the  tactics  of 
July  22, 1864, 148 ;  movement  before,  Aug. 
4-5,  1864,  148,  149;  Johnston's  plans  of 
defense  of,  153;  Hood's  defense  of,  153, 
154;  Hood's  abandonment  of,  158,  159; 
an  objective  of  the  campaign,  160; 
political  value  of  its  capture,  160; 
Hood's  raid  on  railroad  in  rear  of,  161 ; 
Sherman  moves  from,  303,  322 ;  proposal 
to  abandon,  307,  308 ;  held  by  Sherman, 
316,  318,  338,  339 ;  Sherman  proposes  to 
wreck,  316,318 ;  burning  of,  321 ;  supplies 
at,  321 ;  cutting  through  the  South  at, 
337 

Atlanta  campaign,  the,  faults  of  Sher 
man's  organization  in,  122  et  seq.;  ques 
tions  of  rank  in,  150,  151 ;  S.  requeoted 


550 


INDEX 


Atlanta  campaign  —  continued 
to    write    a    critical    history  of,    162; 
Thomas's  service   in,  189;    results  of, 
309 ;  Sherman's  tactics  in,  340-343 

Augusta,  Ga.,  proposed  destruction  of,  by 
Sherman,  317, 318, 333  ;  Sherman's  move 
ment  to,  332,  333,  337,  338 

Austria,  attitude  in  the  Mexican  affair,  385 

Bank  of  South  Carolina,  effect  of  "  brass  " 
on  the  cashier,  17 

Baring  Bros.,  384 

Bartlett,  Miss  Harriet,  married  to  S..  29 

Bartlett,  Prof.  W.  H.  C.,  26,  29,  74 

Bates,  Edward,  U.  S.  Attorney-General, 
letter  to  S.,  Sept.  29,  1863,  93 

Bayonet,  the,  superseded  by  the  rifle,  145, 
146 

Bazaine,  Marshal  Francois  A.,  occupation 
of  Mexico,  391 

Bean's  Ferry,  see  BEARD'S  FERRY. 

Beard's  Ferry,  Tenn.,  proposal  to  ob 
struct  roads  at,  211 

Beatty,  Maj.-Gen.  Samuel,  in  battle  of 
Nashville,  263 

Beauregard,  Gen.  Pierre  G.  T.,  possible 
movements  by,  199,  311,  321,  322 ;  Thom 
as's  ability  to  defeat,  288 ;  proposal  that 
Thomas  take  the  offensive  against,  311, 
312 ;  westward  movement,  321 ;  pro 
posed  inveiglement  ^of,  across  the  Ten 
nessee,  322 

Benham,  Capt.,  reports  condition  of  Gen. 
Blunt' s  district,  93 

"Benicia,"  the,  S.  returns  from  Hawaii 
on,  431 

Bennett's  House,  N.  C.,  capitulation  of 
Johnston  at,  335,  351-353 

Bentonville,  N.  C.,  battle  of,  346 

Bible,  the  inspiration  of  the,  8,  9 

Bigelow,  John,  U.  S.  Minister  to  France, 
383,  384,  391,  392;  letter  from  Seward, 
Nov.  4, 1865,  384 ;  share  in  the  Mexican 
negotiations,  391,  392 ;  letter  from  S., 
Feb.  25,  1866,  392 

Big  River,  military  operations  on  the,  51 

Black  Point,  Cal.,  S.  at,  188 

Blair,  Maj.-Gen.  Frank  P.,  Jr.,  8.' s  friend 
ship  with,  31,  138;  patriotism  and  cou 
rage,  31 ;  introduces  S.  to  Fremont,  48, 
49 ;  opinion  of  Fremont,  49 ;  movement 
favoring  his  succeeding  S.  in  command 
in  Missouri,  59, 60 ;  correspondence  with 
Halleck,  Aug.  11-12, 1862, 59, 60 ;  letter  to 
S.,  Aug.  13,  59;  denies  attempt  to  oust 
S.,  59, 60 ;  views  on  administration  of  the 
Missouri  militia,  60;  reveals  plot  to  S., 
86 ;  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  122, 138 

Blair,  Montgomery,  opinion  of  Fremont, 
49;  forwards  request  that  F.  P.  Blair 
succeed  S.,  59 

Bliss,  Capt.  Tasker  H.,  aide-de-camp,  staff 
of  S.,  work  on  national  defenses,  458-460 

Bloody  Canyon,  Cal.,  a  trip  through,  431 

Blow,  Henry  T.,  member  of  anti-Schofield 
committee  from  St.  Louis  to  Washing 
ton,  58,  59,  425 

Blue  Island,  111.,  labor  riots  at,  497,  498,  500 

Blunt,  Maj.-Gen.  James  G.,  at  Cane  Hill, 
62;  Hindrnan's  movement  against,  62; 
battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  62-64 ;  S.'s  opin 
ion  of,  63,  64;  promoted,  major-general, 
64 ;  disgraceful  condition  of  his  district, 
93 ;  S.  determines  to  relieve,  93 ;  the 
President's  use  of,  ill,  112 

Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortification,  its 
creation  and  work,  459,  485-487 ;  S.  pre 
sident  Of,  459,  484,  485 


Bonaparte,  Jerome  N.,  S.'s  friendship 
with,  7,  8 

Boonville,  Mo.,  S,  joins  Gen.  Lyon  at,  35: 
battle  of,  37 

"  Border  Guards,"  in  Missouri,  78 

Boston  Mountains,  military  operations  in 
the,  61 

Boynton,  Brig.-Gen.  H.  V.,  supports  S.  in 
the  Thomas  dispute,  297 

Breckinridge,  Maj.-Gen.  John  C.,  in  the 
Sherman- Johnston  negotiations,  351, 352 

Brentwood,  Tenn.,  request  for  ammuni 
tion  to  be  sent  to,  187 ;  proposal  to  send 
Smith  to,  221,  223-225;  S.  proposes  to 
stand  at,  223-225;  proposal  to  send 
Steedman  to,  225;  S.'s  arrival  at,  226; 
military  operations  near,  264,  270 

Bristol,  ill.,  the  Schofield  family  in,  1 

Broadhead,  Col.  James  O.,  attitude  on 
emancipation,  90;  supersedes  Dick  as 
provost-marshal-general,  96,  97 ;  letter 
from  S.,  107,  108 

Buchanan,  James,  a  bet  on  the  election 
of,  8 

Buchanan  County,  Mo.,  alleged  arming 
of  disloyal  persons  in,  105 

Buell,  Maj.-Gen.  Don  C.,  Thomas's  ser 
vice  under,  189 

Bull  Run,  Va.,  battle  of,  525 

Bull's  Gap,  held  by  Longstreet,  115, 116 

Bureau  of  Engineering,  prepares  plans  of 
sea-coast  defense,  484-486 

Bureau  of  Ordnance,  prepares  plans  for 
sea-coast  defense,  484-486 

Burnside,  Maj.-Gen. Ambrose  E.,  at  Knox- 
ville,  113,  114;  wreck  of  his  army,  113, 
114;  ordered  to  join  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  116;  Fitz-John  Porter's  de 
spatches  to,  462 

"  Bushwhackers,"  in  Missouri,  78 

Butler,  Maj.-Gen.  Benjamin  F.,  demand 
that  he  relieve  S.  in  Missouri,  94;  the 
President's  attitude  toward,  98 ;  not  ap 
pointed  to  command  in  Missouri,  112 

California,  S.  in,  188, 426,  430,  431 ;  the  great 
earthquake  of  1871, 430, 431 ;  obstruction 
of  railroads  in,  512 

"  California,"  the,  trip  to  Hawaii  on,  431 

Campbell,  Congressman,  11 

Campbell,  J.  A.,  assistant  adjutantrgen- 
eral,  Department  of  North  Carolina,  368, 
369,  372 

Camp  Independence,  Cal.,  a  trip  to,  430,  431 

Camp  Jackson,  Mo.,  secession  militia  at, 
33,  34 ;  capture  of,  36,  37 

Canby,  Maj.-Gen.  Edward  R.  S.,  S.'s  meet 
ing  with  in  Florida,  and  subsequent 
relations  with,  23,  24 ;  commanding  De 
partment  of  the  Columbia,  430;  accom 
panies  Sherman  and  S.  in  tour  of  the 
West,  430 ;  commanding  Division  of  the 
Pacific,  435;  the  Modoc  outbreak,  435- 
437 ;  killed,  437 

"  Canby  massacre,"  true  history  of  the, 
435-437 

Cane  Hill,  Ark.,  Blunt  at,  62 

Cape  Fear  River,  trip  by  Grant  and  S. 
from  Hampton  Roads  to,  294,  295  (see 
also  "RHODE  ISLAND");  military  con 
ference  at,  346 ;  military  operations  at, 
346 

Cape  May,  N.  J.,  interview  between  Sew 
ard  and  S.  at,  382 

Caperton's  Ferry,  S.  ordered  by  Thomas 
to  defend,  162;  the  order  contradicted 
by  Sherman,  162;  military  movements 
via,  317 


INDEX 


551 


Carlin,  Maj.-Gen.  William  P.,  friendship 
for  /S'.  at  West  Point,  3;  (colonel)  com 
manding  at  Pilot  Knob,  51;  action  at 
Fredericktown,  Mo.,  51-53 

Carlotta,  Empress  of  Mexico,  393 

Carney,  Thomas,  governor  of  Kansas, 
asks  tor  court  of  inquiry,  78,  79 ;  Kausas- 
Missouri  troubles,  79-83;  correspondence 
witli  S.,  Aug.  28-29,  1863,  79,  80,  82 ;  Sen 
atorial  aspirations,  80 ;  hostility  to  Gen. 
Ewing,  80,  81 ;  interviews  with  S.,  80,  82 

Carpet-bag  government,  354,  376,  396,  397, 
402,  403.  See  also  RECONSTRUCTION. 

Cartersville,  Ga.,  Sherman  at,  315 

Carthage,  Mo.,  Sigel  retreats  before  supe 
rior  force  at,  38 

Cassville  Road,  Mo.,  military  operations 
on,  38 

Caution,  distinguished  from  cowardice, 
141 

Cedartown,  Ga.,  Hood's  movement  via, 
316 

Central  Pacific  Railroad, the, atripover, 430 

Centreville,  Tenn.,  proposal  to  obstruct 
roads  at,  211 

Chalmers,  Brig.-Gen.  James  R.,  battle  of 
Nashville,  264 

Chambliss,  John  R.,  S.'s  room-mate  at 
West  Point,  3 

Chance  in  war,  234 

"Charcoals,"  in  Missouri,  72,  87,  90 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  S.  at,  17,  21,  26;  an  "af 
fair  of  honor  "  in,  21,  22 ;  Sherman's 
march  to,  316,  318,  333,  337;  Sherman 
proposes  to  destroy,  317 

Charlotte,  N.  C.,  proposed  route  for  Sher 
man  via,  338,  339 

Chase,  Salmon  P.,  Presidential  intrigues 
for,  in  Missouri,  77;  letter  to  S.,  May  7, 
1865,  373,  376 ;  views  on  reconstruction, 
373-376 

Chattahoochee  River,  the,  military  move 
ments  on,  231,  341 ;  Sherman  proposes  to 
march  to  its  mouth,  316 

Chattanooga,  Tenn.,  battle  of,  114;  open 
ing  of  communication  with  Nashville, 
114;  Thomas  at,  115  ;  S.  ordered  to,  161 ; 
threatened  by  Hood,  161,  163,  318 ;  Fed 
eral  possession  of,  193-197 ;  force  of  rail 
road  guards,  convalescents,  etc.,  at, 
195-197,  204, 205 ;  strategic  importance  of, 
260 ;  dedication  of  the  field  of,  297 ;  as 
base  of  supplies  for  Sherman,  304,  320, 
321;  breaking  the  railroads  near,  316- 
318 ;  Thomas  to  hold,  317,  319 ;  possible 
siege  of,  319,  321,  322;  cutting  through 
the  South  at,  337 

Chattanooga  Valley,  Hood's  escape 
through,  161, 162 

Chattooga  Valley,  proposed  movement  by 
Sherman  in,  308 

Chicago,  111.,  becomes  a  military  center, 
425;  Sheridan  removes  headquarters 
from  St.  Louis  to,  425 ;  S.'s  headquarters 
at,  453-455 ;  railroad  strikes  at,  454 ;  its 
importance,  454, 455 ;  military  protection 
for,  454,  455;  establishment  of  Fort 
Sheridan,  454,  455;  Sheridan's  services 
to,  455 ;  the  labor  riots  of  1894,  493  et  seq. 

Chicago,  Rock  Island,  and  Pacific  Rail 
road,  riots  on  the,  498,  499,  501 

Chicago  River,  defense  of,  454 

Chickamauga,  Ga.,  dedication  of  the  field 
of,  297 

Chief  of  staff,  the  office  of,  410 

Chile,  threatened  war  with,  489,  490 

China,  violation  of  treaty  between  the 
United  States  and,  509 


Chinese  laborers,  massacre  of,  in  Wyo 
ming,  509 

Cincinnati,  O.,  S.  ordered  to  purchase 
arms  at,  48 ;  S.  at,  345 

Cipher  code,  the,  232,  233 

Cipher  despatches,  the  art  of  deciphering, 
233.  See  also  MILITARY  TELEGRAMS, 
ETC. 

Citizenship,  necessity  of  training  for,  356 ; 
the  duties  of,  in  time  of  war,  539,  540 

Citizen  soldiery,  a,  366 

City  Point,  Va.,  Sherman's  visit  to  Grant 
at,  347,  348 

Civilians,  the  military  arm  obstructed  by, 
169 

Civil  war,  the  horrors  of,  364,  365 

Civil  War,  the,  approach  of,  30-32;  the 
compound  questions  of  Union  and  sla 
very  in,  94,  (J5 ;  true  tactics  and  strategy 
of,  146,  336;  responsibility  for,  229;  its 
inception  and  fruits,  229,  230;  slavery 
as  a  factor,  235;  financial  difficulties, 
255,  314,  315,  383,  529-532  ;  evil  influences 
at  work  in,  364 ;  the  greatest  wonder  of, 
386,  387 ;  the  lessons  of,  513  et  seq. ;  un 
necessary  prolongation  of,  515 ;  the  real 
objectives  in,  517 ;  the  selection  of  com 
manders  in,  517 ;  necessity  of  military 
unity  in,  517 ;  its  delays,  525 ;  the  finan 
cial  lesson  of,  529-534 

Clarksville,  Tenn.,  scheme  to  draw  Hood 
toward,  211 

"  Claybanks,"  in  Missouri,  72,  87,  91 

Cleveland,  Tenn.,  S.  at,  161 

Cleveland,  Grover,  the  War  Department 
under  his  administration,  423 ;  restores 
Fitz-John  Porter  to  the  army,  460;  as 
signs  S.  to  the  command  of  the  army, 
468 ;  S.  submits  scheme  of  Wrar  Depart 
ment  reform  to,  480 ;  action  and  orders 
in  the  labor  riots  of  1894,  494,  495,  497, 
500-503,  50«,  507  ;  orders  S.  to  suppress 
Chinese  massacres,  509 

Clinton,  Mo.,  military  movements  at,  37 

Cogswell,  Milton,  inspecting  officer  at 
West  Point,  13, 14 

Coinage,  the  right  of,  533 

Colorado,  S.  purchases  a  ranch  in,  426; 
obstruction  of  railroads  in,  509,  510,  512 

Colored  troops,  the  enlistment  of,  90,  92,  99 

Columbia,  S.  C.,  Sherman's  march  to,  327, 
338,  339 

Columbia,  Tenn.,  Federal  movements  at 
and  near,  operations  for  defense,  and 
battle  Of,  160,  166-168,  175,  193-197,  201- 
204,  207,  216,  217,  222,  252,  254,  258,  282,  289, 
290;  Hood's  movements  on  and  near, 
strength,  etc.,  168, 170, 172, 194-197,  201  et 
seq.,  206,  218,  219, 230,  252,  254,  258,  282,  290, 
300,  301;  possibilities  of  Thomas  moving 
against  Hood  from,  194-197;  Thomas's 
purpose  to  fight  Hood  at,  195-197,  201 ; 
Hood  held  in  check  at,  252,  254,  301; 
Thomas's  promises  of  reinforcements 
at,  282;  possibilities  of  Hood's  success 
at,  300 

Columbia  and  Franklin  Turnpike,  held  by 
S.,  208 

Columbia  River,  a  trip  on  the,  430 

Columbia  Turnpike,  military  movements 
on  the,  173-175 

Columbus,  Miss.,  Thomas  to  move  to 
ward,  317 

Commercial  Club,  Chicago,  pledges  money 
for  Fort  Sheridan,  454,  455 

Committee  on  Conduct  of  the  War,  in 
vestigation  of  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek, 
39,40 


552 


INDEX 


Compiegne,  the  French  court  at,  385,  386 

Confederate  States  of  America,  the,  the 
doctrine  of  Missouri  radicals  concern 
ing  the  secession  of,  56,  57;  mistaken 
policy  of  aggressive  warfare,  234,  235; 
guerrilla  warfare,  234, 235 ;  Union  prison 
ers  in,  235;  gallant  fighting  for  a  bad 
cause,  248;  cause  of  their  failure,  248; 
refusal  to  recognize  the  futility  of  their 
cause,  261 ;  overawing  the,  311  et  seq.; 
final  surrenders,  344;  strong  policy  at 
outbreak  of  the  war,  513,  516 

"  Confidential  "  communications,  238 

Confiscation,  question  of,  in  Missouri,  56- 
58,  73,  92 ;  authorized  by  Congress,  July 
17, 1862,  57 ;  instructions  to  S.  concern 
ing,  92 

Connasauga  River,  military  operations  on 
the,  126, 129 

"  Conservatives,"  in  Missouri,  57 

Constitution  of  the  United  States.  See 
U.  8.  CONSTITUTION. 

Contemporaneous  military  history,  the 
logic  of,  198 

Cooper,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  A.,  guarding 
Duck  Klver,  213,  258 ;  battle  of  Franklin, 
225 

Coosa  River,  military  movements  on,  315, 
316,  318 

"  Copperheads,"  in  Missouri,  57,  107 

Corinth,  Miss.,  possible  movement  of 
Beauregard  against  Nashville  from, 
321 

Cotton,  encouraging  the  marketing  of, 
372,  373 ;  restrictions  on  the  trade  in,  373 

Couch,  Maj.-Gen.  Darius  N.,  battle  of 
Nashville,  245,  246,  269,  270,  291 

Courage,  in  the  American  soldier,  183; 
proper  restraint  of,  362-364 ;  its  value  in 
defense  of  a  city,  457 

Courts-martial,  463-466 

Cowardice,  distinguished  from  caution, 
141 

Cox,  Maj.-Gen.  Jacob  D.,  battle  of  Kolb's 
Farm,  132,  133,  135;  battle  of  Resaca, 
140 ;  assault  on  Kenesaw  Mountain,  144 ; 
forces  passage  of  Olley's  Creek,  144 ;  se 
cures  position  on  Nickajack,  144 ;  move 
ments  near  Pulaski,  167,  282;  move 
ment  against  Hood  before  Columbia, 
168;  commanding  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  175 ;  entrusted  with  formation  at 
Franklin,  175 ;  anxiety  to  follow  up  the 
success  at  Franklin,  187;  holding  the 
ford  at  Columbia,  207;  movement  to 
Spring  Hill,  215,  216 ;  ordered  to  move 
to  Franklin,  216;  battle  of  Nashville, 
245,  247,  269,  270,  291 

Craighill,  William  P.,  at  West  Point,  13, 
14 

Crofton,  Col.,  in  labor  riots  in  Chicago, 
497 

Croxton,  Maj.-Gen.  John  T.,  battle  of 
Nashville,  264,  268 

Culpeper  Court-house,  Va.,  A.  P.  Hill's 
residence  at,  26 

Gulp's  Farm.    See  KOLB'S  FARM. 

Cumberland  River,  military  movements 
on,  185;  measures  to  keep  Hood  from, 
304 

Curran  Post-Office,  Mo.,  skirmish  at,  38 

Curtis,  Maj.-Gen.  Samuel  R.,  command 
ing  Department  of  Southwest  Missouri, 
58 ;  enforces  confiscation  orders  in  Mis 
souri,  57, 58 ;  appointed  to  command  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri,  61 ;  orders 
S.  to  move  north  and  east,  62,  63 ;  be 
trays  S.'s  confidence,  63,  65  ;  attitude 


Curtis,  Maj.-Gen.  Samuel  R.  —  continued 
toward  s.,  64,  65 ;  attitude  in  the  Herron 
affair,  65  ;  correspondence  with  Halleck, 
Feb.  18,  1865,  65,  66;  superseded  by  S., 
68,  69, 90, 96,  97  ;  factional  troubles  under 
his  administration  in  Missouri,  69,  71, 
95, 96;  strength  in  Missouri  and  Kansas, 
90;  appointed  to  command  in  Kansas, 
112 

Custer  massacre,  the,  489 

"Daily  Times"  (of  Leaven  worth) ,  re 
ports  meeting  at  Leavenworth,  79 

Dallas,  Ga.,  military  operations  near,  129, 
130,  316 

Dalton,  Ga.,  S.  moves  from  Knoxville  to, 
120;  military  operations  near,  120,  124- 
128 ;  battle  of,  143 ;  S.  at,  161 ;  Hood  at, 
161 ;  breaking  the  railroads  near,  317, 318 

Dana,  C.  A.,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War, 
345 ;  conducts  transportation  arrange 
ments  for  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  345 

Davidson,  Maj.-Gen.  John  W.,  suggested 
service  for,  66 

Davis,  Capt.,  mail-carrier  on  Indian 
River,  19 

Davis,  Jefferson,  persuades  S.  to  retain 
his  commission,  30,;  President,  C.  S.  A., 
visits  Atlanta,  231 ;  relieves  Johnston, 
231 ;  desire  for  aggressive  campaigns, 
234;  promises  to  give  protection  to 
Georgia  and  to  drive  Sherman  out,  309- 
311, 318,  322, 331, 338;  Sherman's  defiance 
to,  309,  310 

Davis,  Maj.-Gen.  Jefferson  C.,  in  march 
to  the  sea,  317 

Dean,  "Widow,  225 

Death,  foreboding  of,  141 

Debs,  Eugene  V.,  leader  of  riots  at  Chi 
cago,  498 

Decatur,  Ala.,  Federal  possession  of,  167, 
194,  197 ;  necessity  for  railroad  guards 
near,  197 ;  as  base  of  supplies  for  Sher 
man,  304 ;  possible  movement  by  Sher 
man  toward,  311;  proposed  movement 
for  Thomas  toward,  317,319,  322;  Hood's 
probable  movement  via,  318;  possible 
siege  of,  319,  321,  322 

Democratic  party,  attitude  on  President 
Johnson's  impeachment,  415 

Denver,  Colo.,  proposed  strike  of  train 
men  at,  509,  510 

Department  of  Arkansas,  repeal  of  orders 
concerning,  451 

Department  of  Justice,  action  concerning 
the  Pacific  railroads,  510,  511 

Department  of  North  Carolina,  S.  as 
signed  to  command  of,  346,  351,  360,  367- 
377 ;  S.  relinquishes  command  of,  377 

Department  of  State,  sends  S.  to  France, 
382 ;  S.  ordered  to  report  at,  383,  393 

Department  of  Texas,  the,  discharge  of 
soldiers  from,  382 ;  S.  appointed  to  com 
mand,  447 

Department  of  the  Columbia,  the,  Canby 
commanding,  430;  Otis  commanding, 
510,  511 

Department  of  the  Cumberland,  the, 
troops  of,  at  Knoxville,  113 ;  Thomas 
commanding,  163,  247  ;  war  material  at 
Franklin,  176;  records  of,  cited,  211, 
212 ;  concentration  of  troops  in,  284 

Department  of  the  East,  S.  assumes  com 
mand  of  the,  458 

Department  of  the  Mississippi,  the,  Fre"- 
mont  relieved  from  command  of,  54; 
contest  over  filling  the  vacant  com 
mand,  60,  61 ;  broken  up,  60,  61 


INDEX 


553 


Department  of  the  Missouri,  the,  created, 
61;  Curtis  appointed  to  command,  61; 
S.  relieves  Curtis  in  command,  68,  69 ; 
the  military  problem  in,  69 ;  S.'s  mili 
tary  policy  in,  70;  split  into  three  de 
partments,  109, 112  ;  a.  again  appointed 
to  command,  425-430;  Miles  command 
ing,  494 

Department  of  the  Ohio,  the,  Foster  com 
manding,  109;  Foster  relieved  by  S., 
109, 110 ;  troops  from,  in  East  Tennessee, 
191 ;  records  of,  quoted,  209 

Department  of  the  Potomac,  S.  assigned 
to  command  the,  394 

Department  of  the  West,  the,  Harney 
commanding,  32,  33;  Lyon  succeeds 
Haruey  in  command,  33,  35;  Frdmont 
commanding,  39 ;  S.  purchases  guns  for, 
50 

Department  of  West  Point,  creation  of 
the,  444 

Despotic  rule,  434,  435 

Dick,  Franklin  A.,  provost-marshal-gen- 
eral,  Department  of  the  Missouri,  96; 
superseded  by  J.  O.  Broadbead,  96,  97 

District  of  Columbia,  the  system  of  gov 
ernment  in  the,  433 

District  of  Kansas,  Blunt  suggested  for 
command  of  the,  63 

District  of  Missouri,  its  commander  or 
dered  to  confiscate  rebel  property,  57 

Doolittle,  Col.  Charles  C.,  in  battle  of 
Nashville,  270 

Douglas,  Stephen  H.,  secures  favorable 
action  from  the  War  Department  in 
S.'s  case,  12 

Drake,  Charles  D.,  letter  from  President 
Lincoln  to,  Oct.  5,  1863,  70,  71;  heads 
radical  delegation  from  Missouri,  94, 
424 ;  reply  of  the  President  to  the  radi 
cal  delegation,  94-99 ;  letter  from  S.  to, 
Oct.  24,  1863,  100;  welcomes  S.  to  St. 
Louis,  424 ;  death,  425 

Drown,  Professor,  28 

Drum,  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.  Richard  C.,  447 

Du  Bois,  Lieut.  John  V.,  ordered  from 
Fort  Leavenworth  to  Missouri,  37 

Du  Bois,  Col.,  reports  condition  of  Gen. 
Blunt' s  district,  93 

Duck  River,  crossed  by  Hood,  129,  168, 
170,  175,  192,  208-210,  212-214,  218,  219,  230, 
254 ;  holding  the  line  of,  168, 170-172,  219, 
220,  282;  military  movements  on,  170- 
172,  174,  175,  185,  186,  191,  192, 195-197,  202- 
220,  251,  254,  258,  282 ;  advantages  of  the 
day  gained  at  Spring  Hill  and,  185, 186, 
219 ;  S.  crosses  to  the  north  side,  207, 208 ; 
Thomas  plans  to  draw  Hood  across,  211 ; 
fears  for  troops  on,  222 ;  possibilities  of 
Hood's  strategy  at,  231;  movement  to 
Nashville  from,  251 

Ducktown,  Tenn.,  S.'s  retreat  from,  175; 
troops  ordered  to  Spring  Hill  from,  219 

Dug  Springs,  Mo.,  skirmish  at,  38 


Earthquake,  a  celebrated,  430,  431 
East  Point,  Ga.,  proposed  military  move 
ments  at,  152 

Eastport,  Miss.,  Forrest  at,  319 
Education,  universal,  519,  520;  the  true 
value  of,  522,  523;   the  foundation  of 
popular  government,  533 
Eighth  Wisconsin  Volunteers,  action  at 

Fredericktown,  Mo.,  51-53 
Elkins,  Stephen  B.,  Secretary  of  War,  423 
Elliot,  Dr.,  president  of  Washington  Uni 
versity,  31 


Elliott,  Maj. -Gen.  Washington  L.,  battle 
of  Nashville,  263 

Emancipation,  the  question  in  Missouri, 
56-58,  71,  74,  90, 103 ;  the  doctrines  of  im 
mediate,  56-58;  the  question  of  gradual, 
71,  74,  95 ;  ordinance  for  gradual  in  Mis 
souri,  74;  S.'s  attitude  on,  74-76,  90;  Lin 
coln's  proclamation  of  and  views  on, 
75,  76,  367,  368 ;  as  a  factor  in  the  civil 
war,  235 ;  status  of  the  negroes  after, 
367-376 

Endicott,  William  C.,  Secretary  of  War, 
plan  of  sea-coast  defense,  487.  See  also 
SECRETARY  OF  WAR;  WAR  DEPART 
MENT. 

England,  S.  visits,  385,  392 

Engle,  Capt.  A.  H.,  killed  at  Resaca,  141 ; 
foreboding  of  death,  141 

Eugenie,  Empress,  S.  presented  to,  392 

Europe,  the  modem  wars  of,  357 ;  S.'s 
Visits  to,  384-393,  449-453 

Evarts,  William  M.,  U.  S.  Attorney-Gen 
eral,  22;  interviews  and  relations  with 
S.  concerning  the  War  Department,  413 
et  seq.,  478 

Everglades,  the,  Fla.,  the  Seminoles  in,  23 

Ewing,  Maj. -Gen.  Hugh,  in  the  Kansas 
Missouri  troubles,  78-84 ;  gives  up  Sena-" 
torial  aspirations,  80;  Gov.  Carney's 
hostility  to,  80,  81 ;  friendship  with  Lane, 
80, 81 ;  scheme  to  expel  disloyal  persons 
from  Kansas,  82 ;  interview  with  S.  at 
Kansas  City,  82:  Order  No.  11,  83;  his 
politic  acti9ns,  83,  84;  at  Independence, 
84;  inspection  of  his  district,  93;  denies 
rumors  of  expulsion  of  Union  families, 
93 

Expediency,  the  value  of,  7 

Fairmount  Park,  Philadelphia,  Meade 
drives  S.  through,  429 

Fayetteville,  Ark.,  military  movements 
near,  62 

Fiat  money,  531-534 

Fifth  Missouri  Regiment,  in  battle  of  Wil 
son's  Creek,  47 

Fighting-cocks,  an  illustration,  305,  306 

Finance,  the  laws  of,  532-534 

Financial  education,  533 

First  Indiana  Cavalry,  action  at  Freder 
icktown,  Mo.,  Oct.  20,  21,  1861,  52,  53 

First  Kansas  Infantry,  service  in  Mis 
souri,  37 

First  Military  District,  Virginia  formed 
into  the,  395 ;  S.  appointed  commander 
Of,  395,  397 

First  Missouri  Artillery  (late  1st  Mo.  V.  L), 
in  action  near  Fredericktown,  Mo.,  51- 
53 

First  Missouri  Volunteer  Infantry,  its  rec 
ord  and  services,  35 ;  S.  appointed  major 
of,  35 ;  in  battle  of  Boonville,  37 ;  S.  as 
sumes  command  of,  48 ;  converted  into 
artillery,  48,  50,  51.  See  also  FIRST  MIS 
SOURI  ARTILLERY. 

First  Missouri  Volunteers  (colored),  or 
ganization  of  the,  99 

First  U.  S.  Artillery,  ordered  to  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  18 ;  S.  appointed  second  lieutenant 
in,  19, 183 ;  outbreak  of  yellow  fever  in, 
20, 183 

First  U.  S.  Cavalry,  service  in  Missouri, 
37 

First  U.  S.  Infantry,  service  in  Missouri, 
37 

Florence,  Ala.,  Hood  at  and  near,  165, 195 
et  seq.,  197,  318,  320;  Beauregard  near, 


554 


INDEX 


Florence,  Italy,  S.  at,  393 

Florida,  the  Second  Artillery  ordered  to, 
18 ;  S.'s  service  in,  19-25, 183 ;  sport  in,  19, 
23;  studying  law  in,  22,  23;  acquiring 
malaria  in,  23 ;  military  engineering  in, 
23,  24 ;  yellow  fever  in,  183 

Foard,  Dr.  A.  J.,  assistant  surgeon,  Bat 
tery  D,  First  Artillery,  20 

Forced  loans,  530,  531 

Foreboding  of  death,  141 

Forrest,  Lieut. -Gen.  Nathan  B.,  raids 
Johnsonville,  165, 288 ;  before  Columbia, 
168 ;  near  Spring  Hill,  171 ;  driven  from 
Spring  Hill,  172 ;  atThompson's  Station, 
173;  attacks  the  column  retreating  to 
Franklin,  174;  in  the  Tennessee  cam 
paign,  191, 193,  228,  308 ;  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  221-223,  228;  harasses  Thomas,  289; 
possibilities  of  his  reaching  Kentucky, 
300;  raid  by,  310;  on  the  Tennessee,  318- 
320;  at  Eastport,  Jackson,  and  Paris, 
319;  capture  of  gunboat  by,  319;  at 
Johnsonville,  320;  failure  to  damage 
Sherman's  communications,  338 

Fort  Brady,  troops  sent  to  Chicago  from, 
501 

Fort  Capron,  Fla.,  8.  joins  Battery  D  at, 
19,20;  service  at,  19-25;  breakdown  of 
mail  service  to,  20,  21 

Fort  Clinton,  N.  Y.,  an  adventure  in  the 
ditch  of,  4 

Fort  Dearborn,  111.,  454 

Fort  Donelson,  Tenn.,  Grant's  strategy 
at,  358 ;  capture  of,  516 

Fort  Fisher,  N.  C.,  capture  of,  346 

Fort  Hamilton,  N.  Y.,  artillery  practice 
at,  458 

Fortification  Appropriation  Act,  Sept.  22, 
1888,  459 

Fortified  lines,  question  of  carrying  by 
assault,  127,  128,  142-148 

Fort  Jupiter,  Fla.,  occupation  of,  24 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kan.,  troops  ordered 
to  Missouri  from,  37 ;  S.  commanding 
at,  278 ;  headquarters  of  the  Department 
of  the  Missouri  removed  to,  428 ;  troops 
sent  to  Chicago  from,  501 

Fort  Monroe,  Va.,  meeting  of  Grant  and 
S.  at,  346;  artillery  practice  at,  458,  459; 
meeting  of  Lincoln  with  the  peace 
commissioners  at,  530 

Fort  Moultrie,  S.  C.,  S.  on  duty  at,  17, 18  ; 
the  First  Artillery  ordered  to,  18;  ar 
tillery  target  practice  at,  18 ;  bombard 
ment  of  Fort  Sumter  from,  18 

Fort  Riley,  Kan.,  establishment  of  school 
of  cavalry  and  light  artillery  at,  426,  427 

Fort  Sheridan,  111.,  establishment  of,  454, 
455,  493;  reinforcement  recommended, 
498 ;  its  value  in  the  labor  riots  of  1894, 
493-498,  506 

Fort  Smith,  Ark.,  proposed  assignment 
of  Gen.  McNeil  to,  93 

Fort  Sumter,  S.  C.,  the  bombardment  of, 
18,  33,  234 

Fort  Wadsworth,  N.  Y.,  artillery  prac 
tice  at,  458 

Foster,  Maj.-Gen.  John  G.,  commanding 
the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  109 ;  sick 
ness  and  relief  of,  109, 113, 114 

Fourteenth  Amendment,  the,  376,  394  et 
seq. 

Fourteenth  Army  Corps,  S.'s  command 
in,  66;  movement  before  Atlanta,  Aug. 
4-5, 1864, 149 ;  strength,  192;  advisability 
of  sending  it  to  Thomas,  192 

Fourteenth  Kentucky  Volunteers,  battle 
of  Kolb's  Farm,  132-134 


Fourth  Army  Corps,  part  of,  at  Knoxville, 
113;  ordered  to  reinforce  Thomas,  164, 
308,  317 ;  at  Pulaski,  165, 166,  285  ;  moves 
from  Pulaski  to  Columbia,  168 ;  at  Frank 
lin,  175-177 ;  battle  of  Franklin,  177-181, 
251,258;  passes  from  S.'s  command,  177; 
service  with  Thomas,  190-192 ;  defending 
Duck  River,  196 ;  reinforcing,  198,  199"; 
defense  of  Nashville,  227-229 ;  battle  of 
Spring  Hill,  251;  Orders  of  the  Day, 
Dec.  16,  1864,  263 ;  battle  of  Nashville, 
242-244,  263,  264,  29i 

France,  S.'s  mission  to,  276,  382  et  seq.;  in 
tervention  in  Mexico,  377  et  seq.,  543; 
friendship  with  the  United  States,  379, 
382  et  seq.;  dangers  of  war  with,  381  et 
seq.;  demands  recognition  of  Maxi 
milian's  government,  384;  excitement 
in,  385;  national  pride,  387;  unpopula 
rity  of  the  Mexican  scheme  in,  387 ;  S. 
journeys  through,  392;  the  autumn  ma- 
noeuvers  of  1881,  451-453;  army  retire 
ment  in,  452  ;  S.'s  memories  of,  453 

"Frank  Blair,"  S.'s  charger,  250 

Franklin,  Tenn.,  battle  of,  160, 161, 166, 177- 
181,  183-188,  197,  220-225,  227-230,  233,  236, 
237,  240,  247,  248,  251-254,  258,  259,  262,  279, 
281-283,  301,  327,  343,  344,  543;  military 
movements  near,  170,  171,  173-176,  178, 
183-187 ;  the  retreat  to,  171,  210,  212.  215 
et  seq.;  clearing  the  way  to,  173;  Twi- 
ning's  ride  to,  174 ;  S.  reaches,  175,  221 ; 
difficulties  of  bridging  the  river  at,  175- 
177, 219, 281, 282  ;  danger  of  Hood's  cross 
ing  the  Harpeth  above,  176;  needless 
sacrifices  in  the  battle,  181-185;  criti 
cisms  of  Hood's  assault  at,  183-185, 187 ; 
exhaustion  of  ammunition  at,  187  ;  rea 
sons  for  not  following  up  success  at, 
187,  188 ;  the  crisis  of  the  Tennessee 
campaign  at,  198;  absence  of  Thomas 
from  the  battle,  200;  necessity  of  S.'s 
retreat  to,  210 ;  covering  the  approaches 
to,  210,  214  ;  S.'s  expectations  of  finding 
reinforcements  at,  215 ;  movement  from 
Spring  Hill  to,  216;  S.  ordered  to  take 
position  at,  217  ;  Hood  captures  road 
between  Spring  Hill  and,  217,  218 ;  pro 
posed  movement  of  A.  J.  Smith  to,  220, 
221,  223;  Thomas's  desire  to  hold,  221, 
223 ;  delays  of  telegraphic  communica 
tion  with  Nashville,  224 ;  S.'s  views  of 
the  slaughter  at,  229,  230;  Hood's  ad 
vance  from  Spring  Hill  to,  251;  Hood 
receives  his  death-blow  at,  252-254 ; 
Hood's  strength  at,  258;  Thomas's  in 
dorsement  on  S.'s  report  of  the  battle, 
276,  277,  283 ;  Stanley  wounded  at,  279 ; 
possibilities  of  Hood's  success  at,  300 ; 
effect  of  Hood's  delay  at,  301 

Franklin  Turnpike,  military  operations 
on,  263,  264,  267 

Fredericktown,  Mo.,  action  at,  51-53,  362, 
363 

Freedmen.  See  EMANCIPATION;  NE 
GROES;  SLAVERY. 

Freedmen's  Bureau,  Virginia  under  con 
trol  Of,  394 

Freeport,  111.,  Rev.  James  Schofield  set 
tles  in,  1 

Freeport,  111.,  helping  the  Baptist  meet 
ing-house  at,  17 

Fremont,  Maj.-Gen.  John  C.,  command 
ing  Department  of  the  West,  39  ;  ambi 
tion  of,  39,  43 ;  letter  to  Wyman,  Aug.  6, 
1861,  39 ;  investigation  by  Committee  on 
Conduct  of  the  War,  39,  40;  disappear 
ance  of  official  papers  from  his  records, 


INDEX 


555 


Fremont,  Maj.-Gen.  John  C.—  continued 
39,  40 ;  correspondence  with  Lyon,  Aug. 
6,  9, 1861,  39-41 ;  charged  with  sacrificing 
Lyon,  40;  organizes  anny  in  Missouri, 
48;  his  character  and  personality,  48-50; 
plans  for  the  Army  of  the  West,  49 ;  at 
titude  of  the  Blair  family  toward,  49; 
purchases  arms  in  Europe,  50;  vacilla 
tion,  50;  takes  the  field  in  central  Mis 
souri,  51;  dogmatic  orders  by,  52;  re 
lieved  from  command  of  Department  of 
the  Mississippi,  54;  system  of  admin 
istration  in  Missouri,  56,  96;  proposed 
dictatorship  for,  86 ;  factional  troubles 
under  his  administration,  95 

French  Broad  River,  the,  military  move 
ments  on,  115 

Fright  on  the  battle-field,  45 

Frost,  Brig.-Gen.  Daniel  M.,  surrenders 
Camp  Jackson  to  Lyon,  36 

Fugitive  slaves.    See  SLAVERY. 

Fullerton,  Lieut.-Col.  Joseph  S.,  battle  of 
Nashville,  263;  supports  8.  in  the  Thomas 
dispute,  297 

"  Gallantry  in  action,"  182 

Gamble,  Hamilton  R.,  governor  of  Mis 
souri,  31,  54 ;  character,  54,  55 ;  attitude 
on  slavery  and  confiscation,  54,  58,  71  et 
seq. ;  raises  special  State  militia,  55,  56 ; 
F.  P.  Blair's  views  as  to  his  authority 
over  the  militia,  60 ;  factional  leader  in 
Missouri,  69 ;  antagonism  between  Cur 
tis  and,  71 ;  relations  between  S.  and, 
71  et  seq.,  90;  teuders  and  withdraws 
his  resignation,  72,  74;  letter  to  S.,  72, 
73 ;  plot  to  seize  and  imprison  him,  86 ; 
places  the  State  militia  under  S.'B  com 
mand,  88,  90,  95 

Garber,  Hezekiah  H.,  friendship  for  S.  at 
West  Point,  3 

Garfield,  James  Abram,  election  and  inau 
guration,  447,  450;  abolishes  the  Divi 
sion  of  the  Gulf,  451 ;  assassination,  453 

Garnett,  Col.  Robert  S.,  commandant  of 
cadets  at  West  Point,  15 

Gaylesburg,  Ga.,  Sherman  at,  326 

Gaylesville,  Ala.,  Sherman  at,  318 

General,  the  rank  of,  538 

Generals,  as  politicians,  355 

Geologists,  "  the  God-hating,"  9 

Georgia,  abandoned  by  Hood,  163,  164, 
309,  318,  332,  333 ;  Sherman's  plans  and 
operations  in,  252,  254,  285,  299  et  seq., 
314,  316  et  seq.,  319,  322,  330  et  seq., 
339,  347  (for  specific  movements  see  the 
names  of  places) ;  question  of  Hood's 
movements  in,  299  et  seq.;  Grant  sug 
gests  a  cavalry  raid  through,  309 ;  Pres. 
Davis's  threat  and  promise  concerning, 
309,  310,  331 ;  Sherman's  loss  of  mastery 
in,  338 

Gerry,  N.  Y.,  birthplace  of  the  author,  1 

Getty,  Maj.-Gen.  George  W.,  on  board  of 
review  of  Fitz-John  Porter  case,  461 

Gettysburg,  Pa.,  Federal  arming  of  rebel 
prisoners  captured  at,  104 

Gillen,  >Maj.-Gen.  Alvan  C.,  disasters  in 
Tennessee,  195 

Gold  and  silver,  532-534 

Goldsboro,  N.  C.,  Sherman's  march  to, 
339,  346;  occupied  by  S.,346;  concentra 
tion  at,  346,  347 

Gordon's  Ferry,  Tenn.,  proposal  to  ob 
struct  roads  at,  211 

Grand  Hotel,  Paris,  S.'s  speech  at,  386, 
387 


Granger,  Brig.-Gen.  R.  S.,  proposed  con 
centration  of  his  troops  on  the  Chat 
tanooga  railroad,  194,  197,  203;  possibili 
ties  of  his  holding  Decatur,  197 ;  detained 
at  Murfreesboro',  197 ;  Sherman  advises 
that  he  threaten  the  rear,  199;  expected 
at  Murf reesboro',  205 

Granny  White  Turnpike,  Tenn.,  military 
operations  on,  244,  245,  264,  268-270 

Grant,  Col.  Frederick  D.,  on  Gen.  Grant's 
esteem  for  S.,  543 

Grant,  General  Ulysses  S.,  charges 
against,  61;  operations  on  the  Missis 
sippi,  siege  and  capture  of  Vicksburg, 
63,  70,  71,  90,  98,  110,  232,  233 ;  reinforced 
by  S.  at  Vicksburg  with  men  and  sup 
plies,  64,  70,  71,  90,  98,  110,  232,  233;  re 
turns  troops  to  S.,  70,  90;  relations  with 
S.,  70, 109-111, 115, 117,  118, 198, 237-240, 252, 
293-297,  337,  346,  361,  379-382,  389-391,  414 
et  seq.,  419-421,  439,  440,  482,  541-543; 
commanding  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi,  109;  reports  relief  of  Gen. 
Foster,  and  asks  for  a  successor,  109; 
predilection  for  McPhersoii,  109 ;  sug 
gests  8.  for  command  of  Department  of 
the  Ohio,  109;  lieutenant-general  and 
general-in-chief,  109,  111,  116,  359,  361, 
362,  422,  538,  546 ;  command  of  his  appe 
tites,  ill ;  taciturnity,  111 ;  entertained 
in  St.  Louis,  111 ;  proposes  to  send  re 
inforcements  to  S.,  115 ;  orders  the  Ninth 
Corps  to  join  the  Army  of  the  Potomac, 
116 ;  nominates  S.  major-general,  U.  S.  A., 
117,  543;  on  the  delays  incident  to  S.'s 
promotion,  117;  approves  S.'s  services 
and  policy,  117,  118 ;  at  Knoxville,  118 ; 
probability  of  his  ending  the  war,  119 ; 
plan  of  operations  for  Sherman,  163  ;  ex 
pectations  from,  and  anxiety  as  to,  Tho 
mas's  movements,  and  measures  for  re 
lieving  him  at  Nashville,  192, 198, 237-240, 
255,  260,  295,  324,  325 ;  interview  with  S. 
on  the  Rhode  Island,  198,  294, 295,  346, 361, 
362;  despatch  to  S.  from  before  Vicks 
burg,  232,  233 ;  advises  Sherman  to  dis 
pose  of  Hood,  237 ;  designs  S.  to  super 
sede  Thomas,  237-239;  at  Washington, 
239,  240 ;  praises  S.'s  defeat  of  Hood  at 
Franklin,  240 ;  orders  S.  to  North  Caro 
lina,  252,  345,  543;  appoints  Thomas  to 
command  Division  of  the  Pacific,  278 ; 
Presidential  candidacy,  inauguration, 
and  administration,  278, 405,  414,  419,  420, 
478,  479,  543  ;  refutes  slander  against  S., 
293-297;  responsibility  for  and  views  on 
the  march  to  the  sea,  300,  301,  311,  315 
et  seq.,  322-326;  campaign  against  and 
capture  of  Lee,  303,  329  et  seq.,  347-349; 
Porter's  mission  to  Sherman  from,  306 ; 
plan  for  Sherman  to  capture  Hood's 
army,  309;  suggests  a  cavalry  raid 
through  Georgia,  309 ;  before  Peters 
burg,  313;  the  cause  of  the  rebellion's 
collapse,  314;  siege  of  Richmond,  316; 
"  Personal  Memoirs  "  quoted,  320,  322- 
324,  361,  411,  543 ;  last  sickness,  323  ;  per 
sonal  relations  with,  and  confidence 
in,  Sherman,  324,  337,  347,  348,  357,  358, 
443,  479,  543 ;  modesty,  337 ;  credits 
Sherman  with  his  plans  and  achieve 
ments,  337;  military  genius,  337,  344, 
524;  Sherman's  visit  to,  at  City  Point, 
347,  348;  the  President's  instructions 
to,  March  3,  1865,  348;  approves  the 
Sherman-Johnston  negotiations,  352 ; 
contrasted  with  Sherman,  357;  discus 
sions  on  his  campaigns,  358;  correct- 


556 


INDEX 


Grant,  General  Ulysses  8.— continued 
ness  of  his  strategy,  358;  attitude  of 
Halleck  toward,  before  SMloh,  361 ;  ap 
plies  to  toe  relieved  before  Shiloh,  361 ; 
refuses  to  be  "  McClellanized,"  361,  362, 
546 ;  calmness  under  stress,  362 ;  in 
Raleigh,  370 ;  encourages  the  marketing 
of  Southern  produce,  372;  selects  S.  to 
solve  the  Franco-Mexican  problem,  379- 
382,  389-391 ;  order  to  Sheridan  concern 
ing  S.'s  Mexican  mission,  380-382  ;  con 
troversies  with  the  War  Department, 
and  attempted  and  successful  reforms 
therein,  407  et  seq.,  411,  412,  414  et  seq., 
421,  422,  437,  438,  478,  479;  empowered  by 
Congress  to  command  the  armies  of  the 
United  States,  408  et  seq. ;  controversy 
with  Pres.  Johnson,  and  views  on  the 
impeachment  trial,  411-413,  416,  418; 
opposes  Stanton's  removal,  411, 412 ;  ap 
pointed  Secretary  of  War  ad  interim, 
412 ;  at  Peabody  Fund  meeting  at  Rich 
mond,  413;  interviews  and  relations 
with  S.  concerning  the  War  Depart 
ment,  414  et  seq. ;  jissigns  commands  of 
departments  and  divisions,  425 ;  attends 
Thomas's  funeral,  429 ;  attends  meeting 
of  the  Society  of  Army  of  Potomac, 
429 ;  relations  with  Hancock,  430 ;  urges 
S.'s  superintendence  at  West  Point,  439, 
440 ;  theory  of  military  administration, 
443 ;  powers  of  argument,  463 ;  on  the 
Fitz-John  Porter  case,  462,  463,  465; 
S.  takes  an  appeal  to,  482;  anecdote 
of  a  Treasury  officer  and  the  President, 
483;  assumption  of  command  by,  523, 
524;  his  military  text-books,  523,  524; 
interest  in  the  relations  between  the 
President  and  the  general-iu-chief ,  539 ; 
greets  S.  as  Secretary  of  War,  543 ;  last 
thoughts  for  S.,  543;  his  character,  543- 
547 

Correspondence  with:  Johnson,  A., 
Aug.  1, 1867, 411 ;  Feb.  3, 1868, 412  :  Logan, 
J.  A.,  Feb.  14,  1884,  239,  240 ;  Feb.  23,  241 . 
Schofleld,  J.  M.,  Dec.  27,  1864,  252-254 ; 
May  10,  1865,  373-376";  Jan.  24,  1866,  390, 
391 ;  April  18,  1868,  400,  401 ;  April  25,  418 ; 
April  26,  418 ;  July  12, 1881,  293,  294  ;  Aug. 
1,  294,  295 :  Sherman,  W.  T.,  April  4,  1864, 
340 ;  Sept.  12,  306,  333 ;  Sept.  20,  306,  315, 
333;  Oct.  10,  315;  Oct.  11,  307,  315-317, 
323,  325  ;  Oct.  22,  318,  325 ;  Nov.  1,  310,  318, 
319,  322,  325,  334  ;  Nov.  2,  307,  319,  321,325; 
Nov.  6,  310,  320,  333-335;  Nov.  7,  320; 
Dec.  3,  327  ;  Dec.  6,  327,  332,  333 ;  Dec.  16, 
327  ;  Dec.  24,  327,  328, 334 :  Thomas,  G.  H., 
252. 

Graviere,  Adm.  de  la,  bombards  and  cap 
tures  Vera  Cruz,  388 ;  relations  with  Na 
poleon  III,  388,  389 ;  friendship  for  the 
United  States,  388,  389 

Gresham,  Walter  Q.,  Secretary  of  State, 
503,  512 

Griffin,  Ga.,  Hood  assembles  militia  at,  319 

Guerrilla  warfare,  234,  235 ;  fears  of,  after 
Lee's  surrender,  350;  in  Missouri,  358, 
359 

Guitar,  Col.,  denies  rumor  of  expulsion  of 
Union  families,  93 

Gulf  of  Mexico,  national  defenses  on,  456, 
458 

Gulf  States,  the,  proposed  campaigns 
in,  253,  255,  256,  303,  326  ;  Confederate 
strength  in,  303 ;  reunion  of  Hood's 
army  in,  335 ;  possibilities  of  Johnston's 
retreating  to,  348  ;  defense  of,  456,  458 

Guzman,  Capt.,  courtesies  to  S.,  392 


Hall,  Willard  P.,  lieutenant-governor  of 
Missouri,  101 ;  letter  to  S.,  Oct.  21,  1863, 
101, 102 

Halleck,  Mai. -Gen.  Henry  W.,  relieves 
Fremont  from  command  of  Depart 
ment  of  the  Mississippi,  54;  S.  reports 
for  duty  to,  54 ;  assigns  S.  to  command 
special  militia  of  Missouri,  56 ;  notifies 
S.  of  movement  to  depose  him,  59 ;  goes 
to  Washington,  60,  359;  relations  with 
S.,  66,  68,  111,  360,  361;  orders  S.  to  send 
troops  to  Grant,  70 ;  on  the  attitude  of 
the  Missouri  factions,  77 ;  orders  San- 
born  to  report  to  S.,  93 ;  factional 
troubles  under  his  administration  in 
Missouri,  95,  96 ;  offers  S.  command  of 
the  Department  of  the  Ohio,  110 ;  com 
manding  in  Missouri,  111 ;  personal 
characteristics,  ill ;  approves  S.'s  ser 
vices  and  policy,  118;  decides  the  ques 
tion  of  relative  rank  between  Stanley 
and  S,,  160;  conversation  with  Thomas 
at  San  Francisco,  293;  his  territorial 
strategy,  358,  359 ;  plan  of  clearing  Mis 
souri  of  rebels,  358,  359;  at  St.  Louis, 
359 ;  takes  command  of  the  armies,  359 ; 
siege  of  Corinth,  359 ;  antiquated  tactics, 
359 ;  plan  for  campaign  of  1864, 359 ;  mili 
tary  education,  359,  360;  singularity  of 
conduct,  359-361 ;  reflection  on  S.'s  repu 
tation,  360,  361;  attitude  toward  Sher 
man,  360,  361 ;  attitude  toward  Grant 
before  Shiloh,  361 

Correspondence  with :  Blair,  F.  P., 
Aug.  11, 12, 1862,  59, 60  :  Curtis,  S.  R.,  Feb. 
18,  1863,  65, :  Schofield,  J.  M.,  Aug.  10, 
1862,  59 ;  Sept.  9,  60,  61 ;  Jan.  31,  1863,  65, 
66 ;  Feb.  3,  65,  66 ;  May  22,  68 ;  July  7, 
70 ;  Sept.  3,  83 ;  Sept.  26,  87  ;  Sept.  30,  85- 
87 ;  Oct.  2, 93 ;  May  7, 1865, 370, 371 :  Sher 
man,  W.  T.,  Sept.  25, 1864,  333  :  Stanton, 
E.,  May  10, 1865, 360 :  Thomas,  G.  H.,  Nov. 
28,  1864,  212 

Hamilton,  Col.  John,  organizes  light-ar 
tillery  school,  426 

Hammond,  Brig.-Gen.  John  H.,  needed  at 
and  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  209,  217,  258 ; 
battle  of  Nashville,  268 

Hammond,  Surg.-Gen.  William  A.,  board 
of  review  in  case  of,  443 

Hampton  Roads,  Va.,  trip  of  Grant  and  S. 
to  Cape  Fear  River  from,  294,  295 

Hancock,  Maj.-Gen.  Winfield  S.,  service 
on  military  court  with  Thomas,  277; 
S.'s  guest  at  Cabinet  and  Diplomatic 
dinner,  278 ;  assigned  to  command  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  Atlantic,  430 ;  rela 
tions  with  Grant,  430 ;  death  and  burial, 
456 ;  character,  456 ;  succeeded  in  com 
mand  by  S.,  456;  action  on  the  retire 
ment  for  age  bill,  481 

Hardee,  Lieut.-Gen.  William  J.,  battle  of 
Jonesboro',  157;  opportunity  for  Sher 
man  to  attack,  159 

Hardin  Turnpike,  Tenn.,  military  move 
ments  on,  264 

Harney,  Brig.-Gen.  "William  S.,  com 
manding  Department  of  the  West,  32, 
33  ;  attitude  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
33 ;  character  and  services,  33 ;  S.'s  rela 
tions  with,  33 ;  relieved  from  duty,  33, 
35 

Harpeth  River,  the,  military  movements 
on,  171,  1T5-177,  181,  184-186,  218,  219,  221- 
224,  228,  233,  244,  248-250, 264,  282  ;  Thomas 
advises  S.  to  retreat  behind  the,  212 ; 
Thomas  asked  to  bridge  the,  219;  crossed 
by  S.,  221-224;  lack  of  bridge  over,  221, 


INDEX 


557 


Harpeth  River,  the,—  continued 
222 ;  repulse  of  Forrest  at,  228  ;  Hood's 
retreat  across,  248-250 ;  S.'s  duty  to  fall 
back  behind,  282 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  the  War  Department 
under  his  administration,  423 

Hartsuff,  George  L.,  ill  luck  in  Florida, 
25 ;  organizes  the  Twenty- third  Army 
Corps,25 ;  intimacy  with  &,  25;  wounded, 
25 ;  death,  25 

Hascall,  Brig.-Gen.  Milo  S.,  battle  of 
Kolb'sFarm,  132,  133,  135 

Haskin,  Capt.  Joseph  A.,  commanding 
Company  I),  First  Artillery,  20 

Hat  Island,  sports  at,  428 

Hatch,  Maj.-Gen.  Edward,  anticipates 
Hood's  advance,  167 ;  in  the  Tennessee 
campaign,  201;  despatch  to  Thomas, 
Nov.  20, 1864,  201 ;  sends  troops  to  Nash 
ville,  205,  206 

Hawaiian  Islands,  a  trip  to  the,  431-433; 
question  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  431;  Americans  and  American 
interests  in,  431-433;  decay  of  the  peo 
ple  Of,  432 

Hayes,  Rutherford  B.,  creates  the  Divi 
sion  of  the  Gulf,  447,  448 

Henderson,  Senator  J.  B.,  letter  to  S., 
April  7,  1864,  117;  urges  S.  to  "whip 
somebody  anyhow,"  117;  letter  from  S. 
to,  April  15, 1864,  117-119 

Herron,  Maj.-Gen.  Francis  J.,  at  Wilson's 
Creek,  62;  marches  to  Blunt's  assist 
ance,  62 ;  battle  of  Prairie  Grove,  62- 
64;  acts  of  insubordination,  64;  S.'s 
opinion  of,  64 ;  protests  against  serving 
under  S.,  64;  rebuked  by  the  President, 
64;  promoted,  major-general,  64;  com 
manding  the  Army  of  the  Frontier,  64; 
ordered  to  report  to  Gen.  Grant  before 
Vicksburg,  64,  98 

Hewit,  Dr.,  at  battle  of  Jonesboro',  157 

Hill,  Lieut.  A.  P.,  attached  to  Battery  D, 
First  Artillery,  20;  lieutenant-general, 
C.  8.  A.,  20;  friendship  with  S.,  sickness 
of  both,  and  mutual  nursing,  25,  26 ;  en 
tertains  S,  at  his  residence  at  Culpeper 
Court-house,  26 ;  his  father,  26 ;  charac 
ter,  26 ;  S.'s  last  interview  with.  26 ; 
killed,  26 

Hillsborough  Turnpike,  Tenn.,  military 
operations  on,  264,  268 

Hilo,  a  trip  to,  431 

Hindman,  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  C.,  crosses 
the  Boston  Mountains,  62;  battle  of 
Prairie  Grove,  62 ;  retreats  toward  Little 
Rock,  63 

History,  the  essentials  of  impartial,  122; 
the  writing  of,  300 

Holden,  William  W.,  appointed  provi 
sional  governor  in  North  Carolina,  377 

Holston  River,  military  movements  on 
the,  114, 115 

Holt,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph,  service  on  mili 
tary  court  with  Thomas,  277 

Honolulu,  a  trip  to,  432 

Honor,  among  soldiers,  352 

"  Honor  graduate,"  the  distinction  of,  460 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B.,  at  West  Point,  14, 15, 
138;  dash,  courage,  and  vigor  as  a 
fighter,  15,  190,  232,  246-248,  251,  260-262, 
273, 317,  324, 341, 343  ;  crosses  Duck  River, 
129,  168,  170,  175,  192,  206,  208-210,  212-214, 
218,  219,  230,  254 ;  battle  of  Kolb's  Farm, 
136;  S.'s  personal  regard  for,  relations 
with,  and  knowledge  of  his  character, 
137,  138,  222,  229,  231,  232,  238,  245,  273,  307  ; 
deficiency  in  mathematics,  138;  advised 


Hood,  Gen.  John  B.—  continued 
by  S.  to  choose  a  military  career,  138; 
Sherman's  policy  concerning,  doubts 
about  his  movements,  relative  strength, 
and  failure  to  destroy,  146, 159,  160, 163- 
165,  191,  237,  261,  288,  300,  302-309,  311, 
313,  316,  324,  327,  338,  343;  defense 
of  Atlanta,  153, 154;  faults  of  his  strat 
egy,  153,  154;  abandons  Atlanta,  158, 
159;  collects  his  forces  at  Lovejoy's 
Station,  159 ;  S.'s  anxiety  to  attack,  159 ; 
advance  on  Spring  Hill,  the  battle  and 
its  strategy,  160, 172, 173, 213,  215-219,  230, 
231,  258,  301;  westward  and  northward 
movement,  the  crossing  of  the  Tennes 
see  River,  and  the  invasion  of  and  cam 
paign  in  Tennessee,  160, 163, 164, 167,  191, 
193,  252,  254,  258,  289,  301,  303  et  seq.,  313, 
315,  316,  318,  319,  321,  325;  advance  on 
and  battle  at  Columbia,  160,  168,  172,  201 
et  seq.,  252,  254, 258,  282 ;  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  160,  161,  166,  177-181,  183-188,  197,  221- 
225,  230,  236,  247,  258,  259,  262,  301,  343; 
battle  of  Nashville,  160,  242  et  seq.,  254, 
258-275 ;  S.  watches  his  movements,  161, 
285 ;  raid  on  railroad  in  rear  of  Atlanta, 
161;  S.'s  narrow  escape  from  capture 
by,  161 ;  threatens  Chattanooga,  161, 163; 
escapes  through  the  Chattanooga  Val 
ley,  161,  162 ;  coincidence  of  Sherman's 
and  Hood's  movements,  162;  possibili 
ties  and  fears  of  his  invading  Kentucky 
and  Ohio,  163,  185,  193,  259,  260,  295,  300, 
303,  305;  movement  around  Sherman's 
right,  163  ;  strikes  the  railroad  at  Alla- 
toona,  163 ;  Thomas  ordered  to  operate 
against,  163 ;  varying  conditions  of 
strength  as  compared  with  Thomas,  163, 
164,  190-199,  237,  247,  248,  252,  255,  259-262, 
284,  288,  300-302,  308,  314,  319;  near  Flo 
rence,  165;  his  advance  on  Pulaski  an 
ticipated,  167  ;  climatic  influences  in  his 
campaign,  167,  193;  suspected  design 
to  move  on  the  Nashville  and  Chatta 
nooga  railroad,  171,  203,  205,  206;  possi 
bility  and  necessity  of  holding  him  back 
at  Duck  River,  171, 196  et  seq.,  208 ;  dan 
ger  of  his  crossing  the  Harpeth  above 
Franklin,  176 ;  doubts  as  to  his  move 
ments,  177,  196  et  seq.;  criticisms  of  his 
assault  at  Franklin,  183-185 ;  possibilities 
of  S.'s  earlier  retreat  to  Nashville,  185; 
possibilities  of  Thomas  moving  against, 
from  Pulaski  or  Columbia,  194-197  ;  ad 
vances  from  Florence,  195  et  seq.; 
Thomas's  purpose  to  fight  him  at  Co 
lumbia,  195-197,  201 ;  necessity  of  guard 
ing  his  bridges  at  Florence,  197 ;  move 
ment  via  Lawrenceburg,  201 ;  Thomas's 
anxiety  to  hold  him  in  check,  205, 206, 220 
et  seq.,  231 ;  superiority  in  cavalry,  207  ; 
gains  possession  of  Rally  Hill,  209 ;  to  be 
urged  toward  Clarksville,  211 ;  Thomas 
plans  to  drawhim  across  Duck  River,2ll; 
S.'s  belief  in  the  ultimate  defeat  of,  '222  ; 
crosses  the  Harpeth,  222-224 ;  S.  depre 
cates  further  attempt  to  hold  him  back, 
222,  223  ;  mistakes  in  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  230;  relieves  Johnston  in  command, 
231 ;  possibilities  of  defeating  S.  at  Duck 
River,  231 ;  attack  on  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  at  Peachtree  Creek,  232;  on 
Davis's  desire  for  aggressive  campaigns, 
234;  his  total  defeat,  246-249,  251-254; 
battle  of  Atlanta,  247 ;  pursuit  of,  248- 
250 ;  advance  from  Spring  Hill  to  Frank 
lin,  251;  escape  across  the  Tennessee, 
251;  Franklin  his  death-blow,  252-254; 


558 


INDEX 


Hood,  Gen.  John  B.—  continued 
Thomas's  inactivity  toward,  255-257 ; 
purpose  of  pursuing  him  into  the  Gulf 
States,  255, 256 ;  strength  and  purpose  at 
Nashville,  258-262 ;  8.'  ordered  to  fight 
him  at  Pulaski,  283-285,  287 ;  S.  to  watch 
and  check,  285 ;  Thomas  expected  to  take 
personal  command  against,  289,  290; 
Stanley  ordered  to  fight  him  at  Pulaski 
or  Columbia,  290;  question  of  his  move 
ments  in  Georgia,  299  et  sect.;  possibili 
ties  of  his  capture  of  Nashville  and 
success  in  Tennessee,  300 ;  effect  of  his 
delays  from  Columbia  to  Franklin,  301 ; 
illustration  of  his  attitude  toward 
Sherman,  305,  306 ;  raid  in  Sherman's 
rear,  308;  abandons  Georgia,  309,  318, 
332,  333;  Sherman's  apprehensions  of 
interference  from,  313;  anticipated 
movement  on  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  rail 
road,  315;  crosses  the  Coosa,  315,  316; 
movement  from  Palmetto  Station,  316 ; 
probability  of  his  striking  for  Nashville, 
316 ;  movements  at  Dallas,  Cedartown, 
and  Ac  worth,  316;  retreat  down  the 
Coosa,  316,  318;  Thomas  to  watch,  317; 
position  near  Selma,  318;  assembles 
Georgia  militia,  319;  Thomas  to  take 
offensive  against,  319,  320,  325,  326;  at 
Florence  and  Tuscumbia,  320;  Thomas 
to  hold  in  check,  321;  Thomas's  failure 
to  destroy,  329,  330,  335 ;  destruction  of 
his  army  in  Tennessee,  340,  343,  348 ;  fall 
of  Atlanta,  341 

Hooker,  Maj. -Gen.  Joseph,  battle  of  Kolb's 
Farm,  132-136 ;  his  ambition,  136 ;  ques 
tions  of  relative  rank,  136 ;  habit  of  seiz 
ing  on  roads  destined  for  others,  136, 
139;  strained  relations  with  Sherman, 
136,  139-141 ;  explanation  of  his  side- 
road  movements,  139;  test  of  courage 
between  Sherman  and,  140, 141 

Howard,  Capt.,  reports  condition  of  Gen. 
Blunt' s  district,  93 

Howard,  Maj.-Gen.  O.  O.,  in  final  move 
ment  against  Atlanta,  154;  battle  of 
Jonesboro',  157 ;  to  accompany  Sherman 
to  Savannah,  165;  march  to  the  sea, 
317 ;  appointed  superintendent  at  West 
Point,  447 

Huey's  Mill,  Tenn.,  Hood  crosses  Duck 
River  near,  208,  210,  213,  214,  219 ;  recon- 
noitering  Hood's  movements  at,  210, 
213,  214 ;  military  movements  at,  219,  230 

Human  nature,  428 

Hunt,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  J.,  suggests  the 
establishment  of  a  light-artillery  school, 
426,  427 

Hunter,  Maj.-Gen.  David,  factional  trou 
bles  under  his  administration  in  Mis 
souri,  95 

Idaho,  obstruction  of  railroads  in,  512 

Illinois,  the  Schofield  family  removes  from 
New  York  to,  1 ;  Rev.  James  Schpfield's 
mission  work  in,  1 ;  the  labor  riots  of 
1894,  493  et  seq. 

Independence,  Mo.,  Ewing  and  S.  at,  84 

Indiana,  a  young  soldier  representative 
of,  155, 156 ;  to  be  called  on  for  militia, 
322 

Indian  Bureau,  the,  the  Modoc  outbreak 
and,  435,  436 ;  abuse  of  its  powers,  436 

Indian  River,  Fla.,  travel  on,  19,  23 ;  ser 
vice  on,  19-25;  military  operations  on, 
23 

Indians,  protection  against  raids  by,  426, 
428, 435-438 ;  results  of  broken  faith  with, 


Indians.—  continued 
436-438;  the  problem  of  restraint  of, 
487-489;  threatened  outbreak  by,  488; 
battle  of  Wounded  Knee,  488;  enlist 
ment  of,  488,  489;  allotments  in  sev- 
eralty,  489;  civilization  of,  489;  cam 
paigns  against,  514,  515 

Indian  Territory,  #.  reclaims  the,  90;  in 
cluded  in  Division  of  the  Gulf,  447 

Infantry  and  Cavalry  School,  460 

"  Influence,"  11, 12,  514 

Insurrection,  tactical  dealing  with,  495, 
504,  505 

Interstate  commerce,  organized  obstruc 
tion  to,  492  et  seq. 

Intrenchments,  question  of  carrying  by 
assault,  127,  128,  142-148 

Iowa,  Rev.  James  Schofield's  mission 
work  in,  1 

Iron-clad  oath,  the,  376,  396,  400,  401 

Italy,  S.  Visits,  385,  393 

Jackman,  in  Shelby's  raid  into  Missouri, 
101 

Jackson,  Tenn.,  possible  movement  by 
Beauregard  to,  311 ;  Forrest  at,  319 

Jackson,  Claiborne  F.,  governor  of  Mis 
souri,  32;  disloyalty,  32,  33;  joins  the 
rebellion  and  flees  from  Missouri,  54 

Jackson,  Lieut. -Gen.  Thomas  Jonathan 
("Stonewall"),  172 

Jacksonville,  Fla.,  S.  at,  19 

"Java,"  the,  S.  sails  for  Liverpool  on,  385 

Jefferson  City,  Mo.,  State  Convention  at, 
71  et  seq. 

Jesup,  Gen.,  24 
ohnson,  Andrew,  reconstruction  policy, 
354,  374,  376,  395,  420;  consults  with  S.  on 
Mexican  affairs,  379 ;  vetoes  reconstruc 
tion  acts,  395 ;  his  conflict  with  Congress, 
395,  404;  impeachment,  395,  404,  407  et 
seq.  ,'413-420, 478 ;  controversy  with  Stan- 
ton,  411  et  seq. ;  letter  from  Grant,  Aug. 
1,  1867,  411 ;  relations  with  Grant,  411  et 
seq. ;  letter  from  Grant,  Feb.  3, 1868, 412 ; 
claims  the  Tenure-of-Offlce  Act  uncon 
stitutional,  412 ;  appoints  Grant  Sec 
retary  of  War  ad  interim,  412 ;  contro 
versy  with  Grant,  413 ;  Grant  on  his  im 
peachment,  416 ;  his  lawless  acts,  416  ; 
creates  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Atlantic,  417 ;  nominates  S.  as  Secretary 
of  War,  418 ;  relations  with  8.,  419,  420 

Johnson,  Maj.-Gen.  Richard  W.,  battle  of 
Nashville,  264 

Johnsonville,  Tenn.,  S.  ordered  to,  165, 166, 
288-290 ;  the  Twenty-third  Corps  at,  165 ; 
Forrest's  raid  at,  165,  288,  320 ;  military 
movements  near,  213 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E.,  menaces  Grant 
at  Vicksburg,  71,  98 ;  in  the  Atlanta  cam- 

Saign,  124-129, 131, 143, 153 ;  his  "Narra- 
ve  "  quoted,  129,  352 ;  battle  of  Kolb's 
Farm,  133 ;  withdrawal  from  Kenesaw, 
136 ;  criticizes  Hood's  assault  at  Frank 
lin,  183 ;  relieved  by  Hood,  231,  342 ;  on 
Davis's  desire  for  aggressive  campaigns, 
234 ;  surrender  to  and  negotiations  with 
Sherman,  262,  335,  348-353,  355,  356,  360, 
367;  collects  Hood's  scattered  forces, 
335 ;  opposes  Sherman  in  the  Carolinas, 
335 ;  Sherman  to  operate  against,  340, 
342 ;  military  genius,  340-342 ;  character 
of  his  campaign  against  Sherman,  342 ; 
prevention  of  his  junction  with  Lee, 
347 ;  his  final  movements  in  the  war,  347, 
348,  350;  apprehends  guerrilla  warfare, 
350;  his  army  provisioned  by  S.,  352, 353 


INDEX 


559 


Tones,  Lieut.  John  M.,  tactical  instructor 
at  West  Point,  14 ;  opinion  of  S.'s  cha 
racter,  14 

Jones,  Mr.,  25 

Jonesboro',  Ga.,  Sherman  at,  153,  159; 
battle  of,  157, 158 

Juarez,  Pres.  Benito,  warfare  against 
Maximilian,  391 

Jupiter,  Fla.,  military  operations  at,  23-25 

Jupiter  Inlet,  Fla.,  fever  on,  24 

Justice,  463-465 

Kansas,  political  intrigue  and  factional 
disturbances  in,  63,  64,  66,  77  et  seq. ; 
S.  ordered  back  to,  66;  the  "Border 
Guards,"  78;  border  and  guerrilla  war 
fare  in,  78  et  seq.,  84,  234;  proposed 
measures  of  retaliation  on  Missouri, 
79-84,  97;  faction  in,  hostile  to  S., 
80;  Curtis's  strength  in  Missouri  and, 
90;  S.'s  strength  in  Missouri  and,  90; 
anti-Schotield  delegation  to  Washing 
ton  from,  91, 93-99 ;  reorganization  of  the 
militia,  105,  106;  enlistment  of  former 
rebels  in  the  volunteers  of,  105,  106; 
Liiicolu's  political  standing  in,  108,  109; 
Curtis  appointed  to  command  in,  112; 
movement  of  troops  to  Chicago  from, 
recommended,  498 

Kansas  Cavalry  Volunteers,  service  in 
Missouri,  37 

Kansas  City,  Mo.,  S.  at,  81-83 ;  Lane  agrees, 
but  fails,  to  meet  S.  at,  81, 83 ;  interview 
between  A',  and  Ewing  at,  82 

Kelton,  Utah,  a  trip  to,  430 

Kenesaw,  Ga.,  military  movements  near, 
133,  143;  Johnston's  withdrawal  from, 
136 ;  Sherman's  assault  and  repulse  at, 
142-144,  340 

Kentucky,  apprehended  invasion  of,  by 
Hood,  163,  185,  193,  259,  260,  300,  303,  305, 
316 ;  possibilities  of  Forrest's  harassing, 
300;  Thomas  to  have  command  over, 
317 ;  to  be  called  on  for  militia,  322 

Keokuk,  Iowa,  S.'s  marriage  at,  489 

Kilauea,  a  trip  to  the  crater  of,  431 

Kilbourne,  Mrs.  George  E.,  489 

Kilbourne,  Miss  Georgia,  marriage  of  S. 
and,  489 

Kilpatrick,  Maj.-Gen.  Judson,  with  Sher 
man  in  Georgia,  285 

Kimball,  Maj.-Gen.  Nathan,  his  troops  at 
Spring  Hill,  173 ;  at  Franklin,  175  ;  placed 
between  Duck  River  and  Rutherford's 
Creek,  214 ;  movement  to  Franklin,  216 ; 
battle  of  Nashville,  263 

King,  Brig.-Gen.  Rufus,  entertains  S.  at 
Rome,  393 

Kingston,  Ga.,  Sherman  at,  320 

Kinston,  N.  C.,  capture  of,  346 

Kissimmee  River,  the,  military  operations 
on,  23 

Klamath  Reservation,  the,  the  Modocs  on, 
435,  436 

Knights  of  St.  Patrick,  Sherman's  speech 
to,  mentioned,  441 

Knoxville,  Tenn.,  S.  arrives  at,  113;  siege 
of,  raised  by  Sherman,  113 ;  anxiety  in 
Washington  concerning,  114 ;  Grant  at, 
118;  Sherman  at,  118,  119;  S.  moves  to 
Dalton  from,  120 

Kolb's  Farm,  Ga.,  battle  of,  132-136 

Labor  riots  of  1894,  the  lessons  of  the, 

534,  535 
Lake  Front   Park,  Chicago,  troops  at,  in 

labor  riots,  494,  496,  501,  506 


Lake  Michigan,  establishment  of  Fort 
Sheridan,  455 

Lake  Monroe,  Fla.,  travel  on,  19 

Lake  Shore  Railroad,  riots  on  the,  498 

Lamont,  Daniel  S.,  Secretary  of  War, 
423;  at  consultation  concerning  the 
Chicago  riots,  494 

Lane,  Brig.-Gen.  James  H.,  U.  S.  Senator 
from  Kansas,  63;  hostility  to  S.,  63,  64, 
80,  81 ;  in  Kansas-Missouri  troubles,  79- 
83;  calls  mass  meeting  at  Lawrence,  80; 
demands  #.'s  removal,  80,  81 ;  friendship 
with  Ewing,  80,  81 ;  Carney's  political 
hostility  to,  80-83;  speaks  at  Leaven- 
worth,  81;  scheme  of  retaliatory  expe 
dition  from  Paola,  81-84 ;  interview  with 
S.,  81;  agrees,  but  fails,  to  meet  S.  at 
Kansas  City,  81,  83  ;  threatens  to  appeal 
to  the  President,  83 ;  speaks  at  Turner's 
Hall,  99 ;  ceases  hostilities  against  S., 
99;  the  President's  use  of,  111,  112;  se 
cures  the  appointment  of  Curtis  in 
Kansas,  112 

Laurel  Hill,  N.  C.,  Sherman  at,  346 

Lawrence,  Kan.,  massacre  at,  77-79,234; 
mass  meeting  at,  80 

Lawrenceburg,  Ala.,  Hood's  movement 
via,  201 

Lazelle,  Col.  Henry  M.,  commandant  at 
West  Point,  investigates  the  Whittaker 
case,  445 

Leavenworth,  Kan.,  plans  in,  for  retalia 
tion  on  Missouri,  79,  81,  83,  84 ;  S.  at,  80- 
82 ;  Lane  speaks  at,  81 ;  martial  law  in, 
84;  a  false  report  from,  93;  military 
station  at,  454 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert  E.,  superintendent  of 
West  Point  Military  Academy,  15 ;  char 
acter,  15;  S.'s  acquaintance  with,  18; 
Longstreet  joins,  116;  his  army  the 
proper  objective  for  the  spring  cam 
paign  of  1865,  253,  255,  337,  347,  348;  his 
surrender  and  its  results,  261,  262,  314, 
330,  344,  347  349 ;  Grant  competent  to 
handle,  without  Sherman,  303  ;  doubts 
of  Grant's  capturing,  329,  330 ;  possibili 
ties  of  his  prolonging  the  war,  329,  330; 
joint  operations  by  Sherman  and  Grant 
against,  331  et  seq. ;  Grant's  final  cam- 

Saign  against,  347,  348;  prevention  of 
is  junction  with  Johnston,  347 ;  neces 
sity  of  beating,  530 

Lee's  Creek,  Ark.,  military  movements 
on,  62 

Legal-tender  notes,  the  issue  of,  531,  532 

Lehman,  Ord.-Serg.,  in  battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek,  45 

Lewisburg  and  Franklin  Turnpike,  Tenn., 
Hood's  movements  near,  208-210,  213 

Lieutenant-general,  the  rank  of,  538 

Light-artillery  school,  established  at  Fort 
Riley,  426,  427 

Limoges,  France,  the  autumn  maneuvers 
of  1881  at,  451-453 ;  speech  by  S.  at,  452, 
453 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  the  spirit  of  charity 
in,  31 ;  first  call  for  volunteers,  32 ;  au 
thorizes  the  raising  of  special  militia  in 
Missouri,  55;  repudiates  Stantou's  or 
ders  for  confiscation  in  Missouri,  57,  58; 
S.  misrepresented  before,  63;  rebukes 
Herron,  64 ;  reappoints  S.  major-general, 
66 ;  personal  relations  with  S.,  and  con 
fidence  in  his  policy  and  administration, 
66,  68-70,  85,  87,  89-92,  97,  99,  101,  102,  106- 
110, 118 ;  relieves  Curtis,  68,  69;  appoints 
S.  to  command  of  Department  of  the  Mis 
souri,  68,  69;  desire  for  settlement  of 


560 


INDEX 


Lincoln,  Abraham—  continued 
internal  troubles  in  Missouri,  68,  69,  72, 
76 ;  his  standards  of  success,  69,  84 ;  the 
emancipation  proclamation,  and  his 
views  on  emancipation,  75,  76,  367,  368 ; 
attitude  of  the  Missouri  factions  toward, 
77;  requested  to  remove  S.,  80;  Lane 
threatens  to  appeal  to,  83 ;  supports 
freedom  of  speech  and  press,  85,  86,  92; 
S.  furnishes  memorandum  for  his  use, 
89-91 ;  asks  for  details  in  Blunt's  case, 
93 ;  reply  to  the  radical  delegation  from 
Missouri,  94-99;  declines  to  remove  S., 
97;  opposes  the  abolition  of  enrolled 
militia  in  Missouri,  98 ;  attitude  toward 
Butler,  98;  Washburne  misrepresents 
S.  to,  107, 108;  summons  S.  to  Washing 
ton,  106-110 ;  political  difficulties  in  the 
West,  108,  109 ;  reception  of  an  aiiti- 
Schofield  delegation  from  Missouri,  108 ; 
S.'s  last  interview  with,  110 ;  appoints 
S.  to  command  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio,  110 ;  his  use  of  bad  tools,  111,  112  ; 
questions  of  special  rank  conferred  by, 
150 ;  reelection,  160,  312 ;  instructions  to 
Grant,  March  3, 1865,  348  ;  assassination, 
349,  411;  humane  purposes  toward  the 
South,  350;  presents  Grant  with  his 
commission  as  lieutenant-general,  361 ; 
patriotism,  409 ;,  transfers  command  of 
the  armies  to  Grant,  409,  411 ;  Blow  de 
nounces]  S.  to,  425 ;  publication  of  a 
confidential  letter  of,  in  St.  Louis,  425 ; 
meets  the  peace  commissioners  at  Fort 
Monroe,  530 ;  the  struggles  of  his  admin 
istration,  539,  540. 

Correspondence  with :  Drake,  C.  D., 
Oct.  5, 1863,  70,  71 ;  Schofield,  J.  M.,  May 
27,  1863,  68,  69;  June  1,  69;  June  20,  75, 
76  ;  June  22,  76 ;  Aug.  27,  77 ;  Aug.  28,  77- 
79;  Sept.  30,  93;  Oct.  1,  58,  88,  91-93,  98; 
Oct.  2,  93 ;  Oct.  3,  94 ;  Oct.  4,  94  ;  Oct.  25, 
101 ;  Oct.  28,  103,  104 ;  Nov.  9,  105,  106 

Lincoln,  Robert  T.,  Secretary  of  War,  451 ; 
abolishes  the  Division  of  the  Gulf,  451. 
See  also  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Little  Rock,  Ark.,  Hindman  retreats 
toward,  63;  proposed  movement  against, 
70 ;  capture  of,  70,  85 

Little  Tennessee  River,  the,  military 
movements  on,  115 

Liverpool,  Eng.,  S.  at,  385 

Livingston,  La  Rhett  L.,  S.'s  room 
mate  at  West  Point,  13 ;  brevet  second 
lieutenant,  Battery  D,  First  Artillery, 
20 

Logan,  Maj.-Gen.  John  A.,  in  battle  of  At 
lanta,  147 ;  letter  from  Grant,  Feb.  14, 
1884,  239,  240 ;  sent  to  relieve  Thomas  at 
Nashville,  but  recalled  at  Louisville, 
239,  240,  295 ;  letter  from  Grant,  Feb.  23, 
1884,  240,  241;  on  the  establishment  of 
Fort  Sheridan,  454 ;  attitude  in  the  Fitz- 
John  Porter  case,  464,  465 

London,  Eng.,  8.  in,  385,  392,  393 

Longstreet,  Lieut. -Gen.  James,  failure  of 
Parke  to  expel  him  from  Tennessee, 
114 ;  advances  to  Strawberry  Plains,  114 ; 
retreats  toward  Morristqwii,  115  ;  holds 
Bull's  Gap,  115,  116;  withdraws  from 
Tennessee  and  joins  Lee  in  Virginia,  116 

Lookout  Range,  S.  proposes  to  seize  the 
passes  through,  161 

Lothrop,  Lieut.,  service  in  Missouri,  35 

Louisiana,  included  in  Division  of  the 
Gulf,  447 

Louisville,  Ky.,  Logan  recalled  from,  239, 
240 ;  S.  at,  345 


Lovejoy's  Station,  Ga.,  Hood's  rendez 
vous  at,  159 

Lunalilo,  King,  ascends  the  throne  of 
Hawaii,  432 

Lynnville,  Tenn.,  proposed  point  of  con 
centration  of  Thomas's  troops,  201 

Lyon,  Brig. -Gen.  Nathaniel,,  succeeds 
Harney  in  command  of  Department  of 
the  West,  33,  35;  enrolls  and  musters 
Missouri  troops,  33-35 ;  elected  briga 
dier-general  Missouri  militia,  34,  35 :  ap 
pointed  brigadier-general  U.  S.  Volun 
teers,  35;  appoints  S.  adjutant-general 
and  chief  of  staff,  35,  37 ;  character  and 
patriotism,  36,  38-45;  captures  Camp 
Jackson,  36,  37;  moves  on  the  interior 
of  Missouri,  37;  junction  with  Sturgis 
and  Sigel,  38 ;  skirmishes  at  Dug  Springs 
and  Curran  Post  Office,  38;  difficulties 
of  hi«  campaign,  38-43;  returns  to 
Springfield,  39  ;  solicitude  for  the  loyal 
people  of  Missouri,  39,  42 ;  battle  of  Wil 
son's  Creek,  39,  40,  42-47,  141,  363,  364; 
letter  from  Fremont,  Aug.  6, 1861, 39,  40 ; 
ordered  to  fall  back  toward  Holla,  40; 
letter  to  Fremont,  Aug.  9,  40,  41 ;  retires 
to  Springfield,  41 ;  consultation  with 
and  reliance  on  Sigel,  42,  43;  despera 
tion,  42-45;  wounded  and  killed,  44,  45, 
47,  141,  364 ;  supported  by  the  "  clay- 
bank"  element,  87,  90 


McAllister,  Caroline,  mother  of  the  au 
thor,  1 

McAllister,  John,  grandfather  of  the  au 
thor,  1 ;  farming  ambitions,  426 

McArthur,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  in  battle  of 
Nashville,  246,  247,  268 

McClellan,  Maj.-Gen.  George  B.,  sugges 
tion  by,  as  to  the  Missouri  special  mili 
tia,  55;  discussions  on  his  campaigns, 
358 

McDonough,  Ga.,  Hood's  troops  at,  159 

McDowell,  Maj.-Gen.  Irvin,  question  of 
appointment  for,  443,  450 ;  commanding 
Division  of  the  Pacific,  450 ;  S.'s  promise 
to,  450 

McMillen,  Maj.-Gen.  William  L.,  in  battle 
of  Nashville,  268 

McNeil,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  proposed  assign 
ment  of,  to  Fort  Smith,  93 

Macon,  Ga.,  Thomas's  plan  for  the  cap 
ture  of,  299 ;  Sherman  proposes  to  de 
stroy,  317,  318,  333;  Hood  assembles 
militia  at,  319;  Sherman's  movement 
on,  333 

McPherson,  Edward,  "  History  of  Recon 
struction,"  cited,  411,  412 

McPherson,  Maj.-Gen.  James  B.,  S.'s 
room-mate  at  West  Point,  13;  Grant's 
predilection  for,  109 ;  proposed  succes 
sion  to  the  command  of  the  Army  of 
the  Tennessee,  109  ;  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  124-129;  Sherman's  admiration 
for,  125;  friendly  relations  with  S.,  125, 
136-139;  question  of  relative  rank  be 
tween  Hooker  and,  136;  personal  cha 
racteristics,  137,  138,  146;  question  of 
relative  rank  between  S.  and,  137 ;  his 
engagement  and  desire  to  get  married, 
137;  killed  at  Peachtree  Creek,  137, 
146,  232 ;  a  night  visit  to  his  camp,  139 ; 
on  the  extension  of  the  lines,  June  24- 
25, 1864, 142 ;  assaults  on  the  lines  before 
Atlanta,  144 ;  opposed  to  the  assault  on 
Kenesaw  Mountain,  144;  general  grief 
at  his  death,  146 ;  battle  of  Resaca,  162 


INDEX 


561 


Mahan,  Capt.  Alfred  T.,  on  the  relative 
functions  of  the  army  and  navy,  527 

Malaria,  the  military  method  of  conquer 
ing,  256 

Man,  reversionary  tendencies  in,  428 

Manter,  Capt.,  commanding  battery  at 
Fredericktown,  Mo.,  53 

Marietta  Road,  Ga.,  military  operations 
on  the,  135 

Marsh,  George  P.,  entertains  S.  at  Flo 
rence,  393 

Martin,  Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.  J.  P.,  action  in 
lahor  riots  at  Chicago,  494,  496,  497,  503, 
504,  507 

Maryland,  the  Confederate  invasion  of, 
234 

Maximilian,  Archduke  and  Emperor,  as 
sumes  empire  in  Mexico,  378  et  seq.; 
attitude  of  the  Austrian  government 
concerning,  385 ;  weakness  of  his  posi 
tion  in  and  hopes  of  his  evacuating 
Mexico,  391 

Maxims  of  war,  their  use  in  official  life, 
482,  483 

Meade,  Maj.-Gen.  George  G.,  commanding 
Division  of  the  Atlantic,  429 ;  entertains 
Grant,  Sherman,  and  &.  at  Philadelphia, 
429 ;  president  of  Fairmount  Park  com 
mission,  429;  designated  to  command 
the  Division  of  the  Pacific,  429 ;  death, 
430 

Medals  of  honor,  474,  475 

Meigs,  Q.-M.-Gen.  Montgomery  C.,  on  the 
civil  war,  365 ;  favors  S.'s  plan  of  War 
Department  reform,  479 

Memphis,  Tenn.,  Fremont's  plan  of  cam 
paign  below,  49 ;  Hatch  sends  troops  to 
Nashville  from,  205,  206 

Merritt,  Maj.-Gen.  Wesley,  protection  of 
the  Pacific  railroads,  511 

Mexican  war,  Thomas's  service  in, 
189 ;  experience  of  army  officers  in,  514, 
515 

Mexico,  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in,  276 ;  French  intervention  in,  377  et 
seq.,  543 ;  recognition  of  the  republic  by 
the  United  States,  379,  381 ;  preparations 
for  military  intervention  in,  379-383; 
France  demands  recognition  of  the  em 
pire  in,  384;  Napoleon  prepares  for 
evacuation  of,  389-391,  393 ;  the  end  of 
the  Franco- Austrian  intrigues,  393  ;  the 
fates  of  Maximilian  and  Carlotta,  393 

Miles,  Maj.-Gen.  Nelson  A.,  telegram  from 
S.,  July  2, 1894,  406;  battle  of  Wounded 
Knee,  488 ;  absence  from  his  post,  493, 
494;  commanding  Department  of  the 
Missouri,  494 ;  doubts  the  use  of  United 
States  troops  in  Chicago,  494;  action 
and  orders  in  the  Chicago  labor  riots, 
494-501,  503,  504 

Military  commission,  trial  by,  398-400 

Military  committee  of  the  Senate,  hinders 
S.'s  confirmation  as  major-general,  109, 
110,  117 

Military  correspondence,  unreliability  of, 
188 

Military  criticism,  the  true  basis  of,  191 ; 
faults  of,  336 ;  the  aim  of,  339,  344 ;  diffi 
culties  of,  356,  357 

Military  cruelty,  435 

Military  Department  of  Missouri,  demand 
that  Butler  relieve  S,  in  command  of 
the,  94 

Military  Department  of  West  Point,  crea 
tion  of  the,  444 

Military  departments,  408 

Military  discipline,  7 

36 


Military  Division  of  the  Atlantic,  the, 
creation  of,  417 ;  Meade  commanding, 
429,430;  Hancock  assigned  to  command, 
430 ;  S.  succeeds  Hancock  in  command, 
456  et  seq.,  487 

Military  Division  of  the  Gulf,  Sheridan 
commanding,  380 ;  creation,  of,  447,  448 ; 
broken  up,  450,  451 ;  S.  commanding, 
447,  450,  451 

Military  Division  of  the  Mississippi,  the, 
errant  commanding,  109  ;  Sherman  suc 
ceeds  Grant  in  command,  109,  116 ;  the 
cavalry  corps  of,  in  the  Nashville  cam 
paign,  227,  264 

Military  Division  of  the  Missouri,  the, 
Sheridan  takes  command  of,  425 ;  S.  suc 
ceeds  to  command,  427,  453-456 ;  impor 
tance  of,  456 

Military  Division  of  the  Pacific,  the, 
Thomas  appointed  to  command,  278; 
Meade  designated  to  succeed  Thomas, 
429 ;  S.  commanding,  430, 439,  440 ;  Cauby 
commanding,  435;  command  offered  to 
S.,  450;  McDowell  commanding,  450 ;  S. 
reassigned  to  command,  453 

Military  education,  advantages  of,  5-7; 
necessity  of,  for  officers  in  high  com 
mand,  181-183;  national  necessity  for, 
366,  516  et  seq.,  534-536 

Military  government,  prejudices  against, 
434-438 

Military  history,  the  logic  of  contempora 
neous,  198;  the  writing  of,  298,  300 

Military  records,  unreliability  of,  188 
*  Military  reform,  a  needed  measure  of,  538 

Military  roads,  509-512 

Military  rules  versus  civil  ^practice,  476- 
478  " 

Military  strategy  and  tactics,  modern  ver 
sus  ancient,  146 ;  the  true  system  for  the 
Civil  War,  146;  division  of  forces,  220; 
use  of  roads  at  night,  231 ;  two  kinds  of 
strategy,  336,  337 ;  territorial  strategy, 
358,  359 ;  application  of  European  rules 
in  America,  359 

Military  study,  235 

Military  system,  345,  346 

Military  telegrams  and  despatches,  diffi 
culties  anddelays  attending  their  trans 
mission  and  deciphering,  169,  204,  206, 
207,  211,  214,  218,  220,  224,  232,  233 

Military  training,  407  et  seq. 

Militia,  Gen.  Scott's  distrust  of,  513 

Milledgeville,  Ga.,  Sherman  proposes  to 
wreck,  318 

Milroy,  Maj.-Gen.  Robert  H.,  in  the  Ten 
nessee  campaign,  205 

Mint-julep,  26 

Mississippi,  Hood's  proposed  movement 
toward,  163;  Thomas  proposes  a  cam 
paign  in,  253,  255,  256 ;  possible  opera 
tions  in,  305 ;  Thomas  to  have  command 
over,  317 

Mississippi  River,  the,  Fremont's  plan  of 
campaign  on,  49;  military  operations 
on,  63-66,  70, 318 ;  S.  seeks  service  on,  64- 
66;  importance  of  the  opening  of,  70, 
337 ;  Halleck's  plan  for  clearing  west  of, 
359;  development  of  railroad  com 
munication  between  the  Pacific  and, 
491,  492 

Missouri,  Rev.  James  Schofield's  mission 
work  in,  1 ;  loyal  and  patriotic  citizens 
of,  30, 31 ;  disloyalty  and  flight  of  the  gov 
ernor,  32, 54 ;  disbanding  and  reorganiza 
tion  of  the  State  militia  and  raising  of 
troops  in ,  32-37, 55,  56, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 94, 95, 
98, 101, 105, 106 ;  the  affair  at  Camp  Jack- 


562 


INDEX 


Missouri  —  continued 
son,  33, 34, 36, 37 ;  anti- Yankee  feeling,  37; 
Lyon's  operations  in  the  interior,  37  et 
seq.;  plight  of  the  Union  troops,  38 ;  Fre 
mont's  plan  of  campaign,  49 ;  Fremont 
takes  the  field  in  central,  51 ;  convention 
declares  for  the  Union,  54 ;  organization 
of  a  provisional  government,  and  plots 
to  overthrow  it,  54,  73,  86,  87;  partizan 
factious,  the  "charcoals"  and  "clay- 
banks,"  54-60,  69,  71  et  seq.,  77,  85-109,  543  ; 
disloyalty  in,  57 ;  importance  of  combin 
ing  with  Arkansas  and  Tennessee  in  a 
department,  60,  61 ;  Confederate  move 
ments,  61 ;  political  intrigue,  66 ;  S.  or 
dered  back  to,  66 ;  the  question  of  eman 
cipation,  69,  74,  103 ;  the  militia  of, 
strengthens  S.'s  hands,  71 ;  the  question 
of  slavery,  71  et  seq. ,  90, 92, 94, 95, 99 ;  the 
State  convention,  71  et  seq.,  90,  92, 100; 
enlistment  of  colored  troops,  73,  90,  92, 
99;  question  of  confiscation,  73,  92; 
downfall  of  the  Republican  party,  77; 
return  of  rebel  soldiers  from  Vicksburg 
to,  77,  78;  the  ''Border  Guards,"  78; 
brigandage,  and  border  and  guerrilla 
warfare,  78  et  seq.,  84,  89,  92,  234,  358, 359 ; 
proposed  measures  of  retaliation  by 
Kansas  on,  79-81,  83,  84 ;  the  militia  for 
bidden  to  cross  into  Kansas,  82,  83,  97 ; 
"revolutionists"  in,  86,  87;  friends  of 
the  government  in,  87,  90,  91 ;  elections, 
88,  92,  94,  98, 100-102, 105-107 ;  charges  of 
misrule  in,  against  S.,  89-91 ;  Curtis's 
strength  in  Kansas  and,  90 ;  S.'s  strength 
in  Kansas  and,  90;  death  of  secession 
and  end  of  rebel  power,  91, 101, 102, 105 ; 
necessity  of  maintaining  a  Federal  force 
in,  91,  92;  anti-Schofield  delegation  to 
Washington  from,  91, 93-99, 108 ;  restora 
tion  of  peace,  92, 105,  106 ;  sufferings  of 
Union  men,  94 ;  the  compound,questions 
of  Union  and  slavery  in,  94,  95 ;  features 
of  Federal  administration  in,  96 ;  cor 
ruption  in,  96 ;  raids  from  Arkansas  into, 
101 ;  misnamed  "  loyalty  "  in,  101 ;  revul 
sion  of  feeling  in  favor  of  S.,  101, 102, 424, 
427,  428 ;  allegations  to  the  War  Depart 
ment  concerning  arming  of  disloyal  per 
sons,  104-106 ;  election  of  a  U.  8.  senator, 
107 ;  the  President's  political  standing 
in,  108,  109;  Halleck  commanding  in, 
111 ;  Gen.  Rosecrans  appointed  to  com 
mand  in,  112 ;  reinforcements  for  Thomas 
from,  284,  285, 290, 321, 325 ;  Halleck's  and 
Pope's  plan  of  clearing  rebels  from,  358, 
359 

Missouri  River,  the,  military  operations 
on,  37 ;  guerrilla  warfare  on,  358,  359 

Missouri  United  States  Reserve  Corps, the, 
organization  of,  35 

Mobile,  Ala.,  proposed  movements 
against,  253,  312,  317,  332  ;  contemplated 
change  of  base  to,  303 ;  cutting  through 
the  South  at,  337 

Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  proposed  move 
ment  against,  from  Vicksburg,  199 ;  an 
ticipated  movement  by  Hood  on,  315 

Modoc  Indians,  their  trials,  outbreak,  and 
repression,  435-438 

Moltke,  Field-Marshal  H.  C.  B.  von,  one 
secret  of  his  success,  7 ;  on  preparation 
for  war,  365,  366 

Money,  the  value  of,  533,  534 

Monroe  Doctrine,  violation  of,  in  Mexico, 
276,  543;  the  maintenance  of,  381;  its 
purpose  explained  to  Napoleon  III.,  389 ; 
Seward's  adhesion  to,  393 


Montana,  obstruction  of  railroads  in,  512. 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  cutting  through  the 
South  at,  337 

Morristown,  Kan.,  Gen's  Ewing  and  Lane 
at,  79 

Morristown,  Tenn.,  Longstreet  retreats 
toward,  115;  &  advances  toward,  115; 
preparations  for  attacking  Longstreet 
at,  116;  held  by  £,  lie 

Mosquito  Lagoon,  8.  at,  19 

Moss,  Col.,  reported  expulsion  of  Union 
families  by,  93 

Motley,  John  L.,  U.  S.  Minister  at  Vienna, 
385 

Mount  Pleasant  Turnpike,  Tenn.,  military 
movements  on,  204 

Mower,  Maj.-Gen.  Joseph  A.,  to  reinforce 
Thomas,  319 

Murfreesboro,  Tenn.,  S.  reports  for  duty 
at,  66;  possibilities  of  Hood's  getting 
between  Nashville  and,  185;  detention 
of  Granger  at,  197;  concentration  at, 
and  proposed  movements  of  troops  to, 
205-207,  215 ;  proposed  movement  to 
Brentwood  from,  223 ;  blunder  of  send 
ing  pontoons  to,  249 ;  strategic  import 
ance  of,  260 

Muscle  Shoals,  Ala.,  Hood  crosses  the 
Tennessee  near,  167,  318 

Napoleon,  Prince,  gives  dinner  at  the  Pa 
lais  Royal,  389 ;  interviews  with  S.,  388- 
391 

Napoleon  III.,  intervention  in  Mexico, 
377  et  seq.;  S.'s  mission  to,  382  et  seq.; 
critical  situation  of  his  government, 
387  ;  a  just  retribution  for,  387 ;  address 
to  the  French  legislature,  389,  390 ;  pre 
pares  for  evacuation  of  Mexico,  389-391, 
393;  audacity  of  his  logic  in  the  Mexican 
affair,  390 ;  seeks  friendship  of  the  United 
States,  390;  S.  presented  to,  392 ;  inter 
est  in  American  military  affairs,  392 

Nashville,  Tenn.,  opening  of  communica 
tion  with  Chattanooga,  114;  battle  of, 
160,  197,  198,  239,  240,  242-251,  254,  258-275, 
279  et  seq.,  290-296,  327;  Thomas  com 
manding  at,  holding,  and  concentrating 
in;  his  strength,  etc.,  161, 163, 166, 192-198, 

220,  223,  226,  231,  236,  252,  254,  259,  261,  283- 
285,  288,  301,  302,  319,  320,  328 ;  S.  ordered 
to  fall  back  to,  the  retreat,  and  inter 
views  with  Thomas,  165,  166,   224,  226, 
227,  288-290;  reinforcements  ordered  to 
and  expected  at,  164, 165, 168, 170, 171, 184, 
185,  190-199,  206-208,  225,  284,  285,  290,  307, 
308,  315,  319-322,  325,  326,  330,  344 ;  possi 
bilities  of  an  earlier  retreat  to,  185 ;  the 
quartermaster's  division  in,  192 ;  arrival 
of  Steedman's  troops  at,  195,  254 ;  Thom 
as's  delays  at,  197,  236  et  seq.,  243, 249, 260, 
261, 271, 294-296;  Thomas's  attitude  at,  ex 
plained  to  Grant,  198;  A.  J.  Smith's  de 
lay  in  reaching,  212,  213,  217,  218,  223,  301, 
325 ;  Thomas  unprepared  for  action  at, 
220  et  seq.;  arrival  of  A.  J.  Smith  at,  220, 

221,  254 ;  Wilson  ordered  to  fall  back  to, 
224;  delays  of  telegraphic  communica 
tion  with  Franklin,  224;  general  feeling 
concerning  immediate  action   against 
Hood,  237;    Grant's   determination  to 
take  personal  command  at,  238-240 ;  Lo 
gan  ordered  to  take  command  at,  239, 
240 ;  climatic  conditions  at,  249 ;  move 
ment  from  Duck  River  to,  251 ;  Hood's 
strength  at,  and  his  actual  and  possible 
movements  against,  258-262,  300,  301,  316 
(see  also  HOOD)  ;  Sherman  on  the  battle 


INDEX 


563 


Nashville,  Tenn.—  continued 
of,  262 ;  loss  of  documents  concerning  the 
battle,  262,  263 ;  S.'s  report  of  the  battle, 
266,  269,  270,  280  et  seq.;  military  confer 
ence  at,  Dec.  14,  1864,  272;  council  at, 
Dec.  9,  1864,  296;  Sherman's  measures 
for  the  protection  of,  304 ;  possible  siege 
of,  319,  321,  322 ;  as  base  of  supplies,  320 ; 
possible  movement  of  Beauregard  from 
Corinth  nu'ainst,  321 

Nashville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  fear 
of  Hood's  gaining  possession  of  the,  171, 
I! ir.  ct  seq.,  201,  203,  205,  206 

National  credit,  the  maintenance  of,  529- 
534 

National  Guard,  the,  522 

Nature,  the  laws  of,  532-534 

Negroes,  question  of  recruiting,  in  Mis 
souri,  73;  question  of  suffrage  for,  373, 
374,  376 ;  status  after  emancipation,  367- 
376,  446 

Negro  suffrage,  forced  upon  the  South, 
396  et  seq. 

Negro  troops,  enlistment  of,  90,  92,  99 

Neuse  River,  bridged  by  8.,  346 

New  Hope  Church,  Ga.,  military  opera 
tions  near,  143 

New  Madrid,  Mo.,  mutiny  among  troops 
ordered  to,  84,  85,  87 

New  Market,  Tenn.,  S.  retires  on,  115 

New  Mexico,  obstruction  of  railroads  in, 
512 

New  Smyrna,  Fla.,  S.  at,  19 

Newton,  Maj. -Gen.  John,  battle  of  Resaca, 
140 

Newtonia,  Mo.,  military  movements  at,  38 

New  York,  a  forbidden  trip  from  West 
Point  to,  7,  8 ;  S.  leaves  for  Liverpool, 
385 ;  Gen.  Scott  removes  his  headquar 
ters  from  Washington  to,  406,  469 ;  Sher 
man's  fondness  for,  542 

"  New  York  Herald,"  quoted,  386,  387 

"  New  York  Times,"  cited,  293,  294 

Nickajack,  Cox  secures  position  on,  144 

Ninety-Fifth  Ohio  Infantry,  in  battle  Of 
Nashville,  268 

Ninth  Army  Corps,  at  Knoxville,  113 

Nolensville  Turnpike,  Tenn.,  military  op 
erations  on,  267 

North  Carolina,  Sherman's  march 
through,  314,  330,  340,  346-348 ;  capitula 
tion  of  Johnston  in,  335 ;  S.  ordered  to, 
345,  543;  operations  of  the  Twenty-third 
Corps  in,  346;  the  end  of  the  war  in, 
353 ;  8.  military  governor  of,  346,  351, 360, 
367-377 ;  the  negro  question  in,  367-376 ; 
announcement  of  cessation  of  hostil 
ities,  368,  369 ;  restoration  of  order  and 
trade  in,  369, 370 ;  reconstruction  in,  370- 
376  ;  the  domestic  relations  in,  371,  372; 
restrictions  of  the  Treasury  on  trade  in, 
373 ;  question  of  the  State  Constitution, 
373-376;  provisional  government,  376, 
377 ;  S.  resigns  command  in,  377 ;  ap 
pointment  of  Provisional  Governor 
Holden,  377 

North  Dakota,  obstruction  of  railroads 
in,  512 

"Northern  Ohio  Democrat,"  the  (of  To 
ledo),  cited,  293-295 

Northern  Pacific  Railroad,  military  pro 
tection  on  the  line  of  the,  510-512 

Oahu,  a  trip  to,  432 

Ohio,  possibilities  of  Hood's  invading, 

305 
Ohio  River,  fears  of  Hood's  reaching,  295, 

300 


Okeechobee,  Lake,  military  operations  at, 

23-25 
Olley's  Creek,  Cox  forces  the  passage  of, 

441 
Olney,Atty.-Gen.  Richard,  report  of, cited, 

493 ;  approves  S.'s  order  of  May  25,  1894, 

509 

Omaha,  military  station  at,  454 ;  S.  at,  509 
Oneco,  Wis.,  S.  teaches  school  at,  2 
One  Hundred  and  Twenty-eighth  Indiana 

Volunteers,  a  young  straggler  from  the, 

Opdycke,  Maj. -Gen.  Emerson,  in  battle  of 
Franklin,  177-181, 229 ;  the  meed  of  praise 
due  to,  179-181 

Oregon,  visit  of  Sherman  and  S.  to,  430; 
the  Modoc  Indians  in,  434-437 

O'Reilley,  Thomas,  member  of  anti-Scho- 
fleld  committee  from  St.  Louis  to  Wash 
ington,  58,  59 

Otis,  Brig. -Gen.,  commanding  Depart 
ment  of  the  Columbia,  510;  orders  to, 
concerning  obstruction  of  Pacific  rail 
roads,  510,  511 

Owens  River,  the  earthquake  of  1871  on 
the,  431 


Pacific  Ocean,  development  of  railroad 
communication  between  the  Mississippi 
and  the,  491,  492 

Pacific  railroads,  the,  riots  on,  492  et  seq. ; 
the  acts  authorizing,  509,  510 ;  military 
roads,  509-512 

Palais  Royal,  Prince  Napoleon's  dinner 
at,  389 

Palatka,  Fla.,  S.  at,  19 

Palmer,  Maj. -Gen.  John  M.,  movement 
before  Atlanta,  Aug.  4-5,  1864,  149 ;  mis 
takes,  149,  150;  his  national  services, 
150;  S.'s  esteem  for,  150,  151;  Thomas's 
opinion  of,  151 

Palmetto  Station,  Ga.,  Hood's  movement 
from,  316 

Paola,  Kan.,  Lane's  scheme  of  retaliatory 
movement  from,  81-84 

Paper  money,  532 

Paris,  France,  S.'s  mission  to,  384-393; 
speech  by  S.  at  the  American  Thanks 
giving  dinner,  386,  387 ;  courtesies  to  S. 
in,  392 

Paris,  Tenn.,  possible  movement  by 
Beauregard  to,  311 ;  Forrest  at,  319 

Paris,  Comte  de,  on  S.'s  services  in  the 
southwest,  62 

Parke,  Maj. -Gen.  John  G.,  attempts  to 
drive  Longstreet  from  Tennessee,  114. 

Parrott  guns,  50 

Parsons,  Col.  Lewis  B.,  conducts  trans 
port  arrangements  for  the  Twenty-third 
Corps,  345 

Partizanship,  dangerous,  540,  543 

Party  politics,  a  detriment  in  the  War  De 
partment,  407  et  seq. 

Patriotism,  of  the  American  soldier,  183; 
a  valuable  kind  of,  360 ;  true,  481 ;  pro 
fessional,  539,  540 

Peabody  Fund,  Grant  at  meeting  of  trus 
tees  of,  413 

Pearl  River,  examination  of  the  harbor 
Of,  432 

Pennock,  Rear-Adm.,  takes  S.  to  Hawaii, 
431 

Pennsylvania,  the  Confederate  invasion 
of,  234;  delays  in  calling  out  her  re 
serves,  525 

Pensacola,  Fla.,  possible  movement  by 
Sherman  to,  312,  332 


564 


INDEX 


Petersburg,  Va.,  siege  of,  313,  329 ;  Sher 
man's  plan  of  marching  against,  347 
Philadelphia,  assembly  of  the  Society  of 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac  at,  429 
Phrases: 

Anonymous  or  unassigned  : 
"If  digging  is  the  way  to  put  down 
the  rebellion  I  guess  we  will  have 
to  do  it,"  155 
"  If  you  were  half  as  scared  as  I  am, 

you  would  run  away,"  45 
"  It  is  all  right,  boys  ;  I  like  the  way 
the  old  man  chaws  his  tobacco," 
120 

"  Oh,  just  to  make  him  yelp,"  490 
"  That  book  is  closed,"  473 
"  The  bell  from  the  Secretary's  office 

is  ringing,"  477 
[Troops]  "  lighted  their  pipes  by  the 

enemy's  camp-fires,"  173 
"  To  hell  with  the  government,"  501 
Grant : 

"Let  us  have  peace,"  478 
"  McClellanized,"  362 
Lane  : 

[Making  war  on  Schofield]  "inciden 
tally,"  99 
Lincoln  : 

"  Beware  of  being  assailed  by  one  fac 
tion  and  praised  by  the  other  "  69 
"  Every  foul  bird  comes  abroad,  and 

every  dirty  reptile  rises  up,"  95 
"Those  fellows  have  been  lying  to  me 

again,"  108 

"You  fellows  are  lying  to  me,"  108 
Popular : 

"  Charcoals,"  72,  87,  90 
"  Claybanks,"  72,  87,  91 
"Copperheads,"  107 
"Cooperate,"    the  military  meaning 
Of,  123,  124 


meaning  of, 


'  To  fire  the  Southern  heart,"  234 

Schofield  : 

"  The  President's  policy  is  my  policy ; 
his  orders  my  rule  of  action,"  540 

Seward  : 
[S.  to  get  his]  "legs  under  Napoleon's 

mahogany,"  385 
Piedmont  route,  the,  338 
Pilot  Knob,  Mo.,  military  movements  at, 

51 ;  S.  at,  51 ;  Col.  Carlin  commanding,  51 
Pittsburg,  Pa.,  S.  ordered  to   purchase 

arms  at,  48 ;  /S'.  at,  345 

Pittsburg,  Fort  'Wayne,  &  Chicago  Rail 
road,  riots  on  the,  499,  500 
Pittsburg   Landing,   Tenn.,   C.   F.   Smith 

ordered  to,  361 
Platte  County,  Mo.,  reported  expulsion  of 

Union  families  from,  93 ;  troubles  in,  105 
Plumb,  Preston  B.,  U.  S.  Senator,  aids  in 

establishing  artillery  and  cavalry  school 

at  Fort  Riley,  427 

Plummer,  Col.  J.  B.,  action  at  Frederick- 
town,  Mo.,  Oct.  21,  1861,  52,  53 
Political  education,  necessity  of,  355,  356 
Political  surgery,  365 
Politicians,  responsibility  for  the  war,  229; 

as  generals,  355 
Politics,  their  evil  influence  in  the  Civil 

War,  517 
Pope,  Maj.-Gen.  John,  method  of  clearing 

Missouri  of  rebels,  358,  359 ;  the  case  of 

Fitz-John  Porter  and,  461,  462 
Popular      government,      education     the 

foundation  of,  533 


"  Gallantry  in  action,"  182 
"  Support,"  the  military  r 
123,  124,  130 


Porter,  Adm.  David  D.,  trip  by  Grant  and 
S.  to  visit,  294,  295 ;  in  military  confer 
ence  at  Cape  Fear  River,  346 ;  superin 
tendent  of  Naval  Academy,  Annapolis, 
439 

Porter,' Maj.-Gen.  Fitz-John,  sits  in  court- 
martial  on  S.  at  "West  Point,  241,  242 ; 
court-martial  judgment  on,  reversed, 
242 ;  board  of  review  in  case  of,  443 ;  re 
view  of  his  case,  460-466 ;  restored  to  the 
army,  460 ;  appeals  to  S.  in  1868, 460,  461 ; 
despatches  to  Burnside,  462 

Porter,  Col.  Horace,  mission  from  Grant 
to  Sherman,  306 

Posse  Comitatus  Act,  the,  509 

Potomac  River,  the,  S.'s  troops  delayed 
in,  294,  346 

Powder  Spring  Road,  Ga.,  military  opera 
tions  on  the,  135 

Prairie  Grove,  Ark.,  battle  of,  62-6t 

Press,  a  false  freedom  of  the,  425 

Price,  Maj.-Gen.  Sterling,  defeated  by 
Lyon  at  Boonville,  37 

Proctor,  Redfield,  Secretary  of  War,  423. 
See  also  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Professional  patriots,  539,  540 

Provisional  government,  376,  377 

Public  service,  the  path  to  success  in  the, 
480-483 

Puget  Sound,  protecting  the  Northern 
Pacific  Railroad  at,  511 

Pulaski,  Tenn.,  expectations  of  Thomas 
concentrating  at,  164, 194,  289,  290 ;  S.  or 
dered  to,  commanding  at,  and  move 
ments  near,  165-167,  200,  201,  282-285,  287, 
288,  319;  the  Fourth  Corps  at,  165,  166, 
285 ;  Stanley  ordered  to,  165,  288,  290;  the 
Twenty-third  Corps  ordered  to,  165- 
167 ;  Cox's  movements  near,  167 ;  Hood's 
advance  on,  anticipated,  167 ;  Thomas's 
mistake  in  sending  troops  to,  167 ;  pos 
sible  results  of  fighting  at,  193,  194 ;  de 
fense  of,  201,  202 ;  discussion  of  the  situ 
ation  at,  281-290 ;  the  retreat  from,  301 

Purdy,  Tenn.,  possible  movement  by 
Sherman  toward,  311 

Quantrill,  W.  C.,  in  Shelby's  raid,  into 
Missouri,  101 ;  sacks  and  burns  Law 
rence,  78 

Quinine,  256 

Railroads,  use  of,  in  time  of  war,  526 

Raleigh,  N.  C.,  Sherman's  march  to,  327, 
334;  S.'s  headquarters  at,  368,  371,  379; 
refugees  prohibited  to  congregate  in, 
369 ;  Grant  at,  370 

Rally  Hill,  Tenn.,  Hood  takes  possession 
of,  209 

Ramsey,  'Asst.  Adjt.-Gen.  Robert  H., 
battle  of  Franklin,  264 

Randon,  Marshal,  French  Minister  of 
War,  courtesies  to  S.,  392 

Rank,  questions  of,  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  124,  136,  137,  150,  151,  156,  157,  160, 
161 

Rawlins, Maj.-Gen.  John  A.,  opposes  the 
march  to  the  sea,  323 ;  military  genius, 
323;  Secretary  of  War,  323;  Grant's 
chief  of  staff,  420 

Reasoning  faculties,  the  cultivation  of 
the,  523 

"  Rebels,"  in  Missouri,  57 

Reconstruction,  S.'s  duties  in  connection 
with,  276;  the  problem,  course,  and 
evils  Of,  353-356,  364,  365,  367-377,  418,  419, 
543;  attitude  of  President  Johnson 
concerning,  354,  374,  376,  395,  420 


INDEX 


565 


Rehearings  in  courts-martial,  464 

Reno,  Admiral,  S.'s  interviews  with,  389 

Republican  party,  downfall  in  Missouri, 
77 ;  reconstruction  under,  354;  apprehen 
sions  as  to  Pres.  Johnson's  acquittal, 
415 

Resaca,  Ga.,  military  operations  near, 
124-129 ;  battle  of,  140, 141, 162 

Res  adjudicata,  463 

Revenge,  legitimate,  241,  242 

"  Rhode  Island,"  the,  interview  between 
Grant  and  S.  on  board,  198,  294,  295,  346, 
361,  362 

Richmond,  Va.,  defeat  of  Stuart  by  Sheri 
dan  before,  154 ;  Sherman's  march  from 
Savannah  toward,  256;  siege  of,  316, 
329;  proposed  movement  by  Sherman 
against,  332 ;  Sherman's  ambition  to 
share  in  its  capture,  347  ;  various  plans 
for  the  capture  of,  358 ;  S.  commanding 
at,  395,  397,  400,  418 ;  Grant  at  Peabody 
Fund  meeting  at,  413 

"  Richmond  Dispatch,"  the,  quoted,  401 

Rifle,  the,  supersedes  the  bayonet,  145, 
146 

Rio  Grande,  the,  Sheridan  ordered  to,  379 ; 
proposed  inspection  tour  by  S.  to,  380- 
383 

Riots,  tactical  dealing  with,  495,  504,  505 

Rives,  Judge,  declines  office  of  chief  jus 
tice  of  Virginia,  396,  397 

Roanoke,  the  river,  Sherman's  proposed 
movement  to,  334 

Rock  Springs,  Wyo.,  massacre  of  Chinese 
at,  509 

Rocky-Face  Ridge,  military  operations 
near,  124, 126, 129 

Rocky  Mountains,  the,  development  of 
the  country  west  of,  491 

Roddey,  Brig. -Gen.  Philip  D.,  on  the  Ten 
nessee,  318 

Rolla,  Mo.,  military  movements  near,  37, 
38,  40,  42,  47,  48,  65 ;  retreat  from  Wil 
son's  Creek  to,  47,  48 

Rollins, James  S., memorandum  furnished 
to,  by  S.,  89-91 ;  relates  anecdote  of  Lin 
coln's  reception  of  a  Missouri  delega 
tion,  108 

Rome,  Ga.,  military  movements  near,  315, 
316 ;  Sherman  at,  318 ;  burning  of,  321 

Rome,  Italy,  8.  at,  393 

Romero,  Sefior,  consultation  with  S.  con 
cerning  Mexican  affairs,  379,  380;  S.  re 
ports  progress  to,  389 

Rosecrans,  Maj.-Gen.  William  S.,  S.  re 
ports  for  duty  to,  66;  S.  sends  rein 
forcements  to,  90;  appointed  to  com 
mand  in  Missouri,  112;  Thomas's  ser 
vice  under,  189 ;  sends  reinforcements  to 
Thomas,  319 

Rough  and  Ready,  Ga.,  capture  of  the 
railroad  at,  159 

Rousseau,  Col.  Laurence  H.,  in  battle  of 
Franklin,  179 

Rousseau,  Maj.-Gen.  Lovell  H.,  on  the 
defense  of  the  bridge  at  Columbia,  203, 
204 

Ruger,  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  H.,  holds  Co 
lumbia,  168,  207,  282;  on  Duck  River, 
171 ;  ordered  to  Spring  Hill,  171-173,  210, 
211,  214,  215,  219 ;  moves  against  Forrest 
at  Thompson's  Station,  173,  216  ;  moves 
to  Columbia,  201;  position  north  of 
Rutherford  Creek,  214 ;  superintendent 
of  the  Military  Academy,  442 

Ruggles,  Adjt.-Gen.  George  p.,  promul 
gates  orders  concerning  tactics  in  riots, 
505,  506 


87 


Rutherford  Creek,  military  movements 
on,  214 

St.  John's  River,  the,  travel  and  sickness 
on,  19,  25 

St.  Joseph,  Mo.,  allegations  from  persons 
in,  concerning  arming  of  disloyal  per 
sons  in  Missouri,  104, 105 

St.  Louis,  Mo.,  (S'.'s  residences,  sojourns, 
and  commands  in,  and  visits  to,  30,  50, 
51,  53,  64,  84,  110,  424,  425,  427,  428;  loyal 
and  patriotic  citizens,  30, 31 ;  enlistment 
of  loyal  volunteers,  33,  34;  defense  of 
the  arsenal,  33,  34;  night  drills,  34;  se 
cured  to  the  Union  side,  37 ;  Jeff  Thomp 
son  threatens  communications  with,  51 ; 
Union  convention,  54;  disloyalty  in, 
57 ;  opposition  to  S.  in,  58-61,  424,  427, 
428;  importance,  60;  dismissal  of  mili 
tia  regiments  in,  85;  factions,  85,  86; 
return  of  the  radical  delegation  from 
Washington,  99;  interview  between 
Washburne  and  S.  in,  107;  Gen.  Grant 
entertained  in,  111;  Halleck  a,  359; 
Sherman  removes  his  headquarters 
from  Washington  to,  406,  469 ;  hospi 
talities  of,  424,  427,  428;  Sheridan  re 
moves  to  Chicago  from,  425;  head 
quarters  of  Department  of  the  Missouri 
removed  to,  427 

"St.  Louis  Democrat,"  the,  publishes 
radical  address  to  the  President,  93; 
publishes  the  President's  letter  to  S., 
97 ;  arrest  of  the  editor,  425 

St.  Paul,  Minn.,  military  station  at,  454; 
protecting  the  Northern  Pacific  Rail 
road  at,  511 

Salomon,  Col.  Charles  E.,  retreat  from 
Wilson's  Creek,  47 

Salt  Lake  City,  Utah,  a  trip  to,  430 

Sanborn,  Brig.-Gen.  John  B.,  ordered  to 
report  to  S.,  93 

Sandtown  Road,  Ga.,  military  operations 
on,  133,  136 

San  Francisco,  Cal.,  S.  commanding  at, 
188,  430;  Thomas  commanding  at,  278; 
conversation  between  Halleck  and 
Thomas  at,  293 ;  death  of  Thomas  at, 
429 ;  the  great  earthquake  of  1871,  430 

Sanger,  Maj.  Joseph  P.,  inspector-general, 
memorandum  by,  on  £.'s  work  of  na 
tional  defense,  458-460 

Savannah,  Ga.,  S.  sick  at,  26 ;  Sherman's 
march  to,  153,  164,  255,  261,  300,  303,  312, 
313,  316,  318,  327,  332-334,  337-339,  343 ;  S. 
marches  toward,  165 ;  Sherman's  north 
ward  movement  from,  256,  330  et  seq. 
(see  also  SHERMAN)  ;  capture  of,  300, 
327;  designed  as  base  for  Sherman, 
303,  306 ;  plans  for  the  capture  of,  306 ; 
Sherman  proposes  to  destroy,  317; 
cutting  through  the  South  at,  337 

Savannah  River,  Sherman's  movement  to 
control,  333  ;  Sherman  crosses,  338 

Schofield,  Brig.-Gen.  George  W.,  accom 
panies  S.  to  Paris,  385 

Schofield,  Mrs.  Harriet,  marriage,  29; 
children,  29 ;  death,  29 

Schofield,  Rev.  James,  father  of  the  au 
thor,  1 ;  moves  to  Illinois,  1 ;  mission 
work,  1 ;  on  the  inspiration  of  the  Bible, 
8;  perturbed  over  his  son's  affluence, 
16,  17 

Schofield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.  (elsewhere 
in  this  Index  referred  to  as  S.),  birth,  1 ; 
early  education,  1,  2 ;  farm  work,  2 ; 
surveyor  in  Wisconsin,  2;  schoolmaster 
at  Oneco,  2;  returns  to  Freeport,  2; 


566 


INDEX 


Schofield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.— continued 
chooses  the  law  as  a  profession,  2;  op 
portunity  to  enter  the  Military  Acad 
emy  at  West  Point,  2 ;  raising  funds  for 
West  Point,  2,  3  ;  fondness  and  ability 
for  mathematics,  2, 10;  entrance  at  the 
Military  Academy,  3;  a  peacemaker 
between  rival  sections,  3 ;  life  at  West 
Point,  3-15;  early  friendships,  3,  189; 
escapes  hazing,  3 ;  affection  of  the  eyes, 
4;  first  meeting  and  subsequent  rela 
tions  with  Gen.  Scott,  4,  18,  30;  use  of 
cards,  5 ;  inattention  to  study,  5 ;  use  of 
tobacco,  5,  12;  high  standing  in  de 
merits,  5, 13 ;  respect  and  taste  for  the 
study  of  law,  5,  29 ;  lessons  of  subordi 
nation,  6,  7  ;  a  forbidden  trip  from  West 
Point  to  NewjYork,  7  ;|views  on  betting, 
8;  views  on  the  inspiration  of  the 
Scriptures,  8,  9;  dismissed  from  the 
academy,  9-11;  goes  to  Washington  to 
plead  his  cause,  11 ;  realizes  the  value 
of  friends,  11 ;  returns  to  West  Point, 
12  ;  court-martialed,  12,  241 ;  proficiency 
in  tactics,  13,  14;  transferred  to  Com 
pany  C,  14 ;  "  honorable  mention,"  15  ; 
pecuniary  condition  on  leaving  the 
academy,  16,  17 ;  graduating  leave,  16, 
17 ;  first  military  pay,  17  ;  ruinous  afflu 
ence,  17;  service  in  the  Second  Artil 
lery,  17-19;  on  duty  at  Fort  Moultrie, 
17,  18;  ascertains  the  value  of  a  ser 
geant,  18;  adopts  a  rule  with  regard 
to  drinking,  19 ;  appointed  second  lieu 
tenant  in  First  Artillery,  19,  183;  on 
United  States  mail  duty,  21;  care  of 
Uncle  Sam's  money,  21 ;  engaged  in  an 
"affair  of  honor,"  21,  22;  proficiency  in 
drawing,  23 ;  military  engineering  in 
Florida,  23,  24,  183;  ordered  to  West 
Point,  24,  25 ;  stricken  with  fever,  24-26 ; 
"practises  medicine,"  25;  promoted 
first  lieutenant,  25 ;  friendship  with  A. 
P.  Hill,  25,  26 ;  professional  life  at  West 
Point,  26-29;  formation  of  studious 
habits,  27-29 ;  study  of  physics,  28 ;  lit 
erary  work,  28;  results  of  Florida  fever, 
28  ;  study  of  astronomy,  28,  29 ;  marries 
Miss  Bartlett,  29;  children,  29;  Secre 
tary  Of  War,  29,  241,  276,  404,  413  et  seq., 
419-421,  424,  426,  460,  543  ;  abandons  hope 
of  promotion,  30;  loses  taste  for  the 
army,  30 ;  early  acquaintance  with  Jef 
ferson  Davis,  30;  studies  the  political 
situation,  30 ;  announces  his  loyalty  and 
readiness  for  duty,  30,  32;  residences, 
soiourns,  and  commands  in  St.  Louis,  30, 
50',  51,  53,  64,  84,110,  424,  425,  427,  428;  mus 
ters  Missouri  troops,  32-35;  relations  with 
Gen.  Harney,  33 ;  reports  to  Capt.  I/yon, 
33 ;  defense  of  the  St.  Louis  arsenal,  34 ; 
major,  First  Missouri  Volunteer  Infan 
try,  35;  adjutant-general  and  chief  of 
staff  to  Gen.  Lyon,  35,  37  ;  battle  of  Wil 
son's  Creek,  35,  39,  40,  42-47,  67,  141,  142, 
363,  364;  receives  the  surrender  of  the 
Missouri  militia,  36,  37;  joins  Lyon  at 
Boonville,  37;  drafts  Lyon's  letter  to  Fre 
mont,  Aug.  9,  1861,  40,  41 ;  between  two 
fires,  44, 45 ;  commanding  First  Missouri 
Volunteer  Infantry,  48 ;  ordered  east  to 
purchase  equipment,  48,  50;  ordered  to, 
and  subsequent  visits  and  residences 
at  Washington,  48,  106-110,  255,  345, 
346,  379,  395,  413-418,  494;  reorganizes 
his  regiment  into  artillery,  48,  50,  51, 
difficulties  in  obtaining  guns  from  Fre"- 
mont,  50 ;  at  Pilot  Knob,  51 ;  engage- 


Schofield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.— continued 
ment  at  Fredericktown,  51-53,  362,  363; 
appointed  brigadier-general  of  volun 
teers,  54-56;  commanding  Missouri  mi 
litia,  55-60 ;  ordered  by  Stanton  to  en 
force  military  confiscation  against  rebel 
property  in  Missouri,  57  ;  limitations  of 
his  compliance  with  order,  57,  58 ;  hos 
tility  to,  in  Missouri,  58-61,  63-65,  90,  91, 
93-99,  103,  107-109 ;  anti-Schofield  com 
mittee  from  St.  Louis  to  Washington, 
58-60,  425 ;  accused  of  inefficiency  and 
imbecility,  59,  97;  commanding  the 
Army  of  the  Frontier,  61 ;  sickness, 
61,  62;  relinquishes  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Frontier,  61 ;  ordered  to 
move  north  and  east,  62,  63 ;  resumes 
command  of  the  Army  of  the  Frontier, 
63-65;  organizes  Indian  regiments,  63; 
hostility  of  Lane  and  Blunt  to,  63,  64 ; 
opinion  of  Blunt,  63,  64 ;  his  confidence 
betrayed  by  Curtis,  63,  65 ;  Herron  pro 
tests  against  serving  under,  64 ;  opinion 
of  Herron,  64;  nominated  major-gen 
eral  of  volunteers,  64 ;  Senatorial  oppo 
sition  to,  64,  66,  109,  110,  116, 117 ;  rein 
forces  Grant  at  Vicksburg  with  men 
and  supplies,  64,  70,  71,  90,  98,  110,  232, 
233;  at  Springfield,  65;  hindered  from 
active  operations,  65,  66;  attitude  to 
ward  Curtis,  65,  66 ;  temporary  humili 
ation  for,  66 ;  relations  with  Halleck, 
66,  68,  ill,  360,  361 ;  ordered  to  Tennes 
see,  66  (see  also  TENNESSEE);  reports  to 
Rosecrans  at  Murfreesboro',  66;  com 
mands  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps 
at  Triune,  66 ;  reappointed  major-gen 
eral  by  the  President,  66 ;  ordered  back 
to  Missouri  and  Kansas,  66 ;  his  Irish 
soldier-servant,  66,  67 ;  reduced  from 
major-general  to  brigadier-general,  67 ; 
supersedes  Curtis  in  command  of  the 
Department  of  the  Missouri,  68,  69,  96, 
97;  position  on  the  slavery  question, 
69,  71,  74-76,  90;  military  policy,  70; 
Grant  returns  troops  to,  70,  90;  relations 
with  and  cordial  support  from  Pres. 
Lincoln,  70, 97-99, 1 01 , 102, 108-110;  relations 
with  and  admiration  for  Grant,  70, 109- 
111,  115,  117,  118,  198,  237-240,  252,  293-297, 
337,  346,  361,  362,  379-382,  389-391,  412,  414 
et  seq.,  439,  440, 482 ;  relations  with  Gov. 
Gamble  and  the  State  government  of 
Missouri,  71  et  seq.,  90  ;  declines  to  make 
agreement  with  Gov.  Gamble  as  to 
policy,  73,  74 ;  troubles  in  Kansas,  77  et 
seq.;  Lane's  hostility  to,  80,  81,  83;  in 
terviews  with  Gov.  Carney,  80,  82;  in 
Leavenworth  and  Kansas  City,  80^83; 
forbids  Kansas  and  Missouri  militia 
crossing  the  border,  82 ;  interview  with 
Ewing  at  Kansas  City,  82 ;  at  Westport, 
83 ;  one  measure  of  success,  84 ;  at  Inde 
pendence,  84;  modifies  Ewing's  order, 
84 ;  interview  with  Mayor  Anthony,  84 ; 
efforts  to  spread  disaffection  among  his 
troops,  85-87 ;  enforces  martial  law  in 
Missouri,  85,  92 ;  plot  to  seize  and  im 
prison  him,  86 ;  threatens  to  regulate  the 
press  of  Missouri,  86,  92  ;  supporters  in 
Missouri,  87, 90, 91 ;  prevents  interference 
with  political  meetings  and  orders  free 
dom  of  voting  in  Missouri,  88, 100, 101 ; 
the  Missouri  militia  placed  under  his 
command,  88,  90,  95 ;  charges  of  misrule 
against,  89-91 ;  furnishes  memorandum 
to  J.  S.  Rollins,  89-91 ;  requires  the  Mis 
souri  militia  to  obey  the  102d  Article  of 


INDEX 


567 


Schotield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.—  continued 
War,  90;  strength  in  Missouri  and  Kan 
sas,  90;  reinforces  Rosecrans,  90;  hos 
tile  delegation  from  Missouri  and  Kan 
sas  goes  to  Washington  concerning,  91, 
93-99 ;  determines  to  relieve  Blunt,  93  ; 
demands  that  he  be  relieved  by  Butler, 
94;  his  administration  praised  by  the 
President,  95;  refuses  to  allow  retalia 
tory  raid  from  Kansas  into  Missouri, 
97;  Lane  ceases  hostilities  against,  99; 
difficulties  in  dealing  with  the  negro  en 
listment  question,  99, 100 ;  revulsions  of 
feeling  in  Missouri  in  favor  of,  101, 102, 
424-428;  attitude  on  license  of  speech 
and  press,  102,  425;  policy  toward  the 
Missouri  factions,  103 ;  desire  for  purely 
military  service,  106;  interview  with 
Washburne  at  St.  Louis,  107  ;  misrepre 
sented  to  the  President  by  Washburne, 
107  ;  succeeds  Foster  in  command  of  the 
Department  and  Army  of  the  Ohio,  109, 
110,  113;  last  interview  with  Lincoln, 
110;  hopes  for  the  future,  112;  arrives 
at  Knoxville,  113 ;  condition  of  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio  on  taking  command,  114; 
sends  out  reconnoissance  on  the  French 
Broad,  115 ;  determines  to  take  the  of 
fensive,  115;  occupies  Strawberry  Plains, 
115 ;  Grant  proposes  to  send  reinforce 
ments  to,  115;  advances  toward  and 
holds  Morristown,  115,  116  ;  the  Ninth 
Corps  withdrawn  from  his  command, 
116 ;  disappointment  at  being  balked  of 
active  operations,  116;  nominated  ma 
jor-general,  U.  8.  A.,  by  Pres.  Grant, 
117,  543;  nomination  confirmed  by  the 
Senate,  117 ;  views  on  promotion,  117- 
119;  his  services  and  policy  approved 
by  his  superiors,  118 ;  views  on  military 
duty,  118,  149-151 ;  on  the  prospects  of 
ending  the  war,  119;  preparations  for 
the  campaign  of  1864, 119, 120 ;  wins  the 
confidence  of  his  men,  120;  relations 
and  confidences  with  Sherman,  121  et 
seq.,  134, 164,  165,  252,  341,  342;  the  spirit 
of  his  military  criticisms,  121  et  seq. ; 
question  of  relative  rank  between  Stan 
ley  and,  124, 156, 157, 160, 161, 199 ;  friendly 
relations  with  McPherson,  125, 136-139 ; 
battle  of  Kolb's  Farm,  132-136;  ques 
tion  of  relative  rank  between  Hooker 
and,  136;  annoyed  by  Hooker's  seizing 
roads  assigned  to,  136, 139 ;  question  of 
relative  rank  between  McPherson  and, 
137 ;  personal  regard  for,  relations  with, 
and  knowledge  of  character  of  Hood, 
137,  138,  222,  229,  231,  232,  238,  245,  273,  307; 
friendship  with  Blair,  138;  helping 
classmates  at  West  Point,  138 ;  a  night 
visit  to  McPherson's  camp,  139;  bat 
tle  of  Resaca,  140,  141;  extension  of 
his  lines,  June  24-25,  1864,  142,  143 ;  or 
dered  to  "attack"  at  Kenesaw  Moun 
tain,  144;  battle  of  Atlanta,  July  22, 
1864,  146-148;  movement  before  At 
lanta,  Aug.  4-5,  1864,  148,  149 ;  ordered 
to  report  to  Stanley,  149,  156;  alleged 
argument  concerning  "relative  rank" 
by,  149;  esteem  for  Gen.  Palmer,  150, 
151 ;  opinion  of  Sherman's  proposed 
movement  against  Atlanta,  153;  ac 
quaintance  with  Stuart  at  West  Point, 
154;  ordered  to  fortify  his  position,  155; 
acquiesces  in  Sherman's  orders  as  to 
rank,  156 ;  narrow  escapes  from  capture, 
157,  161 ;  battle  of  Jonesboro',  157,  158 ; 
anxiety  to  attack  Hood  on  the  Mc- 


Schofleld,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.— continued 
Donough  road,  159  ;  thanked  by  Halleck 
for  action  in  question  of  rank  between 
Stanley  and,  160;  proposes  to  seize  the 
passes  through  Lookout  Range,  161 ; 
asks  to  be  sent  to,  is  ordered  to  join,  and 
reports  to  Thomas,  161, 164, 165, 190,  320, 
322,  344;  ordered  to  Chattanooga,  161; 
watches  Hood's  movements,  161 ;  at 
Cleveland,  Tenn.,  161;  ordered  to  de 
fend  Caperton's  Ferry,  162;  requested 
to  write  a  critical  history  of  the  Atlanta 
campaign,  162  ;  reports  to  Sherman,  164 ; 
marches  toward  Savannah,  165 ;  ordered 
to  Tullahoma,  165 ;  ordered  to  Johnson- 
ville,  165,  166,  288-290;  ordered  to  com 
mand  at  Pulaski,  165, 166  ;  commanding 
Thomas's  troops  before  Nashville,  166; 
meeting  with  Stanley  at  Pulaski,  166, 
167 ;  faults  in  Thomas's  instructions  to, 
166,  167;  Thomas  accepts  his  sugges 
tions,  167 ;  relations  with  Thomas,  167, 
169,  189,  190,  200,  202,  225-227,  238,  239,  241, 
242,  247,  252,  273, 276-298 ;  reasons  for  lack 
of  concert  between  Thomas  and,  169; 
actions  approved  by  Thomas,  169;  his 
operations  obstructed  by  civilian  red 
tape,  169 ;  orders  Stanley  and  Ruger  to 
Spring  Hill,  171 ;  moves  against  Forrest 
at  Thompson's  Station,  173,  174;  Twin- 
ing's  ride  with  despatches  to  Sherman 
from,  174;  reaches  Franklin,  175,  221; 
asks  Thomas  for  pontoons  at  Franklin, 
175, 176 ;  punishes  an  officer  for  needless 
sacrifice  of  his  men,  182 ;  steps  to  eradi 
cate  yellow  fever  from  the  army,  183 ; 
possibilities  of  an  earlier  retreat  to 
Nashville,  185 ;  reasons  for  not  follow 
ing  up  success  at  Franklin,  187, 188 ;  cor 
respondence  between  Thomas  and,  filed 
at  the  War  Department,  188 ;  command 
ing  at  San  Francisco,  188,  430;  com 
manding  the  Twenty-third  Corps,  190; 
ignorance  of  Thomas's  actual  resources, 
194;  interview  with  Grant  on  the  steamer 
Rhode  Island,  198,  294,  295,  346,  361,  362  ; 
on  the  duty  of  a  general  to  command 
in  person,  199,  200 ;  given  free  hand  by 
Thomas,  202;  Thomas  sends  reinforce 
ments  to,  205;  Thomas's  anxiety  for 
him  to  hold  Hood  in  check,  205, 206, 220  et 
seq.,  231,  285;  difficulties  of  communica 
tion  with  Thomas,  206,  207,  218,  281 ;  sup 
poses  that  Smith  had  arrived  at  Nash 
ville,  206-208;  holds  the  Columbia  and 
Franklin  Turnpike,  208;  the  retreat  to 
Franklin,  210,  212-215,  217-219 ;  expecta 
tion  of  finding  reinforcements  at  Frank 
lin,  215;  reliance  on  Stanley,  215,  216; 
mistake  in  orders  of  Nov.  29, 1864,|216, 217; 
Hammond  ordered  to  report  to,  217; 
invites  military  criticism,  219;  crosses 
the  Harpeth,221, 222 ;  deprecates  further 
attempts  to  hold  Hood  back,  222,  223 ; 
Thomas's  failure  to  support  him  prop 
erly,  222,  223;  proposes  to  stand  at 
Brentwood,  223-225 ;  ordered  to  fall  back 
to  Nashville,  224,  226 ;  arrival  at  Brent- 
wood,  226 ;  a  night's  rest  after  the  bat 
tle  of  Franklin,  227 ;  on  the  conduct  of 
his  troops  at  Franklin,  227-230;  on  the 
slaughter  at  Franklin,  229,  230;  in  ad 
vance  on  Atlanta,  231;  deciphers  de 
spatch  from  Grant,  232,  233 ;  on  aggres 
sive  warfare  by  the  South,  234,  235 ;  at 
Thomas's  military  council,  237,  238;  de 
signed  by  Grant  to  supersede  Thomas, 
237-239 ;  upholds  Thomas  in  his  resolve 


568 


INDEX 


Schofleld,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.— continued 
to  postpone  action,  238;  praised  by 
Grant  for  Hood's  defeat  at  Franklin, 
240 ;  question  as  to  seniority,  240 ;  legiti 
mate  revenge  on  Thomas  and  Fitz-John 


Porter,  241, 242  ;  cooperation  with  Wood, 
244;  orders  to  pursue  at  Nashville,  244, 
245 ;  congratulates  Thomas,  247 ;  reasons 
for  his  campaign  in  Tennessee,  252; 
junction  with  Stanley,  252 ;  consulted  by 
Thomas  as  to  spring  campaign  of  1865, 
252 ;  asks  to  be  assigned  to  the  eastern 
field,  252-255;  ordered  to  North  Caro 
lina,  252,  345,  543;  unsatisfactory  sta 
tus  as  to  command,  253,  254;  criticizes 
Thomas's  plans  of  spring  campaigns, 
253,  255-257 ;  new  regiments  assigned  to, 
253,  254 ;  seeks  service  in  Virginia,  253, 
255 ;  conversation  with  Stanton,  255 ; 
Thomas  sends  cavalry  to,  258;  order 
from  Thomas,  Dec.  15, 1864,  269 ;  claim 
of  credit  for  special  services,  273 ;  cred 
ited  by  Thomas  for  part  in  battle  of 
Nashville,  273;  command  in  Virginia 
during  reconstruction,  276,  397-404,  418, 
543 ;  mission  to  France,  276,  382-393 ;  ap 
pointed  brigadier-general,  U.  8.  A.,  277, 
543 ;  recommended  for  brevet  grade,  277, 
279;  brevetted  major-general,  U.  S.  A., 
277,  543;  dinner  to  the  President  and 
Diplomatic  Corps,  277,  278  ;  cessation  of 
personal  relations  with  Thomas,  278; 
commanding  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  278 ; 
proposed  as  commander  of  Division  of 
the  Pacific,  278;  asks  that  command 
of  Division  of  the  Pacific  be  given  to 
Thomas,  278;  Thomas's  omission  to  give 
proper  credit  to,  for  Spring  Hill  and 
Franklin,  279  et  seq. ;  disappearance  of 
papers  belonging  to,  280 ;  order  from 
Thomas,  Dec.  15,  1864,  281;  report  of 
battle  of  Franklin,  282,  283 ;  report  of 
the  Tennessee  campaign,  283  et  seq. ; 
watching  Hood.  285;  equality  of  com 
mand  with  Thomas,  286 ;  responsibility 
for  operations  from  Pulaski  to  Nash 
ville,  286;  interview  with  Thomas  at 
Nashville,  288-290;  conspiracy  against, 
293 ;  Grant  refutes  the  slander  against, 
293-297 ;  alleged  attempt  to  undermine 
and  supplant  Thomas,  293-297 ;  tries 
to  justify  Thomas's  delays,  294,  295; 
at  dedication  of  the  fields  of  Chieka- 
mauga  and  Chattanooga,  297  ;  retire 
ment  of,  297, 405, 547 ;  created  lieutenant- 
general,  297,  547  ;  ground  of  his  objec 
tions  to  Sherman's  plans,  313,  314,  323  et 
seq. ;  proposal  that  he  march  to  the  sea, 
317  ;  views  on  the  march  to  the  sea,  323 
et  seq.  (see  also  GEORGIA  ;  SHERMAN)  ; 
absence  from  the  field  during  Hood's 
raid  in  Sherman's  rear,  325 ;  interview 
with  Sheiman  at  Gaylesburg,  326; 
seeks  permission  to  join  Stanley,  326 ; 
as  a  "decoy"  at  Franklin,  343,  344; 
captures  Kinston,  346;  occupies  Wil 
mington,  346;  commands  the  center  of 
Sherman's  army,  346 ;  occupies  Golds- 
boro',  346 ;  commanding  Department  of 
North  Carolina,  346,  351,  360,  367-377; 
apprehends  guerrilla  warfare,  350,  351 ; 
share  in  the  Sherman- Johnston  negotia 
tions,  351-353,  360 ;  provisions  Johnston's 
army,  352,  353;  on  reconstruction,  353- 
356 ;  informed  by  Halleck  of  his  success 
ful  campaign  in  Missouri,  358;  peace 
able  disposition,  362,  366,  383,  388,  393; 
"  docility,"  359 ;  share  in  active  fighting, 


Schofield,  Lieut.-Gen.  JohnM.— continued 
362,  363;  personal  feeling  in  battle,  362- 
364 ;  issues  orders  concerning  emancipa 
tion,  367-369,  371,  372;  at  Raleigh,  368, 
371,  379;  encourages  the  marketing  of 
Southern  produce,  372, 373 ;  given  charge 
of  movements  and  negotiations  con 
cerning  French  intervention  in  Mexico, 
377  et  seq.,  543;  obtains  leave  of  absence, 
380 ;  proposed  inspection  tour  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  380-383 ;  delicate  position  in  the 
Mexican  affair,  383;  ordered  to  report 
at  State  Department,  383 ;  final  instruc 
tions  from  Seward,  384,  385;  sails  for 
Paris,  385 ;  at  Liverpool,  385 ;  in  London, 
385,  392  ;  arrives  in  Paris,  385 ;  relations 
with  Minister  Adams,  385, 392, 393 ;  visits 
Italy,  385,  393;  speech  at  the  Grand 
Hotel,  Paris,  386,  387 ;  interviews  with 
Adm.  Graviere,  388, 389 ;  interviews  with 
Prince  Napoleon,  388-391 ;  at  Prince  Na 
poleon's  banquet,  389 ;  interviews  with 
Adm.  Reno,  389 ;  reports  progress  to  the 
government,  389-393 ;  end  of  his  mission 
to  France,  391-393;  presented  to  the 
French  Emperor,  392 ;  journeys  through 
France,  392 ;  hospitalities  to,  in  Paris 
and  London,  392,  393;  visits  Switzer 
land,  392 ;  visits  Rome  and  Florence, 
393 ;  presented  to  the  Prince  of  Wales, 
393 ;  returns  to  the  United  States,  393 ; 
on  the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  394 ;  as 
signed  to  command  the  Department  of 
the  Potomac,  394;  at  Richmond,  395, 
397,  400;  appointed  to  command  First 
Military  District,  395,  397,  418 ;  adminis 
tration  of  Virginia  during  reconstruc 
tion,  397-404,  418,  543;  addresses  the 
Virginia  Constitutional  Convention, 
400,  402 ;  nullifies  the  worst  features  of 
the  Virginia  Constitution,  402-404;  re 
signs  the  War  portfolio,  405;  inter 
views  and  relations  with  Evarts  con 
cerning  the  War  Department,  413  et  seq., 
478 ;  interviews  and  relations  with  Grant 
concerning  the  War  Department,  414  et 
seq. ;  views  on  the  removal  of  Stanton, 
417 ;  reconstruction  measures,  419 ;  rela 
tions  with  Pres.  Johnson,  419,  420 ;  suc 
ceeds  Sheridan  as  general-in-chief,  421- 
423,  427,  459,  467,  478,  480,  481,  485,  539; 
institutes  reforms  in  the  War  Depart 
ment,  421-423,  478-483;  reappointed  to 
command  the  Department  of  the  Mis 
souri,  425-430;  agricultural  ambitions 
and  experiments,  426 ;  fondness  for 
sports  and  outdoor  life,  426,  428 ;  inter 
est  in  the  artillery  service,  426,  427; 
establishes  light-artillery  school,  426, 
427;  goes  to  California,  426,  430,  431; 
assumes  command  of  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Missouri,  427;  attack 
of  pneumonia,  429-431;  president  of 
board  on  tactics  and  small  arms, 
430 ;  assigned  to  command  the  Divi 
sion  of  the  Pacific,  430;  relinquishes 
command  in  favor  of  Thomas,  430; 
makes  tour  of  the  West  with  Sherman, 
430 ;  trip  to  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  431- 
433 ;  proposal  that  he  represent  Virginia 
in  the  U.  S.  Senate,  434 ;  action  in  and 
comments  on  the  Modoc  outbreak,  435- 
438 ;  appointed  superintendent  of  West 
Point,  439  et  seq. ;  commanding  Military 
Division  of  the  Pacific,  439,  440 ;  to  re 
vise  the  army  regulations,  443 ;  contro 
versies  with  the  War  Department,  443, 
444,  468  et  seq. ;  the  case  of  Cadet  Whit- 


INDEX 


569 


Schofield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.— continued 
taker,  445, 44G ;  relations  with  Terry,  446 ; 
proposal  to  make  a  scapegoat  of,  446, 
447 ;  relieved  from  fluty  at  West  Point, 
447,  451 ;  commanding  Department  of 
Texas,  447 ;  protests  against  creation  of 
Division  of  the  Gulf,  448;  correspond 
ence  with  Sherman  as  to  the  retirement 
bill,  449;  sojourn  in  Europe  (1881-82), 
449-453 ;  offered  command  of  the  Division 
of  the  Pacific,  450 ;  promise  to  McDowell, 
450 ;  placed  on  waiting  orders,  451 ;  wit 
nesses  French  autumn  manceuvers,  451- 
453 ;  speech  at  Limoges,  452, 453  ;  returns 
from  Europe,  453;  reassigned  to  com 
mand  of  the  Division  of  the  Pacific,  453 ; 
headquarters  at  Chicago,  453-455 ;  ban 
quet  at  Chicago,  454 ;  succeeds  to  com 
mand  of  the  Division  of  the  Missouri, 
454-456;  succeeds  Hancock  in  the  Di 
vision  of  the  Atlantic,  456, 487 ;  schemes 
of  national  defense,  456-460;  taste  for 
science,  457-460;  assumes  command  of 
Department  of  the  East,  458 ;  president 
of  Board  of  Ordnance  and  Fortifica 
tion,  459,  484,  485 ;  review  of  the  Fitz- 
John  Porter  case,  460-466 ;  conducts  the 
ceremonies  at  Sheridan's  funeral,  467; 
"the  bell  from  the  secretary's  office," 
477 ;  relations  with  Seward  in  the  Grant 
and  Stanton  affair,  478 ;  submits  scheme 
of  War  Department  reform  to  Pres. 
Cleveland,  480 ;  action  on  the  retirement 
bill,  481;  institutes  an  appeal  to  Pres. 
Grant,  482 ;  some  experiences  as  general- 
in-chief,  482,  483 ;  mileage  case,  482,  483 ; 
marriage  to  Miss  Kilbourne,  489 ;  esti 
mates  for  proposed  war  with  Chile,  489, 
490 ;  a  curious  dream,  490 ;  meeting  with 
Miles  at  Washington,  494 ;  orders  and 
action  in  the  Chicago  labor  riots,  494  et 
seq. ;  issues  tactical  order  concerning 
insurrection,  495,  504,  505;  orders  to 
Miles,  July  2, 1894,  496 ;  orders  to  Martin, 
July  3, 1894,  497 ;  action  at  time  of  Chi 
nese  massacre  in  Wyoming,  509-512 ;  his 
interpretation  of  the  Pacific  Railroad 
Acts,  510 ;  letter  written  in  1865, 530 ;  se 
cures  payment  for  his  troops,  530; 
Grant's  last  thoughts  for,  543;  relieved 
from  controversies  in  Missouri,  543 ; 
promotions  for  service,  543 

For  details  of  the  battles  of  Frank 
lin  and  Nashville,  and  the  antecedent 
movements,  stands,  and  engagements 
see  BRENTWOOD;  COLUMBIA;  DUCK 
RIVER;  FRANKLIN;  HARPETH  RIVER; 
NASHVILLE;  PULASKI;  SPRING  HILL, 
and  the  names  of  the  various  generals 
engaged  therein,  as  Cox ;  HOOD  ;  SMITH, 
A.  J. ;  STANLEY  ;  THOMAS,  ETC. 

Correspondence  with :  Bates,  E.,  Sept. 
29, 1863,  93 :  Bigelow,  John,  Feb.  25,  1866, 
392 :  Blair,  F.  P.,  Aug.  13, 1862,  59:  Broad- 
head,  J.  O.,  107,  108 :  Carney,  Thomas, 
Aug.  28,  29,  1863,  79,  80,  82 :  Chase,  S.  P., 
May  7,  1865,  373,  376  :  Drake,  C.  D.,  Oct. 
24,  1863,  100:  Gamble,  H.  R.  (1863),  72, 
73:  Grant,  U.  8.,  Dec.  27,  1864,  252-254; 
May  10,  1865,  373-376;  Jan.  24,  1866,  390, 
391 ;  April  18,  1868,  400,  401 ;  April  25, 
418  ;  April  26,  418  ;  July  12,  1881,  293,  294  ; 
Aug.  1,  294,  295:  Hall,  W.  P.,  Oct.  21, 
1863,  101,  102 :  Halleck,  H.  W.,  Aug.  10, 
1862,  59 ;  Sept.  9,  60,  61 ;  Jan.  31,  1863,  65, 
66 ;  Feb.  3,  65 ;  May  22,  68  ;  July  7,  70 ; 
Sept.  3,  83  ;  Sept.  26,  87 ;  Sept.  30,  85-87 ; 
Oct.  2,  93 ;  May  7, 1865,  370,  371 :  Hencler- 


Schotield,  Lieut.-Gen.  John  M.—  conlin  ucd 
son,  J.  B.,  April  7, 1864, 117  ;  April  15,  117- 
119:  Lincoln,  A.,  May  27,  1863,  68,  69; 
June  1,  69  ;  June  20,  75,  76  ;  June  22,  76  ; 
Aug.  27,  77  ;  Aug.  28,  77-79 ;  Sept.  30,  93  ; 
Oct.  1,  58,  88,  91-93,  98;  Oct.  2,  93;  Oct.  3, 
94 ;  Oct.  4,  94 ;  Oct.  25,  101 ;  Oct.  28,  103, 
104 ;  Nov.  9,  105,  106 :  the  Secretary  of 
War,  444 :  Seward,  W.  H.,  Aug.  4,  1865, 
383;  Aug.  9,  383;  Jan.  24,  1866,  390,  392, 
393 :  Sherman,  W.  T.,  Oct.,  1864, 165 ;  Dec. 
28,  252,  254,  255,  326;  May  5,  1865,  370; 
March  28,  1876,  439,  440 ;  March  29,  440 ; 
March  30,  440;  May  25,  445,  453 ;  Dec.  13, 
1880,  447 ;  Dec.  14,  448 ;  May  3,  1881,  450, 
451,  453:  Stanley,  D.  S.,  Nov.  29,  1864, 
214:  Stanton,  Sept.  5,  1862,  57:  Thomas, 
G.  H.,  Nov.  19,  1864,  167,  200,  284,  287,  289, 
290 ;  Nov.  20,  167,  200-202,  284,  289 ;  Nov. 
24, 194, 197,  202-205  ;  Nov.  25, 204-207  ;  Nov. 
26,  204 ;  Nov.  27,  204-207  ;  Nov.  28, 175,  207- 
209,  211-214,  218 ;  Nov.  29,  171,  176,  211-214, 
217,  218;  Nov.  30,  187,  220-225;  Dec.  15, 
265,  281;  Dec.  16,  247:  Thomas,  J.  L., 
Nov.  1, 1863, 102  :  War  Department,  Aug. 
19,  1865,  383:  \Villiams,  J.  E.,  June  1, 
1863,  74,  75  :  Wilson,  J.  H.,  Nov.  29, 1864, 
212  ;  Dec.  16,  263-265 

Science  in  the  art  of  war,  457-460 

Scott,  Lieut.-Gen.  Winfield,  S.'s  first 
meeting  and  subsequent  relations  with, 
4, 18, 30 ;  assured  of  S.'s  loyalty,  30 ;  con 
troversies  with  the  War  Department, 
406,  421,  469,  478,  479 ;  removes  his  head 
quarters  from  Washington  to  New  York, 
406,  469 ;  weakness  of  his  military  policy 
at  outbreak  of  the  war,  513 

Sea-coast  defense,  366,  484-487,  526-528 

Secession,  dead  in  Missouri,  91 

Second  Kansas  Infantry,  service  in  Mis 
souri,  37 

Second  Missouri  Volunteers,  in  battle  of 
Boonville,  37 

Second  U.  S.  Artillery,  S.'s  service  in,  17- 
19;  ordered  to  Florida,  18;  service  in 
Missouri,  35 ;  battle  of  Boonville,  37 

Second  U.  S.  Dragoons,  service  in  Mis 
souri,  37 

Second  U.  S.  Infantry,  service  in  Missouri, 
35,  37  ;  battle  of  Boonville,  37 

Secretary  of  War,  the,  impeached,  406; 
the  functions  of,  410  et  seq. ;  urges  S.'s 
superintendency  of  West  Point,  439, 440  ; 
difficulty  with  £.,443,  444;  correspond 
ence  with  £.,444 ;  relations  between  the 
general-in-chief  and,  536-539.  For  con 
troversies  with  the  general-in-chief,  see 
WAR  DEPARTMENT. 

Selma,  Ala.,  Thomas  to  move  toward,  317, 
322;  Hood's  position  near,  318 

Seminole  Indians,  armed  truce  between 
the  United  States  and  the,  23 ;  hostili 
ties  against  the  United  States,  25 

Seventeenth  Army  Corps,  joins  Sherman 
before  Atlanta,  138 

Seward,  William  H.,  consultations  with 
and  instructions  to  S.  on  Mexican  af 
fairs,  379,  382-385 ;  correspondence  with 
S.,  Aug.  4,  9, 1865,  383;  letter  from  Stan- 
ton,  Aug.  23, 383;  letter  to  Bigelow,  Nov. 
4,  384;  despatches  S.  on  mission  to 
France,  384,  385 ;  S.  reports  progress  to, 
389-393 ;  letter  from  S.,  Jan.  24,  1866, 
390,  392,  393';  his  statesmanship,  393; 
adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  393 ; 
recalls  S.  from  Europe,  393 ;  relations 
with  S.  in  the  matter  of  Grant  and  Stan- 
ton,  478 


570 


INDEX 


Shelby,  Brig. -Gen.  Joseph  O.,  raid  into 
Missouri,  101 

Shelbyville,  Term.,  military  operations  at, 
205,  207 

Sheldon,  Mr.  and  Mrs.,  19 

Sheridan,  Lieut. -Gen.  Philip  H.,  ap 
pointed  lieutenant-general,  U.  S.  A., 
117;  on  Stuart's  defeat  before  Rich 
mond,  154 ;  policy  of  resting  his  men 
and  animals,  154;  ordered  to  the  Rio 
Grande,  379 ;  commanding  Military  Di 
vision  of  the  Gulf,  380;  Grant's  orders 
to,  concerning  S.'s  Mexican  mission, 
380-382 ;  general-in-chief,  421,  427 ;  diffi 
culties  with  the  War  Department,  421, 
471,  478;  transferred  from  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  Missouri  to  the  Division  of 
the  Missouri,  425;  succeeded  by  S.,  425, 
459 ;  interest  in  the  cavalry  service,  427 ; 
Sherman's  desire  to  retire  in  favor  of, 
449 ;  succeeds  Sherman,  453 ;  selects  site 
of  Fort  Sheridan,  454,  455 ;  services  to 
Chicago,  455 ;  death  and  burial,  467 ;  ac 
tion  on  the  retirement  for  age  bill,  481 

Sherman,  Rev.  Thomas,  performs  services 
at  his  father's  funeral,  542 

Sherman,  Lieut. -Gen.  William  T.,  S.'s 
meeting  with  at  Portland  in  1870,  24 ; 
promoted  to  command  the  Military 
Division  of  the  Mississippi,  109,  116; 
siege  of  Knoxville  raised  by,  113;  ap 
proves  S.'s  services  and  policy,  118 ;  at 
Knoxville,  118,  119;  opinion  of  the 
Twenty-third  Corps,  120;  the  spirit  of 
S.'s  criticisms  of,  121  et  seq. ;  his 
"  Memoirs  "  cited,  121,  122,  129,  134, 135, 
138,  142-144,  147,  149,  153,  157,  158,  161,  191, 
308,  310,  321,  411,  412,  477 ;  relations  with 
and  confidence  in  S.,  121  et  seq.,  134, 164, 
165,  252,  341,  342,  541,  542 ;  the  organiza 
tion  of  his  army  in  the  Atlanta  cam 
paign,  122  et  seq.;  campaign  before  At 
lanta,  its  capture  and  burning,  122  et 
seq.,  146,  148,  149,  152-155, 158-160,  231,  308, 
316,  318,  321,  338-343 ;  admiration  for,  and 
grief  at  death  of,  McPherson,  125,  146; 
controversy  as  to  battle  of  Kolb's  Farm, 
133-136;  on  Hooker's  ambition,  136; 
strained  relations  between  Hooker  and, 
136,  139-141;  test  of  courage  between 
Hooker  and,  140, 141 ;  the  assault  of  for 
tified  lines  by,  142-148,  182;  Special 
Field  Orders,  No.  28,  144 ;  responsibility 
for  the  assault  at  Kenesaw  Mountain, 
144;  policy  concerning  Hood,  doubts 
about  his  movements,  relative  strength, 
and  failure  to  destroy,  146, 159, 160, 163- 
165,  191,  237,  261,  288,  300,  302-309,  311,  313, 
316,  324,  327,  338,  343 ;  credits  S.  with  his 
own  soldierly  actions,  147 ;  courage  in 
action,  147 ;  caution,  152 ;  battle  of  Jones- 
boro',  153, 157-159;  Thomas's  opinion  of 
his  proposed  movement,  153  ;  plans  and 
operations  in  Georgia,  the  march  to  the 
sea,  etc.,  153,  157-160,  163-165,236,252,  255, 
261,  285,  299-306,  308,  310-322,  326,  327,  330- 
334,  337-340,  343,  347  (for  specific  opera 
tions  and  battles,  see  names  of  localities, 
etc.) ;  orders  S.  to  report  to  Stan 
ley,  156 ;  opportunity  to  attack  Hardee, 
159 ;  raises  the  question  of  relative  rank 
between  Stanley  and  S.,  160;  his  judg 
ment  therein  reversed,  161 ;  desires  S.  to 
write  a  critical  history  of  the  Atlanta 
campaign,  162;  coincidence  of  Hood's 
and  Sherman's  movements,  162 ;  contra 
dicts  Thomas's  order  to  defend  Caper- 
toii's  Ferry,  162 ;  Hood's  movement 


Sherman,  Lieut.-Gen.  Wm.  T.—  contimied 
around  his  right,  163 ;  proposed  change 
of  base,  163,  164,  327 ;  sends  troops  into 
Tennessee,  163-165;  S.  reports  to,  164; 
S.  asks  to  be  sent  to  Thomas,  164 ;  sends 
reinforcements  to  Thomas,  164,  165; 
Capt.  Twining's  ride  to  meet,  174 ;  criti 
cism  on  the  battle  of  Franklin,  187; 
Thomas's  service  under,  189;  his  esti 
mates  of  Thomas's  strength  in  Tennes 
see,  191,  192;  instructions  to  Thomas, 
193,  194,  197-200;  stragglers,  etc.,  from 
his  army  at  Chattanooga,  195  et  seq.; 
questions  S.  concerning  Hood,  231; 
crosses  the  Chattahoochee,  231 ;  undue 
haste  in  starting  for  the  sea,  236,  301  et 
seq.,  310, 314,  315 ;  sends  S.  to  Tennessee, 
252 ;  at  Savannah,  255 ;  expectations  as 
to  Thomas's  movements,  255;  north 
ward  march  through  the  Carolinas,  256, 
316,  318,  327,  330-334,  337-340,  342,  346-348 ; 
informs  Thomas  as  to  Hood's  strength, 
261 ;  opinion  of  the  battle  of  Nashville, 
262;  asks  that  command  of  Division  of 
the  Pacific  be  given  to  Thomas,  278 ;  on 
the  duty  of  a  commander  to  take  per 
sonal  command,  286;  belief  in  Thomas's 
ability  to  hold  Hood,  288,  324;  per 
plexing  situation,  300;  superabun 
dance  of  strength,  302;  Hood's  suppo 
sitions  as  to  his  movements,  303 ; 
explanation  of  the  march  to  the  sea, 
303,  310  et  seq,;  measures  to  secure 
Nashville,  304 ;  illustration  of  his  atti 
tude  toward  Hood,  305,  306;  Porter's 
mission  from  Grant  to,  306.;  Hood's  raid 
in  his  rear,  308 ;  destroys  the  Chat 
tanooga  railroad,  308;  proposed  move 
ment  in  Chattqoga  Valley,  308 ;  defiance 
to  Pres.  Davis  in  Georgia,  309,  310, 
322;  cuts  the  telegraph,  310;  possible 
movement  against  Beauregard,  311 ;  S.'s 
objections  to  his  plans,  313,  314,  323  et 
seq.;  innocence  of  ravages  after  Lee's 
surrender,  314  ;  share  in  the  subjection 
of  the  South,  314, 315 ;  at  Cartersville,  315; 
theory  of  war,  317;  at  Rome,  318;  at 
Gaylesville,  318 ;  to  destroy  railroads  in 
Georgia,  319,  322;  moves  to  Kingston, 
320 ;  burns  Rome,  321 ;  moves  from  At 
lanta,  322  ;  impatience,  322  ;  military  ge 
nius,  324,  330-342,  344,  355-358  ;  his  policy 
indorsed  by  success,  323 ;  relations  with 
and  opinions  of  Grant,  324,  337,  347, 
348,  357,  358,  443,  479,  543 ;  at  Gaylesburg, 
326;  probable  expectations  from  the 
Tennessee  campaign,  329 ;  joint  opera 
tions  with  Grant  against  Lee,  331  et 
seq.,  337,  347,  348;  possible  movements 
against  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  332 ; 
movement  to  Augusta,  332,  337,  338; 
loyalty,  334;  Johnston's  negotiations 
with  and  capitulation  to,  335,  348-353, 
355,  356,  360, 361 ;  knowledge  of  Thomas's 
character,  336 ;  credited  by  Grant  with 
his  plans  and  achievements,  337  ;  Lee's 
army  his  objective,  337,  347,  348 ;  loss  of 
his  mastery  in  Georgia,  338 ;  failure  of 
Hood  and  Forrest  to  damage  his  com 
munications,  338 ;  aims  to  destroy 
Georgia,  339 ;  a  master  of  logistics,  339  ; 
repulse  at  Kenesaw,  340 ;  character  of 
his  campaign  against  Johnston,  342  ; 
claims  credit  for  destruction  of  Hood, 
343;  plans  junction  with  S.  at  Golds- 
boro',  346 ;  at  Laurel  Hill,  346  ;  battle  of 
Bentonville,  346;  arrives  at  Goldsboro', 
346;  visit  to  Grant  at  City  Point,  347, 


INDEX 


571 


Sherman,  Lieut.-Gen.  Wm.  T.—  continued 
348 ;  ambition  to  share  iii  capture  of 
Richmond,  347 ;  his  movements  auxil 
iary  to  those  of  Grant  and  Thomas,  348  ; 
attacks  on  his  integrity,  349,  350 ;  as  a 
politician,  355 ;  contrasted  with  Grant, 
357 ;  Halleck's  attitude  toward,  360,  361 ; 
impulsiveness,  362 ;  calmness  under 
stress,  362 ;  controversies  with  the  War 
Department,  406,  407,  412,  421,  422,  443, 
469,  471,  478,  479;  removes  his  head 
quarters  from  Washington  to  St.  Louis, 
406,  469;  general-in-chief,  421,  422,  435, 
436,  441-444.  447,  449-451,  453,  478,  479  ;  as 
signs  Meade  to  command  the  Division 
of  the  Pacific,  429 ;  attends  meeting  of 
Society  of  Army  of  Potomac,  429  ;  makes 
tour  of  the  West  with  S.,  430 ;  action  in 
the  Modoc  outbreak,  435,  436 ;  offers  the 
superintendency  of  West  Point  to  £., 
439,  440 ;  guarantees  S.  against  interfer 
ence,  440,  443,  444 ;  speech  to  Knights  of 
St.  Patrick,  mentioned,  441 ;  restored  to 
chief  command,  442;  reasons  for  desir 
ing  S.  in  the  east,  442,  443 ;  theory  of 
military  administration,  443 ;  repudiates 
the  creation  of  Division  of  the  Gulf, 
447;  action  and  correspondence  on  the 
army  retirement  bill,  449,  481 ;  retires 
in  favor  of  Sheridan,  449,  453;  inspires 
plan  of  reform  in  the  War  Department, 
478,  479;  interest  in  the  relations  be 
tween  the  President  and  the  general-in- 
chief,  539 ;  regard  for  military  courtesy, 
541;  visits  to  the  War  Department,  541, 
542 ;  visits  to  the  President,  541,  542 ;  life 
in  New  York,  542 ;  death  and  burial,  542 
Correspondence  with:  Grant,  U.  S., 
April  4,  1864,  340  ;  Sept.  12,  306,  333  ;  Sept. 
20,  306,  315,  333  ;  Oct.  10,  315  ;  Oct.  11,  307, 
315-317,  323,  325  ;  Oct.  22,  318,  325  ;  Nov.  1, 
310, 318,  319, 322,  325, 334;  No v.2, 307, 319, 321, 
325  ;  Nov.  6,  310,  320,  333-335 ;  Nov.  7,  320 ; 
Dec.  3,  327  ;  Dec.  6,  327,  332,  333  ;  Dec.  16, 
327  ;  Dec.  24,  327,  328,  334 :  Halleck,  Sept. 
25,  1864,  333  :  Schofleld,  J.  M.,  Oct.  1864, 
165  ;  Dec.  28,  252,  254,  255,  326 ;  May  5, 
1865,  370 ;  March  28,  1876,  439,  440  ;  March 
29,  440  ;  March  30,  440,  441 ;  May  25,  1876, 
445,  453 ;  Dec.  13,  1880,  447 ;  Dec.  14,  448  ; 
May  3, 1881,  450,451,453  :  Thomas,  G.  H., 
Oct.  19,  1864,  191 ;  Oct.  20,  317,  318 ;  Oct. 
31, 198  ;  Nov.  1,  320 ;  Nov.  7,  199  ;  Nov.  11 , 
321,  322;  Nov.  12,  288,  301 

Sherman,  Mrs.  W.  T.,  542 

Shiloh,  Tenn.,  attitude  of  Halleck  toward 
Grant  before,  361 

Shoal  Creek,  military  movements  on,  201 

Sierra  Nevada,  a  trip  across  the,  430 

Sigel,  Col.  Franz,  commanding  Missouri 
troops,  37,  38;  ordered  to  Springfield, 
37,  38;  retreats  from  Newtonia  to 
Springfield,  38 ;  junction  with  Lyon  and 
Sturgis,  38 ;  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek, 
42,  43,  47 ;  Lyon's  confidence  in,  43 ; 
takes  over  command  from  Sturgis,  47  ; 
protests  against  Sturgis's  reassuming 
command,  47 

Sinclairville,  N.  Y.,  Rev.  James  Scho- 
field's  pastorate  in,  1 

Sioux  Indians,  threatened  outbreak  by, 
488;  battle  of  Wounded  Knee,  488;  en 
listment  of,  489 

Sixteenth  Kentucky  Infantry,  in  battle  of 
Franklin,  178-180,  229 

Slavery,  the  question  in  Missouri,  31,  54, 
56-58,  71  et  seq.,  90,  92,  94,  95,  99 ;  as  a 
factor  in  the  Civil  War,  74, 235 ;  troubles 


Slavery  —  continued 
on  the  Kansas-Missouri  border,  78  et 
seq. ;  abolition  of,  see  EMANCIPATION  ; 
NEGUOES. 

Slocum,  Maj.-Gen.  Henry  W.,  to  accom 
pany  Sherman  to  Savannah,  165,  317; 
proposal  that  he  abandon  Atlanta,  307, 
308 ;  strength,  308 

Smith,  Maj.-Gen.  Andrew  J.,  forces  in  Mis 
souri,  164 ;  ordered  to  reinforce  Thomas, 
and  his  delays  in  reaching  Nashville,  164, 
168,  171,  185,  187,  190-194,  196,  201,  205-208, 
211-213,  217,  218,  223,  284,  285,  290,  301,  319, 
322,  325,  326 ;  strength,  190,  192  ;  to  move 
to  Columbia,  201 ;  proposal  to  send  him 
to  Murfreesboro',  206 ;  S.  asks  that  he  be 
sent  to  Spring  Hill,  209 ;  S.'s  expecta 
tions  of  meeting  his  force  at  Franklin, 
215;  arrives  at  Nashville,  220,  221,  254; 
proposed  movement  to  Franklin,  220, 
221,  223  ;  proposed  movement  to  Brent- 
wood,  221,  223-225 ;  battle  of  Nashville, 
242-246,  250,  254,  268-270,  272,  291 

Smith,  Maj.-Gen.  C.  F.,  ordered  to  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  361 ;  the  question  of  pre 
cedence  over  Grant  at  Shiloh,  361 

Snake  Creek  Gap,  military  operations  at, 
125-128 

Society  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  as 
sembly  of,  at  Philadelphia,  429 

Soldier,  the  value  of  his  life,  182, 183  ;  the 
duty  of  a,  425 

Soldiers,  the  spirit  of  comradeship 
among,  26 ;  their  camp-fires,  473  ;  war 
service  considered  in  appointments  and 
promotions,  473 

South,  the,  reconstruction  in,  353-356, 364, 
365  (see  also  RECONSTRUCTION);  the  ne 
gro  question  after  emancipation,  367- 
376;  oppression  of,  during  reconstruc 
tion  days,  395  et  seq.,  435 ;  disfranchise- 
ment  of  rebels  in,  396  et  seq.  See  also 
CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA. 

South  Carolina,  the  hospitality  of,  19; 
Sherman's  march  through,  314,  330,  332, 
340,  346-348 ;  advantage  of  a  destructive 
campaign  in,  339 

South  Chicago,  labor  riots  at,  498 

Springfield,  Mo.,  military  movements  at, 
37-41,  43,  46,  47 ;  S.  at,  65 

Spring  Hill,  Tenn.,  Hood's  movements 
and  strategy  at,  apprehensions  and 
possibilities  of  his  success  at,  129,  209, 
213,  215,  217,  218,  230,  231,  251,  300,  301  ; 
battle  of,  160, 172,  251,  254,  258,  301 ;  mili 
tary  movements  near,  170-174,  176,  177, 
184-186,  207,  209,  213-219;  trains  parked 
at,  171, 172 ;  Stanley's  movements  near, 
and  gallant  action  at,  171,  172,  210,  211, 
214-217, 228, 230, 279 ;  Forrest  driven  from, 
172;  S.  moves  to,  172,  173,  216;  advan 
tages  of  the  day  gained  at,  185, 186,  219, 
301 ;  Ruger  ordered  to,  210,  211,  214,  215, 
219 ;  necessity  of  heading  off  Hood  at, 
213;  Ruger's  movement  to,  suspended, 
214;  covering  approaches  to,  214,  216; 
S.'s  expectations  of  finding  reinforce 
ments  at,  215;  the  situation  at,  Nov.  29, 
1864, 215  et  seq. ;  Cox  at,  216 ;  movement 
to  Franklin  from,  216;  Hammond  or 
dered  to,  217 ;  possibilities  of  Hood's 
movements  against  S.  at,  230,  231 

Spring  Place,  advantage  <>f  forcing  Hood 
through,  1(>2;  possibility  of  Hood's  re 
treat  via,  308 

Stanley,  Maj.-Gen.  David  S.,  question  of 
relative  rank  with  /S'.,  124, 156,  157,  160, 
161, 199 ;  S.  ordered  to  report  to,  149, 156 ; 


572 


INDEX 


Stanley,  Maj.-Gen.  David  8.—  continued 
doubts  the  validity  of  Sherman's  order, 
156 ;  battle  of  Jonesborp',  157,  158 ;  cou 
rage,  158 ;  ordered  to  reinforce  Thomas, 
158,  164,  317,  322  ;  at  Tullahoma,  164  ; 
ordered  to  Pulaski,  165;  meeting  with 
S.  at  Pulaski,  166 ;  telegram  from 
Thomas,  Nov.  13.  1864, 166, 167 ;  detects 
flaw  in  Thomas's  instructions  to  S.,  166, 
167 ;  moves  from  Pulaski  to  Columbia, 
168;  movement  to,  gallantry  at,  and 
battle  of  Spring  Hill,  171-173, 210, 214, 216, 
217, 228, 230,  279 ;  commanding  rear-guard 
at  Franklin,  175 ;  battle  of  Franklin,  177 ; 
at  Columbia,  202;  supporting  Cox  at 
Duck  River,  207;  despatch  from  S.,  Nov. 
29,  (1864,  214;  S.'s  reliance  on,  215,  216; 
junction  with  S.,  252,326;  recommended 
for  brevet  grade,  277,  279,  280 ;  wounded 
at  Franklin,  279;  Thomas's  omission  to 
give  proper  credit  to,  for  Spring  Hill 
and  Franklin,  279;  at  Pulaski,  282;  tele 
gram  from  Thomas,  Nov.  8, 1864, 284,  290 ; 
marches  from  Tullahoma  to  Pulaski, 
288 ;  ordered  to  fight  Hood  at  Pulaski  or 
Columbia,  290 ;  at  Athens,  Tenn.,  319 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  Secretary  of  War, 
57 ;  orders  S.  to  confiscate  rebel  property 
in  Missouri,  57;  his  confiscation  order 
repudiated  by  the  President,  57,  58 ;  re 
bukes  Herroii,  64 ;  ignores  S.'s  request 
for  instructions  on  the  negro  enlistment 
question,  99, 100 ;  approves  S.'s  appoint 
ment  to  the  Department  of  the  Ohio, 
111 ;  approves  S.'s  services  and  policy, 
118;  speaks  of  the  financial  difficulties 
of  the  war,  255,  530  ;  correspondence 
with  Thomas,  277,  279,  280;  letter  from 
Halleck,  May  10, 1865,  360;  consultations 
with  S.  as  to  Mexican  affairs,  379,  382, 
383 ;  letter  to  Seward,  Aug.  23, 1865,  383 ; 
controversy  with  Grant,  407  et  seq. ; 
usurps  military  command,  411;  contro 
versy  with  Pres.  Johnson,  411  et  seq.; 
his  removal  opposed  by  Grant,  411,  412 ; 
yields  to  superior  force,  412 ;  suspended 
from  office,  412,  478 ;  returns  to  the  War 
Office,  412;  Grant's  and  Sherman's  at 
tempts  to  oust,  412, 413 ;  S.'s  views  on  his 
removal,  417 ;  methods  and  manners, 
477 

State  rights,  the  doctrine  in  Missouri,  54, 
58;  the  question  of  the  Federal  power 
and,  374,  493  et  seq. 

States,  supposed  reduction  to  the  condi 
tion  of  Territories,  374 

Statesmanship,  an  act  of  false,  516 

Steedman,  Maj.-Gen.  James  B.,  his  force 
at  Chattanooga,  195, 197, 205, 206 ;  reaches 
Nashville  from  Chattanooga,  195  ;  tele 
gram  from  Thomas,  Nov.  25,  1864,  197; 
need  of  his  troops  at  Columbia,  197,  205 ; 
expected  at  Nashville,  225  ;  proposed 
movement  to  Brent  wood,  225;  rein 
forces  Thomas  at  Nashville,  254 ;  battle 
of  Nashville,  266^267;  false  statements 
by,  concerning  S.,  267,  296 

Steele,  Maj.-Gen.  Frederick,  captures  Lit 
tle  Rock,  70;  troops  ordered  to  rein 
force,  85;  commanding  in  Arkansas, 
112 

Sternberg,  Surg.-Gen.  George  M.,  praise 
for  his  services,  183 

Stevenson,  Ala.,  necessity   for   railroad 

fuards  near,  197 ;  as  base  of  supplies  for 
herman,  304 ;  Fourth  Corps  ordered  to, 
317 
Stickney,  Ben,  sports  at  Hat  Island,  428 


Stoneman,  Maj.-Gen.  George,  defeats 
Breckinridge,  254;  campaign  in  south 
west  Virginia,  254 

Strawberry  Plains,  Tenn.,  Longstreet  ad 
vances  to,  114;  occupied  by  S.,  115 

Stuart,  Lieut.-Gen.  James  E.  B.,  S.'s  ac 
quaintance  with,  at  West  Point,  154; 
Sheridan's  defeat  of,  before  Richmond, 
154 

Sturgeon,  I.  H.,  member  of  anti-Schofield 
committee  from  St.  Louis  to  Washing 
ton,  58 

Sturgis,  Maj.  Samuel  D.,  commanding 
troops  in  Missouri,  37;  junction  with 
Lyon  and  Sigel,  38 ;  assumes  command 
after  Lyon's  death,  45-48;  relinquishes 
command  to  Sigel,  47 ;  resumes  com 
mand,  47,  48 

Suffrage,  S.'s  views  on,  373-376 ;  the  negro 
and  the  right  of,  373,  374,  376;  in  the 
South  under  reconstruction,  396  et  seq., 
419,  420;  universal,  519,  520 

Sullivan's  Island,  S.  C.,  S.'s  service  at,  17- 
19 ;  Southern  hospitality  on,  18, 19 

Supply  and  demand,  the  law  of,  533,  534 

Survival  of  the  fittest,  the,  438 

Switzerland,  S.  visits,  392 

Tactics.  See  MILITARY  STRATEGY  ANI> 
TACTICS. 

Tampa,  Fla.,  military  operations  at,  23 

Telegraphic  code.  See  CIPHER  DE 
SPATCHES  ;  MILITARY  TELEGRAMS,  ETC. 

Tennessee,  importance  of  combining  with 
Missouri  and  Arkansas  in  a  depart 
ment,  60, 61;  S.'s  service  in,  66, 166, 238,  252 
(see  also  SCHOFIELD  and  names  of  par 
ticular  places) ;  Federal  arming  of  rebel 
prisoners  captured  in,  104;  Burnside'a 
disasters  in,  114;  Longstreet  in,  114; 
anxiety  in  Washington  concerning  the 
situation  in,  114 ;  S.'s  reputed  inaction 
in  East,  117;  Hood's  invasion  of,  and 
destruction  of  his  army,  163,164,  252,  254, 

300,  303  et  seq.,  313,  340,  343,  348 ;  Sher 
man  sends  troops  into,  163-165;  opera 
tions  and  dispositions  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  in,  166;  climatic  influ 
ences  on  the  campaign  in,  167, 193,  302 ; 
Thomas's  concentration  and  strength 
in,  190-199,  319, 336  (see  also  NASHVILLE  ; 
THOMAS)  ;  disasters  to  the  State  forces 
in,  191,  195;  perilous  situation  in,  236; 
freed  from  secession,  257 ;  the  campaign 
in,  its  results  and  possibilities,  260,  300, 

301,  315  et  seq.,  329,  338,  345  ;  Thomas's 
report  of  the  campaign,  277,  279  et  seq. ; 
S.'s  report  of  the  campaign,  283;   For 
rest's  operations  in,  308 ;  reconstruction 
in,  370 

Tennessee  River,  general  military  move 
ments  on,  and  Hood's  crossings  of,  161, 
165,  167,  192,  207,  251.  253,  255-258,  260,  289, 
295,  300,  301,  304,  305,  316-322,  325;  For 
rest's  raid  on,  165;  Thomas's  army  in 
winter  quarters  on,  251 ;  Thomas  pro 
poses  to  campaign  on,  253,  255-257 ; 
Hood's  advance  from,  289 ;  supposition 
as  to  Thomas's  holding  the  line  of  the, 
311,  312,  315 

Tenure-of-Office  Act,  the,  411,  412 
Territorial  strategy,  358,  359,  517 
Terry,   Maj.-Gen.   Alfred    H.,   service    on 
military  court  with  Thomas,  277  ;  trip 
"by  Grant  and  S.  to  visit,  294,  295 ;  cap 
tures  Fort  Fisher.  346  ;  in  military  con 
ference  at  Cape  Fear  River,  346  ;  visits 
S.  at  West  Point,  446 ;  relations  with  S., 


INDEX 


573 


Terry,  Maj.-Gen.  Alfred  H.—  continued 
446 ;  proposal  to  appoint  him  superin 
tendent  at  West  Point,  446, 447  ;  on  board 
of  review  of  Fitz-John  Porter  case,  461 ; 
his  military  education,  rise,  and  ser 
vices,  535 

Texas,  proposed  military  operations  in, 
381,  382 

Thirty-eighth  Illinois  Volunteers,  action 
at  Fredericktown,  51-53 

Thirty-third  Illinois  Volunteers,  action  at 
Fredericktowu,  51-53 

Thomas,  Maj.-Gen.  George  H.,  S.  reports 
to,  at  Murrreesboro',  66 ;  S.  requests  to 
be  sent  to,  is  ordered  to  join,  and  re 
ports  to,  161,  164,  165,  190,  344 ;  proposal 
that  he  reinforce  S.,  115;  at  Chatta 
nooga,  115 ;  unwieldy  size  of  his  army, 
122,  i39, 189 ;  affection  of  his  troops  for 
"  Old  Pap  Thomas,"  123,  239,  242;  in  the 
Atlanta  campaign,  123,  124,  126,  129-131, 
140,  142,  144,  147-149,  154,  157-159,  232  ;  re 
lations  with  Hooker,  136 ;  in  battle  of 
Resaca,  140;  on  the  extension  of  the 
lines,  June  24-25,  1864,  142  ;  opposed  to 
the  assault  at  Kenesaw  Mountain,  144 ; 
battle  of  Atlanta,  147,  148 ;  his  opinion 
of  Gen.  Palmer,  151:  opinion  of  Sher 
man's  proposed  movement  against  At 
lanta,  153  ;  battle  of  Jonesboro',  157, 158  ; 
Stanley  reports  to,  158 ;  doubts  the  cap 
ture  of  Atlanta,  159 ;  position  and  con 
centration  of  troops  at  Nashville,  and 
delays  to  move  against  Hood,  161, 163, 
166,  220  et  seq.,  231,  236  et  seq.,  243,  249, 
252,  254,  259-261,  271,  283-285,  294-296,  301, 
302,  319,  320,  325,  326,  328,  329,  336 ;  orders 
S.  to  defend  Caperton's  Ferry,  162 ;  dis 
approves  S.'s  plan  to  entrap  Hood,  162 ; 
ordered  to  operate  against  Hood,  163 ; 
commanding  Department  of  the  Cum 
berland,  163,  247  ;  varying  conditions  of 
strength  as  compared  with  Hood,l63,l64, 
190-199, 237, 247,248,252,255,259-262,284,288, 
300-302,  308, 314, 319 ;  reinforcements  sent 
to,  164,  165,  168,  170,  171,  184,  185,  190-199 ; 
206-208,  225,  284,  285,  290,  307,  308,  315,  319- 
322,  325,  326,  330,  344 ;  orders  S.  to  Tulla- 
homa  and  Pulaski,  165-167  ;  orders  S.  to 
Nashville,  165;  faults  in  his  instructions 
to  S.,  166,  167 ;  accepts  S.'s  suggestions, 
167;  his  mistake  in  sending  troops  to 
Pulaski,  167 ;  comment  by  S.  on  his  of 
ficial  report,  167;  relations  with  S.,  167, 
169,  189, 190,  200,  202,  225-227,  238,  239,  241, 
242,  247,  252,  273,  276-298 ;  fails  to  send  re 
inforcements  to  Columbia,  168 ;  proposes 
to  take  personal  command  at  Columbia, 
168;  urges  holding  the  line  of  Duck 
River,  168,  171,  207;  approves  S.'s  ac 
tions,  169 ;  his  operations  obstructed  by 
civilian  red  tape,  169;  reasons  for  lack 
of  concert  between  S.  and,  169 ;  the  sit 
uation  at  Spring  Hill  reported  to,  174 ; 
neglect  to  furnish  bridge  at  Franklin, 
175,  176,  219,  249,  281,  282 ;  his  military 
duty  to  provide  for  his  army,  176 ;  ad 
vantages  of  delay  to,  185,  186;  A.  J. 
Smith  ordered  to  reinforce,  and  his  de 
lays  in  reaching  Nashville,  185, 187, 190- 

.  194,  196,  211-213;  Sherman's  criticism 
on  his  course  at  Franklin,  187 ;  corre 
spondence  between  S.  and,  filed  at  the 
War  Department,  188 ;  at  West  Point, 
189 ;  his  military  experience  and  promo 
tions,  189 ;  service  in  Mexico,  189 ;  mili 
tary  genius,  190,  242;  constitutional 
habit  of  deliberate  action,  190,  237,  242, 


Thomas,  Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.— continued 
ill,  302 ;  supposed  estimate  of  his  own 
strength,  191 ;  his  estimate  of  Hood's 
strength,  191,  308;  his  cavalry,  192; 
Sherman's  instructions  to,  193, 194, 197- 
200 ;  wisdom  of  his  defensive  policy,  194 ; 
possibilities  of  moving  against  Hood 
rroin  Pulaski  or  Columbia,  194-197 ;  his 
policy  of  holding  on  to  his  railroads, 
194,  195,  197 ;  slow  to  realize  his  needs 
and  his  means,  195  et  seq.;  his  purpose 
to  fight  at  Columbia,  195 ;  in  doubt  as 
to  Hood's  movements,  196  et  seq.;  his 
principal  fault  in  the  Nashville  cam 
paign,  197;  his  attitude  at  Nashville 
explained  to  Grant,  198 ;  necessity  of  his 
assuming  the  offensive,  198  et  seq.;  ob 
ject  in  preferring  S.  over  Stanley,  199 ; 
recognizes  the  duty  of  a  general  to  com 
mand  in  person,  199,  200,  286,  287  ;  devo 
tion  to  duty,  200;  gives  S.  free  hand, 
202 ;  approves  S.'s  actions  at  Columbia, 
204 ;  sends  reinforcements  to  S.,  205 ; 
anxiety  to  hold  Hood  in  check,  205,  206, 
220  et  seq.,  231 ;  advisability  of  his  send 
ing  Steedman  to  S.,  205 ;  concentration 
of  troops  by,  atMurfreesboro',206;  plans 
the  drawing  of  Hood  across  Duck  River, 
211 ;  advises  S.  to  retreat  to  Franklin, 
212;  orders  Hammond  to  Spring  Hill,  217 ; 
difficulties  of  communicating  with,  218 ; 
desires  to  hold  Franklin,  221,  223 ;  fail 
ure  properly  to  support  S.,  222,  223;  or 
ders  S.  to  fall  back  to  Nashville,  224, 
226 ;  S.'s  report  of  the  battle  of  Frank 
lin,  225;  congratulates  S.,  225,  226;  S. 
reports  to,  at  Nashville,  226  ;  remount 
ing  his  cavalry,  236,  271,  284,  285,  300 ; 
ordered  to  attack  Hood  or  resign  com 
mand,  237  ;  calls  a  military  council,  237, 
238;  upheld  by  his  commanders,  238; 
S.'s  loyalty  to,  238,  239,  241,  242 ;  Logan 
ordered  to  relieve,  239,  240 ;  sits  in  court- 
martial  on  S.  at  West  Point,  241 ;  diffi 
culty  of  calm  discussion  of  his  military 
career,  241 ;  saved  by  S.  from  assign 
ment  to  inferior  command,  241 ;  S.'s  le 
gitimate  revenge  on,  241 ;  courage  and 
patriotism,  242,  250,  278,  297 ;  battle  of 
NashyiUe,  242-254,  260-275,  290-296;  al 
terations  in  his  plans  of  battle,  243, 
244 ;  surprised  at  Hood's  giving  second 
day's  battle,  245 ;  assignments  of  credit 
for  the  battle  of  Nashville,  246;  con 
gratulated  by  S.,  247 ;  blunder  of  send 
ing  pontoons  to  Murfreesboro',  249 ; 
energy  and  determination,  249,  250 ;  an 
nounces  Hood's  flight  across  the  Ten 
nessee,  251 ;  puts  his  army  into  winter 
quarters,  251,  255;  plans  spring  cam 
paign,  251-253,  255-257 ;  assigns  new  regi 
ments  to  S.,  253,  254;  proposes  cam 
paigns  in  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  253, 
255, 256 ;  Grant's  anxiety  and  impatience 
at  his  delays,  and  preparations  for  his 
removal,  255,  260,  295,  325;  inactivity, 
255-257 ;  considers  war  the  normal  con 
dition  of  the  country,  256,  257 ;  sends 
cavalry  to  S.,  258;  interview  with 
Wood,  Dec.  15, 1864,  263 ;  gave  no  orders 
for  battle  of  Dec.  16,  1864,  263  et  seq.; 
order  to  Wilson,  Dec.  15,  1864,  263-265 ; 
disappearance  of  his  orders  from  the 
records,  265;  order  to  S.,  Dec.  15,  1864, 
269;  bestows  credit  on  S.,  273;  use  of 
the  word  "  continued,"  274;  command 
ing  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  275 ; 
promoted,  major-general,  U.  8.  A.,  276, 


574 


INDEX 


Thomas,  Maj.-Gen.  Geo.  H.—  continued 
279 ;  congratulated  by  S.,  276  ;  indorse 
ment  on  report  of  battle  of  Franklin, 
276,  277, 283 ;  president  of  military  court, 
277;  S.'s  guest  at  Cabinet  and  Diplo 
matic  dinner,  277,  278;  recommends 
Stanley  and  S.  for  brevet  honors,  277, 
279,  280;  appointed  to  command  Mili 
tary  Division  of  the  Pacific,  278 ;  cessa 
tion  of  personal  relations  with  S.,  278; 
goes  to  San  Francisco,  278 ;  S.'s  views 
on  the  battles  of  Franklin  and  Nash 
ville,  278  et  seq.;  omission  to  give  proper 
credit  to  S.  for  battle  of  Franklin,  279 
et  seq. ;  omission  to  give  proper  credit 
to  Stanley  for  Spring  Hill  and  Frank 
lin,  279 ;  report  of  the  Tennessee  cam 
paign,  277,  279  et  seq. ;  S.'s  difficulties 
of  telegraphic  communication  with, 
281 ;  promises  of  reinforcements  to  S.  at 
Columbia,  282;  mistake  concerning  the 
situation  at  Pulaski,  282-290 ;  equality  of 
command  with  S.,  286 ;  ability  to  defeat 
Beauregard,  288 ;  assures  Sherman  of  his 
ability  to  cope  with  Hood,  288 ;  orders  S. 
to  Nashville,  288-290;  interview  with  S. 
at  Nashville,  288-290;  expectations  of 
concentrating  at  Columbia  or  Pulaski, 
289, 290 ;  expected  to  take  personal  com 
mand  against  Hood,  289, 290 ;  death  and 
burial,  292,  293,  296,  297,  429 ;  his  honor, 
truth,  and  justice,  292,  296;  conversa 
tion  with  Halleck  at  San  Francisco, 
293 ;  alleged  attempt  by  S.  to  supplant, 
293-297 ;  conspiracy  to  poison  his  mind, 
293,  296,  297 ;  dedication  of  the  fields  of 
ChickamaugaandChattauooga,  297;  plan 
for  the  capture  of  Macon,  299 ;  proposal 
that  he  take  the  offensive  against  Beau- 
regard,  311,  312,  322;  supposition  of  his 
power  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Tennessee, 
311,  312,  315 ;  opposing  Hood  in  Tennes 
see,  313;  smallness  of  his  force,  314; 
campaign  in  Tennessee,  315  et  seq. ;  ex 
tended  command  for,  317;  to  watch 
Hood,  317 ;  to  move  toward  Selma  and 
Columbus,  Miss.,  317  ;  to  hold  Chatta 
nooga  and  Decatur,  317,  319 ;  to  assume 
offensive  against  Hood,  319-321,  325, 
326 ;  possible  movement  of  Beauregard 
against,  321;  official  report  of  battle 
of  Nashville,  327 ;  failure  to  destroy 
Hood,  335 ;  [Sherman's  knowledge  of 
his  character,  336;  possibilities  of  his 
campaign  in  Tennessee,  338 ;  as  a 
"  decoy  "  for  Hood,  343 ;  importance  of 
his  operations  in  Tennessee,  348 ;  calm 
ness  under  stress,  362 ;  S.  relinquishes 
command  at  San  Francisco  in  favor  of, 
430 

Correspondence  with:  Grant,  U.  S., 
252 :  Halleck,  Nov.  28, 1864,  212  :  Hatch, 
E.,  Nov.  20,  1864,  201 :  Schofield,  J.  M., 
Nov.  19,  1864,  167,  200,  284,  287,  289,  290 ; 
Nov.  20, 167,  200-202,  284,  289  ;  Nov.  24,  194, 
197,  202-205;  Nov.  25,  204-207;  Nov.  26,  204  ; 
Nov.  27,  204-207  ;  Nov.  28, 175,  207-209,  211- 
214,  218;  Nov.  29, 171, 176,  211-214,217,218; 
Nov.  30,  187,  220-225 ;  Dec.  15,  265,  281 ; 
Dec.  16,  247 :  Sherman,  W.  T.,  Oct.  19, 
1864,  191 ;  Oct.  20,  317,  318 ;  Oct.  31,  198 ; 
Nov.  1,  320 ;  Nov.  7, 199 ;  Nov.  11,  321,  322 ; 
Nov.  12,  288,  301:  Stanley,  D.  S.,  Nov.  8, 
1864,  284,  290 ;  Nov.  13, 166, 167  :  Stanton, 
E.,  277,  279;  Dec.  31,  1864,  280:  Steed- 
man,  J.  B.,  Nov.  25,  1864, 197  :  Twining, 
W.  J.,  Nov.  30, 1864,  220 :  Wharton,  H.  C., 
Nov.  29,  1864,  228 


Thomas,  James  L.,  letter  from  S.  to,  Nov. 
1,  1863,  102 

Thomas,  Maj.-Gen.  Lorenzo,  Adjutant- 
General  of  United  States,  orders  the 
raising  of  negro  troops,  99 

Thompson,  Brig. -Gen.  M.  Jeff.,  threatens 
Carlin  at  Pilot  Knob,  51 ;  action  at  Fred- 
ericktown,  Mo.,  51-53;  capability  for 
defeat,  254 

Thompson's  Station,  Tenn.,  Forrest  at, 
173 ;  S.  at,  174 ;  military  movements  at, 
207,  211 ;  Ruger  moves  to,  216 

Tilton,  Ga.,  military  movements  near,  126 

Time,  an  element  in  military  problems,  251 

Totten,  Brig. -Gen. -James,  service  in  Mis 
souri,  35 ;  battle  of  Boonville,  37 ;  battle 
of  Wilson's  Creek,  363 

Treason,  a  dangerous  form  of,  540 

Trenton,  Ga.,  S.  moves  to,  161, 162 

Triune,  Tenn.,  S.  commanding  at,  66 

Troops,  the  ballot  among  the,  100;  the 
value  of  a  soldier's  life,  182,  183 ;  petty 
jealousies  among,  229;  their  affection 
for  commanders  a  factor  in  war,  239 

Troy,  N.  Y.,  burial  of  Gen.  Thomas  at,  429 

Tuileries,  the,  S.'s  presentation  at,  392 

Tullahoma,  Tenn.,  Stanley  at,  164 ;  S.  or 
dered  to,  165;  necessity  for  railroad 
guards  at,  197;  S.  ordered  to  Pulaski 
from,  288;  Stanley  moves  to  Pulaski 
from,  288 

Tuolumne  Meadows,  in  camp  on  the,  431 

Turner,  James,  2 

Turner,  Thomas  J.,  appoints  the  author 
to  West  Point,  2 ;  succeeded  in  Congress 
by  Campbell,  11 

Tuscumbia,  Ala.,  Beauregard  near,  288; 
Hood's  forces  at  and  near,  318,  320 

Twelfth  Corps,  French  Army,  autumn 
maneuvers  of  1881,  451-453 

Twelfth  Kentucky  Infantry,  in  battle  of 
Franklin,  178-180,  229 

Twentieth  Army  Corps,  captures  and 
holds  Atlanta,  316,  341 

Twenty-fifth  Missouri  Regiment,  ordered 
to  Arkansas,  84,  85 

Twenty-first  Illinois  Volunteers,  action  at 
Fredericktown,  Mo.,  Oct.  20,  21, 1861,  51- 
53 

Twenty-third  Army  Corps,  organized  by 
George  L.  Hartsuff,  25 ;  portion  of,  at 
Knoxville,  113;  Sherman's  opinion  of, 
120 ;  mutual  confidence  between  S.  and, 
120 ;  in  the  Atlanta  campaign  and  cap 
ture  of  Atlanta,  125,  130,  149, 154-157,  341 ; 
battle  of  Kolb's  Farm,  132-136 ;  battle 
of  Jonesboro',  157;  sent  to  reinforce 
Thomas,  164,  165,  190,  288,  308,  330;  at 
Johnsonville,  165,  166;  ordered  to  Pu 
laski,  165-167 ;  at  Nashville,  165, 166 ;  op 
erations  and  dispositions  in  Tennes 
see,  166;  commanded  by  Cox,  175;  at 
Franklin,  175 ;  battle  of  Franklin,  180, 
251,  258;  S.  commanding,  190;  service 
with  Thomas,  190-192,  199;  defending 
Duck  River,  196 ;  filling  the  ranks  of, 
198, 199,  252-254 ;  ordered  to  Spring  Hill, 
210,  211,  214 ;  defense  of  Nashville,  226 ; 
228;  battle  of  Nashville,  242-247,  291,  292; 
battle  of  Spring  Hill,  251 ;  ordered  to 
North  Carolina,  252,  345,  543 ;  stopped  in 
march  to  Pulaski,  282 ;  operations  in 
North  Carolina,  346 

Twining,  Capt.  "William  J.,  aide-de-camp 
to  S.,  174;  famous  ride  in  North  Caro 
lina,  174 ;  scours  the  Franklin  turnpike, 
174 ;  death,  174  ;  despatch  from  Thomas, 
Nov.  30,  1864,  220 


INDEX 


575 


Umatilla,  Ore.,  a  trip  to,  430 

Union  County,  reported  expulsion  of 
Union  families  from,  93 

Union  Pacific  Railroad,  proposed  strike 
on,  509,  510 

United  States,  the  government  of  law  in, 
5;  the  Semiuole  troubles,  23-25;  the 
compound  questions  of  Uuiou  and 
slavery  in,  94,  95 ;  slow  progress  of  civil 
ization  in,  365,  437,  438 ;  the  proper  prep 
aration  for  war  in,  366  ;  interference 
of  the  Federal  power  within  the  States, 
374,  493  et  seq. ;  feeling  against  French 
intervention  in  Mexico,  378 ;  friendship 
with  France,  379,  382  et  seq.;  proposal 
to  float  a  Mexican  loan,  380,  383;  dan 
gers  of  war  with  France,  381  et  seq. ; 
financial  stringency,  255,  314,  315,  383, 
529-532 ;  France  demands  recognition  of 
Maximilian  by,  384;  strength  of  the 
government,  386,  387;  the  armies  of, 
386,  387 ;  advisability  of  neutrality  be 
tween  Mexico  and  France,  391 ;  contro 
versies  of  the  War  Department,  406  et 
seq.  (see  also  WAR  DEPARTMENT)  ;  de 
fects  in  the  military  department  of  the 
government,  406  et  seq. ;  the  President 
the  comrnander-m-chief,  407-412, 419-423, 
437,  479;  a  time  of  great  national  peril, 
415 ;  subordination  of  the  military  to 
the  civil  power,  420;  impossibility  of 
a  purely  military  commander  for  the 
army,  422;  question  of  annexation  of 
the  Hawaiian  Islands,  431-433;  the 
State  arid  Territorial  systems  of,  433, 
434 ;  military  and  naval  outposts  of,  433, 
434 ;  responsibility  of  officials  of,  to  the 
government  and  the  people,  434;  mili 
tary  government  in,  434-438;  fear  of 
military  despotism  in,  437,  438 ;  presen 
tation  of  site  of  Fort  Sheridan  to,  454, 
455;  national  defense,  456-460,  484-487, 
520  et  seq. ;  the  authority  of  the  voice 
of,  458 ;  patriotism  in,  481 ;  threatened 
war  with  Chile,  489, 490 ;  development 
of  the  West,  491 ;  industrial  depression 
in,  491, 492 ;  weakness  of  military  policy 
at  outbreak  of  the  war,  513  et  seq.;  ad 
vantage  over  the  Confederate  States, 
514-516 ;  the  delays  of  the  Civil  War,  525; 
importance  of  quick  mobilization,  526, 
527 ;  sea-coast  defense,  526-528 ;  rela 
tive  functions  of  the  army  and  navy, 
527,  528;  foreign  policy,  527,  528;  the 
financial  lessons  of  the  war,  529-534; 
military  and  financial  strength,  531, 532 ; 
the  military  staff  of  the  commander-in- 
chief,  536-540;  the  war  governors  of, 
540 

United  States  Army,  the,  its  probity  be 
fore  the  war,  17,  18;  value  of  its  ser 
geants,  18;  devotion  of  its  officers  to 
duty,  20;  self-confidence  and  discipline, 
349 ;  honor  in,  352 ;  General  Orders,  No. 
15,  of  May  25,  1894,  405,  505,  506,  508,  509 ; 
functions  of  the  Commander-in-chief, 
420, 421 ;  relations  with  the  civil  authori 
ties,  420,  495,  503-512 ;  the  offices  of  the 
general-in-chief  and  adjutant-general, 
421-423;  impossibility  of  a  purely  mili 
tary  commander  for,  422;  courtesy  in, 
444 ;  indignation  in,  at  useless  changes, 
448-450;  causes  of  discontent  in,  449, 
450;  retirement  for  age.  449,  450,  453, 
481;  instruction  in  artillery,  458-460; 
medals  of  honor,  474,  475 ;  the  rank  of 
senior  general,  476;  promotion  in,  480, 
481;  misplaced  ambition  in,  480,  481; 


United  States  Army  —  continued 
plans  for  increase  of,  487;  Indians  in, 
488, 489 ;  Gen.  Scott's  theory  concerning, 
513;  condition  at  outbreak  of  the  war, 
513  et  seq. ;  necessity  of  a  well-discip 
lined,  518  et  seq. ;  necessity  of  quick 
mobilization,  526,  527 ;  infantry  and 
light  artillery,  528;  value  of  legal  edu 
cation  in,  534,  535;  supposed  prejudice 
in,  against  non-military  graduates,  535 ; 
the  position  should  seek  the  man,  536; 
the  position  of  general-in-chief,  536- 
540;  the  staff  of  the  comuiander-in- 
chief ,  536-540 ;  the  ranks  of  general  and 
lieutenant-general,  538.  See  also  WAR 
DEPARTMENT. 

United  States  Congress,  authorizes  for 
mation  of  special  militia  in  Missouri,  55 ; 
authorizes  confiscation  of  rebel  prop 
erty,  July  17, 1862, 57  ;  reconstruction  un 
der,  354,  355,  395  et  Beq. ;  legislates  con 
cerning  the  holding  of  civil  office  by 
army  officers,  405;  confers  on  Grant  com 
mand  of  all  the  armies,  408, 409;  necessity 
of  its  guarding  against  Johnson's  law 
less  acts,  416 ;  power  to  declare  war,  437 ; 
bill  for  retirement  of  army  officers,  449, 
453, 481 ;  restoration  of  Fitz-John  Porter, 
460,  465;  reforms  in  the  War  Depart 
ment,  471 ;  authorizes  medals  of  honor, 
474,  475;  national  defense,  484-487;  leg 
islation  concerning  use  of  the  military 
power,  493 ;  creation  of  the  Pacific  rail 
roads,  509,  510 ;  a  qualification  for  mem 
bers,  519,  520 ;  a  doubtful  right  of,  533 ; 
creates  S.  lieutenant-general,  547 

United  States  Constitution,  the,  learning 
it  by  heart,  22 ;  its  powers  and  limita 
tions,  374;  the  Fourteenth  Amendment, 
376,  394  et  seq.;  the  President  the 
commander -in-chief  under,  479,  536-540 ; 
exercise  of  the  military  power  under, 
408  et  seq.,  493  et  seq.,  507,  508 ;  a  vicious 
clause  in,  533,  534;  value  of  knowledge 
of,  to  military  officers,  534,  535 

United  States  courts,  enforcing  the  pro 
cesses  of,  497,  502-505,  507,  508,  510-512 

United  States  mails,  protection  of,  492, 
497-499,  502,  503,  507,  510-512 

United  States  Military  Academy,  "West 
Point,  S.  secures  opportunity  to  enter, 
2 ;  the  Academy  as  a  preparatory  school 
for  the  study  of  law,  2 ;  S.'s  journey  to, 
and  reporting  at,  3;  S.'s  lire  at,  3-15 ; 
camp  life,  4 ;  prohibition  of  smoking,  5 ; 
its  training  audits  graduates,5-7,  27,  514, 
515,  525 ;  a  forbidden  trip  to  New  York 
from,  7,  8;  the  Bible-class  and  skeptics 
at,  8,  9;  instructing  candidates  for  the 
Academy,  10;  an  unconscious  offense 
and  its  results,  10-12 ;  S.  dismissed  from, 
returns  to,  court-martialed,  and  rein 
stated,  11,  12,  241,  242  ;  room-mates  at, 
13 ;  the  last  parade  of  the  class,  15  ;  de 
scription  of  its  graduates,  16 ;  S.  detailed 
for  duty  at,  26 ;  professional  life  at,  26- 
29 ;  an  anomalous  position  at,  27 ;  its  high 
standing,  27,  408 ;  work  in  the  observa 
tory,  28,  29 ;  S.  ordered  to  secure  arms 
at,  48 ;  McPherson  at,  125 ;  Hood  at,  138 ; 
J.  E.  B.  Stuart  at,  154 ;  Thomas  at,  189 ; 
S.  appointed  superintendent,  439  et  seq.; 
effects  of  the  Civil  War  on,  442;  Gen. 
Ruger's  superinteudeucy,  442;  opened 
to  the  line,  442 ;  the  case  of  Whittaker, 
445,  446 ;  visit  of  Gen.  Terry  to,  446 ;  S. 
relieved  from  duty  at,  447,  451 ;  How 
ard  appointed  superintendent,  447 ;  sup- 


576 


INDEX 


U.  S.  Military  Academy  —  continued 
posed  prejudice   in  the  army  against 
non-graduates  of,  535 

United  States  Navy,  the  maintenance  of 
the,  366 ;  the  formation  of  a  new,  484 ; 
national  defense  by,  484,  527,  528;  its 
functions,  527,  528 

United  States  Senate,  S.  misrepresented 
before,  63,  64,  66 ;  Gov.  Carney's  aspira 
tions  to  sit  in,  80 ;  hinders  S.'s  confirma 
tion  as  major-general,  109,  110;  end  of 
S.'s  difficulties  with,  117  ;  impeachment 
of  Pres.  Johnson,  404,  414-419 ;  confirms 
S.'s  appointment  as  Secretary  of  War, 
404;  S.'s  nomination  as  Secretary  of 
War  before,  414-419 ;  the  Fitz-John  Por 
ter  case  before,  465 

United  States  Treasury,  the,  depleted 
condition  during  the  war,  255,  314,  315, 
383,  529-532;  restrictions  on  Southern 
trade,  373 ;  War  Department  versus, 
482, 483 ;  anecdote  of  Pres.  Grant  and, 
483 

United  States  Volunteers.  See  VOLUN 
TEERS. 

Utah,  Territory  of,  obstruction  of  rail 
roads  in,  512 

Valley  Head,  Ga.,  8.  moves  to,  161, 162 

Values,  the  law  of,  533,  534 

Vancouver  Barracks,  Wash.,  Gen.  Otis 
commanding  at,  510,  511 

Vaughan,  Maj.,  99 

Vera  Cruz,  Mex.,  French  bombardment 
and  capture  of,  388 

Veterans,  difference  between  volunteers 
and,  142 ;  the  example  of,  522 

Vicksburg,  Miss.,  S.  seeks  service  at,  64- 
66 ;  S.  sends  reinforcements  to  Grant  at, 
64,  90,  98, 110,  233 ;  fall  of,  70 ;  importance 
of  the  capture  of,  70,  71 ;  results  of  dis 
banding  the  rebel  army  at,  77 ;  proposed 
movement  against  the  Mobile  and  Ohio 
Railroad  from,  199;  Grant  before,  232, 
233 ;  Grant's  strategy  at,  358 

Vincent,  ,  S.'s  room-mate  at  West 

Point,  14 

Virginia,  hospitality  in,  26;  Longstreet 
prepares  to  move  toward,  115 ;  Long- 
street  joins  Lee  in,  116 ;  S.  seeks  service 
in,  253,  255;  Stoneman's  campaign  in 
southwest,  254;  surrender  of  Lee,  261, 
262;  S.'s  administration  during  recon 
struction,  276,  397-404,  418,  543 ;  proposed 
movement  for  Sherman  to,  333,  334,  337 ; 
cutting  off  Confederate  supplies  from, 
347;  Grant's  strategy  in,  358;  recon 
struction  in,  370,  394-404,  434;  under 
control  of  the  Freedinen's  Bureau 
and  the  provisional  government,  394; 
the  Fourteenth  Amendment  in,  394  et 
seq.;  the  provisional  government  in, 
401 ;  the  Constitutional  Convention,  397, 
400-402;  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
402 ;  proposal  that  S.  become  U.  S.  Sen 
ator  from,  434 

Vogle,  John  C.,  member  of  anti-Sehofield 
committee  from  St.  Louis  to  Washing 
ton,  58,  59 

Volunteers,  difficulties  of  untrained  offi 
cers  of,  18 ;  difference  between  veterans 
and,  142 ;  discipline  among,  182 ;  dangers 
of  an  improvised  staff  of,  217;  Gen. 
Scott's  distrust  of,  513 ;  mistaken  policy 
as  to  commands  in,  514 

Volunteer  soldiery,  a,  366 

Von  Moltke.    See  MOLTKE. 


Wade,  Benjamin  F.,  President  of  the  Sen 
ate,  414 

Wagner,  Brig. -Gen.  George  D.,  movement 
against  Hood  before  Columbia,  168 ;  bat 
tle  of  Franklin,  175,  176,  178, 180,  181,  225 

Wales,  Prince  of,  S.  presented  to  the, 
393 

Walker,  Edwin,  special  U.  S.  counsel  in 
Chicago,  497 

Walker,  Henry  H.,  room-mate  at  West 
Point,  3 

Walker,  Rear-Adm.,  on  the  relative  func 
tions  of  the  army  and  navy,  527 

War,  the  evils  of  leaving  anything  to 
chance  in,  8,  234 ;  the  duty  of  a  com 
mander  in,  234;  Sherman's  theory  of, 
317 ;  the  art  of,  407  et  seq. ;  science  in 
the  art  of  ,|457-460 ;  maxims  of,  482 ;  prep 
aration  for,  519  et  seq. ;  economical,  519 ; 
the  duties  of  citizenship  in  time  of,  539, 
540 

War  Department,  the,  orders  S.'s  dis 
missal  from  the  Military  Academy,  10, 
11 ;  Herron's  protest  to,  64 ;  receives  al 
legations  about  arming  disloyal  persons 
in  Missouri,  104;  action  in  regard  to 
questions  of  relative  rank,  151, 160,  J61 ; 
the  telegraph  corps,  169 ;  obstruction  of 
the  military  arm  by,  169;  correspondence 
between  Thomas  and  S.  filed  at,  188; 
regulation  of  cipher  despatches,  232 ; 
Grant  stipulates  against  interference 
from,  361,  362;  telegram  to  S.,  Aug.  19, 
1865, 383 ;  quarrel  between  President  and 
Congress  over  the,  404;  controversies 
with  the  general-in-chief,  406  et  seq.,  468 
et  seq.,  471,  478,  480;  corruption  in,  407; 
interference  with  the  conduct  of  the 
Civil  War,  409  et  seq. ;  its  interest  and 
share  in  the  impeachment  of  Pres.  John 
son,  413  et  seq. ;  reforms  and  attempted 
reforms  in,  421-423,  471,  478  et  seq. ;  in 
vestigates  the  value  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  431,  432;  the  Modoc  outbreak 
and,  435,  436 ;  approves  scheme  of  Fort 
Sheridan,  454 ;  deplorable  condition,  468 
et  seq. ;  a  great  lawyer  in,  472,  473 ;  an 
acting  Secretary  of  War,  472-473 ;  an  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  War,  473-475 ;  elec 
tric  bells  in  the  Secretary's  office,  477, 
478;  the  Treasury  Department  versus, 
482,  483 ;  Indian  troulrtes,  488 ;  the  rela 
tions  between  the  general-in-chief  and 
the,  536-539 

War  governors,  the,  540 

War  of  the  Rebellion.     See  CIVIL  WAR. 

War  party,  the  Northern,  ascendancy  of, 
312 

"War  Records,  unreliability  of,  188 

Warren, ,  suggested  service  for,  66 

Washburne,  Emory  B.,  interview  between 
S.  and,  in  St.  Louis,  107 ;  misrepresents 
8.  to  the  President,  107, 108 

Washington,  D.  C.,  S.  goes  from  West 
Point  to  plead  his  cause  at,  subsequent 
summonses  to,  and  visits  at,  11,  48, 106- 
110, 255, 345,  346,  379,  395,413-418, 494  ;  S.  or 
dered  to  purchase  arms  at,  48 ;  deputa 
tion  from  St.  Louis  to,  to  ask  removal 
of  S.,  58,  59 ;  political  influence  in,  60 ; 
political  intrigue  in,  63,  64,  66 ;  anti- 
Schofield  delegation  from  Missouri  and 
Kansas  goes  to,  91,  93-99 ;  return  of  the 
radical  delegation  from,  99 ;  nervous 
ness  in,  over  delays  at  Nashville,  236  et 
seq.;  excitement  in,  on  Lincoln's  ^assas 
sination,  349 ;  possibilities  of  its  capture 
in  1863,  525;  the  question  of  living  ex- 


INDEX 


577 


Washington,  D.  C.  —  continued 
penses  at,  538 ;  Gen.  Scott  removes  his 
headquarters  to  New  York  from,  406 ; 
Sherman  removes  his  headquarters  to 
St.  Louis  from,  406 ;  interviews  between 
Evarts  and  S.  at,  413^418;  meeting  of 
Miles  and  S.  at,  494 

Washington  State,  obstruction  of  rail 
roads  in,  512 

Washington  University,  S.  accepts  pro 
fessorship  of  physics  in,  30 

Weldon,  N.  C.,  Sherman's  movement  to, 
334 

"West,  development  of  the,  491 

West  Point,  Grant  at,  380.  See  also 
MILITARY  DEPARTMENT  OF  WEST  POINT; 
UNITED  STATES  MILITARY  ACADEMY. 

Westport,  Mo.,  S.  at,  83 

Wharton,  Col.  H.  C.,  despatch  from 
Thomas,  Nov.  29,  1864,  228 

Wheeler,  Lieut. -Gen.  Joseph,  on  the  Ten 
nessee,  318 

Wherry,  Brig.-Gen.  William  M.,  aide-de 
camp  to  S.,  188,  294;  lieutenant-colonel, 
Second  U.  S.  Infantry,  188;  accompa 
nies  S.  to  Paris,  385 

Whisky,  tendency  to  conflict  with  busi 
ness  and  military  duties,  19 

Whitaker,  Mai. -Gen.  Walter  C.,  at  Spring 
Hill,  173,  216 

White,  Col.  John  S.,  in  battle  of  Franklin, 
179 

Whittaker,  Cadet,  alleged  outrage  on,  at 
West  Point,  445,  446 

Wilder,  A.  C.,  heads  faction  against  Gen. 
Ewing,  80 

Williams,  Col.,  denies  rumor  of  expulsion 
of  Union  families,  93 

Williams,  J.  E.,  letter  from  S.  to,  June  1, 
1863,  74,  75 

Williamsport,  Tenn.,  proposal  to  ob 
struct  roads  at,  211;  troops  ordered  to 
Franklin  from,  217 

Will's  Valley,  military  movements  via, 
317 

Wilmington,  N.  C.,  trip  by  Grant  and  8. 
to,  294,  295;  military  operations  at,  346  ; 
capture  of,  346 


Wilson,  Maj.-Gen.  James  H.,  operations 
on  Duck  River,  206,  208,  209,  211-214,  217  ; 
urges  immediate  retreat  to  Franklin, 
210 ;  to  organize  his  cavalry  force,  211, 
284,  285 ;  despatch  from  S.,  Nov.  29, 1864, 
212;  reports  Hood's  crossing  of  Dxick 
River,  213 :  to  cover  Franklin  and  Spring 
Hill,  214  ;  Hammond  ordered  to  report 
to,  217  ;  battle  of  Franklin,  221-224  ;  or 
dered  to  fall  back  to  Nashville,  224; 
sent  to  reinforce  Thomas  in  Tennessee, 
228,  316, 319,  322  ;  battle  of  Nashville,  254, 
263-265,  268,  270;  orders  from  Thomas, 
Dec.  15,  1864,  263-265;  despatch  to  S., 
Dec.  16,  263-265 ;  to  check  cavalry  raids 
by  Hood,  321 

Wilson's  Creek,  Mo.,  battle  of,  35,  39,  40, 
42Ht7,  67, 141, 142,  363,  364;  the  battle  vir 
tually  a  Union  defeat,  46;  military 
movements  near,  62 ;  S.'s  Irish  soldier- 
servant  in  the  battle  of,  67 

Wisconsin,  S.  a  surveyor  in,  2 

Wood,  Frank  F.,  240 

Wood,  Maj.-Gen.  Thomas  J.,  at  Franklin, 
175,  176  ;  battle  of  Franklin,  176,  180;  re 
ports  Hood's  crossing  of  Duck  River, 
214;  placed  between  Duck  River  and 
Rutherford's  Creek,  214 ;  movement  to 
Spring  Hill,  215,  216 ;  battle  of  Nashville, 
243,  244,  250,  263,  267,  269,  272 ;  cooperation 
of  S.  with,  244 ;  interview  with  Thomas, 
Dec.  15,  1864,  263;  orders  to  Fourth 
Corps,  Dec.  15,  1864,  263 ;  Orders  of  the 
Day  for  Dec.  16,  1864,  263 

Wounded  Knee,  battle  of,  488 

Wyman,  Col.  John  B.,  letter  from  Fr6- 
mout  to,  Aug.  6, 1861,  39 

"Wyoming,  massacre  of  Chinese  in,  509; 
obstruction  of  railroads  in,  512 

Yankee,  what  constitutes  a,  at  West 
Point,  3 

Yeatman,  James  E.,  president  of  the  San 
itary  Commission,  31 

Yellow  fever,  outbreak  of,  in  Florida,  20, 
24,  25,  183 ;  S.'s  eradication  of,  from  the 
army,  183 

Yosemite  Valley,  a  trip  through  the,  431 


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